

The

TWENTY-YEAR
REVOLUTION

from Roosevelt to Eisenhower

To
Mary Jane

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REVOLUTION

from Roosevelt to Eisenhower

BY

CHESLY MANLY



Chicago • HENRY REGNERY COMPANY • 1954

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I. The Present Crisis

AS THOMAS PAINE wrote in *The Crisis*, in 1776, "These are times that try men's souls." The question then was whether the American revolution could be saved. The question now is whether the American Republic, born in a patriotic revolution against foreign oppressors, can survive a stealthy, encroaching revolution, motivated by treasonous allegiance to alien ideologies.

There is overwhelming evidence that the primary menace to this Republic is not the Soviet military threat, but internal subversion through control of foreign policy and related armaments programs. World War II demonstrated that domestic policy, particularly in the economic field, can be determined by federal expenditures generated by a great emergency. Revolutionaries learned that a post-war external crisis would provide continued justification for the taxing and spending levels and the stifling economic controls by which they hoped to destroy the American free enterprise system.

Earl Browder, who headed the American Communist Party for fifteen years, declared in 1950 that socialism had progressed farther in the United States than in Great Britain, which was ruled by a socialist government from 1945 to 1951.¹ Most of the 33,927,549 Americans who voted for Eisenhower in 1952 undoubtedly hoped to stem the tide of collectivism in this country. There was no basic disagreement between the Republican and Democratic candidates on foreign policy. Republican campaign orators concentrated their attacks on the communist infiltration of the government, the drift to national socialism, centralization of power in Washington, corruption in public

1. Earl Browder, *Keynes, Foster and Marx* (1950).

office, the "bloated bureaucracy," profligate spending, excessive taxation, etc. They promised to halt the march of statism, and on that issue they won a landslide victory.

The hopes of the people have been frustrated. There has been no change in our foreign and military policies, which account for seven eighths of the federal budget. The state department still is dominated by holdovers from the Marshall and Acheson regimes, which betrayed China to communism and involved the United States in a disastrous lost war in Korea. The Eisenhower administration's foreign and military policies are indistinguishable from those which produced the present crisis except that even greater global commitments have been made.

The Communists and their Marxist cousins, the Socialists, have worked for revolution since the advent of the New Deal twenty-one years ago by infiltrating government offices, labor unions, schools and colleges, churches, radio and television, the movies, the publishing business. They have advanced their program not only by policy subversion, but by thought perversion on a national scale. The Communist cause has been aided and abetted by a vast penumbra of fellow travelers, witting, unwitting and witless dupes, false liberals and left "intellectuals," sometimes called the not-so-very-intelligentsia; by world-savers who would bankrupt America to aid foreign countries; by promoters of world government or federation schemes, who would submerge American sovereignty in some supra-national authority or subvert the Constitution by treaty law-making through the United Nations; and by generals and admirals in the Pentagon who exaggerate the Soviet military menace to support their demands for stupendous appropriations for armaments. This book will attempt to show what has happened to America in twenty years of revolution, what perils confront us and what we should do to avert them.

The menace of this creeping revolution was perceived and expressed with extraordinary clarity by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur in a speech at Jackson, Mississippi, on March 22, 1952. "It becomes increasingly clear," he said, "that the pattern of American fiscal policy is being brought into con-

sonance with the Karl Marx communist theory that through a division of the existing wealth mankind will be brought to a universal standard of life—a degree of mediocrity to which the Communists and their fellow travelers seek to reduce the people of this great nation.

“Whether it be by accident or design, such policy, formulated with reckless indifference to the preservation of constitutional liberty and our free enterprise economy, coupled with rapid centralization of power in the hands of a few, is leading us toward a communist state with as dreadful certainty as though the leaders of the Kremlin themselves were charting our course.”

In another speech, General MacArthur declared: “Talk of imminent threat to our national security through the application of external force is pure nonsense. . . . Indeed, it is part of the general pattern of misguided policy that our country is now geared to an arms economy which was bred in an artificially induced psychosis of war hysteria and nurtured upon an incessant propaganda of fear. While such an economy may produce a sense of seeming prosperity for the moment, it rests on an illusionary foundation of complete unreliability and renders among our political leaders almost a greater fear of peace than is their fear of war.”

The implications of these charges, made by the nation’s most distinguished military leader, are shocking. Lest it be suspected that General MacArthur was motivated solely by resentment against President Truman, who removed him from command in the Far East, the following quotation shows that his view of the use of the cold war to promote revolutionary objectives is acknowledged by a leading Marxist theoretician. In an essay appearing in the *Nation* of New York, on December 16, 1950, Richard H. Crossman, Labor Party member of the British Parliament and assistant editor of the socialist *New Statesman and Nation*, declared:

“We are coming to realize in Britain that the cold war is not merely an unfortunate mishap caused by mistakes of diplomacy on both sides or a struggle between rival imperialisms.

Essentially, it is a struggle of ideas, in which free enterprise is not the protagonist on the western side but the chief obstacle to our victory. Every American action which has been successful in resisting communism has been carried out in defiance of the principles which actuate American business. Marshall aid became a magnificent if involuntary precedent for international cooperation because the Americans who ran it applied to European recovery methods of social planning which are anathema to most business men; and if our military defenses are to be adequately strengthened this will only be done by once again violating every principle of competitive free enterprise and capitalist economics.

“The cold war in fact is not only a menace but a creative force. If the Fair Dealer and the Socialist understand their job, the cold war will enable us to reconstruct the non-communist world in a way that would have been totally impossible had the Russians been willing to work with us peacefully in 1945. Russian collaboration at that time would certainly have precipitated a world slump and removed any possibility of the American aid which has provided so many of the physical resources for the British socialist experiment.”

The writings of the late dictator Stalin make it clear that Soviet strategy contemplates the use of military force to overthrow the American stronghold of capitalism only after a “revolutionary crisis” has developed in this country. Meanwhile the Kremlin hopes to develop world revolution by communist subversive activity in the noncommunist countries, and by applying pressure all around the 25,000 mile periphery of the Soviet Union, thereby inducing the United States to dissipate its resources and spend itself into bankruptcy. In *Problems of Leninism*, of which millions of copies have been distributed throughout the Soviet Union, Stalin said the “victorious proletariat” of Russia should raise revolts against the capitalists of other countries and even come out with armed force “in the event of necessity.”

The primary emphasis is on revolutionary activity, and armed force is to be used in a final struggle with the United States only

if this becomes necessary. Addressing the American commission of the executive committee of the Communist International, on May 6, 1929, Stalin declared, "When a revolutionary crisis develops in America, that will be the beginning of the end of world capitalism as a whole."

Stalin referred to the "sharpening antagonism between America and England, the struggle for markets and raw materials and, finally, the colossal growth of armaments" as portents of an approaching crisis of world capitalism. The world-wide depression of the early 1930's did not develop into a revolutionary crisis, but Stalin's words seem to reflect the present world situation more than that of 1929. At all events, he called for communist revolutionary activity, not a military attack, to hasten the crisis of capitalism. "I think, comrades, that the American Communist Party is one of those few Communist Parties in the world upon which history has laid tasks of a decisive character from the point of view of the world revolutionary movement," Stalin said.

In his radio report to the nation on the budget and taxes, last May 19th, President Eisenhower acknowledged that the United States faces "more than merely a military threat."

"It has been coldly calculated by the Soviet leaders—by their military threat, they have hoped to force upon America and the free world an unbearable security burden leading to economic disaster," the President declared. "They have plainly said that free people cannot preserve their way of life and at the same time provide enormous military establishments. Communist guns, in this sense, have been aiming at an economic target no less than a military target. . . . Prolonged inflation could be as destructive of a truly free economy as could a chemical attack against an army in the field. If, in today's continuing danger, we ever were to strain our capacity until rigid governmental controls indefinitely or permanently continued, became mandatory, where then would our freedom be?"

Having recognized the gravity of the fiscal peril, what did the President propose to do about it? Elected on repeated pledges

to reduce spending and taxes—and in one speech he used the word “now”²—Eisenhower proposed expenditures of 74.1 billion dollars in the 1954 fiscal year and declared that present conditions would permit no reduction in taxes. He proposed to spend thirty billion dollars more than Truman spent in fiscal year 1951, during all of which the United States was at war in Korea. He recommended an outlay of six billion dollars more than the total spent by President Franklin Roosevelt in the first eight years of his administration.

The extent to which foreign and military policies dominate the taxing and spending program was recognized by President Eisenhower when he attributed eighty-eight per cent of the total budget to the cost of wars and war preparations. The President announced this fact, however, as a challenge to those who would reduce taxing and spending. The same percentage of the budget was devoted to the same purpose in 1952, when Eisenhower was campaigning for the presidency on a promise to reduce taxing and spending substantially.

The President proposed to spend 43.2 billion dollars in the 1954 fiscal year for national defense. Although the admirals and generals dutifully assured Congress that such an enormous outlay was required by the military situation, they contradicted their own testimony. General Alfred M. Gruenther, new supreme commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces, declared in Paris on May 18, 1953, that he did not foresee a third world war. General Matthew B. Ridgway, retiring commander of the NATO forces and new Army Chief of Staff, questioned by members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 18, acknowledged that Russian divisions, airplanes, and tanks numbered about the same as they did in 1947.

The President's State Secretary, John Foster Dulles, had told a press conference at the United Nations on March 9 that the death of Stalin ushered in a new “Eisenhower era” of universal brotherhood and peace. “A new era begins, one in which the guiding spirit is liberty, not enslavement, and when human re-

2. Madison Square Garden, October 30, 1952.

lations will be those of fraternity, not one-man domination," said Dulles. "Then, in the words of our Charter preamble, the nations, large and small, may come to enjoy equal rights and dignity and peace."

As recently as March, 1950, General Omar N. Bradley, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told a Senate appropriations subcommittee that 13 billion dollars was enough for the national defense budget of the next fiscal year. This was before the Korean war but after President Truman had announced the first atomic explosion in the Soviet Union. Bradley emphasized that the strength of the country depended upon its industrial capacity, and said this should not be destroyed by excessive spending. "So, if we came here and recommended to you a 30 or 40 billion dollar budget for defense, I think we would be doing a disservice and that maybe you should get a new chairman of the joint chiefs of staff if I were the one who did that," Bradley said. The 13 billion dollar budget defended by Bradley in 1950 had been prepared in 1949, when General Eisenhower acted as unofficial chairman of the joint chiefs. Having declared in 1950 that any chairman who recommended a 40 billion dollar defense budget should be fired, Bradley, as chairman, helped prepare the 43.2 billion dollar defense budget recommended by Eisenhower in 1953.

Just before the first session of the 83rd Congress adjourned, Eisenhower confirmed the worst fears of American conservatives regarding his spending policies by requesting an increase in the statutory debt ceiling from 275 billion to 290 billion dollars. This measure, passed by the house with little opposition from the Republicans, was rejected by the Senate Finance Committee, thanks largely to the sanity and courage of Senator Harry F. Byrd (D., Va.). The annual interest cost of the federal debt is nearing 7 billion dollars, which is almost as much as the total cost of the government in the early years of the Roosevelt administration.

In its issue of August 14, the authoritative *U. S. News and World Report* commented ominously: "You can be sure of this:

An Eisenhower administration will embrace most of the New Deal; will involve little shift away from big government. Big spending will go on. Debt will grow not decline. Taxes will stay high. . . . Foreign policy will follow the Truman Acheson line. . . . What Eisenhower is going for is a government supported economy. Government will undertake to assure continuing prosperity. There's to be no ditching of the New Deal, no strong shift away from the developing trend toward state capitalism. . . ."

The success already achieved by this encroaching revolution is probably not realized by many Americans. In a period of "seeming prosperity," even when it rests upon an "illusionary" foundation of armaments spending, as General MacArthur observed, the people don't worry much about taxes, debt and inflation—until it is too late. According to the September, 1953, monthly economic letter of the National City Bank, business activity was being well sustained by high levels of employment, incomes, retail trade and construction. Yet the danger signals were plainly visible. According to studies made by the Tax Foundation—a highly respected research organization headed by Roswell Magill, former Undersecretary of the Treasury—a married man with two children whose income before taxes was \$2,000 in 1939 would have to make \$4,200 now to be exactly as well off. Other income increases required to maintain the 1939 standard of living are shown in the following table:

<i>1939</i>	<i>1952</i>
\$5,000	\$11,641
\$8,000	\$19,760
\$15,000	\$44,384
\$25,000	\$96,447
\$100,000	\$1,005,381

According to the Tax Foundation, a family making \$86.54 a week pays \$1,494 a year in direct and indirect taxes. This is more than one-third of the family's total income. Here are the taxes paid:

Federal income tax.....	\$ 446
State and local income tax.....	9
Sales and excise taxes.....	378
“Hidden” taxes.....	354
Cost of social insurance.....	159
Direct and indirect property taxes.....	144
Estate, gift and inheritance taxes.....	4
Total.....	\$1,494

Colin Clark, distinguished Australian economist who has studied the problem of taxation and inflation in France, Britain, Germany, Italy, the Scandinavian countries, Japan, and the United States, has concluded that “25 per cent of the national income is about the limit for taxation in any non-totalitarian community in times of peace.” According to the Tax Foundation, federal, state and local taxes in the United States were 31.2 per cent of the national income in the calendar year 1952. The national income and tax figures for the calendar years 1950–1952 are shown in the following table:

	1950	1951	1952
	MILLIONS		
National Income	\$239,170	\$277,554	\$290,400
Tax receipts, Total	67,747	84,565	90,500
Federal	50,311	65,684	70,500
State and Local	17,436	18,881	20,000
Tax receipts as percent			
of national income (total)	28.3	30.5	31.2
Federal	21.0	23.7	24.3
State and Local	7.3	6.8	6.9

According to Clark, “it is very widely understood that if a government incurs very heavy expenditures, and these are not covered by taxation, and the government runs at a deficit, the automatic result will be an inflationary trend. It is not so generally understood that if a government incurs very heavy expenditures, and these are covered by taxation, so that the budget is balanced, the trend—while it may be deflationary for a

time—will in the long run be toward inflation if the rate of taxation is too high to be borne.

“The ‘long run’ in this case is probably a period of two or three years, though this may depend on the nature of the emergency; in wartime it may be longer.”³

But President Eisenhower appears to be a prisoner of revolutionary forces which are beyond his power of resistance if not comprehension. His training and experience in military command and staff procedures certainly did not qualify him to contend with the transcendent political problems now confronting him, problems which would challenge the statesmanship of a Lincoln. The President’s innocence in political and governmental affairs was demonstrated in his campaign year, when he airily announced that government expenditures ought to be reduced by 40 billion dollars a year.

His major appointments portended a continuation of the foreign and military policies of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. These were the most significant:

1. State Secretary Dulles. Like Eisenhower himself, Dulles had been an advocate of the New Deal–Fair Deal foreign policy and could not attack it too vigorously without knocking himself out. He had served the State Department as an adviser and representative at international conferences from 1945 to 1952. Moreover, Secretary Dulles, who was given responsibility for the elimination of communist influences from the State Department, had been a colleague, a patron, and a dupe of the traitor Alger Hiss. As chairman of the board of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, he selected Hiss, who had resigned from the State Department under fire from Congress, as president of the organization at a salary of \$20,000 a year. When a Detroit lawyer wrote to Dulles, offering to produce evidence that Hiss had a “provable communist record,” Dulles contemptuously rejected the offer.

2. Harold Stassen, foreign operations administrator. Stassen

3. “The Danger Point in Taxes,” *Harper’s* (December, 1950).

had distinguished himself in 1947 by out-Wallacing Henry Wallace. Whereas Wallace had proposed to give a quart of milk a day to every Hottentot, Stassen advocated a ten-year give-away program of 10 per cent of our total production of goods and food. At the current production rate, this would amount to more than 20 billion dollars a year, or more than 200 billion dollars for a decade. Stassen also manifested his capacity for global statesmanship at San Francisco on April 14, 1945, when he was a member of the American delegation to the United Nations Charter conference. With no irony intended, he proposed that the late President Roosevelt be acclaimed posthumously as "President emeritus of the United Nations world."

3. James B. Conant, High Commissioner to Germany. Dr. Conant, former president of Harvard University and a zealous New Dealer, had supported the communist-inspired Morgenthau plan to destroy Germany's industry and thereby facilitate Soviet domination of all Europe.

4. General Walter Bedell Smith, Undersecretary of State for policymaking. Smith, a protégé of General George C. Marshall, was Secretary of the General Staff when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. When decoded Japanese messages heralding immediate war reached the War Department on the night of December 6, Smith, a colonel, was urged by two other colonels to notify General Marshall at once. He refused and was reprimanded by an army board of inquiry, which found that action by the War Department would have been sufficient to alert the Hawaiian command on the afternoon (Hawaii time) before the Japanese attack on the morning of December 7.⁴

5. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern affairs. Robertson was a member of the notorious China mission headed by General Marshall from the end of 1945 until January, 1947, which was inspired by Communists and immeasurably aided the communist conquest of China, according to a report of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. Robertson was in charge of the Peiping executive headquarters

4. George Morgenstern, *Pearl Harbor*.

of the Marshall mission, which sought to integrate eighteen Chinese Communist divisions into Chiang Kai-shek's army.⁵ If he saw anything wrong with this plan at the time, he neither resigned nor expressed any opposition to it.

6. Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African affairs. Byroade, a West Pointer and a temporary brigadier general during the war, is another Marshall protégé. He was operations officer at the Peiping executive headquarters of the Marshall China mission. He became Assistant Secretary for the crucial Middle East, a major center of Soviet interest, under Dean Acheson's regime in the State Department.

7. Charles E. (Chip) Bohlen, ambassador to Moscow. Bohlen, a career foreign service officer, is a graduate of the New Deal appeasement school of diplomacy. He faithfully served President Roosevelt at Teheran and Yalta and President Truman at Potsdam; and when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee questioned him he refused to repudiate the wartime sellouts to Stalin.

8. Winthrop W. Aldrich, former board chairman of the Chase National Bank, ambassador to Great Britain. Aldrich, an honorary Knight of the British Empire, and one of the foremost Anglophiles in the United States, received his appointment as a reward for heavy financial support of the Eisenhower candidacy. Addressing the English Speaking Union in London on April 1, 1953, he humbly apologized because the United States did not plunge into both world wars at the beginning. He expressed profound regret that Britain was "left standing heroically alone," and promised that the United States will be in the next war when it starts.

9. Henry Cabot Lodge, chief of the United States delegation to the United Nations. Lodge, a New Deal internationalist Republican, was defeated in the 1952 election. Shortly after taking up his duties at the U.N. he made a speech in French on the U.N. radio, declaring that French soldiers in Indochina and Americans in Korea were fighting for the same purpose. Hun-

5. *United States Relations with China*, Department of State (1949).

dreds of millions of Asians must have regarded this as confirmation of the communist charge that "American imperialists" were fighting to colonize Korea. It is known throughout Asia, as well as in France, that the French in Indochina are fighting not for altruistic reasons but to retain French colonial interests there.

President Eisenhower's appointment of General Ridgway as Army Chief of Staff confirmed his continued reliance upon the ground warfare concept of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to deter or resist Soviet aggression. General Ridgway had succeeded General Eisenhower as NATO Commander in Chief.

The most appalling aspect of the NATO program is that it contemplates a land invasion of Russia in the event of war. This strategy was clearly expressed by General Bradley, for years the Pentagon's leading spokesman on defense policy, in a speech at Boston on February 4, 1949. General Bradley proposed "a strategy that can defend our shores, aid our allies, and preserve a foothold from which to strike the aggressor in his homeland." While the enemy is flooding neighboring states, he said, "we must commit ourselves unreservedly to the preservation of a springboard for an eventual climactic ground attack." He added: "However crippling air attack can be, I am convinced beyond any reasonable doubt that should this nation be forced into still another conflict, we shall once more be forced to gain the inevitable victory over our dead bodies—those of our soldiers on the ground."

Clearly he was talking about preserving a "springboard" in western Europe for an invasion of Russia. He was talking about gaining "the inevitable victory" over the dead bodies of our soldiers in the "homeland" of the Soviet Union. Napoleon tried that with an army the world had deemed invincible, and left the bodies of his soldiers on the frozen Russian steppes. Hitler tried it with 220 divisions, and failed to take Moscow. B. H. Liddell Hart, distinguished English military analyst, once wrote that "over 2,000 years of experience tells us that the only thing

harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out." Apparently General Bradley has a military mind.

NATO has some 25 so-called active divisions, some of which are understrength and poorly equipped, and 25 reserve divisions, some of which would require several months for commitment to battle. In the absence of a German national army, the creation of which would alienate the French and wreck NATO, French divisions must constitute the backbone of any western European defense force. The following excerpt from an interview with Major General J. F. C. Fuller, published in the *U. S. News and World Report* of November 7, 1952, shows what this renowned British authority on modern warfare thinks about the French:

Q. "Isn't France strong enough to become a bulwark for the West?"

A. "Absolutely not. At this time, France is an actual liability. A truly prudent commander, with advanced forces in Germany, would have to earmark several divisions to protect his lines of communication through France. There is too much danger of communist disruption and sabotage."

Q. "Can France become strong within a reasonable time?"

A. "I am pessimistic about that. It's been about 100 years, away back in the Crimean war, since France had genuine military vitality. Ever since 1870 the French have been slipping in terms of stability and power."

Italy, the southern anchor of NATO, in 1953 voted 35 per cent communist, which is a measure of its military potential in case of war with Russia. The Communists actually increased their percentage of the popular vote from 31.3 in 1948 to 35.3 in 1953, despite billions of dollars of American aid under the Marshall and mutual security plans.

This, then, is the crisis in which we find ourselves. We are governed by an administration that, like its predecessors, is committed to a program of astronomical taxing and spending

and to the military and foreign policies which purport to justify that program. How did we get this administration?

In the last four presidential elections the people have had no opportunity to pass judgment on these vital issues. Lincoln was indubitably right when he said you cannot fool all the people all the time. The American people have not been deceived. They have been robbed. They have been effectively disfranchised on an issue of such magnitude that other questions are relatively insignificant. Eastern seaboard internationalists, heedless of George Washington's advice against interweaving our destiny with Europe to which they are bound by financial, cultural, emotional, and social ties, have eliminated foreign policy from the last four national elections by controlling the nominating conventions of both major parties. Control of the Democratic conventions by the internationalists was assured in each election year by the presence of an internationalist Democrat in the White House. Control of the Republican Party, which is predominantly non-interventionist west of the Allegheny mountains, was achieved with the aid of the Democrats by means of Trojan Horse tactics.

While there has been some half-hearted shadow boxing about foreign relations in the last four presidential campaigns, no candidate of either major party has challenged the basic internationalist contention that the defense of the United States is dependent upon European nations which are too weak or too indifferent to defend themselves, and that to retain the friendship of our European "allies" we must support them, economically, militarily, and in crises by going to war.

In 1940, the internationalists captured the Republican nomination with Wendell Willkie, a former registered Democrat who had been active in New York's Tammany hall. In 1952, the same forces captured the Republican nomination with Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had been a Democratic precinct worker as a youth in Kansas and was a self-declared Republican only since January, 1952.

The Republican conventions of 1944 and 1948 presented

no problem for the internationalists, since there was no strong opposition within the party in those years to the nomination of Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York. Dewey, a former non-interventionist, had been converted early in the war not only to internationalism but to New Dealism as well, and could be relied upon to conduct a harmless "me, too" campaign.

The pre-convention campaigns for Willkie and Eisenhower and the candidates themselves were remarkably similar. Both candidates were political amateurs who had never sought public office. Little was known about Willkie's views on public questions except that he strongly favored intervention in the European war, as did Roosevelt. Little was known about Eisenhower's views except that he eagerly supported the Roosevelt-Truman foreign policy. Neither candidate was thought to have strong convictions or great intellectual power, but each was credited with glamor and personal magnetism. To create the illusion of rock-ribbed Republicanism, Willkie was billed as a Hoosier and Eisenhower as a Kansan, although both men lived and voted in New York.

The same Republican faction of eastern internationalists engineered the drive for both nominations. The same financial interests, centered in Wall Street, contributed money to the Willkie and Eisenhower campaigns. The same newspapers, magazines, advertising agencies, columnists, Broadway and Hollywood actors, Park Avenue and café society leaders, and "liberal" propaganda groups whooped it up for both candidates.

The doctrine that knavery is the best defense against a knave is ascribed by Plutarch to the philosopher Zeno. This was the principle on which Roosevelt and Willkie conducted their campaign. With audacious contempt for the intelligence of the people, these two merry charlatans, who completely understood and secretly admired each other, competed for the pro-war vote by promising more and more aid to Britain, and for the antiwar vote by accusing each other of a purpose to lead the country into war. Each candidate reiterated that he could be trusted to

keep the country out of the conflict, while his opponent could not.

After the election, Roosevelt told Miss Perkins: "You know, he is a very fine fellow. He has lots of talent. I want to use him somehow."⁶ Willkie promptly repudiated his "campaign oratory" and was happy to be used as an instrument of Roosevelt's war intervention plans.

Eisenhower had never been regarded as a Republican until the eastern internationalists began looking around for a candidate who could be depended upon, if elected, to continue the Roosevelt-Truman foreign policy. Although he is a native of Texas, his parents moved to Abilene, Kansas, when he was a year old. Before going away to West Point, he took part in local politics as a Democrat. A speech he made in support of Democratic candidates is extant and was printed during the 1952 campaign. In Washington before and during the war his closest friends were New Dealers and White House cronies such as Harry Hopkins, Steve Early, and George E. Allen. His closest political adviser is his brother Milton, a former official of the Department of Agriculture, whose views were highly esteemed by Professor Rexford Guy Tugwell, one of the revolutionary men in the New Deal. President Truman certainly had no doubt that Eisenhower was a Democrat. Eisenhower himself relates in his book *Crusade in Europe* that while they were riding in an automobile during the Potsdam conference in 1945, the President suddenly turned to him and said: "General, there is nothing that you may want that I won't try to help you get. That definitely and specifically includes the presidency in 1948."

In 1948, Eisenhower was favored for the Democratic nomination instead of President Truman by Americans for Democratic Action, the party's extreme left wing. The ADA and the CIO-PAC collaborated in the production and distribution of a million pamphlets calling for the nomination and election of Eisenhower as a Democrat. As late as January, 1952, after

6. Frances Perkins, *The Roosevelt I Knew*.

Eisenhower had proclaimed himself a Republican, Truman wistfully averred that he had always believed the general was a Democrat.

The campaign to capture the 1952 nomination for Eisenhower was launched at a meeting of Wall Street bankers and New York Republican leaders in the board room of the Chase National Bank on August 28, 1950. Aldrich rushed back from a vacation trip and called the meeting after Governor Dewey had declared that he would not be a candidate for re-election in the following November. Present at the meeting, besides Aldrich and other New York bankers, were Herbert Brownell, Dewey's 1948 campaign manager; Thomas J. Curran, New York County Republican chairman; Carl Hallauer, a member of the Republican state committee; Norman Gould, of Seneca Falls, an upstate Republican leader, and Frank E. Gannett, of Rochester, owner of an upstate newspaper chain. Gannett was supporting the candidacy of Joe R. Hanley, lieutenant governor, for governor. Aldrich and others present told Gannett that it was "imperative" to draft Dewey for the governorship race. They urged him to withdraw his support from Hanley, and bluntly warned him that Hanley, if nominated, could expect no financial support from Wall Street. Details of this meeting were published by the *New York Times* on August 31, 1950, and were confirmed by one of the Republican leaders present in a letter to this writer.

Aldrich's purpose in "drafting" Dewey for re-election as governor was made clear a few weeks later when Dewey, on October 15, declared himself out of the 1952 presidential race and announced his support of General Eisenhower for the Republican nomination. The bankers were looking forward to 1952 and were taking no chances on losing control of the New York delegation, which has 96 votes in the Republican national convention. Accordingly they induced Dewey to run for re-election.

Gannett refused to withdraw his support from the unfortunate Hanley, but Dewey himself took care of that detail. On

September 5, 1950, Hanley wrote an anguished letter to W. Kingsland Macy, Suffolk county Republican chairman, declaring that he had agreed, at Dewey's behest, to withdraw from the governorship race and run for the Senate instead. Hanley said he had received "certain unalterable and unquestionably definite propositions" from Dewey, whereby he would be able to "clean up my financial obligations within 90 days." He said he had "an iron-clad, unbreakable agreement" whereby he would receive a good state job if defeated for the Senate. Finally, he declared that he was "humiliated, disappointed and heartsick," but was obliged to accept Dewey's proposition.

The *New York Times* reported that Hanley owed \$30,000 to Gannett and Macy. Representative Walter A. Lynch, the Democratic candidate for governor, charged that \$70,000 was involved. Lynch accused Dewey of committing a "nefarious crime" by giving the 74-year-old Hanley "a real third degree treatment in the pay-off suite of the Roosevelt hotel." He said Dewey put the old man through mental "torture" from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00 A.M.

A provision of the New York penal code made it a felony, punishable by two years in prison, for any person "who, while holding public office . . . corruptly uses or promises to use, directly or indirectly, any official authority or influence . . . in order to secure any nomination . . . or makes, tenders, or offers to procure, or cause any nomination or appointment for any public office or place." After Hanley's defeat, Dewey gave him a job as counsel to the New York state veterans' bureau at \$16,000 a year.

Truman and other Democrats favored Eisenhower for the Republican nomination because of their confidence that he would continue the New Deal-Fair Deal foreign policy and their fear that Senator Taft would liquidate it. Democratic leaders openly urged members of their party to go into the Republican primaries and vote for Eisenhower, particularly in New Hampshire and New Jersey, and thousands of them did so. In Texas the Democrats swarmed into the Republican

primary conventions, took over the proceedings and elected members of their own party as Republicans for Eisenhower. In some districts the Republicans, who favored Taft's nomination, called separate conventions and elected members of their party as Taft Republicans.

In disputes over delegates from Texas, Georgia, and Louisiana, the Eisenhower managers raised a fake moral issue which was resolved by unseating more than 50 Taft delegates and replacing them with Eisenhower supporters. On the eve of the national convention, which met in Chicago on July 7, Dewey induced 23 of 25 Republican governors attending a conference in Houston to sign a manifesto calling on the convention not to permit contested delegations to vote in delegate contests. It was essential, the manifesto declared, for the nominee to enter the campaign with "clean hands." When he arrived in Chicago, the New York governor, whose own hands bore the stains of the Hanley deal, ordered his supporters to picket Taft's headquarters bearing placards inscribed with the words of the Eighth Commandment: "Thou Shalt Not Steal."

The pro-Eisenhower *New York Times* reported that a large number of New York delegates threatened to defy Dewey's leadership and support Taft. How Dewey suppressed that rebellion was told by the Alsop brothers, in the pro-Eisenhower *New York Herald-Tribune*. They said Dewey reminded the delegation at its first Chicago meeting that he would be governor for two and a half more years and that he had a "long memory." They reported that in private talks Dewey was somewhat blunter in threatening the dissident delegates with the loss of their livelihood. "That way he held New York as an almost monolithic solid front against Senator Taft," said the Alsops.

Meanwhile New York banks, connected with the country's great corporations by financial ties and interlocking directorates, exerted their powerful influence on the large uncommitted delegations for Eisenhower. They did it more subtly, but no less effectively, than in 1940 when they captured the Republican convention for Willkie. Having made enormous profits out of foreign aid and armaments orders, the bankers and corpora-

tion bosses understood each other perfectly. The Wall Street influence was most fruitful in the Pennsylvania delegation, which gave Eisenhower 53 of its 70 votes, and in that of Michigan, with 46 votes of which Eisenhower received 35. Eisenhower had set himself up as a "no deal" candidate and had been making pietistical speeches about public "morality." It transpired, however, that some high powered deals were made. Arthur Summerfield, Michigan's national committeeman and the largest Chevrolet dealer in the world, was rewarded for his delivery of the bulk of the Michigan delegation by appointment as Eisenhower's campaign manager and later as his Postmaster General. Charles E. Wilson, president of the General Motors Corporation, which had strong influence in the Michigan delegation, became Secretary of Defense. Aldrich, the front man for Wall Street, was in Chicago pulling wires for Eisenhower, and his labors paid off with an appointment as ambassador to Great Britain.

The Eisenhower high command made a deal early in the convention with Senator Richard Nixon of California which turned out to be the decisive factor in Eisenhower's nomination. California's 70 delegates were instructed for Governor Earl Warren, but Eisenhower could win the nomination without them if he could take 50 odd Texas, Louisiana, and Georgia delegates away from Taft. Nixon was promised the vice presidential nomination if California would vote to unseat the Taft delegates and replace them with Eisenhower supporters. Nixon's agreement to swing the California delegation to Eisenhower in the dispute over the southern delegates was not a violation of his pledge to Warren, for California still gave Warren its 70 votes. However, the deal accomplished Eisenhower's nomination and cooked Warren's goose.

Although the national committee and the credentials committee, which seated the Taft delegates, had heard the evidence and the full convention had not, the convention overruled the decisions of those two regularly constituted party organs and gave Eisenhower 14 of Georgia's 17 delegates, 13 of Louisiana's 15, and 33 of Texas' 38. All of this was done in professed

observance of the Biblical injunction: "Thou Shalt Not Steal!"

When the roll of states was called, Eisenhower received 614 votes, 10 more than he needed for the nomination. Stolen or not, the delegates he took from Taft put him over.

Arthur Krock, Washington correspondent of the *New York Times*, reported from Chicago on July 9: "The observation has been made here that a majority of these delegates vastly prefer Taft to Eisenhower as their national candidate, and this is probably true."

Such minority control of the Republican nominating conventions has deprived the American people of the opportunity to redirect the course of the United States government. President Eisenhower, elected on the promise of "a change at Washington," is continuing policies and programs which the people opposed at the polls and which, if not arrested, will destroy America.

II. "The Hand Maidens and Heralds of Communism"

American Socialists, whose program has been taken over in the United States by Americans for Democratic Action, the left wing of the Democratic Party, are the main reserve forces of the revolutionary movement in which communist cadres constitute the vanguard. Adlai Stevenson, a political idol of the ADA, received 27,311,316 votes for President in 1952.

The revolutionary thought-perversion-technique has worked so effectively that many Americans sincerely believe that only ignorant or malicious persons confuse socialism with communism. They are deceived by tactical differences between Socialists and Communists who often attack each other violently. It is true that there are many varieties of Socialists, just as there are Communists who profess abhorrence of the Soviet Union, such as the Titoites in Yugoslavia and the Lovestoneites and Trotskyites in this country. On one question, however, all Socialists and all Communists are united, and that is their common hatred of the American free-enterprise economic system, and of the constitutional-republican-form-of government under which it has flourished.

Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain once characterized Britain's Fabian Socialists, the leaders of the Labor Party, as "the hand maidens and heralds of communism." This was not a mere Churchillian figure of speech. As long ago as 1848, Marx and Engels declared in *The Communist Manifesto*: "The Communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order of things." In the 1930's the Communists supported the New Deal. They form popular front coalitions with the

socialists and other revolutionary elements in their struggle to overthrow the existing order. Even while attacking the Socialists for tactical reasons, they infiltrate and seek to give direction to socialist movements.

In an article on socialism in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Prof. G. D. H. Cole, a leading theoretician and historian of the British Labor Party, declares: "The distinction between socialism, as represented by the various Socialist and Labor parties of Europe and the New World, and communism, as represented by the Russians and the minority groups in other countries, is one of tactics and strategy rather than of objective. Communism is indeed only socialism pursued by revolutionary means and making its revolutionary method a canon of faith. . . ."

The identity of communist and socialist objectives was acknowledged by the late dictator Stalin himself, in August, 1946, according to the official report of a British good will mission to Moscow when the Labor Party was in power and Clement Attlee was prime minister. This report, included in the annual report of the Labor Party's executive committee and published May 9, 1947, said: "After a general discussion Mr. Stalin said he was gratified to know that two great countries were traveling in the socialist direction. In the Soviet Union, the Russians were traveling to socialism in the Russian way, whereas Britain was going in the roundabout British way, to which there was an aside that 'we' had a habit of getting there. He felt that in both countries we could reach the socialist objective. They (the Russians) recognized that though socialism could be obtained by other methods than through the soviets, they believed that theirs was the shortest, even if the most difficult way, and that it may be accomplished by bloodshed. Britain had the opportunity of a more peaceful approach to socialism than they had in Russia and, although by the British method the change might be without violence, the process would be much longer.

"Mr. Stalin said he was glad to receive the assurance that the British people desired friendship and understanding with

Russia and that it would be amazing if there was no friendship between the two peoples—particularly so now that we both had the same aim, the achievement of socialism.”¹

The affinity of American “liberals” for the British Socialists was impressively demonstrated in May, 1953, when Attlee attacked the American Constitution and was in turn denounced by Senator McCarthy. Attlee, addressing the House of Commons, said the American Constitution was “framed for an isolationist state.” He expressed contempt for the separation of powers in the American government by insinuating that President Eisenhower could not speak with authority, because of the constitutional prerogatives of the Senate, at a proposed conference with Prime Minister Malenkov of the Soviet Union. “One sometimes wonders who is more powerful, the President or Senator McCarthy,” Attlee remarked.

The left wingers did not seem to resent Attlee’s gratuitous slur on the American Constitution, but their imprecations on “McCarthyism” rose to a crescendo after the Wisconsin senator had assailed Attlee. In a single issue, in fact on the same page, the *New York Times* of May 25 reported denunciations of McCarthy by four different groups: ADA, B’nai B’rith, Freedom House, and the communist-controlled National Council of the Arts, Sciences and Professions. New York’s Senator Herbert H. Lehman, a pillar of the ADA, issued an ultimatum to President Eisenhower: he must either stop trying to achieve unity in the Republican Party by appeasing “McCarthyism,” or sacrifice the unity of “the free world.” Twelve clergymen in Boston, members of the Back Bay Ministers’ Association, took it upon themselves to offer an apology to Queen Elizabeth and Attlee for McCarthy’s remarks in the Senate.

In *The Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels stated that communist ends can be attained “only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions.” To bring about conditions in which a violent revolution can be successful, however, they advocated a gradual, or creeping revolution. They declared: “The

1. *New York Times*, May 10, 1947.

first step in the revolution by the working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class, to establish democracy.”

“The proletariat,” Marx and Engels wrote, “will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie (property owners), to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the state, i.e., of the proletariat organized as the ruling class; and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible.

“Of course, in the beginning, this cannot be effected except by means of despotic inroads on the rights of property, and on the conditions of bourgeois production; by means of measures, therefore, which appear economically insufficient and untenable, but which, in the course of the movement, outstrip themselves, necessitate further inroads upon the old social order, and are unavoidable as a means of entirely revolutionizing the mode of production.”

Marx and Engels advocated the following 10-point program to effect the revolution:

1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes.
2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax.
3. Abolition of all right of inheritance.
4. Confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels.
5. Centralization of credit in the hands of the state, by means of a national bank with state capital and an exclusive monopoly.
6. Centralization of the means of communication and transport in the hands of the state.
7. Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the state; the bringing into cultivation of waste lands, and the improvement of the soil generally in accordance with a common plan.
8. Equal obligation of all to work. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture.
9. Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country, by a more equitable distribution of the population over the country.

10. Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of child factory labor in its present form. Combination of education with industrial production, etc.

In a notable speech in Chicago on November 10, 1952, Admiral Ben Moreell, wartime boss of the navy's tremendous construction program and now chairman of the board of the Jones & Laughlin Steel Company, declared that since Marx enunciated his doctrine "we Americans have adopted, in varying degrees, practically his entire program." Admiral Moreell noted that the federal government already owns 24 per cent of all the land within the continental limits of the United States and is steadily increasing its holdings. The present federal income tax, he said, is in complete accord with the communist plan to "wrest by degrees all capital from the bourgeoisie." As for the third plank in the *Communist Manifesto*, Admiral Moreell recalled that one of the du Ponts had recently died, leaving an estate of \$75,000,000, of which \$56,000,000 or approximately 75 per cent, was paid out in inheritance taxes. Following is a summary of his remarks respecting other points in the communist program:

4. In the last war, the United States confiscated the property of American citizens of the Japanese race, who received a pitifully small percentage of its real worth after the war.

5. The trends of our federal reserve system and government controls of credit and interest rates appear to be exactly what Marx had in mind.

6. Our Federal Communications Commission and Interstate Commerce Commission seem to have made a good start toward achievement of point six of the communist program. Federal loans and subsidies for highways, bridges, steamship lines, truck lines, air lines, airports, etc., are added evidences of government encroachment in the transportation field.

7. Many factories and other instruments of production are owned by the government. Federal, state and local governments own 23.8 per cent of all the electric power generating capacity in the United States.

8. The Works Progress Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps under the New Deal made a good beginning on point eight. A bill favored by President Truman and passed by the House of Representatives in May, 1946, authorized the President in an "emergency" to draft workers, labor leaders and management into the army following the seizure of production facilities involved in a strike or lockout. The Senate eliminated the draft provisions after Senator Taft (R., O.) had denounced them as a blueprint for dictatorship.

9. The notorious Brannan plan for aid to both farmers and consumers, as well as the entire system of basing agriculture subsidies on "parity," thus linking farm prices to industrial wages, are in accord with the Communist proposal for a "combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries."

10. It is clear that Marx intended that government operation of the schools should be exclusive. The federal government is moving into this field with its aid to education program.

In his pamphlet, *Keynes, Foster and Marx*, Earl Browder lists 22 policies and practices of the federal government which "concentrate in the hands of the state the guiding reins of the national economy" and "express the growth of state capitalism." All of these factors "contribute to immediate progress, as well as to the ultimate socialist revolution," Browder declares.

Browder sets forth "the essential features of the program which has the support of the labor movement and the progressive majority of the country, and which the Socialists (Communists, Marxists), can equally support without compromising their socialist goal, but on the contrary, advancing it—the program which, therefore, can be made the basis of a fighting coalition of progressivism and socialism." Browder's program is substantially identical with the official policy declaration adopted by the ADA at their sixth annual convention in Washington, D. C., in June, 1953. Following is a comparison of a few of the essential points in the two programs.

Browder: "Consolidation and extension of the labor movement . . . the legal and practical abolition of all discriminations

against racial and other groups; the close alliance of labor, toiling farmers, and other progressives. . . ."

ADA: "We believe a strong democratic labor movement is essential to the effective functioning of democracy. . . . We therefore recommend the repeal of the Taft-Hartley law and the enactment of legislation embodying the fair and equitable principles of the Wagner act. We urge that the basic rights embodied in the Wagner act be extended to farm labor. . . . We support legislation . . . to eliminate segregation and other forms of discrimination in housing, education, employment, transportation, recreation and other forms of life."

Browder: ". . . living standards must constantly rise . . . full use of all forms of economic and political struggle to advance wages and incomes of toiling groups, to put legal minimum floors under the conditions of those least able to defend themselves; rent controls, price controls, shorter work-week laws, protection of women and children. . . ."

ADA: "A rising level of real wages within the framework of full employment is possible and desirable. . . . With continuous full employment we can, within a decade, lift our national output to 500 billion dollars, provide more than 10 million additional jobs, increase the American standard of living by 25 per cent, greatly reduce poverty and underprivilege. . . . We favor government support of farm prices at levels sufficient to yield an equitable share of the national income. . . . We favor measures to underwrite a minimum standard diet for low-income families. . . . We favor immediate steps to increase the income-earning and productive ability of 2,000,000 submarginal farm families. . . . We favor the enactment of stand-by authority by which the President could impose appropriate economic controls."

Browder: "Steady expansion of the social security system to provide improving insurance against the hazards to employment, health, old age, and for the protection of all helpless groups."

ADA: “. . . every American has a right to public protection from personal socio-economic catastrophe resulting from sickness, disability, unemployment, or age. . . .”

Browder: “Steady expansion of government support to mass housing programs for lower income levels . . . public works and highway construction . . . limited only by the availability of labor.”

ADA: “Middle-income housing through government guarantees to promote private low interest loans to individuals, housing cooperatives and public agencies; continued support of low-rent public housing; controls on rents where the housing shortage is critical; enlarged slum clearance and redevelopment programs to prevent the appalling decay of our cities and towns.”

And so on—parallels between the two programs can be multiplied almost at will. Socialism has indeed conquered the minds of many Americans.

Some Socialists maintain that individual liberties such as Americans enjoy under the constitution can be preserved in a socialist society, but others frankly advocate what they call “social discipline.” In *The Coming Victory of Democracy*, Thomas Mann declares, “A reform of freedom is necessary which will make of it something very different from the freedom of our fathers and grandfathers, the epoch of bourgeois liberalism. Now we need something different from ‘*laissez-faire, laissez-aller*,’ for freedom cannot survive on such a basis. . . . Freedom has been driven out of liberalism—driven out by deepest anguish . . . freedom must be restored through social discipline.” Mann’s book was translated from the German by Agnes E. Meyer, wife of the publisher of the *Washington Post*. The text was a lecture which Mann delivered on a coast-to-coast tour in 1938.

A notable parallel is the following passage from the 1953 yearbook of the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, a department of the National Education Asso-

ciation: “The individualist social theory of the founding fathers is being supplemented by new forms of social organization and social control. Our free enterprise, which is still the determinant of our economy, and not infrequently of our national and international policy, is nevertheless being modified by our societal-welfare concept. . . . This trend toward a balance between the welfare of the individual and the welfare of the society is in conflict with earlier assumptions. It is a trend which we cannot ignore.”

After four years of socialism in Britain, the authoritative *Economist* of London, in its issue of November 5, 1949, pronounced this verdict: “When Mr. Churchill, in the course of the last general election, predicted that the principles of Labor Socialism must inevitably lead to the creation of a British Gestapo, he was widely derided. It begins to look as if the country owes Mr. Churchill an apology. It is happening here.”

In *Life* magazine, April 7, 1947, Prof. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., national co-chairman of ADA, declared: “The existence of Franklin Roosevelt relieved American liberals for a dozen years of the responsibility of thinking for themselves.”

While they gave their minds a rest, the revolution crept on.

III. Communism and the New Deal

Two events which launched the creeping revolution and already have profoundly altered the course of history occurred shortly after President Franklin D. Roosevelt took the oath of office on March 4, 1933, swearing to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."

One was Roosevelt's establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, fountain-head of world revolution, whose leaders had affirmed their determination to overthrow constitutional government in the United States and replace it with a communist regime. The four previous occupants of the White House since the Bolshevik revolution of 1917—Wilson, Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover—had refused to recognize the Soviet Union.

The other event was the influx of thousands of Communists and Marxian Socialists into the federal government.

In a letter to Roosevelt dated November 16, 1933, Maxim Litvinov, then Soviet commissar for foreign affairs, solemnly pledged his government "to refrain from interfering in any manner in the internal affairs of the United States" and to restrain all persons and organizations under Moscow's control "from any act overt or covert liable in any way whatsoever to injure the tranquility, prosperity, order or security" of the United States.

How serious was Litvinov when he gave this pledge? The question was answered before the House Committee on Un-American Activities by D. H. Dubrowsky, former head of the Russian Red Cross. Only a few minutes after he had left the White House with Roosevelt's recognition agreement in his pocket, Litvinov met Dubrowsky, Boris Skvirsky, attaché of

the Soviet embassy, and Peter A. Bogdanov, chairman of the board of directors of the Amtorg Trading Corporation. Dubrowsky testified that Litvinov vigorously rubbed his hands and gave this gleeful account of the negotiations: "Well, it's all in the bag. They wanted us to recognize the debts we owed them and I promised we were going to negotiate. But they did not know we were going to negotiate until doomsday. The next one was a corker; they wanted us to promise freedom of religion in the Soviet Union, and I promised that, too. I was very much prompted to offer that I would personally collect all the Bibles and ship them over."

When Roosevelt recognized the Soviet Union, the United States government had incontestable evidence from the highest possible source—dictator Stalin himself—that the American Communist Party was dominated by the Communist International with headquarters in Moscow, and that it had been assigned the task of destroying capitalism in the United States. This was set forth in two speeches by Stalin on "The American Communist Party," one given before the American commission of the presidium of the ECCI (Executive Committee, Communist International), on May 6, 1929, the other before the presidium of the ECCI, on May 14, 1929. The speeches were published by the central committee of the American Communist Party but were recalled from circulation because of their incriminating character. However, copies were and still are on file in the State Department and all the intelligence agencies in Washington.

The American Communist Party was then involved in a factional dispute between one group headed by William Z. Foster and another led by Jay Lovestone. An American delegation was summoned to Moscow for a settlement of the dispute, which ended in defeat for the Lovestoneites. Some members of the American delegation argued that the decision of the presidium of the ECCI would destroy the American Communist Party. To this Stalin replied: "No, comrades, the American Communist Party will not perish. Only one small factional

group will perish if it continues to be stubborn, if it does not submit to the will of the Comintern, if it continues to adhere to its errors.”

Stalin predicted a revolutionary crisis in the United States which would be the beginning of the end of world capitalism, and assigned this task to the American Communist Party: “It is essential that the American Communist Party should be capable of meeting that historical moment fully prepared and of assuming the leadership of the impending class struggle in America. . . . For that end we must work in order to forge real revolutionary cadres and a real revolutionary leadership of the proletariat, capable of leading the many millions of the American working class toward the revolutionary class struggle.”

Shortly after Roosevelt’s election in 1932, Justice Frankfurter, then a professor in the Harvard Law School, informed friends that recognition of the Soviet Union was “in the bag.” He boasted that in this matter he had the new administration in his vest pocket.¹

Frankfurter, who was born in Vienna in 1882 and came to the United States at the age of twelve, had aided and abetted communist propaganda campaigns since World War I by defending Mooney and Billings, the California dynamiters, the I.W.W. conspirators deported from Bisbee, Arizona, and Sacco and Vanzetti, the Massachusetts radicals who were executed for murder. Frankfurter was secretary and counsel of President Wilson’s mediation committee which investigated the Mooney-Billings case and the I.W.W. deportations. Theodore Roosevelt, in a letter to Frankfurter, declared: “Your report is as thoroughly misleading a document as could be written on the subject. No official, writing on behalf of the President, is to be excused for failure to know and clearly to set forth that the I.W.W. is a criminal organization. . . . No human being in his senses doubts that the men deported from Bisbee were bent on destruction and murder.”

Frankfurter was one of the three justices of the Supreme

1. Dr. J. B. Matthews, in *The American Mercury* (June, 1953).

Court who dissented from a majority decision denying a stay of execution for the Rosenbergs. In the Sacco-Vanzetti case, he wrote an article for *The Atlantic Monthly*, insinuating that the jury was "picked" and making other charges that were described as "baseless and worthy only of unscrupulous yellow journalism" by John H. Wigmore, renowned Dean of Northwestern University Law School. Dean Wigmore, writing in the *Boston Transcript*, said the facts were "demonstrative of the cruel and libelous falsity of the whole tenor of the plausible pundit's article" in *The Atlantic Monthly*.

All of this is set forth in the record of the Senate Judiciary Committee's hearing on Frankfurter's nomination to be a Supreme Court justice in January, 1939. He was the only nominee in the court's history to come before the Senate committee accompanied by counsel (Dean Acheson), and the only one of whom it occurred to the senators to ask: "Are you a Communist, or have you ever been one?"

When questioned by Senator McCarran (D., Nev.) and Senator King (D., Utah), Frankfurter disappeared behind a smokescreen of tergiversation, refusing to say whether he agreed with the doctrine advocated by his English friend, Professor Laski, in a pamphlet called *Communism*. He also evaded Senator King's question whether he believed in "the ideology of Marx or Trotsky." Finally it occurred to the subcommittee chairman, Senator Neely (D., W. Va.), a New Dealer, that Frankfurter's nomination might not be confirmed by the Senate if he stood on such answers, so he asked the 64-dollar question in a tone that demanded a forthright reply: "Are you a Communist or have you ever been one?" The "plausible pundit" meekly replied that he was not and never had been one.

Through Frankfurter's influence in the Roosevelt administration, the legal divisions of almost every department and agency of the government were staffed in whole or in part with graduates of the Harvard Law School who were dubbed "the happy hot dogs" by the late General Hugh Johnson, first NRA administrator. Johnson said that Frankfurter was "the most influential single individual in the United States."

The late George N. Peek, first administrator of the AAA, declared in his book *Why Quit Our Own*: "I only know that in the legal division were formed the plans which eventually turned the AAA from a device to aid the farmers into a device to introduce the collectivist system of agriculture into this country. This was due to Jerome Frank—probably acting as spearhead. He was a lawyer who had practiced in Chicago and New York and had come to Washington, so he told me, at the request of Felix Frankfurter." Peek also wrote: "The Socialists, or more strictly, the collectivists, seemed—for nothing was in the open—to be headed by Felix Frankfurter, Rexford G. Tugwell, and Jerome Frank."

Frank, now a federal judge, was general counsel of the AAA. He had a law degree from the University of Chicago and was one of the few Frankfurter protégés not from Harvard. However, the assistant general counsel of the AAA was a Harvard Law School man, Alger Hiss, a Soviet underground agent, who testified at his perjury trial in 1949 that Frankfurter sponsored him for a government appointment. Frankfurter testified as a character witness for Hiss.

While Harvard supplied most of the revolutionary lawyers for the New Deal, Columbia University contributed the largest quota of Marxian economists. Chief of these was Professor Tugwell, one of Roosevelt's leading brain-trusters, who began as Assistant Secretary of Agriculture.

The purpose of the Marxian infiltration was to carry out a revolution by subverting government policy to collectivist ends. As early as 1928, in an article headed "Some Measures in Transition" and published in a book titled, *The Socialism of our Times*, Stephen A. Raushenbush declared: "One good man with his eyes, ears and wits about him, inside the department—whether it be the interior, where the oil scandal started and the Boulder Dam bill received most active support, or the Treasury, where the taxation scandals breed and the government tax policies originate—can do more to perfect the technique of control over industry than a hundred men outside." Raushenbush

later was associated with Hiss on the staff of a Senate munitions investigating committee headed by former Senator Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota. By dubbing munitions makers "merchants of death," Hiss, as counsel of this committee, sought to drive the Du Ponts, and other companies with vast facilities for research and development, out of national defense production, thus weakening the United States as a potential enemy of the Soviet Union.

Most of the New Deal Marxists believed that a revolution could be carried out without bloodshed, by means of federal taxing and spending policies, government competition with private industry, and laws that would hamstring business while aggrandizing labor unions (the proletariat) as a broad base for the perpetuation of political power. This was the doctrine of the British Fabian Socialists.

However, New Deal extremists were prepared to countenance violence if it should become necessary to accomplish their objectives. In an address before the American Economic Society in Washington in 1932 Professor Tugwell said: "There is no denying that the contemporary situation in the United States has explosive possibilities. The future is becoming visible in Russia; the present is bitterly in contrast; politicians, theorists, and vested interests seem to conspire ideally for the provocation to violence of a long patient people. No one can pretend to know how the release of this pressure is likely to come. Perhaps our statesmen will give way, or be more or less gently removed from duty; perhaps our Constitution and statutes will be revised; perhaps our vested interests will submit to control without too violent resistance. It is difficult to believe that any of these will happen; it seems incredible that we may have a revolution. Yet the new kind of economic machinery we have in prospect cannot function in our economy."

The late Dr. William A. Wirt, famous as the originator of the Gary system of public education and superintendent of schools at Gary, Indiana, for many years, caused a furor early in 1934 when he wrote letters to various friends and later testified before a House investigating committee about a dinner

party he attended in the Virginia home of his former secretary, Miss Alice Barrows. Also present at the dinner were Laurence Todd, Washington correspondent of *Tass*, the Soviet press agency, and several minor New Deal officials. At the house committee hearing, Wirt quoted one of the dinner guests as saying: "We believe we have Roosevelt in the middle of a stream and that the current is so strong that he cannot turn back or escape from it. We believe that we can keep Mr. Roosevelt there until we are ready to supplant him with a Stalin. We all think Mr. Roosevelt is only the Kerensky of the revolution."

New Dealers derided Dr. Wirt as a lunatic fringer. Representative John J. O'Connor (D., N. Y.), a member of the investigating committee, later confessed: "I took a leading part as prosecutor and inquisitor. What a tossing around Dr. Wirt did get! Little did we know that most of the happenings which Dr. Wirt said the plotters had predicted would come to pass." (On June 23, 1953, Miss Barrows, then seventy-three years old, was called before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and asked whether she had ever been a Communist. Availing herself of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, she refused to answer.)

Whittaker Chambers, a leader in the Soviet underground apparatus in Washington from 1934 until he repudiated communism in 1938, confirms Dr. Wirt's charge about the attitude of the revolutionaries toward the New Deal. In his book *Witness*, Chambers relates that all the New Dealers he knew were Communists or near Communists who regarded the New Deal as an instrument for gaining their revolutionary ends, and not as an end in itself. For some time Chambers himself thought of the New Deal as a benevolent reform movement, but he later realized, he recalls, that it was "a genuine revolution, whose deepest purpose was not simply reform within existing traditions but a basic change in the social, and, above all, the power relationships within the nation." It was a revolution by "book-keeping and lawmaking," rather than violence, but a revolution

is always an affair of force, however the force may disguise itself, according to Chambers.

This courageous, Dostoevskian genius, whose testimony effected the downfall of Alger Hiss, tells the story of the amazing Ware cell in the government, which was one of at least four Soviet espionage rings known to have operated in Washington, only two of which have been exposed.² The Ware group, organized by the late Harold Ware, son of Ella Reeve (Mother Bloor), was, according to Chambers, "one of the most formidable little fifth columns in history, whose influence for evil, widening outward long after he was dead, would also be felt in the crash of China and the Carthaginian mangling of Europe."

When J. Peters, Hungarian boss of the communist underground, took Chambers to Washington, he made this exultant comment: "Even in Germany under the Weimar Republic the party did not have what we have here."

The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee received information about the Ware group from Chambers, Nathaniel Weyl, another ex-Communist, and a third witness whose testimony was not published. The subcommittee's report of August 24, 1953, sets forth the names of its leaders, and the jobs they held, beginning in 1933, as follows:

Nathan Witt. Attorney, AAA; assistant general counsel, NLRB; secretary, NLRB (invoked Constitutional privilege against self-incrimination).

Lee Pressman. Assistant general counsel, AAA; general counsel, WPA; general counsel, Resettlement Administration; general counsel, CIO (admitted Communist Party membership before House Un-American Activities Committee).

John J. Abt. Attorney, AAA; assistant general counsel, WPA; special counsel, SEC; chief counsel, La Follette Civil Liberties Committee; special assistant to the Attorney General (invoked privilege).

Charles Kramer. AAA staff; National Youth Administration; La

2. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee Report, August 24, 1953.

Follette Committee; NLRB; Senate Committee on War Mobilization; Senate Subcommittee on Wartime Health and Education (invoked privilege).

Henry H. Collins, Jr. NRA; Soil Conservation Service; Labor Department; House Committee on Interstate Migration; Senate Committee on Small Business; Senate Subcommittee on Technological Mobilization; captain, major in military service; State Department displaced persons program; Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (invoked privilege).

Victor Perlo. NRA; HOLC; Commerce Department; OPA; WPB; Treasury Department (invoked privilege).

Harold Ware. Consultant to Department of Agriculture. (Deceased.)

Alger Hiss. Assistant to general counsel, AAA; counsel to Senate Munitions Committee; staff of Solicitor General of United States; special assistant to director, office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State; Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State; Secretary General, U.N. conference (denied Communist Party membership).

Donald Hiss. Attorney, PWA; assistant solicitor, Department of Labor; assistant to legal counsel, Department of State (denied Communist Party membership).

Some or all of the Ware Group leaders had charge of separate secret cells of from 12 to 15 members each, most of them employes of the government. Chambers says there must have been 75 underground Communists in the Ware group alone. Under Peters' direction, Chambers took Hiss away from the Ware group and organized a separate apparatus. Next to Hiss, who later went to the State Department, the most important member of this group was the late Harry D. White, the Treasury Department's leading monetary expert, who became Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and was one of Elizabeth Bentley's espionage sources during the war. Chambers endeavored to recruit Laurence Duggan, who was in the State Department and later became chief of the Latin American division, but was unsuccessful because Duggan already belonged to another underground apparatus. During the Hiss

case, Duggan was killed by a fall from his New York office window, several days after he had been questioned by FBI agents. Chambers relates that Hiss tried to recruit another State Department official, Noel Field, but was unsuccessful. Chambers learned from Peters that Field already belonged to an apparatus headed by Hede Gumperz (Hede Massing). Field later disappeared behind the Iron Curtain. Still another State Department official, Henry Julian Wadley, in the Trade Agreements Division, was successfully recruited and he later confessed his work for the underground apparatus at the Hiss trials.

In 1939, after his desertion from the communist underground, Chambers desired to tell what he knew about it to the American government. Isaac Don Levine, editor of *Plain Talk* magazine, endeavored to arrange an interview with President Roosevelt, but was unsuccessful. However, Levine did arrange a meeting with Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State, and Chambers told his story to Berle on September 2, 1939. Months later, Chambers reports, Levine told him that Berle had taken the information to President Roosevelt, who had laughed about it. When Berle was insistent, the President told him in words which Chambers deemed it necessary to paraphrase for publication to "go jump in a lake."

On August 31, 1948, Berle testified before the House Un-American Activities Committee that in 1944 he had had a fight with a pro-Soviet group in the State Department, headed by Dean Acheson and Alger Hiss, and that he "got trimmed in that fight." Berle said he was transferred to Brazil and his public career soon ended.

President Roosevelt was himself no Communist. He knew nothing about communism, and therefore was not repelled by it. Members of his official family have reported that he rarely read a book and that when he did it was a whodunit, a treatise on stamp collecting, or a tale about war at sea. Frances Perkins,

in *The Roosevelt I Knew*, says the President was "simple" in his judgment of others. Although a Roosevelt idolater, she implies that Sidney Hillman and his communist collaborators in the labor unions used the President for revolutionary purposes. "The degree to which the PAC and other political activities in the labor movement could have been relied upon as a permanent support for Roosevelt is open to question," Miss Perkins writes.

Roosevelt collaborated with the Communists because they held the balance of power in New York State, through their control of the American Labor Party, and were a major factor in other populous states, such as Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Indiana and Illinois, because of their influence in the CIO. There was almost as much truth as humor in a remark once made by H. L. Mencken: "If Roosevelt thought cannibalism would get votes, he would immediately start fattening up a missionary in the White House backyard."

In 1934, the Communist Party received instructions from Moscow to abandon its policy of maintaining separate unions in the Trade Union Unity League and to penetrate the American Federation of Labor. The TUUL was dissolved and its communist members marched into the AFL unions. The purpose of this infiltration was set forth in a resolution adopted by the central committee of the American Communist Party in January, 1935, which said the influx of "hundreds of thousands of new workers" from the mass production industries into the AFL would open up "new and greater possibilities of revolutionary mass work." The resolution said the Communist Party's main task would be the mobilization of union members for "the class struggle" and "the leadership of strikes."

The communist program to organize the workers in the steel, automobile and other heavy industries resulted in a split between William Green, president of the AFL, and John L. Lewis, who took his United Mine Workers out of the AFL and organized a new group of unions called the Congress of Industrial

Organizations (CIO). In his book *The Trojan Horse in America*, Representative Martin Dies (D., Tex.), former chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee, declares that Roosevelt strongly favored immediate organization of the workers in the basic industries on a mass scale. The President sent for Green, who said it could not be done as quickly as Roosevelt wanted it done. Then he sent for Lewis, who welcomed an opportunity, with the government's help, to organize the mass production industries. His only difficulty was that he lacked trained organizers. The Communist Party met this need with from 5,000 to 10,000 trained organizers from the TUUL unions, who had received expert instruction in the theory and tactics of class warfare. Lewis later broke with the CIO and said it was dominated by the Communists.

In 1938, the Dies committee held public hearings on communism in the CIO. Before the hearings began, Dies conferred with Lewis and Lee Pressman in Lewis' office. Lewis refused to appear or send a representative to testify. He assured Dies that charges about communism in the CIO were inspired by selfish interests who were seeking to discredit trade unionism. Dies tells about this conference in his book, published in 1940. Not until 1951, however, when he opened his successful campaign to return to congress, did Dies say anything about a conference with President Roosevelt at the time the hearings were started in 1938. In his 1951 campaign speeches he declared that Roosevelt, in the presence of the late Senator Sheppard (D., Tex.), told him that Lewis was disturbed about the committee's plans to hold hearings for the purpose of disclosing communism in the CIO. Dies said the President told him he could not "go forward with this investigation" because it would antagonize the CIO and harm the Democratic Party in many congressional districts in the fall elections. When Dies refused to call off the hearings, Roosevelt warned him that he would destroy his prospects for "a very bright political career."

Dies went ahead with the hearings. John P. Frey, president of the AFL metal trades department, identified 280 CIO or-

ganizers as members of the Communist Party. Joseph Zack, director of the Communist Party's labor activities from 1919 to 1934, testified that when the CIO was organized 11 unions controlled by Communists were taken out of the AFL. The committee received sworn testimony identifying more than half of the CIO directors as Communist Party members, former members or fellow travelers. Earl Browder, head of the party, testified that about 50,000 Communists were active in trade unions, two thirds of them in the CIO and one third in the AFL.

In 1940, when Roosevelt was elected to a third term, his support of the Communists paid off handsomely. In New York State, the straight Republican vote for Willkie (3,027,477) was 192,978 greater than the straight Democratic vote for Roosevelt, but with the aid of the American Labor Party Roosevelt received a total of 3,251,918. He also carried such industrial states as Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, where the CIO was strong. The American Labor Party demonstrated its power in New York in 1942, when it withheld its support from the Democratic candidate for governor, Bennett, and Dewey was elected. In 1944, the Democratic vote for Roosevelt in New York state (2,478,598) was less than the Republican vote for Dewey (2,987,647), but the Communist-controlled American Labor Party vote (496,405) and that of the Liberal Party (329,235) raised Roosevelt's total to 3,304,238.

At the Democratic convention in 1944, when Vice President Wallace thought he had a commitment from the President to support his candidacy for renomination, Robert E. Hannegan, the national chairman, got a letter from Roosevelt saying he would be glad to have either Senator Harry S. Truman or Justice Douglas as his running mate. And the President, according to Arthur Krock of the *New York Times*, instructed Hannegan to "clear everything with Sidney." The party of Jefferson had been reduced to such a low estate that a Russian-born revolutionist held a veto power over the nomination of a candidate

who was destined to succeed Roosevelt as president of the United States.

In a letter dated September 19, 1949, which was inserted in the record of a Senate judiciary subcommittee appointed to hold hearings on immigration legislation in 1950, former Representative O'Connor declared that he often saw Browder in the White House during the period 1933-39. O'Connor, who was chairman of the House Rules Committee and a leader of the administration during that period, said Browder was especially active at the White House during the president's campaign in 1938 to purge Democratic senators who had fought his demand to pack the United States Supreme Court in 1937. In fact, O'Connor wrote, "Browder directed operations from the White House, from which he telephoned instructions from time to time."

In May, 1942, Roosevelt ordered Browder released from the federal penitentiary at Atlanta, where he had served one year and two months of a four year sentence for passport fraud. The President said Browder's release would "have a tendency to promote national unity and allay any feeling which may exist in some minds that the unusually long sentence was by way of penalty imposed him because of his political views."

Both the President and Mrs. Roosevelt interested themselves in the case of Mrs. Browder, who was in this country illegally and was facing deportation to her native Russia. Finally, in 1941, an order for Mrs. Browder's deportation was vacated and she was permitted to leave the country voluntarily and re-enter legally on a visa issued by the American consulate in Montreal. Representative Velde (R., Ill.) told the house on March 21, 1953, that this was "one of the most flagrant violations of our laws that has ever come to my notice."

In 1939, Mrs. Roosevelt put pressure on Sumner Welles, Under-secretary of State, to reverse a previous ruling excluding Hans Eisler, German communist musician, from the United States. Hans Eisler is a brother of the Gerhart Eisler who

jumped bail and escaped from this country a few years ago and later became propaganda commissar of the Soviet puppet regime in East Germany. Mrs. Roosevelt wrote to Welles on February 7, 1939: "This Eisler case seems a hard nut to crack. What do you suggest?" The nut was cracked by permitting Eisler to obtain an American visa in Mexico City.

Diplomatic relations with an implacable enemy; subversion of national policies by collectivist legal and economic "experts"; willful toleration of communist infiltration into the government; active encouragement of such infiltration into the labor unions; reliance upon the Communists for political support: these were some of the innovations of the New Deal "bloodless revolution." What happened to our economic system is the subject of our next chapter.

IV. The War on Business

REVOLUTIONARIES in the New Deal set out immediately after President Roosevelt's inauguration to grab control of the nation's economic system. Their plans contemplated destruction of private enterprise.

"Business," said Professor Rexford Guy Tugwell, "will logically be required to disappear. This is not an overstatement for the sake of emphasis; it is literally meant."

In the same address, titled "Economic Planning and Laissez-faire," Tugwell told the annual convention of the American Economic Society in 1932 that the government would do away with private business by controlling the use of capital for investment. "Planning," he said, "will necessarily become a function of the federal government; either that or the planning agency will supersede that government."

This was the orthodox communist gospel according to Marx and Lenin, whose writings reiterated that business men could be tied hand and foot by the centralization of credit in the hands of the state.

There was no doubt about the objective of the New Dealers, so boldly expressed by one of Roosevelt's leading braintrusters, but there was a choice of methods. Some favored a violent assault, others preferred the seductive approach. It was a choice between the tactics of the "hoot" owl and those of the "scrootch" owl, which were compared in the Senate by the late Huey Long of Louisiana as follows:

"A hoot owl bangs into the nest and knocks the hen clean out and catches her while she's falling. But a scrootch owl slips into the roost and scrootches up to the hen and talks softly to

her. And the hen just falls in love with him. And the first thing you know—there ain't no hen."

The New Dealers compromised by adopting both methods.

The NRA, which offered glittering inducements to employers and labor, was the "scrootch" owl approach. Employers were granted exemption from the anti-trust laws; they were permitted to fix prices, control production, and otherwise eliminate competition. Labor was given a guarantee of minimum wages, maximum hours, and the right to organize unions and bargain collectively. Employers and employees were to be partners, with the government as senior partner, and everyone would be prosperous and happy.

The NRA was copied from Mussolini's so-called "corporative" system. Frances Perkins, in *The Roosevelt I Knew*, recalls that she felt a little uneasy when the late General Hugh Johnson, who was secretly working with Tugwell on a bill to create the NRA, handed her a copy of *The Corporate State* by Raffaello Viglione, "in which the neat Italian system of dictatorship for the benefit of the people was glowingly described." Miss Perkins also wondered whether Johnson, a flamboyant ex-cavalry officer, really "understood the democratic process . . . and whether he might not be moving by emotion and indirection toward a dangerous pattern." It was Johnson's idea, she recalls, that the Labor Advisory Board of the NRA "ought to rush out and give orders that no one was to strike," and that the Department of Labor ought to "rule" labor. But whatever Miss Perkins may have thought about the Italian dictatorship, the New Dealers were not disturbed by the fascist character of the NRA. Fascism did not acquire an evil name in Washington until Hitler became a menace to the Soviet Union. In Roosevelt's first term, the late Harry Hopkins, Federal Relief Administrator, held a press conference on his return from Italy to tell the country what a magnificent job Mussolini was doing.

Title II of the NRA law appropriated 3.3 billion dollars for a public works program which was administered by Interior Secretary Harold Ickes. Other billions were appropriated for leafraking and boondoggling activities under Hopkins. Having

provided for industry and labor in the NRA, the New Dealers set up the AAA (Agricultural Adjustment Administration), under which Henry Wallace paid farmers hundreds of millions of dollars to destroy pigs, plow under cotton, burn oats, or refrain from planting wheat.

Miss Perkins recalls that the late John Maynard Keynes, British author of a formula for perpetual prosperity through government spending, came to Washington in 1934 and was "liberally consulted" by a number of "government people" including Roosevelt. Keynes, she relates, "pointed out that the combination of relief, public works, raising wages by NRA codes, distributing moneys to farmers under agricultural adjustment, was doing exactly what his theory would indicate as correct procedure. He was full of faith that we in the United States would prove to the world that this was the answer."

Thus the New Deal was well launched on a program of Keynesism. And Earl Browder, former head of the American Communist Party, maintains in his pamphlet, *Keynes, Foster and Marx*, that Keynesism, which he defines as state capitalism, is the road to communism.

Although welcomed at first with a popular fervor approaching delirium, stimulated by all the known instruments of exhortation and ballyhoo, the NRA soon disillusioned labor, the farmers, consumers, business men, and everyone else except the 6,000 members of its Washington staff and the other thousands who worked for the local code authorities. Consumers complained that it was a scheme to jack up prices and keep them up. Labor leaders and industrialists battled for control of the NRA. A wave of strikes swept the country. General Johnson quarreled with Donald Richberg, NRA's general counsel. The people were shocked by reports of such acts as the jailing of a New Jersey tailor named Jack Magid, whose crime was pressing a suit for thirty-five cents when the code fixed the price at forty cents. The NRA was blowing up, as Miss Perkins said, from "internal combustion," when a unanimous Supreme Court, on May 27, 1935, did the New Deal a favor by declaring the law unconstitutional. The court ruled

that Congress had unlawfully delegated its law-making authority to the President and the NRA.

Another attempt by the New Dealers to take over the economic system by the "scrootch" owl method was more successful. This was the program to centralize credit in the hands of government. By 1940, according to a report to the Senate by Treasury Secretary Morgenthau given in response to a resolution by Senator Byrd (D., Va.), the RFC and thirty other government lending agencies had loaned nearly 25 billion dollars. Meanwhile, Federal Reserve Board figures showed that new private capital investment for the six years 1933–1938 averaged only \$669,000,000 a year and totalled less than it did for the single year 1930, when it was 4.4 billion. The yearly average for the 10 year period 1923–1932 had been 3.7 billion. The *Baltimore Sun* reported that federal agencies were part owners of 2,000 corporations with total assets of 4 billion dollars and had some control, through regulations, subsidies, loans and the fear of "getting in wrong," over more than 23,000 corporations with assets of 70 billion dollars. And this was before the war.

Meanwhile the New Dealers were also employing violent assault, or "hoot" owl methods, in their campaign to destroy business. One of their favorite weapons was the investigating power of Congress, which they used to attack business and create popular support for encroaching government regimentation or competition.

In 1933, Ferdinand Pecora, a Sicilian-born assistant district attorney of New York, was hired by the Senate Banking and Currency Committee to investigate abuses by investment bankers and the New York Stock Exchange. There was general agreement that such abuses had occurred and that reforms were both desirable and inevitable. Nevertheless, the Securities and Exchange Act could have been drafted and passed without calling a single witness. Pecora and a great staff of lawyers, accountants, and detectives had examined all the files of the banking houses and had all the evidence they needed, but they

put on a public inquisition, somewhat like the Soviet demonstration trials of purge victims already adjudged guilty. Their purpose was to instill suspicion of the business community as a whole in the minds of the people. Sensational publicity was obtained by such press agent stunts as planting a female midget on J. P. Morgan's lap.

In the same year, Senator Hugo Black, the Alabama Ku Kluxer who later became a Supreme Court Justice, pilloried representatives of shipping and air line companies which were receiving subsidies under government mail contracts. As a result of Black's inquisition, President Roosevelt, in February, 1934, canceled the air mail contracts and ordered the army air corps to carry the mail. One month later, after ten army flyers had lost their lives, the President ordered the air corps to stop flying the mail. Postmaster General Farley, in his book *Behind the Ballots*, acknowledged: "The outcome was tragedy—unforeseen and unavoidable—and the unhappy fate of the brave military aviators who perished in line of duty served to overshadow entirely the question of whether the private contracts had been let on a just and equitable basis."

In 1935, Black was chairman of a so-called lobby investigating committee which harried opponents of the Wheeler-Rayburn public utility bill, imposing a death sentence upon holding companies. His committee issued dragnet subpoenas for all telegrams sent or received during periods of several months by opponents or suspected opponents of the "death sentence" bill. Black disdained complaints that his activities flouted the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, which provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . ."

In the same year, the Senate Munitions Committee headed by Senator Gerald P. Nye (R., N. D.) conducted an investigation which resulted in the adoption of neutrality legislation. Through the efforts of the senators, this committee adduced information of great historical value about the duplicity of President Wilson and the influence of J. P. Morgan and Com-

pany, fiscal agents of Great Britain, in the campaign to take this country into the First World War. However, the staff director, Stephen Raushenbush and his principal assistants, Alger Hiss and Robert Wohlforth, concentrated on smearing American munitions makers as "merchants of death." This was in keeping with the communist program to drive the major industrial corporations with vast facilities for research and development out of national defense production, and thus to weaken the United States as a potential enemy of the Soviet Union.

As we have seen, Communists took over the CIO campaign to organize the mass production industries in 1935 and 1936. After the NRA, with its collective bargaining provision, section 7 (a), had been killed by the Supreme Court, the Wagner Labor Relations Act was adopted and under it the old National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was reconstituted. The Communists immediately took over the NLRB, which became a government enforcement arm of the communist organization campaign in the heavy industries. Between the tyranny of the NLRB and the revolutionary activity of the Communists in the unions, such as sitdown strikes, mass picketing, and organized violence that resulted in a state of anarchy, American industry was subjected to a reign of terror which alarmed the nation.

Communist domination of the NLRB during this revolutionary "class struggle," which dictator Stalin had ordered, has been established beyond any possibility of reasonable doubt in sworn testimony before Senator Jenner's Internal Security Subcommittee. The three members of the NLRB were J. Warren Madden, chairman; Edwin S. Smith; and Donald Wakefield Smith. Madden found himself increasingly at odds with the two Smiths and was happy in 1941 to take a job on the Federal Court of Claims. Donald Wakefield Smith, with Jim Curley of Boston, later was convicted of using the mails in a scheme to defraud, and still later was pardoned by President Truman.

Nathan Witt, successor to Harold Ware as leader of the Soviet underground apparatus in which Alger Hiss served the

Kremlin, was assistant general counsel of the NLRB until November, 1937, when he became its secretary. Interrogated on May 26, 1953, by Robert Morris, counsel for Senator Jenner's committee, Witt refused to answer questions about his membership and activity in the Communist Party, appealing to the Fifth Amendment.

Edwin S. Smith, appearing before the Jenner committee on May 21, 1953, acknowledged that he was registered as an agent for a Soviet principal, among others. Like Witt, he refused to answer questions about his Communist Party membership and activity, citing his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.

The chief economist of the NLRB from 1935 to 1940 was David J. Saposs. Before the Jenner committee on June 4, 1953, Saposs testified that Witt, as executive officer of the board, had "full responsibility for the staff in the NLRB, except the attorneys, and it gave him responsibility for the staff in the regions, the hiring of regional directors, the hiring of field examiners; again, everyone in the field offices, except the attorneys."

The attorneys were hired by Thomas I. Emerson, head of the review division, Saposs testified. He was also responsible for Washington review of cases from the field. In response to questioning, Saposs stated that Emerson was sympathetic to the point of view of Edwin Smith and Witt, and with them formed a triumvirate in NLRB matters. Asked if Smith and Witt ran the board, Saposs replied, "No doubt about it. They enjoyed it."

Saposs testified that Allan Rosenberg, assistant NLRB secretary, was "sort of regarded as Nathan Witt's hatchet man." He declared that Harry Bridges, the Australian Communist who was throttling the shipping industry on the west coast, was "sort of regarded as a hero by these people" and that "Edwin Smith devoted a lot of time trying to convince me that Harry Bridges was the greatest labor leader in the United States." When the Pacific longshoremen's case came before the NLRB, Saposs said, he was not permitted to prepare the economic data,

although that was his responsibility. "My surmise is that they deliberately kept me from preparing any of the material because by that time they knew what my point of view was and they knew what my general understanding was of the maneuvers, the manipulations of the Communists and the fellow travelers," Saposs declared.

The alliance between the Communists in the NLRB and the Communists in the unions produced many so-called hearings about the country that resembled a Soviet purge trial more than a quasi-judicial proceeding in a free country. Trial examiners insulted company lawyers, resolving every point, every objection, in favor of the NLRB attorneys. Hearsay and hearsay of hearsay was admitted in evidence. And the United States Supreme Court held that the labor board's findings of fact, under the Wagner Act, were not subject to review. The courts could review law questions, but not the facts.

Not content with their control of the NLRB, the Communists organized a Senate inquisition in 1936 to place responsibility upon the employers for the industrial warfare being waged by revolutionaries in the unions. This was the so-called Civil Liberties Subcommittee, headed by the late Senator Robert M. La Follette Jr., of Wisconsin. Robert Wohlforth, who had worked with Alger Hiss and Stephen Raushenbush on the staff of the Nye munitions committee, was secretary of the La Follette subcommittee. John Abt, a co-conspirator with Hiss in the communist underground, was chief counsel. Charles Flato, who "invoked the privilege" when questioned by the Jenner subcommittee about his communist connections, was public relations director of the Civil Liberties Subcommittee, in charge of reports, press releases and other propaganda. Charles Kramer, alias Krivitsky, a veteran of the Ware cell, was a field investigator, who worked on reports and prepared for public hearings. When questioned by the Jenner subcommittee on May 6, 1953, Kramer refused, under the Constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, to deny sworn testimony link-

ing him with the Ware cell in the 1930's and with Elizabeth Bentley's espionage apparatus during the war.

Kramer testified that he and Wohlforth investigated the 1937 Memorial Day riot at the Republic Steel Company's plant in South Chicago, in which ten men were killed by police bullets. Witnesses selected by Kramer and Wohlforth appeared before the La Follette committee and accused the Chicago police of unprovoked murder. The incident was characterized by newspapers throughout the country as the "Memorial Day massacre."

Kramer's testimony, together with other evidence placed in the record by Attorney Morris, make it unmistakably clear that the Communists not only planned and led the Memorial Day riot but initiated and provided the witnesses for the La Follette committee's hearing. The record contains excerpts from an article in the July, 1937, issue of *The Labor Defender*, official organ of the International Labor Defense, which has been declared subversive and communist by the Attorney General. This article declares that the ILD "took the precaution of making a movie" of the disturbance and then sent telegrams of protest to the La Follette committee and "all progressive senators and congressmen." It states that the committee immediately accepted "our ILD film and affidavits."

When questioned by Morris, Kramer did not deny that he cooperated with the Communists in carrying out his investigation. "I have no idea of who it was that I interviewed or under what circumstances," he said. He said he could not recall working with David J. Bentall, that he "may have" worked with Joe Weber, that the name of Nick Fontecchio sounded familiar, that he had no recollection of Jack Spiegle, and that Lupe Marshall was a witness before the committee. Morris then placed the following communication from the Chicago police department in the record: "Our records show that one Joe Weber and Lupe Marshall, who are known Communists, were taken into custody on May 30, 1937, and charged with violation of section 139 of chapter 38. Our records further show that Nick

Fontecchio, George Patterson, and Jack Spiegle are also known organizers or are affiliated with organizations of communist activities.”

Morris questioned Kramer as follows:

Morris: “Did you meet with Lupe Marshall in Chicago?”

Kramer: “I met with most of the witnesses, and so did the other members of the staff, yes. I don’t know whether specifically I met with her or not. I am pretty sure that I did.”

Morris: “Now, Mr. Kramer, you did meet with Communists in Chicago at that time, did you not?”

Kramer: “I told you that I met with any number of people, including members of the police department and the sheriff’s office. . . .”

Morris: “Is it your testimony that you did not meet with people you knew to be Communists?”

Kramer: “My testimony is exactly as I stated, that I met with people who came into the course of the investigation.”

One of the witnesses who defended the rioters and denounced the police at the La Follette committee’s hearing was Meyer Levine. Levine wrote an article for the July, 1937, issue of *The Labor Defender*, maintaining the same position. In 1940, however, he published a book called *Citizens*, in which he declared that the whole attack “was under the leadership of known Communists” who had seized control of the CIO steel workers’ union and “had been drilling all week in secret.” Ben Mandell, research director of the Jenner committee, testified that he had received information from the union “that those responsible for the violence, which was inimical to the interests of the labor movement, were subsequently dropped from the administration of that union by the national union itself.”

The La Follette committee’s hearings were so flagrantly prejudiced that the Senate Postoffice Committee, which had been investigating collusion between the strikers and the postal authorities, called witnesses to bring out the facts of the South Chicago riot. Captain James L. Mooney of the Chicago police department testified that the two hundred policemen on duty at the plant were forced to shoot to save their own lives when

the two thousand rioters, armed with such deadly weapons as concrete slabs, automobile parts, and clubs with meathooks attached, advanced singing the communist "Internationale." He said he pleaded with the rioters to disperse, but they kept coming and began hurling missiles at the policemen. "If ten of them were killed that's too bad, but there would have been 200 killed if they had ever got through to that plant," Captain Mooney declared.

In its four-year inquisition, the La Follette subcommittee took 18,000,000 words of testimony from 485 witnesses on 98 days of public hearings. Most of the testimony accused employers of using "labor spies" and professional strikebreakers and maintaining arsenals of "industrial munitions," such as machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, and tear gas, to prevent organization of their employees.

In an article in *Collier's Magazine*, on February 8, 1947, Senator La Follette confessed: "I know from first hand experience that Communist sympathizers have infiltrated into committee staffs on Capitol Hill in Washington. . . . A few years ago, when I was chairman of the Senate Civil Liberties Committee, I was forced to take measures in an effort to stamp out influences within my own committee staff." In the same article, La Follette, on whom the Communists turned in 1946, complained that a "left wing official of a left wing union" in Milwaukee issued a statement on behalf of the Milwaukee county and Wisconsin state CIO councils denying that the Senator was a liberal. One of the strangest paradoxes in modern political history is that the Communists, in purging La Follette, were responsible for sending Joe McCarthy to the Senate.

Not only the NLRB and the La Follette committee but the executive branch of the government supported the revolutionary strike program. When the sitdown strikes broke out in Flint, Michigan, spread to other General Motors plants, and finally extended to different parts of the country, Miss Perkins encouraged the insurrectionists by saying their method should not be regarded as illegal. (The United States Supreme Court

later said it was illegal.) Governor Frank Murphy of Michigan, as well as New Deal governors in Iowa, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, used state troops to prevent local law officers from enforcing court orders for the ejection of the invaders. Governor Davey of Ohio and Governor Kraschel of Iowa later had a change of heart and refused to use the soldiers to protect the sitdown strikers.

Miss Perkins insists that the employers took "a very intransigent attitude" in refusing to negotiate while their plants were occupied by the invaders. "I never could see why employers should be so stuffy about it—and Roosevelt agreed with me," she writes. She maintains this attitude despite her admission that she and Murphy were alarmed by the discovery that "people who did not work in the industry were filtering into the factories." Miss Perkins relates that she finally induced the President to call Knudsen, president of General Motors, and urge him to go into conference with the CIO leaders without demanding prior evacuation of the plants. Knudsen agreed.

In 1937, during the violent Little Steel strikes, Governor Davey of Ohio announced that he had turned down an "autocratic and dictatorial plan" proposed to him over the long distance telephone by Miss Perkins. Davey had ordered the state troops to protect all employees wishing to return to work, and the plants of the Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company had reopened. Davey said Miss Perkins asked him to keep the plants closed pending a settlement with the union. He said she also asked him to subpoena Tom Girdler of Republic Steel and Frank Purnell of Youngstown and hold them until they agreed to sign contracts with the CIO union.

Representative Cox (D., Ga.) told the house on June 28th that if such a demand had been made by any cabinet officer other than a woman, there would have been a dozen impeachment resolutions. But the Democrats were worried about losing the 1938 congressional elections. Representative Hook (D., Mich.) told the House he was not opposed to industrial organization but was opposed to "communistic and anarchistic

groups boring from within the labor movement." Senator Ellender (D., La.) warned the Senate that revolutionaries were trying to organize all the workers in the country under one banner and that such a stupendous aggregation could "paralyze industry overnight." Free government was imperiled, he said.

Finally Roosevelt himself became alarmed. Blaming extremists on both sides, he pronounced: "A plague o' both your houses."

Miss Perkins also resisted congressional demands for the deportation of Harry Bridges as an undesirable alien. In the face of sworn testimony by witnesses who said they had known him as a Communist, she insisted that there was no evidence on which to deport him. She told the President, she states in her book, that Bridges, "a conspicuous and successful labor leader, had been charged with being a Communist by witnesses whose veracity and competence remained to be proved." Roosevelt asked whether Bridges had done anything to overthrow the government, and when Miss Perkins said he had not, the President exclaimed: "Then why in the world should a man be punished for what he thinks, for what he believes?"

When the immigration service was under the Labor Department, Dean James M. Landis of the Harvard Law School, sitting as a special examiner, found that Bridges was not a Communist. When the service was transferred to the Justice Department, Judge Charles B. Sears was appointed to hold another hearing, and he found that Bridges was a Communist. In June, 1945, the Supreme Court reversed Judge Sears' finding. The late Justice Murphy, who had capitulated to the revolutionaries when he was governor of Michigan, now distinguished himself with the remarkable observation that "the record in this case will stand forever as a monument of man's intolerance to man." Bridges became a naturalized citizen in 1949. In June, 1953, the Supreme Court invalidated his conviction on charges of conspiracy in obtaining his citizenship. He was accused of perjury in denying that he had been a Com-

munist. The Court held that his conviction was barred by the statute of limitations.

The undistributed profits tax of 1936 was the first attempt to strangle business by controlling the allocation of investment capital, as advocated by Tugwell. Herman Oliphant, Treasury Department legal adviser, was credited with selling this Marxian bill of goods to Roosevelt while Treasury Secretary Morgenthau was away on a vacation. However, Tugwell had already advocated such a scheme in a book called *The Industrial Discipline and the Governmental Arts*, published in 1933. The tax was designed to force corporations to pay out all of their earnings in dividends which are subject to the individual income tax. The plan had two main purposes: (1) to prevent the accumulation of capital for plant expansion and rehabilitation, thus forcing corporations to turn to the government for credit; (2) to prevent the accumulation of reserves to weather the economic storm of the next depression, which would create a national emergency and provide a pretext for the government to take over the whole system.

As originally proposed, the plan called for the elimination of all other corporation taxes and the substitution of a graduated tax on undistributed profits. If all earnings were distributed, there would be no tax; if none were distributed, the tax would be confiscatory. A compromise plan adopted by Congress combined previously existing levies with a graduated surtax on undistributed profits, ranging up to twenty-seven per cent.

When the Roosevelt depression struck the country in 1937, beginning with the "Black Tuesday" stock market crash of October 19, the New Dealers attacked business with a vengeance. Unemployment was increasing at an alarming rate. A government census report estimated it at about 11,000,000 in November. Henry Morgenthau recalls in his diaries, published in *Collier's Magazine* in 1947, that the new depression was the subject of a gloomy cabinet discussion on November 4. He told Roosevelt that something had to be done about business.

"You want me to turn on the old record?" asked Roosevelt, contemptuously alluding to his repeated promises to balance the budget.

"What business wants to know," Morgenthau said, "is this: 'Are we headed toward state socialism or are we going to continue on a capitalistic basis?'"

"I have told them that again and again," Roosevelt protested.

"All right, Mr. President, tell them for the fifteenth time," Morgenthau persisted. "That's what business wants to know."

"That's what business wants to know," echoed Jim Farley. Roosevelt impatiently cut them off. He said he was sick and tired of hearing complaints about economic conditions from people who didn't know what to do about it. "Business, particularly the banking business, has ganged up on me," he declared.

That was the signal for the new assault on business. Assistant Attorney General Robert H. Jackson and Interior Secretary Ickes made a series of speeches denouncing the so-called sixty families who were accused of ruling America. They charged that business had gone on a sit-down strike against the administration. Meanwhile, the Justice Department declared war on "monopolists." Business men who had been told by the NRA that it was their patriotic duty to get together, fix prices and eliminate cutthroat competition, now were denounced as public enemies and haled into court for price fixing.

In 1938, the New Dealers opened their last big show trial before the war. This was the Temporary National Economic Committee, comprising representatives of the Senate, the House, and the executive agencies of government. Although the TNEC was headed by Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney (D., Wyo.), the ring master was Leon Henderson, executive director. According to the Morgenthau diaries, Henderson at that time was one of the leading advocates of a big new spending program. Others were Ickes and Hopkins, administrators respectively of the PWA and the WPA; Tommy Corcoran and Ben Cohen, authors of New Deal legislation, and Lauchlin Currie, Assistant

Research Director of the Federal Reserve Board, who later moved into the White House and was identified by Miss Bentley as an agent of the Kremlin. Henderson himself had been a director of Howard Scott's crackpot totalitarian movement called Technocracy in the early 1930's.

Roosevelt asked the TNEC to find out "why vast amounts of capital lie idle in stagnant pools." The New Deal answer, as given to the TNEC on May 23, 1939, by A. A. Berle Jr., Assistant Secretary of State, who appeared as a witness for the SEC, was simple. "The private financial system as at present constituted does not work," said Berle.

"Briefly," Berle continued, "the government will have to enter into the direct financing of activities now supposed to be private; and a continuance of that direct financing must mean inevitably that the government ultimately will control and own those activities. Put differently, if the government undertakes to create wealth by using its own credit at the rate of four billions or so a year and its work is well done, the government will be acquiring direct productive mechanisms at the rate of four billions' worth a year or thereabouts. Over a period of years the government will gradually come to own most of the productive plants in the United States."

The TNEC report attracted little attention. War had broken out in Europe when it appeared, and Roosevelt had resolved to end the depression by undertaking a large-scale armaments program, as Hitler had done in Germany.

V. Roosevelt Rebels Against the Constitution

AFUNDAMENTAL principle of the American Constitution is the separation of powers it vests in the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government. James Madison, who has been called the father of the Constitution, declared in *The Federalist*: "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."

It would labor the obvious to maintain that any president who could impose his will upon both the legislative and the judicial branches of the government would be a tyrant. Yet that is precisely what Franklin D. Roosevelt endeavored to do. In 1937, he tried to pack the United States Supreme Court, because he did not like its decision. In 1938, he tried to "purge" Democratic senators who had helped defeat his court packing scheme.

Revolutionaries in the New Deal had never put in any faith in constitutional government. In *The Industrial Discipline and the Governmental Arts* published in 1933, Professor Rexford Guy Tugwell had written: "Any people which must be governed according to the written codes of an instrument which defines the spheres of individual and group, state and federal actions must expect to suffer from the constant maladjustment of progress. A life which changes and a constitution for governance which does not must always raise questions which are difficult for solution."

Roosevelt himself disclosed in his first inaugural address, delivered on March 4, 1933, that his concept of leadership

did not exclude dictatorship. He warned that if Congress failed to support his recommendations, "I shall not evade the clear course of duty that will then confront me. I shall ask the Congress for the one remaining instrument to meet the crisis—broad executive power to wage a war against the emergency as great as the power that would be given me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe. . . . The people of the United States have asked for discipline and direction under leadership. They have made me the present instrument of their wishes."

In his annual message to Congress on January 3, 1936, Roosevelt boasted that his administration had developed "new instruments of public power," and declared: "In the hands of a people's government this power is wholesome and proper. But in the hands of political puppets of an economic autocracy such power would provide shackles for the liberties of the people. Give them their way and they will take the course of every autocracy in the past—power for themselves, enslavement for the public."

The first intimation that Roosevelt would not tolerate an independent judiciary came on May 31, 1935, four days after the Supreme Court had declared the NRA unconstitutional. At a press conference, he said the Court's decision had put the United States back in the "horse and buggy age." He predicted, correctly, that the court would invalidate the AAA, and incorrectly that five-cent cotton and forty-cent wheat would be the result. In their book about the Supreme Court crisis of 1937, called *The 168 Days*, Joseph Alsop and Turner Catledge report that Roosevelt first declared war on the court an hour or so before the "horse and buggy" press conference. Felix Frankfurter of the Harvard Law School and General Hugh Johnson, NRA administrator, were summoned to the White House where they found Roosevelt in a fighting mood. He said the country was with him, not with the court. He swore angrily to bring the court into line if he had to "pack it" or "deny it appellate jurisdiction."

Roosevelt's "horse and buggy" attack on the court produced

a storm of popular and editorial indignation, which may have shaken his conviction that the country was with him. He secretly put Homer Cummings, his Attorney General, to work on the problem of bringing the court "into line," but he concealed his intentions all through the 1936 election campaign. However, on July 5, 1935, in a letter to Representative Samuel B. Hill of Washington, the President manifested contempt for the Constitution. Hill was chairman of a subcommittee which was considering the Guffey-Vinson bill to regulate the coal industry. Roosevelt, who had taken a solemn oath on a Bible that had been in his family for more than 300 years to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States," wrote to Representative Hill: "I hope your committee will not permit doubts as to constitutionality, however reasonable, to block the suggested legislation." The purpose of the legislation was to re-establish, for the coal industry, the NRA code system which the Supreme Court had unanimously declared unconstitutional. Therefore the doubts about its constitutionality were reasonable indeed, as Roosevelt acknowledged when he said he wanted the legislation anyway. The Supreme Court further confirmed the reasonableness of the doubts on May 18, 1936, when it held the Guffey-Vinson Act unconstitutional.

In 1936 the court held the AAA unconstitutional. In the same year it invalidated a New York State minimum wage law for women. Roosevelt sarcastically remarked that the judges seemed determined to create a "no man's land" in which neither the federal government nor the states could act. In March, 1937, however, the court upheld a Washington State minimum wage law, reversing the effect of its decision in the New York State case a year earlier. It was a five to four decision in each case. A switch by Justice Roberts changed the result.

On April 12, 1937, the court handed down a five to four decision sustaining the Wagner Labor Relations Act. On May 24 it upheld the New Deal's social security law.

Meanwhile the President, having won re-election by a landslide of 27,476,000 votes to 16,679,000 for Landon, carrying

every state except Maine and Vermont, assumed that he had a mandate to govern the people without let or hindrance from Congress or the Supreme Court. On February 5, 1937, he astonished Congress and the country with a message demanding the right to appoint to the Supreme Court and all inferior courts an additional justice for each sitting member who, having served ten years and attained the age of seventy, should refuse to resign or retire within six months. Such legislation, in the absence of retirements, resignations, or deaths, would have given Roosevelt the right to enlarge the Supreme Court from nine to fifteen members.

The Democratic leaders of the Senate and House were not advised of the revolutionary proposal until the morning before the President sent his message to Congress. He received Vice President Garner, Speaker Bankhead, Majority Leader Joe Robinson of the Senate, Majority Leader Sam Rayburn of the House, Senator Ashurst of Arizona, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and Representative Sumners of Texas, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, at the White House a half hour before he announced his plan at a press conference. He did not consult them; he told them. Hurriedly, he read brief excerpts from his message. On the way back to the Capitol, Sumners announced: "Boys, here is where I cash in my chips."

Senator Ashurst, who recently had denounced court packing as a "prelude to tyranny," issued a one-line statement late that afternoon saying he was in "favor of the President's proposal."

As expected, conservative Democrats promptly condemned the proposal. Virginia's venerable Carter Glass, almost eighty years old, was in Lynchburg. "Of course I shall oppose it," he told a reporter. "I shall oppose it with all the strength which remains in me, but I don't imagine for a minute that it will do any good. Why, if the President asked Congress to commit suicide tomorrow they'd do it."

What the administration had not anticipated was opposition from many so-called liberals, both in and out of Congress, who had been ardent New Dealers. Foremost in the congressional

group was Senator Burton K. Wheeler (D., Mont.), who was chosen leader of the Senate opposition. The Republicans wisely decided to keep quiet and let the Democrats lead the fight. However, the late Senator Borah of Idaho, a member of the Judiciary Committee, worked closely with Wheeler and was an effective leader because of his prestige in the senate. The unhappy Ashurst, half statesman and half clown, probably contributed as much as anyone else to the defeat of the court packing scheme, which he privately abhorred and publicly damned with faint praise. He adopted a Fabian strategy, insisting that protracted hearings should be held, that all comers should be heard, and that the people should be educated on all the issues involved. "We court hesitation, neglect, and delay," he said. Administration leaders were frantic, but they could not hurry him. "No haste, no hurry; no waste, no worry," he quipped.

On June 14, a bipartisan majority of the Senate Judiciary Committee submitted an adverse report condemning the court packing bill as a plan to "subjugate the courts to the will of Congress and the President and thereby destroy the independence of the judiciary, the only certain shield of individual rights."

"It applies force to the judiciary," the report declared. "It violates all precedents in the history of our government and would in itself be a dangerous precedent for the future."

In his message to Congress, the President said the legislation was needed to expedite the work of the courts and to invigorate them by the "permanent infusion of new blood." In a radio address to the nation, on March 9, 1937, however, the President said: "When the Congress has sought to stabilize national agriculture, to improve the conditions of labor, to safeguard business against unfair competition, to protect our national resources, and in many other ways to serve our clearly national needs, the majority of the court has been assuming the power to pass on the wisdom of these acts of Congress and to approve or disapprove the public policy written into these laws."

"Here," said the Judiciary Committee's report, "is the frank

acknowledgement that neither speed nor 'new blood' in the judiciary is the object of this legislation, but a change in the decisions of the court—a subordination of the views of the judges to the views of the executive and legislative, a change to be brought about by forcing certain judges off the bench or increasing their number."

Opposition to the packing plan increased with the Supreme Court's decisions upholding the Washington minimum wage law in March, the Wagner Act in April, and the social security legislation in May. The opposition grew even stronger when Justice Willis Van Devanter retired on June 2, creating a vacancy for Roosevelt's first appointment. On July 20, the morning after his return from Joe Robinson's funeral on a train with congressional leaders on both sides of the court packing fight, Vice President Garner went to see Roosevelt and told him his project was dead beyond any hope of resurrection. Two days later, when Senator Logan (D., Ky.) moved by pre-arrangement to send the court packing plan back to the Judiciary Committee and instruct it to report out a harmless measure for the reform of judicial procedure, California's aged and ailing Hiram Johnson struggled to his feet and asked: "The Supreme Court is out of the way?"

"The Supreme Court is out of the way," said Logan.

"Glory be to God!" Johnson exclaimed.

The motion was adopted by a vote of seventy to twenty-five.

Roosevelt lost the court packing battle, but won his war to change the American form of government. When the Supreme Court upheld the Wagner Labor Relations Act on April 12, 1937, the United States ceased to be a republic with a government of limited powers, expressly enumerated in the Constitution, and became a welfare state on the European model, in which the national legislature has power to regulate industry, agriculture, and virtually all the activities of the citizens. This concept of government was not completely established until the court upheld the Social Security Act on May 24, 1937, and the compulsory marketing quotas of the new AAA on April

17, 1939; but the New Deal principle of unfettered legislative authority was accepted when the court pronounced the Wagner Act constitutional. We still have the Bill of Rights, which safeguards the fundamental liberties of the people, but even this protection could be destroyed by treaties.

In 1935, when the Supreme Court upheld the New Deal's repudiation of the gold payment clause in government obligations as well as private contracts, Justice McReynolds declared in a dissenting opinion that "the Constitution as we have known it is gone." He was widely derided. Two years later, however, it could be demonstrated that the Constitution, as a majority of the court had known it before Roosevelt declared war on the judiciary, was indeed gone. In the NRA case, the Supreme Court cited with approval its dictum in *Industrial Association v. United States* (268 U.S. 64): "The alleged conspiracy and the acts here complained of spent their intended and direct force upon a local situation, for building is as essentially local as mining, manufacturing, or growing crops; and if by resulting diminution of the commercial demand, interstate trade was curtailed, either generally or in specific instances, that was a fortuitous consequence so remote and indirect as plainly to cause it to fall outside the reach of the Sherman act."

Here was a specific dictum, quoted with approval as late as May 27, 1935, that such activities as building, mining, manufacturing, and the growing of crops, are local, and therefore beyond the purview of Congress. Even more significant was the court's 6 to 3 decision invalidating the Guffey-Vinson Coal Act on May 18, 1936, less than a year before Roosevelt sought to pack the court. This law had two parts, one setting up price fixing and marketing provisions and one regulating labor relations. Justices Cardozo, Brandeis, and Stone dissented from the majority opinion invalidating the whole law. Chief Justice Hughes dissented from that part of the majority opinion which struck down the marketing provisions, but concurred in the ruling that the labor relations provisions were unconstitutional. The majority opinion declared that "the relation of employer

and employee is a local relation." To the government argument that interstate commerce was affected by struggles between employers and employees, the court replied that such "evils are all local evils over which the federal government has no legislative control." This was about as specific as the court could be in denying the power of Congress to regulate labor relations. Chief Justice Hughes, in a separate concurring opinion, declared that Congress has adequate authority to maintain the orderly conduct of interstate commerce, but may not use it to regulate activities and relations within the states which affect interstate commerce only indirectly.

Vehemently, he continued: "Otherwise in view of the multitude of indirect effects Congress in its discretion could assume control of virtually all the activities of the people to the subversion of the fundamental principles of the Constitution. If the people desire to give Congress the power to regulate industries within the state and the relations of employers and employees in those industries they are at liberty to declare their will in the appropriate manner, but it is not for the court to amend the Constitution by judicial decision."

Eleven months later, Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the majority, pronounced the Wagner Labor Relations Act constitutional. Congress has power, he said, to regulate labor relations in manufacturing plants to protect interstate commerce "from the paralyzing consequences of industrial war."

The court's construction of the constitutional power of Congress to "regulate commerce . . . among the several states" in the Wagner Act decision was followed by an equally revolutionary interpretation of the so-called "general welfare" clause in the decisions upholding the social security law and the new AAA. In Article 1, Section 8, the Constitution gives Congress power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States." In all previous interpretations of this provision since the founding of the Republic the court had held that the power of Congress to tax and spend

for the general welfare is limited by the other powers enumerated in Article 1, Section 8. These enumerated powers do not include authority to tax and spend for the regulation of agriculture or for the payment of old age pensions and other social security benefits. Yet that is the effect of the court's decisions upholding the Social Security Act and the second AAA. With that principle established, the only limitation on the power of Congress to tax and spend for the general welfare is its own discretion as to what the general welfare is.

Chief Justice Hughes may have believed that "amending the Constitution by judicial decision," which he had condemned so fervently in the coal act case, was a lesser evil than the possible subjugation of the judiciary, as proposed by the President. It may be the verdict of history, however, that he saved the court by sacrificing the Constitution. He acceded to a doctrine which—to use his own words in the coal act case—would give Congress power in its own discretion "to assume control of virtually all the activities of the people to the subversion of the fundamental principles of the Constitution."

When retirements and deaths gave Roosevelt an opportunity to "pack" the Supreme Court with New Deal zealots, his victory was complete. His first appointee was Senator Hugo L. Black of Alabama, a former police court judge and Ku Klux Klansman, who had denounced the Supreme Court as intemperately as any New Deal Jacobin in the Senate. Black concealed his former membership in the Klan until he was safely confirmed by the Senate, and there is no evidence that Roosevelt knew anything about it when he made the appointment. However, even supporters of the President attributed the Black appointment to spite. Roosevelt wished to humiliate the Senate and degrade the court by making the worst possible appointment. After Black's Ku Klux past had been disclosed by a newspaper, he confessed it in a nation-wide radio speech.

The standard of judicial appointments established by Roosevelt was continued by Truman. Justice Clark, the last Truman appointee, refused to accept the invitation of a House Judiciary

Subcommittee which wanted to question him about tax fixing scandals, the paroling of Capone gangsters, and other irregularities when he headed the Justice Department.

In the 1938 primaries, Roosevelt attempted to purge Democratic candidates up for re-election that year who had fought his court-packing bill and other New Deal proposals. Senators on the purge list included George of Georgia, Smith of South Carolina, Tydings of Maryland, Gillette of Iowa, Clark of Missouri, McCarran of Nevada, Adams of Colorado, Van Nuys of Indiana and Lonergan of Connecticut. Rep. John O'Connor of New York, chairman of the Rules Committee, headed the list of several members in the House. Attacking Sen. George in a speech at Gainesville, Ga., Roosevelt implied that those who opposed him had been purchased by vested interests. He ascribed the South's difficulties to "old fashioned feudalism," adding: "When you come down to it, there is little difference between the feudal system and the fascist system. If you believe in the one you believe in the other." O'Connor was the only Democrat on the purge list who failed to win renomination.

Harry Hopkins' WPA, which had billions of dollars of taxpayers' money to spend for relief, was turned into a political machine in the campaign to purge anti-New Deal Democrats and re-elect the New Deal faithful. A Senate committee, headed by the late Senator Sheppard of Texas, found that in Kentucky all reliefers were canvassed by the WPA foremen and asked to sign papers pledging themselves to vote for the renomination of Alben Barkley, the Senate Majority Leader. Gov. "Happy" Chandler was running against Barkley. WPA supervisors were shaken down for contributions to the Barkley campaign fund. Conditions were similar in Pennsylvania, where Sen. Joe Guffey, a New Deal yes-man, was seeking re-election, and in Illinois, where the New Deal Senate candidate was Scott Lucas. When questioned by the Senate Commerce Committee on January 11, 1939, regarding his appointment as Secretary of Commerce, Hopkins acknowledged that his own activities in behalf

of New Deal candidates were improper and that he should have fired the "whole kaboodle" of WPA officials in Kentucky.

Harry Hopkins, a seedy, impecunious ex-social worker who never had been and never could be elected to any public office, already had acquired a position of greater influence in the government than Felix Frankfurter enjoyed. Soon he would move into the White House as one of the most powerful figures in history, swaying kings, dictators, and prime ministers, commanders of mighty fleets and armies, all in the name of a president whose vanity he flattered and whose mind he enthralled.

Roosevelt's aggrandizement of the executive function has left the nature of American government permanently altered. Numerous assumptions of broad executive power have become accepted precedents. A series of Supreme Court rulings have destroyed the legal limitations on the scope of federal legislation. A chief executive has attempted to eliminate from Congress members of his own party personally unacceptable to him. Public funds have been used lavishly to coerce the votes of citizens. "The Constitution as we have known it is gone."

VI. "He Lied Us Into War"

THERE is no authority under the American Constitution to "make" war upon another country. The Founding Fathers expected that Congress would "declare" war only in the eventuality that some other country should "make" war upon the United States.

In the Constitutional Convention on August 17, 1787, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts said he "never expected to hear in a Republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war." George Mason of Virginia said such power could not safely be entrusted to the president. Pierce Butler of South Carolina was the only member who had suggested vesting the war power in the president, and he abandoned his proposal in the face of overwhelming opposition. On a motion by Gerry and Virginia's James Madison the members even sought to narrow the war power of Congress by substituting "declare" for "make."

This fundamental principle of the Constitution was subverted by Franklin D. Roosevelt. As Clare Booth Luce told the Republican national convention in 1944, "He lied us into war."

Some of the late President's most zealous apologists now acknowledge that he betrayed the American people into World War II. In his book, *The Man in the Street*, Professor Thomas A. Bailey, of Stanford University, an unmitigated interventionist, writes: "Roosevelt repeatedly deceived the American people during the period before Pearl Harbor. . . . He was faced with a terrible dilemma. If he let the people slumber in a fog of isolation, they might well fall prey to Hitler. If he came out unequivocally for intervention, he would be defeated in 1940."

Reviewing Professor Bailey's book for the *New York Times*, Professor Schlesinger commented approvingly: “If he (Roosevelt) was going to induce the people to move at all, Prof. Bailey concludes, he (Roosevelt) had no choice but to trick them into acting for what he conceived to be their best interests.”

This is the anti-moral Marxist-Leninist precept that the end justifies the means. “We must be ready to employ trickery, deceit, law-breaking, withholding and concealing truth,” wrote Lenin. Can good ends be achieved by evil means? The Gospel according to St. Matthew, 8:18, tells us: “A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit.”

It is self-evident that those who justify the President's deception of the people on the ground that he knew what was best for them, while they did not, have no faith in representative government. The same argument could be used to justify any conceivable despotism, as in fact it has been used by tyrants throughout history. “Necessity is the argument of tyrants, it is the creed of slaves,” said William Pitt.

Many Roosevelt partisans scorn any critical examination of his misdeeds as the judgment of hindsight. Their argument overlooks the historical fact that eighty per cent of the people, according to all the polls, had enough foresight to oppose intervention in the war. Moreover, all history is hindsight. If we don't learn from history, from experience, how can we learn? It is doubly important to scrutinize Roosevelt's record because his adherents still have charge of the foreign relations of the United States.

Also, the subversion of the constitutional war power is relevant to any survey of the revolutionary movement in this country. President Truman, relying solely on the recommendation of the United Nations Security Council and even anticipating that, took the country into the Korean war. A document subsequently prepared for the information of Congress by the executive departments of the government, headed “Powers of the President to Send Armed Forces Outside the United States,”

declares: "Use of the congressional power to declare war . . . has fallen into abeyance because wars are no longer declared in advance. . . . Repelling aggression in Korea or Europe cannot wait upon congressional debate."

There is impressive evidence that Roosevelt was responsible for the intervention of Great Britain and France, as well as the United States, in World War II. If he had refrained from goading British and French officials to stand up to Hitler, and from promising American help if their resistance should result in war, the conflict might have been confined to Germany and Russia. The two most horrible dictatorships in history then might have fought each other to impotence. Western Europe and the United States might have been spared the disasters visited upon them by World War II, as well as the terrible sacrifices now required by the menace of communist Russia.

Hitler had made it unmistakably clear in *Mein Kampf* that he was driving at Russia. He had set himself up as the great enemy of communism, the defender of western civilization; but he had more practical reasons for smashing the Bolshevik regime. He wanted the grain of the Ukraine, the oil, lumber, and mineral resources of the Caucasus. There can be no doubt that he would have settled accounts with Poland by seizing the Polish Corridor, which was taken from Germany by the Versailles Treaty, but this loss would have been negligible compared with the fate that befell Poland.

Great Britain's guarantee to Poland on March 31, 1939, which was supported by France, was followed by British and French declarations of war on Germany when Hitler's Wehrmacht attacked Poland on September 1. The guarantee to Poland was a military absurdity, for there was no possibility that Britain and France could protect that country from a German attack. B. H. Liddell Hart, one of Britain's leading military writers, said the commitment to Poland was both a temptation and a provocation to Hitler. Winston Churchill, who was not a member of the cabinet when Prime Minister Chamberlain made the commitment, declares in his memoirs that history affords no parallel "to this sudden and complete reversal of five

or six years' policy of placatory appeasement and its transformation almost overnight into a readiness to accept an obviously imminent war.”

Churchill recalls that at Munich, in the previous September, Britain and France recoiled from war, in violation of France's treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia, although the Czechs had thirty-five divisions behind their natural fortress line in the Sudeten Mountains, the French had sixty or seventy divisions, and the Germans “could scarcely put half a dozen trained divisions on the Western front.”

After all these advantages had been thrown away, Churchill scornfully declares, “Great Britain advances, leading France by the hand, to guarantee the integrity of Poland which with hyena appetite had only six months before joined in the pillage and destruction of the Czechoslovak state.”¹

Why did Chamberlain do this? Would we have done so without American instigation and a commitment of American support?

In December, 1938, less than ten weeks after the Munich conference, Anthony Eden, former British foreign minister, who had resigned from the Chamberlain government in the previous February as a protest against appeasement of Hitler and Mussolini, conferred with President Roosevelt at the White House. The late Senator William E. Borah (R., Ida.) who had been chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and was well acquainted in Washington diplomatic circles, told this author he had information which made him believe that Roosevelt gave Eden a war commitment. He said he was advised that Roosevelt told Eden to go back home and tell Chamberlain to stand up to Hitler. Roosevelt, it was said, told Eden that if resistance to Hitler should result in war, the United States would not permit the defeat of Britain by Germany.

On December 27, 1945, the late James Forrestal made an entry in his diary about a conversation that day with Joseph P. Kennedy, former ambassador to Great Britain. Forrestal asked Kennedy to tell him about his conversations “with Roosevelt

1. *The Gathering Storm*, by Winston Churchill.

and Neville Chamberlain from 1938 on." Kennedy's view, Forrestal wrote, was that Hitler would have fought Russia without any later conflict with England but for the commitment to Poland. Neither the French nor the British would have made Poland a cause of war "if it had not been for the constant needling from Washington," Kennedy told Forrestal. Kennedy also declared that in his telephone conversations with Roosevelt in the summer of 1939 the President kept telling him "to put some iron up Chamberlain's backside." Forrestal also noted in his diary that Clarence Dillon, a New York investment banker, told him that at Roosevelt's request he had talked to Lord Lothian, the British ambassador before the war, in the same general sense as Kennedy was urged to talk to Chamberlain.

Forrestal acknowledged that there was "undoubtedly foundation for Kennedy's belief that Hitler's attack could have been deflected to Russia," but he said Kennedy failed to take into account "what would have happened after Hitler had conquered Russia." What Forrestal failed to take into account was that Hitler never would have conquered Russia. The German generals knew this. According to Liddell Hart, in his book, *The German Generals Talk*, both General von Brauchitsch, Commander in Chief of the German Army, and General Halder, Chief of the General Staff, "tried to curb Hitler's ambition to succeed where Napoleon had failed." In the captured archives of the German foreign office there was a memorandum dated April 28, 1941, by Baron Ernst Von Weizsacker, Secretary of State, warning Hitler that although the German armies might advance victoriously to Moscow and beyond, Germany would not be able to turn what it had won to account because of "the well known passive resistance of the Slavs." He said Germany would have to reckon with "a continuation of the Stalin system in Eastern Russia and in Siberia and with a renewed outbreak of hostilities in the spring of 1942." Even General George C. Marshall, Roosevelt's Chief of Staff, declared in his official report to Congress that the "turning point of the war" came in December, 1941, when Hitler's forces were stopped before Moscow by a combination of the Russian army and the Russian

winter. And that was before American lend-lease aid had reached Russia in sufficient quantity to have any appreciable effect.

Writing in the September-October, 1949, issue of *Army Ordnance*, General J. F. C. Fuller, distinguished British soldier and historian, assessed the results of Roosevelt's intervention as follows:

“Though Germany was defeated and National Socialism overthrown, Russia and Stalinism took their place. Great Britain was bankrupted and her empire is now in a state of dissolution; and yearly America is spending billions of dollars to stem the Communist flood. . . .

“We Europeans are a truculent congeries of nations who have been fighting each other for upward of 2,000 years and we dislike outside interference. In 1917 you Americans stepped into the war to save one side; and whatever at the time we may have asked for as Englishmen and Frenchmen, as Europeans we did not want to be saved by a non-European power; instead, what we really wanted was to settle our quarrels in our own historic way. Had you not stepped in we should have been forced to come to terms between ourselves, as we have done scores of times before. Without your aid, and it was generous, we Europeans would have concluded the first world war, probably in 1917, by a negotiated peace, which could not have been worse than the one established.

“Again, in the last war, what with your lend-lease, etc., you got entangled in the European brawl, and between 1942 and 1945, backed by your enormous industrial power, you laid the greater part of central Europe flat. But for lend-lease the war could not have continued for long. Again there would have been a negotiated peace, which could not possibly have been as bad as the present so-called one. Though it is true that it would almost certainly have been followed (if not preceded) by a war between Germany and Russia, nothing could have been more beneficial to the world at large; for in it the two dictatorial powers which were threatening the western way of life would

have bled each other white. To imagine that Hitler, had he conquered Russia in Europe, could have held it for long is a joke. It needed no hindsight to see these things, only a modicum of foresight; but sad to say this was lacking. Europe is now impotent either to make peace or wage war, and today she is hanging around your neck like the Ancient Mariner's albatross. If you abandon her she will turn Red; if you do not, there is a high probability that there will be another war."

There is neither space nor necessity here to review the steps by which Roosevelt dragged the country into the war. That has been done by George Morgenstern, in *Pearl Harbor*; by Professor Charles Callan Tansill, in *Back Door to War*; by Frederic Sanborn, in *Design for War*; and by the late Charles A. Beard, in *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War*. It is pertinent, however, to consider some of the factors which accounted for the transformation of Roosevelt from a "perfect isolationist," as he was described by Senator Hiram Johnson after his Chautauqua, N. Y., speech in 1936, into a passionate interventionist.

In the Chautauqua speech, Roosevelt acclaimed the Neutrality Act which Congress had passed at his behest in 1935, and warned the country: ". . . if war should break out again in another continent, let us not blink the fact that we would find in this country thousands of Americans who, seeking immediate riches—fools' gold—would attempt to break down or evade our neutrality."

The President added: "We can keep out of war if those who watch and decide have a sufficiently detailed understanding of international affairs to make certain that the small decisions of each day do not lead toward war and if, at the same time, they possess the courage to say 'no' to those who selfishly or unwisely would let us go to war."

But even before the European war started, the President, in his annual message to Congress on January 4, 1939, attacked the neutrality law and called for its revision to permit action against aggressors by "methods short of war." Four years after

making the Chautauqua speech, Roosevelt, on September 3, 1940, announced the transfer of fifty American destroyers to Great Britain in exchange for naval and air base leases in British western hemisphere possessions. Winston Churchill, in his memoirs, frankly acknowledged that the destroyer deal was “a decidedly unneutral act” which would “have justified the German government in declaring war upon them (the United States).”²

Shortly after transferring the destroyers to Britain, Roosevelt wanted to institute a naval blockade against Japan. Admiral J. O. Richardson, former commander of the United States fleet in the Pacific, testified before the Joint Congressional Committee which investigated the Pearl Harbor disaster that on Oct. 10, 1940, he was summoned to a conference in the office of Navy Secretary Knox. He said Knox reported that the President was considering a plan to station two lines of American ships, one from Hawaii to the Philippines and one from the Dutch East Indies to Samoa, which would shut off all Japanese trade with North and South America. Richardson protested that such an act would mean war with Japan, for which the navy was not prepared, and that the United States would lose the ships. Roosevelt was compelled to abandon the scheme. Only three weeks after proposing what would have been undeclared war against Japan, the President, on October 30, 1940, declared at Boston: “And while I am talking to you mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again: Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars.”

When he made that speech he had no doubt that the United States “sooner or later” would be at war. He had discussed the Pacific situation with Admiral Richardson at the White House on October 8. Richardson testified before the congressional committee that Roosevelt said the Japanese could not always avoid making mistakes, and that “sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter the war.”

What had come over Roosevelt? Certainly the failure of

2. *Their Finest Hour*, by Winston Churchill, p. 404.

his New Deal to solve the unemployment problem was a factor. Just as naturally as in the spring a young man's fancy lightly turns to thoughts of love, a tyrant becomes interested in foreign quarrels when he gets into trouble at home. In Shakespeare's *King Henry IV*, the king admonishes his son, Prince Henry: "Therefore, my Harry, be it thy course to busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels; that action, hence borne out, may waste the memory of the former days."

John D. Biggers, appointed by the President to make a special census of unemployment, reported that about 11,000,000 were totally unemployed as of November, 1937. The depression was as bad as it was when Roosevelt took office. The situation got so bad, according to Morgenthau's diary, that on January 16, 1938, the President told him they would have to continue running a deficit of 3 billion dollars a year for the remainder of Roosevelt's second term and then turn the country over to a Republican or a conservative Democratic administration. Roosevelt was certain that the economic policies of such an administration would produce "chaos" and that the people then would return the New Dealers to power.

In the 1938 elections the Republicans gained 81 House seats, 8 in the Senate, and 11 governorships. It looked bad for the Democrats in 1940. Although Roosevelt told Jim Farley at a Hyde Park conference on July 23, 1939, "Of course I will not run for a third term," Farley doubted his sincerity. Soon after the European war broke out Farley ceased to have any doubt that Roosevelt was a candidate.³ The President had been telling Cordell Hull that Hull was his candidate while telling Farley that Hull was impossible. All the time he was maneuvering, through Harry Hopkins, Henry Wallace, Harold Ickes, and Tommy Corcoran, to be "drafted" as an indispensable man in a great war emergency. With the country in an economic crisis, Roosevelt would go out of office as one of the most discredited presidents in American history unless he could win a third term. Roosevelt's biographers all agree that vanity was one of his strongest characteristics. He was profoundly concerned

3. *Jim Farley's Story*.

about his place in history. In the war he saw an opportunity not only to defeat the depression, but to defeat Hitler and all the forces of evil as well, and thereby to assure for himself an incomparable place in history which would endure throughout the ages.

Roosevelt's impulse to get into the war was fostered, of course, by internationalist-minded men, the same forces which prevailed upon Woodrow Wilson to lead the country into World War I. Some were pro-British, or pro-French, or just anti-Hitler; some sincerely and patriotically believed that Hitler's victory would imperil American security; others wanted to make money out of the war.

A third factor which contributed greatly to Roosevelt's transformation from isolationist to interventionist was communist influence. When Hitler began to rearm Germany and menace the Soviet union, Communists throughout the world became champions of "collective security." The Spanish civil war, beginning in 1936, presaged an eventual death struggle between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, and the Communists intensified their agitation for collective action against Hitler. During the Hitler-Stalin alliance, from August, 1939, to June, 1941, the Communists violently opposed intervention in the European "imperialist" war, but clamored for intervention against Japan in China. The reason, of course, was that a Japanese victory in China would menace the Soviet Union. Stalin had staked out China for the Soviet empire in the 1920's. The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, after an exhaustive investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations, reported that organization was controlled by Communists and used by them "to promote the interests of the Soviet Union in the United States."

The IPR "line" on the Japanese-Chinese war during the period of the Hitler-Stalin alliance is shown by the following quotation from an article by "Asiaticus" in the June, 1941, issue of *Pacific Affairs*, official organ of the IPR: "The conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality agreement . . . was a serious defeat for the equivocal Anglo-American policy of non-inter-

vention in the Sino-Japanese war and another proof that such a policy brings results quite different from those presumably expected. The toleration which allowed Japan to swallow Manchuria and North China failed to encourage Japan to wage war on the Soviet Union. But it did encourage Japan to reach out beyond for spheres of colonial possessions of the non-intervention powers in the south." Professor Philip C. Jessup, IPR chairman, reported in the March, 1940, issue of *Pacific Affairs* that an IPR meeting at Virginia Beach had been marked by "vigorous intimations that it was not only to the interest but also was the duty of the United States to take a stand in behalf of China."

As early as 1935, John V. A. MacMurray, a veteran Far Eastern specialist in the American diplomatic service, now retired, wrote a prophetic memorandum warning the State Department that "even the elimination of Japan, if it were possible, would be no blessing to the Far East or to the world. It would merely create a new set of stresses, and substitute for Japan the U.S.S.R. as the successor of imperial Russia—as a contestant (and at least an equally unscrupulous and dangerous one) for the mastery of the east. Nobody except Russia would gain from our victory in such a war."⁴

Joseph C. Grew, United States ambassador to Japan, wrote in his diary, on May 15, 1939, that a "Japanese-American war would be the height of stupidity from every point of view." Grew repeatedly urged Roosevelt and Secretary Hull to strengthen the position of the Japanese moderates, including Emperor Hirohito and Premier Konoye, by heeding their appeals for a settlement of differences between the two countries. The counsel of these experienced and wise diplomatists was ignored, however, because Roosevelt wanted to get into the European war through the Japanese backdoor. War with Japan would mean war with Germany, Japan's ally under the Tripartite Axis Alliance.

After the American occupation of Iceland on July 7, 1941, according to Churchill, "American convoys escorted by American warships ran regularly to Reykjavik, and although the

4. George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950*.

United States were still not at war they admitted foreign ships to the protection of their convoys.”

Thus the United States was waging undeclared war against Germany in the Atlantic. On July 31, Admiral Harold Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, wrote to Captain Charles M. Cooke Jr.: “The Iceland situation may produce an ‘incident’. . . . Whether or not we will get an ‘incident’ . . . I do not know. Only Hitler can answer.”

Roosevelt was compelled to wait for the Japanese to give him the “incident” he wanted, because Hitler was determined to keep the United States out of the war if possible. According to Churchill, Admirals Raeder and Doenitz urged Hitler to permit submarine attacks on the American ships if convoyed or proceeding without lights. “Hitler, however, remained adamant,” Churchill declares. “He always dreaded the consequences of war with the United States, and insisted that German forces should avoid provocative action against her.” Churchill’s testimony is amply supported by the minutes of Hitler’s conferences with Admirals Raeder and Doenitz and other German naval documents captured at the end of the war, which are set forth in a book titled, *Hitler and His Admirals*, by Anthony K. Martiensen.

While negotiations for a settlement with Japan were in progress in Washington, the administration, on July 25, froze all Japanese assets in the United States. On August 1, the United States banned the export of gasoline and oil to Japan. Roosevelt took these steps in the expectation that sanctions against Japan would mean war. Admiral Stark, testifying before the Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee, declared that all high officials in Washington believed that an oil embargo against the Japanese would force them to grab the oil supplies of the Dutch East Indies, which the United States was secretly committed to defend.

After his Atlantic conference with Churchill, the President, on August 17, handed the Japanese ambassador an ultimatum: “. . . if the Japanese government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by

force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States."

Sumner Welles, Undersecretary of State, testifying before the congressional committee, said this meant "that if Japan continued its aggression the United States would be obliged to take the necessary steps, which would include military action."

In the face of this ultimatum, Prince Konoye, the Japanese prime minister, and Admiral Toyoda, the foreign minister, persisted in efforts which indicated, according to Ambassador Grew, "the earnest wish of the Japanese government to achieve a basic settlement with the United States."⁵ The Japanese officials urged a meeting at Honolulu between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye, but Hull stalled, maintaining that such a meeting should be preceded by a general agreement.

The Konoye cabinet, repeatedly rebuffed by the United States, fell on October 16 and was succeeded by a military dictatorship under General Hideki Tojo. Even the Tojo government, however, did not abandon negotiations for a peaceful settlement. On the contrary, Japan sent a special envoy, Saburu Kurusu, to Washington to assist Admiral Nomura, the Japanese ambassador, in peace negotiations. New proposals also were sent to Nomura for submission to the United States. By intercepting Japanese communications, the United States learned that these proposals were to be Japan's "last effort to prevent something from happening," and that Nov. 25 was the deadline for an agreement. On Nov. 22, Tokio sent a highly significant message to Washington, fixing a new deadline for the negotiations and indicating that a breakdown would mean war. This message, intercepted by the United States, said Japan had decided to wait until Nov. 29, and added: "This time we mean it . . . the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen."

5. *My Ten Years in Japan*, by Joseph C. Grew.

From November 22 to November 25, Hull worked on a *modus vivendi* proposal, calling for a ninety day truce, during which the United States and Japan would resume economic relations and Japan would make no more expansion moves. War Secretary Stimson wrote in his diary that the proposal “adequately safeguarded our interests.” However, Hull never handed the *modus vivendi* proposal to the Japanese. Instead, on November 26, he handed them his historic ultimatum, which was described by an army board appointed to investigate the Pearl Harbor disaster as “touching the button that started the war.”

Why did Hull change his mind? One reason may have been the President’s attitude, expressed at a meeting of the war cabinet at noon on November 25. Stimson’s diary gives the following account of this meeting: “The President . . . brought up entirely the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.”

Hull himself testified at the Pearl Harbor inquiry that the Chinese, British and Dutch influenced his decision to drop the *modus vivendi*. Chiang Kai-shek’s political adviser at that time was Owen Lattimore, whose appointment had been recommended by Roosevelt. Lauchlin Currie, Roosevelt’s administrative assistant for Far Eastern affairs, persuaded the President to recommend Lattimore to Chiang. Lattimore, according to the report of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on its investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations, was “a conscious articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy.” Elizabeth Bentley testified that Currie aided her in her work for the Soviet military intelligence during the war. On June 18, 1941, while the Hitler-Stalin alliance was still in force, Lattimore and Edward C. Carter, secretary general of the IPR, had a two-hour luncheon with Constantine Oumansky, the Soviet am-

bassador in Washington, about Lattimore's appointment as Chiang Kai-shek's adviser. Lattimore testified that his appointment was the subject of their discussion.

On November 25, while the *modus vivendi* was still under consideration, Lattimore, in Chungking, sent Currie at the White House a message saying: "After discussing with the Generalissimo the Chinese ambassador's conference with the Secretary of State I feel you should urgently advise the President of the Generalissimo's very strong reaction. I have never seen him really agitated before. Loosening of economic pressure or unfreezing would dangerously increase Japan's military advantage in China. A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has its forces in China would dismay the Chinese. Any *modus vivendi* now arrived at . . . would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America . . . I must warn you that even the Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation together if the Chinese national trust in America is undermined by reports of Japan's escaping military defeat by diplomatic victory."

At the Pearl Harbor hearing, Hull testified that: "It was manifest that there would be widespread opposition from American opinion to the *modus vivendi* aspect of the proposal, especially to the supplying to Japan of even limited quantities of oil. The Chinese government violently opposed the idea. The other interested governments were sympathetic to the Chinese view and fundamentally were unfavorable or lukewarm. Their cooperation was part of the plan. It developed that the conclusion with Japan of such an arrangement would have been a major blow to Chinese morale."

Thus it is clear that Lattimore and Currie, both identified in sworn testimony as Soviet agents, exerted pressure in the name of Chiang Kai-shek to prevent a settlement with Japan. Even more remarkable evidence of the part played by the Soviet fifth column in precipitating the war is disclosed by William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason in their recently published quasi-official history, *The Undeclared War*. They report that on November 17, 1941, the late Harry Dexter White, a highly placed Soviet spy in the Treasury Department, handed a memorandum

to Secretary Morgenthau, who submitted it to President Roosevelt the next day. According to Langer and Gleason, the White memorandum “became the basis” of the 10-point ultimatum which Secretary Hull transmitted to the Japanese on November 26.

When Stimson returned to his office from the war cabinet meeting on June 25, he found a G-2 report that five Japanese divisions had embarked on ships at Shanghai and had been sighted south of Formosa. When this intelligence was reported to Roosevelt the next morning, according to Stimson, the President “fairly blew up,” accusing the Japanese of bad faith in their truce negotiations. That afternoon Hull obtained the President’s approval and handed the Japanese ambassadors his ten-point ultimatum.

In language threatening war, Hull’s ten-point note demanded withdrawal of all Japanese forces from Indo-China and China, including Manchuria; withdrawal of recognition and support from the Wang Ching-wei and Manchukuo regimes; abandonment of all extraterritorial rights and special concessions in China, and abandonment of the axis alliance to give the United States a free hand in the European war.

On Thursday, November 27, Hull indicated that he regarded his note as an ultimatum. When Stimson called to find out what had happened, Hull said: “I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox—the army and navy.”

With a Japanese attack expected soon, perhaps by Monday, December 1, as the President had indicated, Washington sent messages on November 27 to the army and navy commanders in Hawaii which were in full accord with Roosevelt’s expressed purpose to “maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot.” In a message purporting to be “a war warning,” Admiral Kimmel was told that a Japanese amphibious expedition against the Philippines, Thailand, or the Kra peninsula was indicated, and that he should “execute a defensive deployment.” The message said that Guam, Samoa, and the continental districts had been directed to take measures against sabotage, thus implying that Kimmel should do the same thing. The message to General

Short warned of possible hostile Japanese action at any moment and said that if hostilities could not be avoided the United States desired that Japan should "commit the first overt act." Short was told to take such reconnaissance and other measures as he deemed necessary but "not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent." The army board of inquiry characterized this as a "do-don't" message.

Having been instructed to report on measures taken, Short reported on November 28 that his command was "alerted to prevent sabotage." He interpreted Washington's silence as tacit approval. At the Congressional inquiry, Representative Keefe (R., Wis.) asked General Marshall whether it was not his responsibility, as Chief of Staff, to give further orders when it appeared that Short was alerted only against sabotage. Marshall said it was his "responsibility as Chief of Staff" to intervene and that he did not do it.

On November 29, Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, sent Kimmel a message saying: "Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act." The next day Kimmel received, for his information, a dispatch addressed to Admiral Hart, commander of the Asiatic squadron in the Philippines, saying the Japanese were about to attack points on the Kra isthmus. On December 1 the fortnightly naval intelligence summary, issued by Stark, informed Kimmel that, "Major capital ship strength (of Japan) remains in home waters, as well as the greater portion of the carriers."

In short, the only information conveyed to Hawaii by Washington indicated that the Japanese were expected to attack the Kra isthmus and that the Pearl Harbor commanders were expected to take defensive measures against sabotage only.

Meanwhile, Washington was intercepting Japanese war messages indicating the time, place and character of the Pearl Harbor attack. Washington knew that Tokio had requested information from Hawaii that obviously was intended to make a "bomb plot" of Pearl Harbor. The army board of inquiry reported that "between the dates of December 4 and 6 the im-

minence of war on the following Saturday or Sunday was clear-cut and definite.”

On December 6, Tokio advised its emissaries in Washington that it was sending a fourteen-part reply to Hull's November 26 ultimatum. The ambassadors were directed to withhold the reply from the American government pending the arrival of a separate message fixing the time for its delivery. The first thirteen parts of the message were translated and delivered to President Roosevelt at the White House by Commander L. R. Schulz, assistant White House naval aide, at 9:30 P.M. Commander Schulz testified that when Roosevelt read them he looked up at Harry Hopkins and exclaimed: “This means war!”

It was more than fifteen hours before the attack came, ample time to warn the Pearl Harbor commanders, but this was not done. Schulz said the President asked the White House telephone operator to get Admiral Stark, but was told that Stark was at the National Theater, where *The Student Prince* was playing. The President did not have Stark paged, Schulz said, because he did not wish “to cause public alarm.”

When the thirteen parts of the Japanese message reached the War Department at 9:00 P.M., they were transmitted at once by Colonel R. S. Bratton to Colonel (later Lt. General) Walter Bedell Smith, secretary of the General Staff. Bratton emphasized the extreme importance of the information, but Smith did nothing about it.

“Whatever was the reason of Colonel Smith for not conveying this message to General Marshall on the night of December 6, it was unfortunate,” said the Army Board of Inquiry.

At 5:00 A.M. on December 7 the final part of the Japanese message, breaking off relations and proclaiming war with the United States, was intercepted. It was translated and available for distribution by 9:00 A.M. Then, between 9:00 and 9:30 A.M., there came a separate message directing delivery of the fourteen-part reply at 1:00 P.M. Although he failed to do anything about it when this information was received, Secretary Knox later stated in a secret report to Roosevelt, on December

15, 1941, that "a surprise move of some kind was clearly indicated by the insistence upon the precise time of . . . 1 o'clock on Sunday." One o'clock Washington time would be 7:30 Honolulu time, the right hour for a daylight attack. The attack came at 1:25 Washington time (7:55 Honolulu time).

When the message fixing one o'clock as the time for delivery of the Japanese note reached the War Department, Colonel Bratton tried to reach Marshall but discovered that the Chief of Staff was out horseback riding. According to the Army Board's report, Marshall finally reached his office at 11:25 A.M. The final message from Washington to Hawaii was drafted by Marshall and was dispatched to Short at 12:18 P.M. Washington time (6:48 A.M. Honolulu time), one hour and seven minutes before the Pearl Harbor attack. But it was not delivered until 11:45 A.M., two hours after the attack had ended. Marshall could have reached Short in a matter of minutes by using his "scrambler" telephone but he did not. He said "there was a possibility of a leak which would embarrass the State Department." The War Department was dubious about getting through to Hawaii with its own radio transmitter but Marshall could have used the powerful navy and FBI transmitters. Instead he sent his message by commercial radio. Because it was not marked "priority," other messages so marked were decoded first in the Hawaii signal office. Marshall's use of only one means of communication, according to the Army Board, "violated all rules requiring the use of multiple means of communication in emergency. . . . We find no justification for a failure to send this message by multiple secret means either through the navy radio or FBI radio or the scrambler telephone or all three."

Marshall was questioned at the congressional inquiry about Stimson's statement, "The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves." He replied: "Of course no one anticipated that that overt act would be the crippling of the Pacific fleet."

The announced army and navy casualties in the Pearl Harbor disaster were 2,897 dead, 879 wounded and 26 missing.

Also lost, or severely damaged, were eight battleships, three cruisers, three destroyers and 188 airplanes.

Ernest Lindley and Forrest Davis report in *How War Came* that Roosevelt was tieless and in his shirtsleeves, attending to his stamp collection, when Secretary Knox reached him by telephone and said: "Mr. President, it looks like the Japanese have attacked Pearl Harbor. . . ."

"No!" the President is said to have cried, as if the information surprised him.

At 8:30 P.M. on December 7, after he had received fairly comprehensive reports on the catastrophic extent of our losses at Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt presided at a meeting of the Cabinet in the White House. Miss Perkins reports that Postmaster General Frank C. Walker turned to her as they left the White House and remarked: "I think the boss really feels more relief than he has had for weeks."

VII. World Revolutionary War

“**T**HE legitimate object of war is a more perfect peace,” said General Sherman. The object of World War II, as the revolutionists in Washington saw it, was world revolution in the image of the Soviet Union.

American Communists, working under the direct supervision of shadowy agents of the Kremlin, sat in the centers of power of the United States government, where they were in a position to subvert both domestic and foreign policies. They held influential positions in the White House, the State Department, the Treasury Department, the War Department, the Office of Strategic Services, the War Production Board, the Board of Economic Warfare, the Office of Price Administration, the Office of War Information, and many other government agencies. They had access to every top secret government document with the possible exception of some which never left the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Espionage for the Soviet Union, however, was a secondary consideration. Their primary purpose was to influence government policies toward the creation of a Soviet America and a Soviet world.

The work of these undercover Kremlin agents was facilitated by the prevailing attitude of the highest New Deal officials, who exalted the Soviet system as a new and superior form of “democracy” which should serve as a model for reforms in the United States. Sumner Welles, former Undersecretary of State, recalls in *Where Are We Heading* that Roosevelt himself believed the American and Soviet systems would undergo modifications until all but about twenty per cent of the difference between them would be eliminated. In short, he believed the

United States would go forty per cent communist and the Soviet Union forty per cent free.

Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's alter ego, was the most powerful individual in the government because of his singular, almost hypnotic influence upon the President. He was the ultimate arbiter of everything from domestic politics to the grand strategy of the war. He was the grand panjandrum of the wartime New Deal.

Even before the United States formally entered the war Hopkins made it clear that he regarded the struggle as a world revolution. In an article published in the *American Magazine* in July, 1941, he wrote: "This is not only a fight for freedom of speech, religion and assembly. It is a fight for economic freedom for the people of the world, a fight to fulfill in this generation all that our fathers fought and strove for in the last 200 years. . . . When a democratic victory is won, then the great wealth of the world must be shared with all people." (Since Hopkins wrote that article the United States has "shared" about 100 billion dollars of its wealth with other nations in the form of lend-lease and postwar aid.)

The diaries of the late James Forrestal contain an illuminating account of some remarks by Hopkins at a dinner given by Lord and Lady Halifax at the British embassy on June 29, 1945. Forrestal, who was present, wrote in his diary:

"Hopkins said that he thought the world was now definitely swinging toward the left, that we were in the middle of the revolution and that it would be unwise to try to oppose it. I replied that it was not inconceivable that the real reactionaries in world politics would be those who now call themselves revolutionaries, because the dynamics of their philosophy all tended toward the concentration of power in the state, with the inevitable result of exploitation of the common man by the masses, or rather, by those who in such a system apply power over the masses. . . .

"Hopkins said that England must inevitably go socialist and that Churchill did not want the things for England that the Labor people wanted—federal housing, slum elimination, own-

ership of industries, etc. I asked Hopkins how any country such as England could go communistic—I said England had been able to exist and subsist because she was a trading nation and that a capitalistic system was essential to the existence of England. . . . I said that such a nation could only become communistic if we, the United States, underwrote the transaction. . . .

“Hopkins obviously did not want to pursue this conversation too far, because, I suspect, he did not want to be driven to the position that he was advocating either revolution or Communism for this country. . . .”

In April, 1952, Colonel Igor Bogolepov, former counselor of the Soviet Foreign Office, who escaped from Russia and came to the United States after the war, told the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee a remarkable story about Hopkins and lend-lease aid to the Bolsheviks. Bogolepov testified that in July, 1941, the Kremlin learned that Roosevelt was sending Hopkins to Moscow for lend-lease negotiations with Stalin. Constantine Oumansky, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, was ordered to find out everything he could about Hopkins, especially his attitude toward the Soviet Union, and also to get all possible information about concessions that Roosevelt would demand in return for lend-lease assistance. Meanwhile, Stalin appointed a committee, headed by V. M. Molotov, the foreign minister, to prepare a list of “maximum” concessions that would be granted by Moscow in the expected bargaining with Hopkins. Bogolepov was a member of this committee of high ranking Soviet officials. The Soviet government was prepared, if necessary, to: (1) permit strict American inspection of the use of lend-lease materials; (2) admit American military observers into the Soviet lines; (3) grant mining concessions for manganese ore, which the United States imports for its steel industry; (4) invite American capital to participate in the development of Siberia’s resources; (6) give a solemn pledge to maintain freedom of speech, freedom of political parties, and freedom of religion. Of course these pledges would have been worthless after the war, but so long as the Bolsheviks were getting lend-

lease assistance, the United States could have held them to their contract. Before Hopkins reached Moscow, however, Molotov gleefully told his colleagues that their recommendations would be shelved. He said the Soviet government had learned from "a certain man at the very highest level of the Roosevelt administration" that "Mr. Hopkins will demand no concessions whatever."

"His desire is to ask nothing and to give everything," Molotov added. "What he wants is to keep us in the fight—and that is all. Mr. Hopkins is completely on our side and may be trusted absolutely."

Bogolepov said he was led to believe that Moscow's informant was a spy either in the White House or the State Department, but he did not learn his name.

In October, 1941, Averell Harriman headed a second lend-lease mission to Moscow. At Hopkins' request, according to Robert E. Sherwood's book, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, Harriman left Colonel Philip Faymonville in Moscow to act as representative there for lend-lease. Sherwood reports that this appointment led to a controversy in the War Department, because Faymonville "was one regular army officer who was sympathetic to the Russians." However, when General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, received a memorandum from an undisclosed source declaring that competent men who had served with Faymonville had serious doubts about his judgment and his impartiality respecting the Soviet Union, he merely sent it to Hopkins without comment.

Faymonville, who became a brigadier general before he retired, had not changed his opinion of Communist Russia as late as February 18, 1949, when the *People's Daily World*, an official communist organ on the west coast, published a fulsome report on his views and activities. In his paean to the Bolshevik tyranny he declared that "there is no such thing in the Soviet Union as hostility to other nations, or a desire for their conquest."

As commissar of lend-lease Hopkins sent the Russians many

tons of secret written and photographic data about American military and industrial installations, including atomic energy plants. He even sent them generous samples of Uranium 235, the rare fissionable material which occurs in natural uranium at the ratio of only one part to 140. Major G. R. Jordan, who commanded a ferry base at Great Falls, Montana, where the Russians took possession of lend-lease planes, told the House Un-American Activities Committee in December, 1949, that one consignment of blueprints was accompanied by a note on White House stationery, bearing Hopkins' printed name and initialed, "H. H." It said: "Had a hell of a time getting these away from Groves." Major General Leslie Groves was war-time chief of the atomic project.

Jordan said some Russians listed as many as fifty suitcases as personal luggage. He searched the bags and reported what he found to his superiors in Washington, but their only response was to transfer him to a post where he could not make trouble.

Elizabeth Bentley, a former operative of the Soviet underground, is a major source of information about communist activities in the government during the war. Miss Bentley, who received a B.A. degree from Vassar College, an M.A. from Columbia, and studied a year at a university in Florence, Italy, joined the Communist Party in March, 1935. In 1938, she began working for Jacob Golos, a representative of the Soviet NKVD (secret police), who also was a member of the three-man control commission of the American Communist Party. When Golos died in 1943, Miss Bentley succeeded him as liaison between various underground apparatuses and her superiors in the Kremlin's service. In November, 1945, she renounced communism and told the FBI everything she knew about the Soviet underground.

Miss Bentley has testified before the House Committee on Un-American Activities and the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security. Her story is succinctly told in an excerpt from an FBI report, dated November 25, 1945, which was placed

in the record of the Internal Security Subcommittee on April 14, 1953. According to this report, Miss Bentley named more than eighty individuals who were connected with Soviet espionage work in New York and Washington. Of this number, thirty-seven were employes of the United States government. Miss Bentley told the FBI that "each of these individuals probably obtained information from others either casually, or through actual recruiting" without her knowledge.

Late in 1944, Miss Bentley said, the various espionage groups under her direction were turned over to the direct control of Soviet representatives at their insistence. She was able to identify only one of them. Of him the FBI report states: "This Soviet representative, who has used the cover name 'Al,' has been identified as Anatole Gromov, first secretary of the Soviet embassy, Washington, D. C., who since his arrival in the United States on September 15, 1944, has been suspected by this bureau to be the successor in NKVD activities of Vassili Zubelin, former second secretary of the Soviet embassy, who was recalled to the Soviet (Union) in July, 1944. Zubelin was the reported head of all NKVD activity in North America."

The head of the most important Soviet apparatus under Miss Bentley's direction, according to the FBI report, was Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, who was transferred from the Farm Security Administration to the Board of Economic Warfare in 1942. Members of this group included: Harry Dexter White, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury; Lauchlin Currie, administrative assistant to President Roosevelt; Michael Greenberg, assistant to Currie in the White House; William L. Ullman, a Treasury Department official who later became a major in the air forces, stationed at the Pentagon, where he obtained copies of top secret war plans for the Kremlin; Abraham George Silverman, a civilian employe of the War Department; William Taylor, another Treasury Department official, and several lesser government employes.

The head of the next most important group under Miss Bentley's direction was Victor Perlo in the War Production Board. Members of this group were introduced to Miss Bentley early

in 1944 at the New York apartment of John Abt, general counsel of the CIO Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union and a veteran of the old Harold Ware communist cell in the government. Members of the group included Charles Kramer, an investigator for the Kilgore Subcommittee of the Senate; Henry Magdoff, of the War Production Board, Edward Fitzgerald, who moved from the Treasury Department to the War Production Board; Donald Wheeler, of the Office of Strategic Services; Mary Price, secretary to Walter Lippman, the *New York Herald-Tribune* columnist, and later employed by the CIO United Office and Professional Workers of America; Major Duncan Lee, who went from William J. Donovan's New York law firm to the OSS, which was headed by Donovan; Sol Leshinsky, of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency; George Perozich, also of the UNRRA, and various minor government employes.

Miss Bentley said she had been informed that Alger Hiss of the State Department had separated Harold Glasser, a Treasury Department official, and two or three other members from the Perlo group and turned them over to the direct control of Soviet representatives in this country.

Less important agents with whom Miss Bentley maintained contact but who were not members of particular groups included Robert T. Miller III, of the State Department; Maurice Halperin, of the OSS; Julius J. Joseph, of the OSS; Helen Tenney, of the OSS; Williard Park and Bernard Redmont, of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs; and William Remington, of the War Production Board.

The influence of these Soviet agents with the highest New Deal officials was so great that they could move from one strategic place to another or transfer their friends at will, and successfully defy efforts of the government intelligence services to remove them from so-called sensitive positions. The experience of Silvermaster is an example. Early in 1942, Miss Bentley persuaded him to move from Farm Security to the Board of Economic Warfare, in charge of the Middle East Division, because she thought he would be more useful there. On June

3, 1942, Major General George V. Strong, head of military intelligence, wrote a memorandum to William T. Stone, Silvermaster's immediate superior in the BEW, stating that the Office of Naval Intelligence, the FBI, and various police agencies on the west coast had reports showing conclusively that he was disloyal. General Strong recommended Silvermaster's removal.

Miss Bentley testified that she went to Currie in the White House and that Currie persuaded Robert P. Patterson, Undersecretary of War, that an injustice was being done to Silvermaster. On July 3, 1942, Patterson wrote the following letter to Milo Perkins, executive director of the BEW:

"Dear Mr. Perkins:

"I have personally made an examination of the case and have discussed it with Major General G. V. Strong, G-2. I am fully satisfied that the facts do not warrant anything derogatory to Mr. Silvermaster's character or loyalty to the United States and that the charges in the report of June 3 (from General Strong) are unfounded.

"I request that the copy of the report of June 3 in your files be returned to the War Department."

Testifying about this incident before the House Committee on Un-American Activities on August 4, 1948, Silvermaster declared that neither Currie nor Patterson asked him whether he was a Communist. On April 16, 1953, this Russian-born revolutionist appeared before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. Counsel Robert Morris asked: "As of this moment are you engaged in active sabotage or espionage against the government of the United States?"

"I refuse to answer this question under the privilege," he said.

When Miss Bentley testified before the Senate subcommittee on August 14, 1951, she was asked what avenues she had for moving communist agents from one strategic position to another.

"I would say that two of our best ones were Harry Dexter White and Lauchlin Currie," she replied. "They had an im-

mense amount of influence and knew people and their word would be accepted when they recommended someone."

She said Currie passed secret information to her, including a report that the United States was about to break the Soviet code. Asked whether Currie was a "full fledged member of the Silvermaster group," she replied: "Definitely."

Miss Bentley continued: "It was my understanding he (Currie) was going to be reassigned when I left the group in September, I think it was, 1944. My Soviet contact told me that they did not believe in having such large groups for security reasons because if someone turns sour they know too much; that he intended to put White directly in contact with a Soviet superior and Lauchlin Currie also in direct contact with a Soviet agent, and possibly with some of the smaller fry he could put two or three in one group. But he definitely mentioned putting White and Currie in direct contact."

Miss Bentley testified that White, who had worked for Whitaker Chambers in the Soviet espionage service before the war, gave her many copies of secret government documents. All of them were labeled "Harry," because Soviet agents like to know who is providing what, she said.

"Many, many times those documents were photographed in the Silvermasters' cellar because they couldn't be spared," Miss Bentley declared.

Miss Bentley testified as follows about the Morgenthau plan for Germany:

Senator Eastland: "Did you know who drew that plan?"

Miss Bentley: "Due to Mr. White's influence, to push the devastation of Germany, because that was what the Russians wanted."

Senator Ferguson: "That was what the Communists wanted?"

Miss Bentley: "Definitely Moscow wanted them completely razed because then they would be of no help to the allies."

Mr. Morris: "You say that Harry Dexter White worked on that?"

Miss Bentley: "And on our instructions he pushed hard."

Senator Eastland: "What you say is that it was a Communist plot to destroy Germany and weaken her to where she could not help us?"

Miss Bentley: "That is correct. She could no longer be a barrier to protect the western world."

Senator Eastland: "And that Mr. Morgenthau, who was secretary of the treasury of the United States, was used by the Communists to promote that plot?"

Miss Bentley: "I'm afraid so; yes."

Senator Ferguson: "So you have conscious and unconscious agents?"

Miss Bentley: "Of course. The way the whole principle works is like dropping a pebble into a pond and the ripples spread out, and that is the way we work."

Miss Bentley said White conceived and executed a plan which gave her access not only to all information in the Treasury Department but also secret reports from at least seven or eight other government agencies. She testified that White persuaded the obedient Morgenthau to propose an information trading arrangement to the other government agencies. They agreed and in exchange for secret and confidential reports from the treasury they sent over all their own classified material, which passed over White's desk.

Harold Glasser, now employed by the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds in New York, was questioned by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on April 14, 1953. His duties in the Treasury Department during the war were "to advise the Secretary of the Treasury on foreign financial and economic matters that came before the Treasury Department." He refused to answer any questions about communist connections or espionage for the Soviet Union.

Glasser said he was the Treasury Department's financial expert in the organization of UNRRA, which was headed first by former Governor (now Senator) Herbert H. Lehman of New York and later by the late Fiorello La Guardia, former mayor of New York City. When asked whether he had anything

to do with determining the amount of money the United States should contribute to UNRRA, Glasser said he was one of a group of people who made recommendations to the higher echelons of government. Glasser was asked to name some of the others, and the questioning continued as follows:

Glasser: "Well, the man in the State Department who had the top governmental responsibility below the secretary level was then assistant secretary, I believe, Dean Acheson."

Senator Watkins: "Was Harry Dexter White a member of it?"

Glasser: "I refuse to answer that question on the ground it may tend to incriminate me."

Senator Jenner (Chairman): "Who was your immediate superior in this group?"

Glasser: "I refuse to answer that question on the ground it may tend to incriminate me."

Senator Jenner: "Did you have conferences with Dean Acheson?"

Glasser: "Yes, sir. I couldn't calculate the number, but I don't believe they were ever alone with Dean Acheson. I had conferences as a member of a group."

Senator Jenner: "Was Alger Hiss ever present when you had a conference?"

Glasser: "I refuse to answer that question on the ground it may tend to incriminate me."

Senator Watkins asked whether it was the Treasury Department's policy "to have most of these goods and wares and other things . . . go to the so-called communist bloc of nations." Glasser said the State Department had primary responsibility for political decisions. One of the primary responsibilities of the Treasury Department, he said, was to make a determination as to whether countries seeking UNRRA aid were able to pay for such assistance. Senator Watkins asked whether the Treasury Department ever determined that the Soviet Union could or could not pay for the large-scale assistance it received under the UNRRA program. After consulting his coun-

sel, Glasser replied: "I refuse to answer that question, sir, on the ground that it may tend to incriminate me."

Glasser was asked by the committee counsel, Morris, whether he knew anything about the arrangement whereby the Treasury Department turned over printing plates for American occupation currency to the Russians in Germany. The Russians printed several hundred million dollars worth of this currency, which had to be redeemed by the United States at the expense of the taxpayers. After consulting his counsel, Glasser refused to answer under the privilege against self-incrimination.

Before dismissing Glasser, Morris read into the record a letter of recommendation from Dean Acheson, dated December 23, 1947, to H. L. Lourie, executive director of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, Inc., 165 West 46th Street, New York City.

Acheson wrote that he and Glasser had "worked together" over a seven-year period and that he had been impressed by Glasser's "technical competence and his ability to work under the strain of long hours and difficult negotiations. . . ." He recommended Glasser as "a first rate economist."

In retrospect, the ascendancy of the Communists in the Roosevelt administration during the war seems incredible. Aided by the direct intervention of the White House, they sabotaged the security system of the War and Navy Departments, received commissions in the army and navy, and were admitted to the most secret activities of the armed forces.

Major Hamilton Long, of New York, an air force combat intelligence officer in World War II, has told the amazing story of the communist grip on the War and Navy Departments in his fully documented pamphlet, *America's Tragedy—Today*. Commander Floyd G. Caskey, wartime head of the communist section of the navy's counter-intelligence service, known as the "Red desk," told Major Long that his files contained 100,000 cards on known and suspected Communists and fellow travelers when he left late in 1943 to attend an advanced intelligence

school. When he returned in the spring of 1944 the cards had been destroyed. His assistant, a lieutenant commander who had been left in charge, reported that he had received orders from "higher authority" to destroy the cards.

On May 18, 1944, Senator Bridges (R., N. H.), a member of the Military Affairs Committee, learned that the War Department had ordered the destruction of all records of subversive activities. The next day he went to see Secretary Stimson, who called in General Marshall, Chief of Staff; Lt. General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, and others. When Stimson demanded information about the order, Marshall angrily protested that he was too busy running a war to bother about such matters. McNarney was evasive and belligerent. He challenged the constitutional authority of Senator Bridges (that is, of Congress) to question him. His arrogance finally subsided when Bridges said to him: "I could forgive an officer who makes a mistake and loses a battle, but an officer who betrays his country's security should be taken out and shot." McNarney admitted that his office had issued the order on "higher authority." Since Marshall and Stimson had denied any knowledge of the order, the only other higher authority was the White House.

Although Marshall urged Bridges not to demand a Senate investigation, saying it would bring the army into disrepute, the senator reported to his colleagues and a Military Affairs Subcommittee held closed hearings on the matter. The inquiry was dropped when Stimson on May 27, 1944, wrote a letter promising that no subversive activity files would be destroyed. Despite this promise, some files were destroyed. In October, 1946, Colonel Charles A. Drake testified before the House Military Affairs Committee that he was in charge of a crew of eighteen officers and forty to sixty WACs who worked on a destruction program. The work was suddenly stopped in August, 1945, when General Clark, deputy chief of military intelligence, learned about it and protested that there would be "hell to pay" because it violated Stimson's agreement with the Senate.

A War Department directive of December 30, 1944, stated: "No action will be taken . . . that is predicated on membership in or adherence to the doctrines of the Communist Party unless there is a specific finding that the individual involved has a loyalty to the Communist Party which overrides his loyalty to the United States." Since it was impossible to prove such a superior loyalty if the subject denied it, this order made Communists eligible for commissions and for admission to intelligence, radar, cryptographic, and other schools and duties so secret that military personnel assigned to them could not tell their wives what they were doing.

The directive clearly violated the Hatch Act, which prohibited the payment of government compensation to Communists. The House Military Affairs Committee investigated the granting of commissions to Communists in February, 1945. John J. McCloy, a Wall Street lawyer, whom Stimson had brought to Washington as Assistant Secretary of War on Justice Frankfurter's recommendation, was asked whether a Communist should be given a commission if it should be determined that he was 51 per cent loyal to the United States and 49 per cent loyal to the Communist Party (that is, the Soviet Union). He said: "In the determination of such cases you might get down to a fine point. We try to be sensible about it." McCloy advanced the incredible argument that the "dissolution" of the Communist Party, as announced in January, 1944, by Earl Browder, had made it "impossible any longer to identify actual Communists in this country through current membership in the Communist party." McCloy denied knowledge that any actual Communists had been commissioned, and was promptly rebuked by Browder, who wrote in *The Daily Worker*: "Of course there are Communists holding commissions in the United States army." At a subsequent inquiry, in July, 1945, the House Military Affairs Committee learned that a War Department board headed by Gen. Craig had rejected applications for commissions for nine Communists and that McCloy and McNarney had overruled the board.

Undersecretary Patterson was asked at a press conference

in July, 1945, whether former membership in the Communist Party would bar an individual from receiving a commission. He replied: "I don't think it should, do you?"

How the Communists, aided by the White House, ousted two admirals because they tried to remove communist radio operators from merchant ships is related in Major Long's pamphlet in the words of Admiral Staton, one of the victims. Staton was chairman of a navy board appointed to remove subversive radio operators from merchant ships, under a new law. The board first removed certain Japanese, German and Italian operators of questionable loyalty, and encountered no difficulty. Next it moved against members of the communist-dominated American Communications Association, who were listed under the heading, "Un-American Activities." Admiral Staton reports that the word *Communist* was regarded as political dynamite. One of those removed had boasted that Stalin had a Communist on every American ship and could immediately learn its location by sending out a radio signal. Soon after the board began removing Communists, a delegation from the union demanded their reinstatement and threatened that otherwise "two admirals will be out of a job." This referred to Staton and Admiral Hooper, the navy's distinguished electronics expert, who was responsible for the security of communications at sea.

On March 19, 1942, an extraordinary meeting was held in the office of Secretary Knox. The official minutes, supplied by Admiral Staton, show that Admiral Hooper emphasized the danger of communist cells in the transportation and communications industries. He said they should be destroyed, despite our "temporary military alliance with the USSR," because a change in the international political situation might come at any time. Knox said he held no brief for the Communists, but that President Roosevelt had told him that the United States, being an ally of the Soviet Union, must not oppose the activities of the Communist Party. He said the President had ruled specifically that communist radio operators must not be re-

moved from ships. Knox said he regarded this as an order from the commander-in-chief and that he expected it to be obeyed without mental reservations. Ralph A. Bard, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, supported Knox. When Staton after the conference suggested that Bard and Knox ought "to go to the President and get him to change his mind," Bard curtly replied: "The President has more information than you have." Later, on Knox's orders, Staton was placed on the inactive list and Hooper was retired for "disability."

In 1943, when the Cox Committee of the House was investigating the FCC and related matters, Staton and Hooper were ordered not to testify. Adlai Stevenson, then Knox's assistant, called Staton on the telephone and said the White House had ordered him to refuse to obey a House subpoena.

It can be said in defense of all these War and Navy Department officials that they merely carried out White House orders. However, that defense was pleaded in vain by the Germans who were tried at Nuernberg. The War and Navy Department officials might have protested or resigned, but rather than deprive themselves of the opportunity to bask in the refulgence of Washington officialdom in wartime, they silently sheltered a fifth column in the topmost control centers of the nation's armed forces.

The War Department's Information and Education Division sent out so-called "Orientation Fact Sheets," for use in the indoctrination of all army personnel, which denounced critics of the Soviet Union as "Fascists" and glorified the Stalin tyranny as a "peace-loving democracy" with a constitution superior in some respects to that of the United States. As a combat intelligence officer in the Air Forces, one of my duties was to give orientation talks to the troops, and I received these "fact sheets" from the War Department. I never used them, and if I had there would have been justifiable insubordination if not a riot. Fortunately the American soldiers had too much gump-tion to be deceived by the War Department's communist propaganda. They were more discerning in this respect than Frederick

Osborn, who became a major general as director of the War Department's Information and Education Division and later represented the United States in atomic energy negotiations with the Russians at the United Nations.

The Board of Economic Warfare, created to control the export and import of essential raw materials and deprive the Axis powers of such supplies by "preclusive" buying in foreign countries, was headed by Henry Wallace, the Vice President. Wallace was the candidate of the Communists, on the Progressive Party ticket, for president in 1948. He was a disciple of Nicholas Constantin Roerich, a grotesque, white-bearded Russian who was pleased to be addressed as "Guru," meaning teacher or spiritual leader. Westbrook Pegler, the newspaper columnist, has in his possession a batch of letters to Roerich, written on Department of Agriculture stationery when Wallace was secretary and purporting to be signed by Wallace. The letters can only be described as imbecilic. Wallace has ignored Pegler's repeated challenges to affirm or deny their authenticity.

Another member of the fantastic Roerich cult was Louis L. Horch, a wealthy New York broker, who raised the money to erect the Roerich Museum at 105th Street and Riverside Drive in New York City, which Pegler calls Roerich's Lamasery or Joss House. Horch was an official of the Department of Agriculture under Wallace, and in 1942 he joined Wallace in the BEW. The executive director of the BEW, Milo Perkins, also came from the Department of Agriculture. Perkins, a former theosophist preacher and burlap bag manufacturer in Houston, Texas, wrote a piece for *The Nation* in 1934, advocating a thirty-hour week and a twenty-five per cent wage boost for everybody. Fervidly, he cried: "Grab the Torch! Men of Means, Grab the Torch!" Perkins sold himself to Wallace, a fellow mystic, by writing a letter declaring that "from childhood I have wanted to live in a world I could lift."¹

The chief economist of the BEW was "Dr." Maurice Parma-

1. John T. Flynn, *The Roosevelt Myth*.

lee, who was born in Constantinople and had written a book titled *Bolshevism, Fascism and the Liberal Democratic State*, in which he said: "The high technological development in the United States renders it feasible to introduce a planned social economy much more rapidly than has been the case in the U.S.S.R. . . . The superficial paraphernalia of capitalism can be dispensed with more quickly than in the Soviet Union." He also had written a book called *Nudism in Modern Life*, in which he advocated revival of the cult of the ancient gymnosophists of India, who went naked and devoted themselves to meditation. Nudism should be practiced "wherever feasible in office, workshop or factory," he wrote.

When the House Committee on Un-American Activities exposed Parmalee's aberrations, he was eased out of the BEW and into another New Deal agency, in the customary manner of bureaucracy. And the character who was brought in to replace him as chief economist of the BEW was "Dr." John Bovingdon, whose credentials were thus described on February 7, 1935, by *The Western Worker*, a communist organ: "John Bovingdon, former director of the International Theater in Moscow and well known as a dancer, having recently returned from the Soviet Union, will give a lecture and dance program in Jenny Lind Hall. . . . The affair is being arranged by the Friends of Soviet Russia under whose auspices Bovingdon is touring this country."

Representative Dies, chairman of the Un-American Activities Committee, also exposed Bovingdon. He gave Wallace a list of thirty-five Communists on the BEW payroll. The only thanks he got was a statement by Wallace that it would be better for the "morale" of the BEW if Dies were on Hitler's payroll.

A feud between Wallace and Jesse Jones, head of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which put up the money for the BEW, finally became such a public scandal that Roosevelt, in 1944, was compelled to abolish the BEW and set up a new alphabetical agency, the FEA (Foreign Economic Administration), under Leo Crowley.

The Office of War Information, under Elmer Davis, probably had a higher percentage of Communists on the payroll than any other war agency, although the competition for that dishonor was great. Davis, a radio "news analyst" before and after the war, was and is one of the leading anti-anti-Communists in the United States. He protects himself by occasionally attacking Soviet policies, but he serves the forces of subversion by maintaining that "McCarthyism" is a greater menace to this country than communism.

Owen Lattimore was deputy director of the OWI for Pacific operations and Joseph F. Barnes, foreign news editor of the *New York Herald-Tribune* before and after the war, was deputy director for overseas operations. Both Lattimore and Barnes were leaders in the communist-dominated Institute of Pacific Relations. Alexander Barmine, who was a brigadier general in the Soviet intelligence service before he escaped from Russia and became an American citizen, testified before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee that his superiors in Moscow told him that Lattimore and Barnes were "our men." Hede Massing, a former Soviet agent, testified that she knew Zubelin, mentioned earlier in this chapter, in Washington and Moscow, and that in Moscow in 1937 he took her to a closely-guarded tennis court, reserved for officers of the NKVD. She said she saw Barnes playing on one of the courts and mentioned to Zubelin that it was dangerous for them to be seen there together by an American newspaperman. Zubelin replied: "Barnes? Oh, you needn't worry about Barnes." The subcommittee's record contains an exhibit headed, "Memorandum of Informal Conversation at the Communist Academy, Volkhonka 14, Moscow, May 26, 1934," which states that the following were present: "Voitinsky, Abramson, Barnes, Carter." Barnes and Edward C. Carter were American IPR officials, the others were Russians. Colonel Bogolepov testified that the Russians used the IPR as an arm of their military intelligence.

Archibald MacLeish was the director of the Office of Facts and Figures, which preceded the OWI, and was assistant director of the OWI before he went to the State Department as

assistant secretary. This precious spirit went away to France to live and write poetry in 1923 because life in the United States was too vulgar for his ethereal nature, but he returned in 1930, when the Marxists were beginning to talk boldly about making America over. On June 8, 1937, the communist *Daily Worker* of New York reported his election as vice president of the League of American Writers, successor to the League of Revolutionary Writers. Earl Browder, guest speaker at the meeting, was introduced by MacLeish. Wrote the *Daily Worker* reporter: "It was a genuine people's front meeting, and at such a meeting it was significant and proper that Browder spoke as a Communist. By doing so he gave a tone and necessary sense of direction the meeting might not otherwise have had."

The OWI had a payroll of more than 5,500 and spent \$3,-000,000 a month. It was loaded with draft dodgers, red revolutionists, and a scum of European refugees who pretended to sell America to the world but made it their business to sell Communist Russia to America. The inconceivably alien and un-American character of its personnel was shown by a publication it prepared for distribution in the Soviet Union, called *America Illustrated*. This treatise, written in Russian, described eight Middle Western states as a "bleak, drought-stricken, semi-desert." Industry in that remote region, centering around Chicago, was said to be "almost non-existent." It declared that these eight states, with prairie lands covering almost one quarter of the United States, supported only one twentieth of the population. "The people in it are mostly farmers," it added. "Raw materials and fabricated goods must be imported from other states."

The war gave the revolutionists a vision of the Marxist-Leninist promised land: government taxing and spending on a scale hitherto undreamed of; absolute government control of the national economy; unquestioning obedience, motivated by patriotism, to national authority; exaltation of the Soviet Union as a glorious ally and exemplar for a postwar America.

VIII “Unconditional Surrender” —to Stalin

IN LONDON on the night of April 14, five days after the abandoned American and Filipino forces on the Bataan Peninsula had been overwhelmed by the Japanese, and three weeks before the defenders of Corregidor were to meet the same fate, the decision was made to aid Communist Russia by invading Germany through France. Appeals from the American people to rescue the American garrison in the Philippines were rejected as impractical and reckless, but the Roosevelt administration was prepared to take any risk, at whatever cost in American lives, to save the Soviet Union.

General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, and Harry Hopkins, personal representative of President Roosevelt, won a great victory for the Soviet Union, which was clamorously demanding an invasion of western Europe to open a second front against Hitler. Winston Churchill and other members of the British War Cabinet agreed with extreme reluctance, protesting that Japan was threatening India and might effect a junction with the Germans in the Middle East.

Robert E. Sherwood, in *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, notes the “contradictory circumstance of the American representatives constantly sticking to the main topic of the war against Germany, while the British representatives were repeatedly bringing up reminders of the war against Japan.”

It was “contradictory” indeed, but it was consonant with a policy that dominated American military and political decisions throughout the war—decisions that insured victory for communism. Militarily, the policy called for the total defeat and destruction of Germany as a European power. Politically,

it called for support of the Soviet Union on all European and Far Eastern questions. Hopkins and Marshall persuaded Roosevelt that, to keep Stalin in the war against Germany and later bring him into the war against Japan, it was necessary to give him everything he wanted. Hopkins persuaded Roosevelt that he could prudently do this because Stalin would cooperate for peace after the war. William C. Bullitt, former ambassador to Moscow, protested to Roosevelt that his Russian policy would fail because Stalin could not be trusted. As quoted by Bullitt in *Life* magazine, Aug. 23, 1948, Roosevelt said: “Bill, I don’t dispute your facts. They are accurate. I don’t dispute the logic of your reasoning. I just have a hunch that Stalin is not that kind of man. Harry says he’s not, and that he doesn’t want anything but security for his country. And I think that if I give him anything I can and ask nothing from him in return, noblesse oblige, he won’t try to annex anything and will work with me for a world of peace and democracy.”

There can be no doubt that Hopkins and Marshall expected Russia to dominate Europe after the destruction of Germany. An astounding document which Hopkins took with him to the Quebec conference in August, 1943, headed “Russia’s Position,” is quoted in Sherwood’s book. It was part of “a very high level United States military strategic estimate,” which means that Marshall was familiar with it if he did not write it. Sherwood quotes the following:

“Russia’s post-war position in Europe will be a dominant one. With Germany crushed, there is no power in Europe to oppose her tremendous military forces.

“The conclusions from the foregoing are obvious. Since Russia is the decisive factor in the war, she must be given every assistance and every effort must be made to obtain her friendship. Likewise, since without question she will dominate Europe on the defeat of the Axis, it is even more essential to develop and maintain the most friendly relations with Russia.

“Finally, the most important factor the United States has to consider in relation to Russia is the prosecution of the war in the Pacific. With Russia as an ally in the war against Japan,

the war can be terminated in less time and at less expense in life and resources than if the reverse were the case. Should the war in the Pacific have to be carried on with an unfriendly or negative attitude on the part of Russia, the difficulties will be immeasurably increased and operations might become abortive."

The decision to fight a land war against Germany was the first of a long series of tragic mistakes in the prosecution of the war. Hanson Baldwin, military critic of the *New York Times*, declares in his book, *Great Mistakes of the War*: "There is no doubt whatsoever that it would have been to the interest of Britain, the United States, and the world to have allowed—and indeed to have encouraged—the world's two great dictatorships to fight each other to a frazzle."

Russia, in a death struggle with Germany, could not have won without our help. Stalin could not have made a separate peace with Hitler without giving up Russian territory—the Ukraine and the Caucasus—which would have imperiled his own regime. Yet, as Baldwin remarks, the United States put itself "in the role—at times a disgraceful role—of fearful suppliant and propitiating ally, anxious at nearly any cost to keep Russia fighting." Charitably, he adds: "In retrospect, how stupid!"

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, headed by Franklin D'Olier, former president of the Prudential Life Insurance Company, and staffed by hundreds of technical experts, made an extensive evaluation of the effects of the air war against Germany. It reported: "By the beginning of 1945, before the invasion of the homeland itself, Germany was reaching a state of helplessness. Her armament production was falling irretrievably, orderliness in effort was disappearing, and total disruption and disintegration were well along. Her armies were still in the field. But with the impending collapse of the supporting economy, the indications are convincing that they would have had to cease fighting—any effective fighting—with in a few months. Germany was mortally wounded."

This conclusion is supported by the testimony of General

Heinz Guderian, Germany's great commander of armored forces and master of the blitzkrieg technique. In his book, *Panzer Leader*, General Guderian writes: “The Allied air offensive had brought ever increasing devastation to Germany during the last few months. The armament industry had suffered heavily. The destruction of the synthetic oil plants (in January, 1945) was a particularly severe blow, since our fuel supplies were mainly based on those installations. . . . The destruction of the greater part of our synthetic fuel industry meant that the German command now had to make do with such supplies as came from the wells at Zistersdorf in Austria, and from around Lake Balaton in Hungary.”

Certainly the air offensive, the sea blockade, and Russia's successes on the eastern front would have wrecked the German economy and power of resistance to such an extent that Hitler's regime would have been overthrown and satisfactory peace terms could have been imposed upon his successors.

However, Roosevelt, Hopkins and Marshall were dedicated to the destruction of Germany and were opposed to a negotiated peace even with an anti-Nazi regime in that country. A secret report headed “Joint Board Estimate of United States Over-all Production Requirements,” signed by Marshall and Admiral Stark and submitted to Roosevelt on Sept. 11, 1941, said: “It is believed that the overthrow of the Nazi regime by action of the people of Germany is unlikely in the near future, and will not occur until Germany is upon the point of military defeat. Even were a new regime to be established, it is not at all certain that such a regime would agree to peace terms acceptable to the United States. . . . It should be recognized as an almost invariable rule that only land armies can finally win wars.”¹

This report purported to be a purely military estimate of the situation, but in his letter of July 9, 1941, directing War Secretary Stimson to take the initiative in its preparation, Roosevelt said: “I am asking Mr. Hopkins to join with you in these conferences.”

1. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*.

It is unlikely that historians ever will be able to determine the proportionate share of responsibility which must be attributed collectively to Roosevelt, Hopkins and Marshall for the disasters they brought upon the American people and a large part of the world. Roosevelt had the power, but he was influenced by Hopkins and Marshall. Hopkins also influenced Marshall, and therefore was the dominant member of the triumvirate. Of the three, Marshall's record is the most tragic and incomprehensible. Throughout World War II and the postwar years, down to 1951, when he was largely responsible for the removal of General MacArthur from command in the Far East and for the strategy of appeasement which resulted in our defeat in the Korean war, he seemed to be under a spell, the mental captive of invisible and sinister forces. The record of his service to the communist cause, however innocent, is appalling, and hardly could have been worse if he had consciously acted on instructions from the Kremlin.

Marshall's reputation as a military "genius" was one of the many myths propagated by the New Dealers. He did have an exceptional memory for detailed figures and facts about the army, such as its strength, organization, equipment, state of training, deployment and finances, and by reciting such information hour after hour without reference to notes he greatly impressed committees of Congress. For that reason it was all the more remarkable when he said he could not remember where he was on the night before the Pearl Harbor attack. He knew little more about the science of warfare than Roosevelt knew about economics or Hopkins about religion. I once heard him express an "expert" military opinion which astonished non-military observers at the time, and which in retrospect seems incredible. He was testifying before a Senate committee in the summer of 1940, after the German break-through in France. A senator asked him whether the army knew how to stop tanks. Marshall said he believed the jeep was the answer to the tank. To the flabbergasted senators, he explained: "As I conceive it, hundreds of jeeps will swarm over the battlefield, each of them towing a 37 millimeter anti-tank gun. That way we will put

the tanks out of business.” As it turned out, the 37 millimeter anti-tank guns Marshall was talking about wouldn’t stop a light tank at close range, but that was beside the point. What the German tiger and panther tanks might have done to a fleet of jeeps racing out on a battlefield would have been a spectacle.

As a colonel in the early years of the Roosevelt administration, Marshall ingratiated himself with the New Dealers by his efforts in behalf of Civilian Conservation Corps camps under his command. At Fort Screven, he had under his command the CCC activities of Georgia and northern Florida. Later at Fort Moultrie he directed the CCC in South Carolina. His activities in charge of these camps attracted the attention of the New Dealers who were interested in the CCC, including Mrs. Roosevelt, Hopkins, and Aubrey Williams, head of the National Youth Administration.² In 1936, Marshall became a brigadier general and in 1938 Roosevelt made him Chief of Staff, jumping him over the heads of twenty major generals and fourteen senior brigadier generals. Sherwood reports that Hopkins “strongly recommended” Marshall’s appointment as Chief of Staff.

According to Stimson’s book, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, the plan for an invasion of Europe across the English channel “was the brain child of the United States army.” General Eisenhower, a Marshall protégé, who was in charge of the War Department’s War Plans (later Operations) Division, takes full responsibility, or rather credit, for the European invasion project and says it was enthusiastically supported by his subordinates. The evidence is conclusive, however, that if Eisenhower’s ideas had not been in full accord with those conceived before the war by Marshall and Hopkins, the planning assignment, the supreme command of the allied expeditionary forces, and the five stars that adorned his shoulders would have gone to some other general.

The officers in the War Plans Division were thinking about the purely military question of defeating Germany as quickly as possible. They were not concerned about the postwar world

2. *America’s Retreat from Victory*, by Senator Joseph McCarthy.

or other political questions. Churchill, however, strongly opposed the cross channel invasion both on military and political grounds. He was thinking about the 3,190,235 British empire casualties in World War I, which irreparably weakened his country. He was thinking about the future of Europe and the world, with Germany destroyed and triumphant communism dominating the Eurasian heartland.

Churchill's exemplary prudence only provoked suspicion in the minds of the American "Russia First" strategists. "A major factor in all American thinking of that time," writes General Eisenhower, "was a lively suspicion that the British contemplated the agreed-upon cross-channel concept with distaste and with considerable mental reservations. . . ."

Hopkins told Churchill in London in April, 1942, that "the disposition of the United States was to take great risks to relieve the Russian front," according to Sherwood. Marshall spoke of the possibility of launching an emergency operation on the French coast as early as the fall of 1942, and said President Roosevelt would favor taking this "great risk" using American troops to the fullest extent possible, if it should be required by developments on the Russian front. Eisenhower was afraid of becoming involved in the Middle East or northwest Africa so deeply that the cross-channel invasion would be postponed indefinitely. Accordingly he told Marshall that he favored a limited operation on the northwest coast of France in the fall of 1942 to capture an area which later would serve as a bridgehead for a large-scale invasion.³ He was prepared to take that risk, although he states that in June, 1942, "the great bulk of the fighting equipment, naval, air and ground, needed for the invasion did not exist." Hanson Baldwin declares: "It is obvious that our concept of invading western Europe in 1942 was fantastic; our deficiencies in North Africa, which was a much needed training school, proved that."

The projected 1942 operation in France was abandoned in favor of the invasion of North Africa, which Churchill favored and Roosevelt demanded because of his determination to do

3. *Crusade in Europe*, by Dwight D. Eisenhower.

something for the Russians in 1942. The major cross-channel invasion, originally planned for the spring of 1943, was postponed until the fall, then May 1, 1944, and finally June 6, 1944, as the British repeatedly sought to prevent it by extending operations in North Africa to Sicily and Italy. Churchill hoped that the campaign in Italy would lead to an invasion across the Adriatic Sea through Yugoslavia and into central and southeastern Europe before Stalin could get there. Churchill was defeated, however, when Roosevelt supported Stalin at the Teheran conference in late November, 1943.

According to Sherwood, Roosevelt said he was opposed to any secondary operation which would delay the cross-channel invasion but acknowledged that he had been talking to Churchill about future operations in the Adriatic and Aegean Seas and in the Balkans, from bases in Turkey, if the Turks could be brought into the war.

This suggestion annoyed Stalin, but not more so than Hopkins. Sherwood reports that Hopkins scribbled a note to Admiral King, Chief of Naval Operations, demanding: “Who’s promoting that Adriatic business that the President continually returns to?” Hopkins was virtually accusing the Commander in Chief of insubordination. Admiral King could not enlighten him.

Elliott Roosevelt, in his book *As He Saw It*, reports an extraordinary conversation he had with his father about the disagreement between Churchill and Stalin. The President said it was obvious that both Churchill and Stalin were motivated by political considerations. When Elliott suggested that Churchill might possibly be right, Roosevelt told him the “one great big invasion” plan had been favored from the beginning by the war plans division and the chiefs of staff. And he added: “It makes sense to me. It makes sense to Uncle Joe. . . . Trouble is, the P. M. [Churchill] is thinking too much of the post-war, and where England will be. He’s scared of letting the Russians get too strong. . . .”

The next display of madness in the conduct of the war was the “unconditional surrender” policy, jauntily proclaimed by

Roosevelt at a press conference in Casablanca, January 24, 1943, after a ten-day parley with the British on war plans. According to Elliott Roosevelt, his father first used the phrase at a luncheon on January 23, attended only by the President, Elliott, Churchill, and Hopkins.

Elliott reports: "For what it was worth it can be recorded that it was father's phrase, that Harry took an immediate and strong liking to it, and that Churchill, while he slowly munched a mouthful of food, thought, frowned, thought, finally grinned, and at length announced, 'Perfect! And I can just see how Goebbels and the rest of 'em'll squeal!'"

Elliott attributes this comment to his father: "Of course, it's just the thing for the Russians. They couldn't want anything better. Unconditional surrender! Uncle Joe might have made it up himself."

In a statement to the British House of Commons on Nov. 17, 1949, Churchill substantially confirmed Elliott's account of the birth of the policy. He said the phrase "just popped into Roosevelt's mind." As Hanson Baldwin remarks, however, the notion that the policy was a sudden inspiration is wholly erroneous. It was deeply embedded in the war philosophy of Roosevelt, Hopkins, and Marshall, and had been implicitly expressed in the secret report of the Army and Navy Joint Board of Sept. 11, 1941. General Grant, in 1862, won great popularity when he used the phrase "unconditional surrender" in response to a request from General Buckner for terms for the capitulation of Fort Donelson. It is a reasonable conjecture that Roosevelt believed the phrase would be equally popular as a slogan for his program to destroy Germany. How Churchill failed to perceive the vast differences between surrendering a fort and a country is incomprehensible.

The disastrous consequences of the unconditional surrender policy soon became evident. Captain Harry Butcher, Eisenhower's naval aide, noted in his diary on April 14, 1944: "Any military person knows that there are conditions to every surrender. . . . Goebbels has made great capital with it to strengthen the morale of the German army and people. Our

psychological experts believe we would be wiser if we created a mood of acceptance of surrender in the German army which would make possible a collapse of resistance. . . .”

Captain Liddell Hart, who interviewed the leading German generals after the war, declares in his book, *The German Generals Talk*: “All to whom I talked dwelt on the effect of the Allies’ ‘unconditional surrender’ policy in prolonging the war. They told me that but for this they and their troops—the factor that was more important—would have been ready to surrender sooner, separately or collectively. ‘Black-listening’ to the Allies’ radio service was widespread. But the Allied propaganda never said anything positive about the peace conditions in the way of encouraging them to give up the struggle. Its silence on the subject was so marked that it tended to confirm what Nazi propaganda told them as to the dire fate in store for them if they surrendered.”

Roosevelt and his war strategists not only adhered to the unconditional surrender policy to the bitter end but refused to cooperate in any way with Germany’s extensive underground. Allen W. Dulles, brother of State Secretary Dulles and head of the Central Intelligence Agency, has told the story of the amazing anti-Nazi resistance movement in his book, *Germany’s Underground*. With any encouragement from Washington, particularly a promise that the unconditional surrender policy would be modified, the strength of the underground would have been vastly increased by recruits from the army, and Hitler’s regime would have ended much sooner than it did. Even without such encouragement, the underground almost succeeded on July 20, 1944, when Hitler was injured by a bomb explosion in his headquarters on the eastern front.

Closely allied to the unconditional surrender atrocity was the infamous Morgenthau plan for the destruction of Germany. As we have seen, the plan was drafted by a member of the Soviet conspiracy, Harry Dexter White, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. Like the unconditional surrender policy, however, the plan was in full accord with Roosevelt’s war philosophy dating back to the report of the Army and Navy

Joint Board on September 11, 1941. Roosevelt wholly agreed with the spirit of the Morgenthau plan. James F. Byrnes, who was Roosevelt's war mobilization director, reports in *Speaking Frankly* that Roosevelt discussed the kind of peace he wanted for Germany at the White House in late August, 1944. The President said the German people, for a long time, "should have only soup for breakfast, soup for lunch and soup for dinner."

On August 25, 1944, Roosevelt appointed a Cabinet Committee consisting of State Secretary Hull, War Secretary Stimson, Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, and Harry Hopkins to formulate a policy for Germany. According to his diary, Stimson dined with Morgenthau and White on the night of September 4, 1944, and learned that he could expect trouble. His fears were confirmed the next day at the first meeting of the Cabinet Committee. Although Hull later turned against the Morgenthau plan, Stimson wrote in his diary, after the first meeting, that "Hull was as bitter as Morgenthau against the Germans. . . . He and Morgenthau wished to wreck completely the immense Ruhr-Saar area of Germany and turn it into second rate agricultural land regardless of all that area meant not only to Germany but to the welfare of the entire European continent."

Sherwood tries to absolve his hero, Hopkins, from any responsibility for the Morgenthau plan, even insisting that he strongly opposed it. Stimson, however, wrote the following in his diary: "Hopkins went with them (Hull and Morgenthau) so far as to wish to prevent the manufacture of steel in the area, a prohibition which would pretty well sabotage everything else. I found myself in a minority of one."

Members of the Cabinet Committee presented their conflicting views to Roosevelt on September 6 and again on September 9 but no decision was reached until the Quebec conference, which began on September 11. Although Hull and Stimson were not invited to the conference, Morgenthau was. Hull reports that groups interested in the destruction of Germany induced the President to invite Morgenthau. On October 15, 1944, Roosevelt and Churchill initialed an agreement provid-

ing that the industries in the Ruhr and the Saar would be “put out of action and closed down.” The two areas were to be put under some international organization which would “supervise the dismantling of these industries.” The program looked forward “to converting Germany into a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character.”

According to Stimson’s book, Morgenthau reported that Churchill at first strongly opposed the Carthaginian program for Germany but was converted by the argument that the elimination of German competition would create new markets for Britain. United Nations economic reports subsequently confirmed the validity of this argument with figures showing that Britain had grabbed up virtually all of the European markets lost by Germany. In addition to the trade argument, Churchill was prompted to approve the Morgenthau plan by the hope of getting billions of dollars of postwar American aid. Morgenthau relates that tears came to Churchill’s eyes as he pleaded with Roosevelt for a continuation of lend-lease or a huge loan after the war. In what Morgenthau describes as “a marvelous and touching gesture of impatience,” Churchill asked Roosevelt: “What do you want me to do? Get on my hind legs and beg like Falla?”

When Roosevelt returned to Washington from the Quebec conference he became alarmed over the unfavorable press reaction to reports about the Morgenthau plan that had leaked out to a newspaper columnist. He sent a memorandum to Hull, dated September 29, declaring that someone was putting out untrue statements and adding: “I wish you would catch and chastise him.” On October 3 Roosevelt told Stimson he had no intention of turning Germany into an agrarian state. Stimson, according to his diary, then read the language of the agreement to the President, who was “frankly staggered,” and said he must have initialed the document “without much thought.”

The Morgenthau agreement made a mockery of the so-called Atlantic Charter, proclaimed by Roosevelt and Churchill on August 14, 1941, which pledged the joint efforts of the two governments “to further the enjoyment by all states, great or

small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity."

The plan was considerably modified by the Cabinet Committee before it was put into effect but its essential spirit was retained in the subsequent Yalta and Potsdam agreements and in "J. C. S. 1067," the policy directive sent to General Eisenhower for the occupation of Germany. This directive ordered the military governor to "take no steps (a) looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany or (b) designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy." At the Yalta conference Roosevelt accepted, as a basis for future discussions, Stalin's proposal for reparations of twenty billion dollars from Germany, half of which would go to the Soviet Union. At the Potsdam conference this proposal was abandoned, but it was agreed that reparations without limit, both out of current production and in the form of capital assets, could be taken by the Russians in their own occupation zone, and that twenty-five per cent of all capital equipment removed from the western zones would be turned over to the Russians, fifteen per cent of it in exchange for food and ten per cent of it without payment. This was the "dismantling" program advocated by Morgenthau.

The territorial concessions which gave the Soviet Union mastery of eastern Europe and eastern Asia were made at the Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences. Tacit agreements reached at Teheran, where Roosevelt first met Stalin, resulted eventually in the betrayal of Poland and China, the dismemberment of Germany, and a further repudiation of earlier pledges by Roosevelt and Churchill. In the Atlantic Charter declaration, they had opposed "territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned." In the so-called United Nations declaration of January 1, 1942, they had given a pledge "to cooperate with the governments signatory hereto," which included Poland and China. And in the Cairo declaration of November 22, 1943, they had agreed that Manchuria should be restored to China.

At the Teheran conference, Roosevelt and Churchill expressed no objection when Stalin announced that the western frontier of Poland should extend to the Oder River in Germany. According to Sherwood's report, which is based on the official records, Roosevelt himself first suggested that the Russians should have access to the port of Dairen, in Manchuria. When Stalin expressed the opinion that the Chinese would object, Roosevelt said he thought they would agree if Dairen were made a free port under an "international guarantee." Sherwood notes that this proposal was made by Roosevelt at Teheran, and not fourteen months later at Yalta, when "according to legend he was so enfeebled as to be *non compos mentis*."

According to Byrnes, who was present and took shorthand notes at the Yalta conference, Roosevelt first proposed that Poland's eastern frontier should follow the so-called Curzon line. This gave Stalin that half of Poland which he occupied under his deal with Hitler in 1939. Roosevelt said it would be "desirable" to adjust the southern end of the line so that the city of Lwow and at least part of the oil fields should be inside Polish territory. Stalin demanded extension of Poland's western frontier to the Oder and Neisse rivers in Germany. Churchill said, "It would be a pity to stuff the Polish goose so full of German food that he will die of indigestion." Churchill also estimated that acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line would require the transfer of about 9,000,000 Germans to the remainder of Germany, which would lose twenty-five per cent of the arable land it had in 1937. Stalin, however, said he would prefer to continue the war if necessary to get what he wanted.

The conference approved an ambiguous statement saying the eastern frontier should follow the Curzon line "with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometers in favor of Poland," that Poland should receive "substantial accessions of territory in the north and west," and that "the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference." The last stipulation was reaffirmed at Potsdam, although the Russians meanwhile had turned over

the administration of Germany east of the Oder-Neisse line to their Polish puppet government.

Having agreed to give Stalin the eastern half of Poland and Poland a large slice of Germany, Roosevelt and Churchill next proceeded at the Yalta conference to sell out the exiled Polish government, a faithful ally whose air, land, and sea forces were giving an excellent account of themselves in the war against Hitler. Stalin supported the so-called Polish Committee of National Liberation, the communist regime at Lublin. Roosevelt thereupon proposed reorganization of the Lublin regime "to represent all the political parties." The conferees finally agreed that the Lublin government should be reorganized "on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad," and should be called the "Polish Provisional Government of National Unity." It remained provisional just long enough for the Communists to kick out the non-Communists who were provisionally taken in. In his book *Defeat in Victory*, Jan Ciechanowski, former Polish ambassador to Washington, understandably protests: ". . . an illegal act had been committed, by virtue of which, contrary to international law and justice, the sovereignty of the Polish nation, vested in its legal government, had been appropriated by the Big Three powers, without giving the Polish people or their legal representatives the chance of having any say in the matter . . . in violation of the principles of self-determination and of all the traditions for which the United States had always stood in the past."

Stalin sugar-coated the appeasement pill for Roosevelt and Churchill by accepting a declaration that the three governments would act jointly, if in their judgment such action should be required, to form "broadly representative" interim governments and facilitate the holding of elections in the liberated states and former axis satellites. This declaration was so meaningless on its face that Stalin accepted it without objection.

The Yalta agreement on the Far East, which profoundly changed the history of the world, was reached in private discussions between Roosevelt and Stalin, according to accounts

by Sherwood and others. Churchill was not present, although he signed the secret Far East protocol, which was dated February 11, 1945, but not released for publication until February 12, 1946. Alger Hiss, the State Department traitor, was a member of the American delegation and one of Roosevelt's advisers. Whether he was present at Roosevelt's private discussions with Stalin has never been disclosed. The secret protocol provided that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan "in two or three months after Germany has surrendered" on the following conditions: 1. The status quo of Outer Mongolia, which the Russians had detached from China, would be preserved. 2. The southern part of Sakhalin and all adjacent islands would be returned to the Soviet Union. 3. The commercial port of Dairen would be "internationalized," while safeguarding "the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union" in the port, and the former lease of Port Arthur as a naval base would be restored to Russia. 4. The Chinese Eastern and the South Manchurian railroads would be jointly operated by Russia and China, "it being understood that the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria." 5. The Kurile Islands would be "handed over" to the Soviet Union.

Roosevelt agreed to "take measures" in order to obtain Chiang Kai-shek's concurrence in these capitulations to Stalin. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin agreed "that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated."

This agreement was made without consulting Chiang. The recognition of the Soviet Union's "preeminent interests" in Manchuria gave the Communists the base from which they conquered China with a population of 460,000,000. Although Chiang regarded the deal as a betrayal of his country, he submitted to it under American pressure. He was dependent upon American assistance in his war with the Communists.

Sherwood, Sumner Welles, and other New Dealers defend Roosevelt's concessions to Stalin on the ground that they involved the restoration of possessions and privileges taken by

the Japanese from the Russians in the war of 1904. These rights and possessions were acquired, however, by imperial Russia in its aggressions against China. The argument that the United States fought a world war to restore to Russia the fruits of its aggressions in China hardly would commend itself to the American people. Moreover, the Kuriles had been Japanese from remote antiquity, and Russia had agreed in a treaty signed in 1875 to abandon its aggressions in the northern part of the islands in return for Japan's withdrawal from southern Sakhalin. Japan got back southern Sakhalin in the war of 1904.

Stalin had agreed at the Moscow conference in October, 1943, attended by Secretary Hull, to enter the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany. Elliott Roosevelt, reporting on the Teheran conference, quotes his father as saying Stalin agreed at that meeting to declare war against Japan within six months after the defeat of Hitler. Actually the important question, as the war with Japan neared its end, was not how to bring the Russians in but how to keep them out.

The military judgment of General Marshall was the decisive factor in the Yalta betrayal. Stimson wrote that "much of the policy of the United States toward Russia, from Teheran to Potsdam, was dominated by the eagerness of the Americans to secure a firm Russian commitment to enter the Pacific war." The late Edward Stettinius, who attended the Yalta conference as Secretary of State, wrote: "President Roosevelt had just been told by his military advisers that the surrender of Japan might not occur until 1947, and some predicted even later. The President was told that without Russia it might cost the United States a million casualties to conquer Japan."

Roosevelt's principal military adviser at Yalta was Marshall, and Marshall was virtually alone among the top commanders of the army, navy, and air forces in his opinion that Russia should be brought into the Pacific war. Admiral Leahy, Roosevelt's Chief of Staff, and Admiral King, Chief of Naval Operations, were there, but Admiral Leahy opposed bringing Russia into the war and Admiral King merely went along with Marshall. Leahy reports in his book *I Was There* that as early

as July, 1944, when Roosevelt conferred at Honolulu with General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz, Commander of the Pacific fleet, he was told that Japan could be defeated without an invasion.

Leahy writes: "MacArthur and Nimitz were now in agreement that the Philippines should be recovered with ground and air power then available in the western Pacific and that Japan could be forced to accept our terms of surrender by the use of sea and air power without an invasion of the Japanese homeland."

Reporting on the Yalta conference, Leahy declares: "I personally . . . did not feel that Russian participation in the Japanese war was necessary. The army did. Roosevelt sided with the army."

Major General Courtney Whitney, who was a member of MacArthur's staff, told the writer that MacArthur never favored bringing the Russians into the war with Japan. He said MacArthur was "constantly sending strategic estimates" to Washington, in which he "consistently took the position that once the Philippines were conquered, Japan's position would be hopeless." Roosevelt received word of the liberation of Manila during the Yalta conference.

Having surrendered eastern Europe to Stalin at the Teheran and Yalta conferences, the military and political strategists of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations gave him control of central Europe by failing to capture Berlin, Prague, and Vienna and by agreeing to a Soviet occupation zone in which Berlin was an island with no access corridor for the American, British, and French sectors of that city.

The plan for the occupation zones was drafted by the European Advisory Commission and was approved at the Yalta conference. The late John G. Winant, United States representative on the EAC, is generally blamed for failing to insist on a corridor connecting Berlin with the western zones. Winant was a victim of the prevailing delusion that nothing should be done that would indicate a lack of faith in the Russians. However, he was an agent, not a policy-maker, and all agreements reached

in the EAC were subject to confirmation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of State, and the President. In all the negotiations on the occupation zones, Marshall was the only member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who was directly concerned, because the War Department was to have responsibility for the occupation of Germany.

Eisenhower maintains in his book that it would have been "stupid" for his armies to drive for Berlin before the Russians could take the city, but that judgment has been repudiated by the Berlin blockade and by more recent events in Germany. Churchill strongly disagreed with Eisenhower during the war. In a message to Roosevelt he insisted that troop maneuvers had a political significance, and that Berlin should be occupied. However, Roosevelt and Marshall supported Eisenhower, who declared in a message to Marshall that "Berlin itself is no longer a particularly important objective."⁴

As Hanson Baldwin points out, the Americans had a bridgehead across the Elbe by April 12 and the Russians did not reach that river until April 25. While the American forces remained static on the Elbe, the Russian battle for Berlin was not won until early May.

Edgar Ansel Mowrer, in his book *The Nightmare of American Foreign Policy*, reports that he was personally told by the White House that "the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Truman to let the Russians take Berlin." This, of course, meant that Marshall so advised Truman.

Marshall's next great service to the communist cause was the suppression of a proposed surrender warning to Japan, identical with the declaration later issued at Potsdam, which might have ended the war with Japan two months earlier, before Russia could come in. If this declaration had been issued at the end of May, when Marshall shelved it, thousands of American lives might have been saved, for the bloody battle of Okinawa did not end until June 21.

Marshall had been warned by an intelligence report, signed by fifty of his own officers, all with the rank of colonel or

4. *Crusade in Europe.*

above, on April 12, 1945, that the entry of Russia into the Asiatic war would result in a Soviet China and would destroy America's position in Asia “quite as effectively as our position is now destroyed in Europe east of the Elbe and beyond the Adriatic.” The intelligence officers expostulated that “to pay the Soviet Union to destroy China” would be “an act of treachery that would make the Atlantic Charter and our hopes for world peace a tragic farce.”⁵

The Yalta deal had been made when Marshall received this report, although he must have been acquainted with the views of the intelligence officers who prepared it when he went to Yalta. At all events, there was time enough when he received it to bring the war to an end before the Russians could come in.

In late May, 1945, Acting State Secretary Joseph C. Grew called in Eugene H. Dooman, chairman of the Far Eastern Division of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWINK) and instructed him to draw up a declaration setting forth the policies that would be followed by the United States if Japan would surrender. The facts of this amazing and little known episode were given to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on September 14, 1951, by Dooman, who drafted the surrender ultimatum. The key provisions of the document stated that there was no intention to enslave the Japanese people and that they would be free, if they wished, to retain “a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty.” The alternative, said the declaration, was “prompt and utter destruction.”

Acting Secretary Grew approved the declaration and presented it to the State Department's policy committee, consisting of the legal adviser and the assistant secretaries. There was no dissent when Grew read the document until he came to the provision relating to the retention of the emperor. At this point, Dean Acheson and Archibald MacLeish, assistant secretaries, vehemently objected. Acheson and MacLeish were supporters of Owen Lattimore, who was energetically working to prolong the war until Russia could come in. Lattimore, described in

5. *America's Retreat from Victory*, by Senator Joseph McCarthy.

the Senate subcommittee's report as "a conscious, articulate instrument of the soviet conspiracy," was especially working to depose the Japanese emperor. In a radio round table discussion sponsored by the University of Chicago on July 8, 1945, Lattimore called for a period of "good old chaos" in Japan.

Despite the objections by Acheson and MacLeish, Grew took the document to President Truman on May 28, 1945. The President read it and said he would approve it if it was acceptable to the armed services. On May 29, Grew and Dooman took the document to a meeting in War Secretary Stimson's office, attended by Stimson, Navy Secretary Forrestal, Assistant War Secretary McCloy, Marshall, Elmer Davis, director of the Office of War Information, and a dozen or more high ranking army and navy officers. Dooman testified that Stimson, Forrestal, and McCloy approved the declaration, but that Davis "reacted violently" against it. He said Davis objected to anything that might be construed "as forming a basis for a negotiated surrender."

"However, the thing was pigeon-holed because of the view among the military people that the publication of this document at that time would be premature," Dooman declared.

"What military people?" he was asked.

"Well, principally General Marshall . . . he went along with the paper but his statement was that the publication of the document at that time would be, and this word I remember textually, 'premature.'"

Thus it appears that Marshall had no objection to the terms of the declaration; it was just "premature." Can it be doubted, reasonably, that he wanted to wait until the Russians could come into the war?

Dooman said he learned that Lattimore called on the President a few days later and strongly protested against taking any position that would enable the monarchy to remain in Japan.

The same document drafted by Dooman and approved by President Truman on May 28 was later issued as the Potsdam

declaration on July 26. It was the basis of Japan's surrender on August 14. On May 28, the day that Truman approved the declaration, Hopkins cabled from Moscow, after a meeting with Stalin: “Japan is doomed and the Japanese know it. Peace feelers are being put out by certain elements in Japan. . . .”

Early in May the Japanese approached Jacob Malik, Moscow's ambassador in Tokio, with a request for the Soviet government to act as an intermediary in efforts to end the war. The Russians stalled and the United States was not officially informed of these peace feelers until after the end of the war. However, Forrestal's diaries disclose that the United States was intercepting messages between Togo, the Japanese foreign minister, and Sato, his ambassador in Moscow, about enlisting the good offices of the Russians to end the war. These messages must have been intercepted prior to July 1, for Forrestal's diary states: “Finally, on the first of July, Sato sent a long message outlining what he conceived to be Japan's position, which was in brief that she was now entirely alone and friendless and could look for succor from no one. . . . He strongly advised accepting any terms, including unconditional surrender, on the basis that this was the only way of preserving the entity of the emperor and the state itself.”

The U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey states that on April 7, 1945, two months after Yalta, the Suzuki government was installed for the purpose of ending the war. When it became obvious that no help could be expected from the Russians, the emperor, on June 20, called a meeting of the six members of the Supreme War Direction Council and requested a plan to end the war at once. Three of the six members were prepared to accept unconditional surrender while the other three favored continued resistance unless certain mitigating conditions could be obtained. There can be little doubt that the “mitigating conditions” approved by Truman on May 28 and pigeon-holed by Marshall would have ended the war in June. On August 6, the first atomic bomb was dropped, and on August 9 Russia entered the war. The Strategic Bombing Survey concludes that

Japan would have surrendered on the basis of the Potsdam declaration if the atomic bombs had not been dropped and if Russia had not entered the war.

As foreseen in military intelligence estimates and apparently contemplated with equanimity by Marshall and Hopkins, the Soviet Union emerged from the war as the dominant power of both Europe and Asia. The influence of the Soviet fifth column in Washington upon military and political decisions that gave communism this tremendous victory has not yet been fully exposed. But we know that it was a major factor.

IX. Truman, Traitors, and Red Herrings

IT IS A TRAGIC paradox of our history that Harry Truman, a son of the Missouri-Kansas border country whose antecedents were as American as hog jowls and black-eyed peas, was the President of the United States who denounced the Hiss case as a "red herring" and tolerated in his Cabinet such abettors of world communism as George C. Marshall and Dean Acheson.

Washington spoiled Truman. The ideological city slickers deluded him "as the serpent beguiled Eve through his subtlety." According to *The Man of Independence*, an authorized Truman biography by Jonathan Daniels, it was Max Lowenthal, a crafty southpaw government lawyer, who first corrupted Truman's mind with Marxist prejudices against railroads, insurance companies, and "big business" generally. Lowenthal was counsel to a Senate Interstate Commerce Subcommittee, headed by Senator Burton K. Wheeler (D., Mont.) which began an inquiry into railway finances in 1936. Truman, an eager member of the subcommittee, fell under Lowenthal's spell. When Lowenthal proposed to take him to see Justice Louis D. Brandeis, the country boy said he was "not used to meeting people like that," but he went anyway and became a disciple of "the great liberal," who held forth on the evils of the American economic system in his apartment on California Street.

Lowenthal also enlisted the support of the railway labor unions for Truman's nomination for vice president in 1944. New Deal insiders knew that the vice presidential candidate would succeed the ailing Roosevelt. A report of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, dated August 24, 1953, declares that "several witnesses before our subcommittee refused to ac-

knowledge [Lowenthal] as an associate on grounds that it might incriminate them” and that a book by Lowenthal, attacking the FBI, was favorably reviewed by the communist magazine *Political Affairs*, under the heading: “J. Edgar Hoover’s American Gestapo.” When questioned by the House Un-American Activities Committee on September 15, 1950, Lowenthal denied that he had ever been a Communist.

Truman progressed so well under left-wing tutelage in Washington that in 1948, after his election, he received this salute from Junior Schlesinger: “The conceptions of the intellectual are at last beginning to catch up with the instincts of the Democratic politician.”

On January 27, 1950, Representative Nixon of California, now Vice President of the United States, made a speech in the House in which he quoted directly from a secret FBI memorandum on Soviet espionage in the United States, dated November 25, 1945. Nixon said this document was “circulated among several key government departments and was made available to the President” in November, 1945. The report was placed in the record of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on April 14, 1953. It stated:

“Igor Gouzenko, former code clerk in the office of Col. Nikolai Zabotin, Soviet military attache, Ottawa, Canada, when interviewed by a representative of this bureau and officers of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, stated that he had been informed by Lieutenant Kulakov in the office of the Soviet military attache that the Soviets had an agent in the United States in May, 1945, who was an assistant to the then Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius.”

The document also contained a detailed report of Miss Bentley’s statements to the FBI, identifying thirty-seven government officials and employes as members of the Soviet espionage service. Among these were Alger Hiss, head of the Office of United Nations Affairs in the State Department; Harry Dexter White, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, and Lauchlin Currie, administrative assistant to the President. The report quoted

Miss Bentley as stating that she had been told by members of the Perlo group, one of the spy rings under her direction, that Hiss had taken Harold Glasser, a treasury department official, and two or three others away from the Perlo group and turned them over "to direct control by the Soviet authorities in this country."

This FBI report is one of the most significant documents in recent American history. It shows that as early as November, 1945, Truman had received evidence from the FBI that Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, and many other officials of his administration were Soviet spies. As the Internal Security Subcommittee reported on August 24, 1953, "these people stayed in their jobs, received promotions, and influenced policy for several years after impressive information had been marshalled." In January, 1946, Truman promoted White to the office of United States executive director of the International Monetary Fund. In the same month, Hiss went to London as senior adviser to the American delegation to the first session of the United Nations General Assembly.

The FBI report also shows that the FBI, prior to November 25, 1945, had examined Gouzenko, and therefore had all the evidence he turned over to Canadian authorities regarding Americans involved in the Soviet spy ring in Canada. A United Press dispatch from Ottawa, dated June 29, 1953, attributed to Canadian officials the information that one hundred and sixty-three Americans were named in a notebook of one of the suspects arrested in the spy investigation. The names of these Americans were turned over to United States authorities. The United Press report said the notebook contained the name of Klaus Fuchs, the naturalized British physicist who was sentenced to fourteen years in prison in 1950, after he had confessed that he spied for the Russians while working on the American atomic project. Alan Nunn May, another British scientist, was implicated by other members of the Canadian spy ring and sentenced to ten years in prison by a British court in 1946. Fuchs, May, and David Greenglass, a United States

army sergeant who worked as a machinist on the atomic bomb, were the principal sources of information obtained by the Soviet atomic spy ring. Leaders in the spy ring included Harry Gold, an American biochemist, who was sentenced to thirty years in prison in 1950, and the Rosenbergs, Julius and Ethel, who were executed in 1953.

If the information obtained in the Canadian investigation in 1945 had been acted upon by American authorities immediately, members of the spy ring who were arrested in 1950 might have been rounded up five years earlier, in time to prevent the transmission of at least some of their atomic information to the Russians. Fuchs did not leave the United States until 1946, and he made a second visit to this country in 1947. Moreover, he continued to spy for the Russians, giving them information he had acquired in the United States, after he became head of the theoretical physics division of Britain's atomic project at Harwell.

In June, 1953, Senator McCarthy announced that his investigating committee might call former President Truman and ask him whether the list of names of Americans involved in the Canadian spy investigation was turned over to the FBI. McCarthy later said he had been authoritatively advised that Truman withheld no information from the FBI and therefore would not call him to testify. This was not the point of the Canadian spy ring scandal. The point was that the FBI had the information and was not permitted to arrest the suspects.

On February 29, 1946, Constantine Brown, the able diplomatic correspondent of the *Washington Star*, reported that Americans were named in the Canadian spy investigation, that FBI Director Hoover wanted to arrest them, and that the State Department had prevented such action on the ground that it would prejudice relations with the Soviet Union.

On April 18, 1946, Representative Dondero made the same charge in the House and said Hoover was the source of his information.

"I discussed this matter with J. Edgar Hoover for one hour,"

Dondero said. "The President authorized these arrests to be made, and the arrests were forbidden by the State Department."

Congressional demands for action against American members of the spy ring became so insistent that State Secretary Byrnes was called before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Members of this committee said Byrnes blandly assured them, at a closed session, that no Americans were involved in the Canadian spy inquiry.

When the report of the Canadian Royal Commission which conducted the secret inquiry was made public in the summer of 1946, it named several Americans who were involved in espionage for the Russians. "It is not within our province to investigate spying activities in other countries, but some of the activities carried on in Canada were so linked with what happened elsewhere that we feel bound to mention them in this report," the commission said.

One of those mentioned was Arthur Steinberg, an American scientist. The report stated that Fred Rose, a former communist member of the Canadian Parliament and a leader of the spy ring, sent an emissary to Washington to enlist Steinberg for espionage work. Steinberg's name was found in a notebook of Lieutenant Colonel Peter S. Motinov, assistant Soviet military attaché in Ottawa. Gouzenko testified that Colonel Zabotin, the Soviet military attaché, reported in telegrams to Moscow that Steinberg had been "handed over," that is, introduced, to the Soviet military intelligence in Washington.

Steinberg worked for a time in Canada and became a friend of Professor Raymond Boyer of McGill University, a member of the spy ring. Later Steinberg worked for about two years, from June, 1944, to June, 1946, in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington. On August 26, 1946, when this writer asked the navy what his duties had been, the reply was that his work was so secret it still could not be discussed.

In 1951, the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy reported that the failure to arrest Arthur Adams, a Soviet master spy who escaped from the country in 1945, was due to

“government policy in existence at that time, the full details of which are unknown to this committee because it has not had access to the records.”

The prevailing attitude in Washington at this time was that friendly relations with the Russians must be preserved at any price, even at the cost of providing a privileged sanctuary in the government for American traitors who were spying for the Kremlin. Even the late James Forrestal, who was one of the few officials in the Roosevelt and Truman administrations with the courage to express doubt that Stalin could be trusted, was afraid that the FBI, by acting precipitately against the spies in the notorious *Amerasia* case, would offend the Russians. On May 28, 1945, Forrestal noted in his diary that the Justice Department wanted to arrest Lieutenant Andrew Roth, a naval intelligence officer who was involved in the *Amerasia* case. The FBI wanted to act speedily, before the evidence could be destroyed.

Forrestal was fully aware that it was a case of espionage, for he wrote in his diary that Roth had been supplying secret documents to Philip Jaffe, editor of the magazine *Amerasia*, who “has had intimate relationship with the Russian consul in New York.” Yet Forrestal wrote: “I pointed out that the inevitable consequence of such action now would be to greatly embarrass the President in his current negotiations with Stalin, because of the anti-Russian play-up the incident would receive out of proportion to its importance. I asked Capt. Vardaman [naval aide to the President] to see to it that the President was informed in this matter and I then called Mr. Edgar Hoover and suggested that he advise Mr. Tom Clark [Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division] and have him also see that the President is in full information of all the facts in the matter as well as their implications.”

The *Amerasia* case is one of the most incredible chapters in the whole story of Truman’s wretched administration. Frank Bielaski, who was director of investigations for the OSS during the war, presented the facts of the case to a Senate Foreign

Relations Subcommittee in 1950. The magazine was directed by Jaffe and Frederick Vanderbilt Field. Both were officials of the communist-dominated Institute of Pacific Relations and both were identified in sworn testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee as members of the Communist Party. Bielaski went to work on the case when *Amerasia* appeared with an article containing language taken verbatim from a secret OSS report. Visiting the New York offices of the magazine at night, Bielaski was astounded to find stacks of government documents, most of them marked "secret" or "top secret." One of the documents bore the notation "A Bomb," but that meant nothing to Bielaski at the time. He thought it meant simply "a bomb." The case was referred to the FBI, which put seventy-five agents to work on it. The FBI found that documents were flowing from the State Department to *Amerasia* and back. Some of the documents originated in the army and navy intelligence offices and in the OSS, but they all appeared to be funneled through the State Department to *Amerasia*. Lieutenant Roth, who had worked for *Amerasia* before he got his commission in naval intelligence, was assigned to the State Department as a liaison officer. After a two-month investigation, the FBI arrested Jaffe, Roth, Kate Louise Mitchell, assistant editor of the magazine; John Stewart Service, a State Department foreign service officer; Emanuel Larsen, a State Department employe, and Mark Gayn, a correspondent for Marshall Field's *PM* and *Chicago Sun*. A grand jury indicted Jaffe, Larsen, and Roth. The Justice Department made no effort to obtain indictments against Service, Mitchell, and Gayn. Service had been detected visiting Jaffe's hotel room and turning over documents to him with a warning that they were secret. Service admitted that he had made copies of his own secret documents and turned them over to Jaffe. Yet he was neither indicted nor dismissed from the State Department. It was not until five years later, after he had been attacked by Senator McCarthy, that the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission forced the State Department to fire him as a security risk. Gayn said he got his material from Jaffe in

typewritten form and saw no government documents, but the FBI found his finger prints on original documents. Yet he was not indicted. Miss Mitchell was not indicted, although eighteen envelopes of secret documents were found on her desk.

The case against Roth was dropped. The indictments of Jaffe and Larsen were dismissed and charges of simple larceny were substituted. On a quiet Saturday morning the prosecutor slipped into court and persuaded the judge to let Jaffe and Larsen off with fines of \$2,500 and \$500 respectively, both of which Jaffe paid. The prosecutor, representing the defendants as "journalists," said it was merely a case of excessive zeal.

J. Anthony Panuch, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for administration, testified before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on June 25, 1953, that "Mr. Acheson and Mr. Hiss at the time that I was in the department were sympathetic to the soviet policy." This was in 1945 and 1946. Panuch was asked whether he became suspicious of Hiss, who was in charge of United Nations affairs. He replied: "Mr. Chairman, one of the elements in my jurisdiction was the security operation in the department, and naturally we had a file on Alger Hiss, and the file showed a good deal of the matters that came out before the Un-American Activities Committee in 1948 and subsequently came out at the trial."

Panuch told this writer that FBI Director Hoover departed from his usual practice and recommended Hiss' dismissal from the department in 1946. Normally the FBI merely carries out investigations and submits evidence, without making recommendations. As early as July 22, 1946, the writer disclosed in a Washington dispatch to the *Chicago Tribune* that Hiss' dismissal had been recommended by the State Department's own Security Committee. Representative Jonkman (R., Mich.) had charged, on the floor of the House, that the Security Committee's report, which he had been permitted to examine confidentially, recommended the dismissal of certain officials and employes on grounds ranging from "belonging to Communist front organizations and distributing Communist literature" to committing "overt acts on behalf of a Soviet espionage organ-

ization.” Although Jonkman did not disclose the names, the *Tribune* said it was learned that Hiss was among those who received an adverse report.

Hiss testified at his trial in 1949 that in the spring of 1946, shortly after his return from the first United Nations General Assembly session in London, Secretary Byrnes sent for him and told him that several members of Congress were preparing to make statements charging that he was a Communist. He said Byrnes told him the stories seemed to be coming from the FBI and suggested that Hiss would do well to go to the FBI and offer himself for a full inquiry. Hiss said he went to the FBI and offered “to make any statement upon any subject they suggested, and they had no specific one initially.”

Hiss went back to the State Department and told Byrnes the FBI had no quarrel with him. However, Byrnes was under increasing pressure from Congress to get rid of Hiss. Acheson sent two emissaries to Panuch to find out how much evidence the department’s own security officers had against Hiss and Panuch indicated that it was conclusive. It was obvious that something had to be done about Alger.

In the fall of 1946, Acheson learned that John Foster Dulles, his friend and fellow one-worlder, was about to be made chairman of the board of trustees of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Edward G. Miller, then special assistant to Acheson and later Assistant Secretary of State, had worked for Dulles’ New York law firm, Sullivan and Cromwell, before taking a government job in 1941. Accordingly, Acheson sent Miller to ask Dulles if he couldn’t take care of Hiss.

Dulles knew Hiss, having been closely associated with him in United Nations conferences, and was favorably disposed toward him as a candidate for president of the Carnegie Endowment, a job which pays \$20,000 a year. He consulted two eminent evangelists of the cosmic New Order, James Reston of the *New York Times* and the late Bert Andrews of the *New York Herald-Tribune*, and they agreed that Hiss would be a superlative choice.¹ Hiss announced his resignation from the

1. *Witness*, by Whittaker Chambers, Random House, p. 648.

State Department, effective at the end of 1946, and the Carnegie trustees, acting on Dulles' recommendation, elected him president. Hiss had not taken office when Dulles received a letter from a Detroit lawyer, who offered to produce evidence that Hiss had a "provable Communist record." Dulles spurned the offer in a letter expressing contempt for "information which seems inconsistent with all that I personally know." Whatever Dulles may have thought about the lawyer's representations, it would seem that he was put on notice and at least should have consulted the FBI, but he did not do that. He consulted only Reston and Andrews.

Despite all the information the State Department had about Hiss, including FBI reports dating back to November, 1945, State Secretary Marshall told a press conference on August 4, 1948, after Chambers had accused Hiss, that so far as he knew there was "nothing in the State Department records to indicate that Mr. Hiss was ever suspected of being a Communist." About the same time, Truman denounced the congressional inquiry as a "red herring," a charge which he subsequently repeated several times.

In his book *Witness*, Chambers recalls the situation that followed Truman's "red herring" remark: "I had been warned repeatedly that the brunt of official wrath was directed, not against Alger Hiss as a danger, but against me for venturing to testify to the danger. Moreover, the most articulate section of public opinion was bitterly aroused against me and persistent in its attacks. . . . The Communist Party did not need to move openly against me. It had only to sit back, to give a quiet turn here, to prompt my enemies there, to feed out information, some of it true and damaging, but most of it slanderous and false, to iterate that most potent of falsehoods: that nobody can believe an ex-Communist, and the powers hostile to me that the Hiss case had set in motion would do the rest."

Members of the House Un-American Activities Committee warned Chambers that the Justice Department was threatening to indict him for perjury. The committee itself was beset by doubts and fears that it had been the victim of an imposter.

This would destroy not only its fight against the communist conspiracy but also the political careers of its members. In a state of "anxiety neurosis," as Chambers describes it, the committee was trying to find a graceful way to drop the case when Hiss proved his own undoing by suing Chambers for libel. Chambers produced the celebrated "pumpkin papers," the documentary evidence which forced the Justice Department to indict Hiss and convinced a jury, at his second trial, that he was guilty. On the day Hiss was sentenced to five years in prison, Acheson told reporters: "I will not turn my back on Alger Hiss."

Panuch was brought into the department by Byrnes, in October, 1945, to supervise the "coordination and integration" of the OSS, the OWI, the Foreign Economic Administration, the Office of Inter-American Affairs and the Office of Foreign Liquidation, all of which had been transferred to the department under a reorganization scheme devised by the Budget Bureau. Panuch had the job of setting up a security system to screen more than four thousand new employes who were scheduled for permanent integration into the department. His investigators displayed considerable zeal and began flushing Reds out of the woodwork. In a letter to Representative Sabath (D., Ill.) on July 26, 1946, Byrnes said 285 officials and employes of the department had received unfavorable loyalty reports from the department's own Security Committee and that seventy-nine of these had been separated. Of those dismissed, forty were found to have "close connections with foreign governments or their organs," Byrnes wrote.

On July 1, 1946, the Appropriations Committee of the Senate attached an amendment by Senator McCarran (D., Nev.) to the State Department appropriation bill which was designed to make things easier for Panuch. This amendment, approved by Congress, authorized the Secretary of State to fire any employe in the interests of the government, without regard to civil service regulations.

Secretary Byrnes, a former Supreme Court Justice, adopted a policy of resolving any reasonable doubt about an employe's

loyalty in favor of the government, but he insisted that there must be substantial evidence of disloyalty. That rule seemed fair enough to Panuch, but he sought to apply it in a manner that aroused the wrath of Acheson, the Undersecretary. Panuch recalls a conversation in which he told Acheson that proof of past membership in the Communist Party should create reasonable doubt about an employe's loyalty. That, said Acheson, would be "thought control."

Nevertheless, Panuch went ahead with his plans and undertook to make a test case of Carl Marzani, who had been a sergeant in the OSS in charge of its presentation (graphic display) branch, and was doing the same work in the State Department. The department had reports showing that Marzani had been a Communist, with the party name of Tony Whales, in New York in 1941, that he signed a petition for Earl Browder as a candidate for Congress, that he campaigned against conscription during the existence of the Hitler-Stalin alliance, and that he advocated revolution. He had denied under oath to the Civil Service Commission, the FBI, and the OSS that he ever had been a Communist, but he could not be prosecuted for perjury because of the statute of limitations. When questioned by Panuch, although not under oath, he again denied that he ever had been a Communist. Panuch dug up a statute declaring that willful concealment of communist activities or affiliations in applying for federal employment is a crime, punishable by imprisonment, and he resolved to test that statute in the courts. Witnesses were found in New York who had known Marzani as a Communist and they so testified at his trial. He was convicted and sentenced to prison, but by that time Marshall was Secretary of State and Panuch was out of a job.

Byrnes gave Truman his resignation in April, 1946, "on the advice of a physician," but it was agreed that he would stay on until after the impending peace conference in Paris. In January, 1947, while Byrnes was making preparations to attend a foreign ministers' conference in Moscow the next month, Truman suddenly accepted the resignation and appointed Mar-

shall Secretary of State. On January 23, shortly after Marshall had taken over, Acheson sent for Panuch and requested his resignation. Panuch told him he had already turned in his resignation to Marshall, who had gone home. He went into Marshall's office, took the resignation from his desk, and handed it to Acheson. It was a short "resign at your pleasure" letter. Acheson took it and handed Panuch a letter, signed by Marshall, accepting the resignation. Acheson had gone to Marshall and induced him to sign an acceptance of Panuch's resignation before he knew that Panuch had resigned.

When Panuch left the State Department his loyalty program went out the window. In four years, from 1947 to 1951, not a single State Department employe was dismissed on loyalty grounds. In March, 1947, Truman announced a new loyalty program for the whole government. Superficially, it appeared to be a good program, for the FBI was assigned the responsibility of making all loyalty investigations. However, the FBI does not evaluate the evidence it submits to the government departments and agencies. That is their own responsibility. Furthermore, Truman's order abolished the "reasonable doubt" test first adopted by the Civil Service Commission in 1942 and reinstated in the State Department by Panuch in 1946. This was the standard that reasonable doubt about an employe's loyalty should be resolved in favor of the government. The new standard provided for the dismissal of employes only if "present" disloyalty could be proved. Past membership in the Communist Party ceased to be ground for dismissal. Since Communists are ordered by the party to deny membership, it was virtually impossible under the new standard to prove "present" disloyalty even when former communist affiliations could be shown. Not until 1951, when Senator McCarthy had stirred up Congress and the country about subversives in the government, was the Acheson-Truman rule changed. Former Senator Hiram Bingham replaced the flabby Seth Richardson as chairman of the Loyalty Review Board. In April, 1951, Bingham persuaded Truman to restore the "reasonable doubt" standard of loyalty.

“By that time,” Panuch recalls, “the damage had been done. China was lost to the Communists and American soldiers were dying in Korea.”

Under the Marshall-Acheson regime, early in 1947, Hamilton Robinson was brought in to replace Frederick Lyon as director of controls. He was in charge of six divisions, including investigations. Robinson had worked for Dulles' law firm for six years, and Dulles gave him a high recommendation. On March 25, 1948, Representative Busbey (R., Ill.) made some illuminating comments in the House about Robinson's qualifications for the job. Robinson had been questioned extensively at a House committee hearing about State Department employes, whom Busbey identified only by numbers. The case of No. 5 was typical. Eight witnesses—six professors at Harvard and the University of California, a naval officer, and a fellow student—testified that No. 5, as a student at the universities, frequently expressed communist sympathies and was regarded as a party member or a conscious fellow traveler. The evidence showed that No. 5 had been discharged from a naval school during the war “because it was found that he was an ardent student and advocate of the Communist doctrines.” In applying for his government job, No. 5 said he had a Ph.D. degree from the University of California. This was fraudulent misrepresentation, for the university said he flunked his examinations. Furthermore, a State Department official who had known No. 5 in China testified that his work was “below par,” and that he was a “mediocre, dull, and slow thinking individual.” Another State Department official testified that No. 5 was “weak as to ability, common sense, and public relations.”

When Robinson was asked at the House committee hearing what he had to say about such evidence, he commented: “That case is interesting, Mr. Chairman, because there is not one iota of evidence indicating any overt act, any association he has had, anything that he has done which would indicate that he

is actually working against or even associating with people who are working against our people.”

Apologists for Truman, Marshall, and Acheson deny that they served the cause of world communism. On the contrary, they assert, these officials initiated the so-called Truman doctrine, the Marshall plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, all elements of a policy of “containing” Soviet communism. Let us consider the facts.

According to Daniels, in *The Man of Independence*, Truman dates his break with Byrnes to the Moscow foreign ministers’ conference in December, 1945. At that conference Byrnes agreed that the Yalta pledge regarding the liberated and former Axis satellite countries of eastern Europe might be construed as providing merely for the nominal participation of two opposition representatives in the interim governments which the Communists were setting up. There can be no question that Byrnes was deluded by the Russians. He knew little about foreign affairs, and his career as a senator was distinguished principally by his propensity for making deals, his efforts to work out a “compromise,” even on matters of the highest principle. Yet Byrnes in Moscow merely recognized an existing situation. Something could have been done to save eastern Europe before the war ended, but it was too late when Byrnes went to Moscow. The Yalta declaration itself was hollow. It provided merely that the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, “where in their judgment conditions require,” would jointly assist the peoples of the eastern European countries to form interim governments “broadly representative of all democratic elements.” This gave the Russians a veto against any action that might be proposed.

Truman called Byrnes an appeaser and said he “failed miserably as Secretary of State.” This was the same Truman who read and approved a world-shaking appeasement speech which his Secretary of Commerce, Henry Wallace, delivered at Madison Square Garden on September 12, 1946. Wallace, whom the Communists supported for president two years later, said:

"I am neither anti-British, nor pro-British—neither anti-Russian, nor pro-Russian. And just two days ago, when President Truman read these words, he said they represented the policy of his administration."

Reporters who had seen the advance text asked Truman if his approval applied to the whole speech. He said it did.

Byrnes, who was in Paris at the peace conference, strongly intimated in a radio teletype conversation with Truman that he would resign if Wallace remained in the Cabinet. Truman thereupon fired Wallace for making a speech which Truman had approved.

On March 12, 1947, Truman appeared before Congress and requested \$400,000,000 for aid to Greece and Turkey. At the same time he announced a policy of aiding "free peoples everywhere against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes." He did not mention the Soviet Union by name but the reference was unmistakable. Although this program was acclaimed as a "doctrine," a new policy to "contain" Soviet communism, what it amounted to was that the United States took over bankrupt Britain's commitments in the Near East. The anti-Communist label was pasted on to assuage anti-spending sentiment in Congress. Forrestal's diary reports that on February 27, Marshall showed Forrestal a memorandum saying the British ambassador had called at the State Department that morning to inform the United States that Britain could no longer support Greece and Turkey. Winthrop Aldrich of the Chase Bank and Lewis Douglas, ambassador to Britain, were agitating for action to rescue the British empire. Forrestal helped Clark Clifford, the President's speech writer, prepare a memorandum stating the problem as a struggle for survival between the communist and noncommunist systems.

Although the Greek-Turkish aid program was announced as an anti-communist project, the Marshall plan was not, despite efforts of the Truman-Marshall-Acheson apologists to represent the two as parts of the same piece. Many Washington pundits trace the origin of the Marshall plan to a speech made by Acheson in Cleveland, Mississippi, on May 8, 1947.

As Daniels reports, however, Truman himself intended to deliver this speech but was unable to do so. Acheson, speaking for Truman, merely restated the so-called Truman doctrine. He declared that "free peoples who are seeking to preserve their independence and democratic institutions and human freedoms against totalitarian pressures, either internal or external, will receive top priority for American reconstruction aid."

An account of the genesis of the Marshall plan by Edward W. Barrett, former Assistant Secretary of State in charge of propaganda, indicates that there was consternation in the department about the anticommunist implications of the Truman doctrine. In his book *Truth Is Our Weapon*, Barrett declares that the Truman doctrine "backfired in many parts of the world," that the Greek government had a reputation for corruption and oppression (this is what the Communists were saying), and that the United States seemed to be embarking on a program of imperialism in which small nations would be used as pawns in a gigantic contest with the Soviet Union. Barrett reports that a new plan, without these "drawbacks," was evolved in "prolonged evening discussions" by a State Department "crew," which was aided by Averell Harriman, then Secretary of Commerce.

Speaking at Harvard University on June 5, 1947, Marshall said: "Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. . . . Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation, I am sure, on the part of the United States government." Marshall then invited the countries of Europe to get together and agree as to what help they would need from the United States to "place Europe on its feet economically." He said the program should be a joint one, "agreed to by a number if not all European nations." At a press conference on June 12, he emphasized that the Soviet Union was included in his invitation to come and get it. On June 17, the procommunist *PM*, now defunct, exulted: "Unlike the Truman doctrine, which explicitly and by definition excluded from aid any of the countries in Russia's sphere of influence, the Marshall doctrine

is careful to include even Russia itself as the possible recipient of aid. It is not accompanied, as the Truman doctrine was, by emotional anticommunist face making and name calling.”

The Kremlin at first considered taking the United States up on Marshall's offer and sent Foreign Minister Molotov to the European conference in Paris. Later Moscow decided to stay out and sabotage the program, presumably on the theory that by maintaining pressure against western Europe it could force the United States to weaken itself by an endless expenditure of money and materials.

In a “Dear Alger” letter to Hiss, dated Aug. 4, 1948, the late Robert P. Patterson, former Secretary of War, wrote: “This is just to say that the stories in the press this morning have not made the slightest dent in my trust and confidence in you. You and Clark Eichelberger started the organization of the Committee for the Marshall plan, which was certainly 180 degrees from the ‘party line.’ ”

The Communists certainly opposed the Marshall plan publicly, but their opposition was based upon tactical considerations. The communist propagandist line accused the United States of seeking to enslave the western European countries by shutting off their trade with eastern Europe and reducing them to the status of American economic satellites. Such propaganda by no means proved that the Kremlin regarded the Marshall plan as inimical to its interests.

Earl Browder, former head of the American Communist Party, who still is in good standing with international communism, discusses the subject of American aid to Europe in his pamphlet *Keynes, Foster and Marx*. He writes: “The net impact of America upon Europe has been for long, and increasingly is, to drive her more rapidly to socialism, rather than to retard her [when Browder uses the term “socialism” he means communism]. . . . American power commands the tides of socialism to halt; but American action, by choking the independent development of western European economy, reduces it to a level which multiplies the necessity of socialism. . . . Cut off from eastern Europe, the west declines and sinks into ever-

deeper dependence upon America. Thus it is American policy which has faced Europe with the alternative: either toward European unity and socialism, or toward restoration of capitalism, with a split Europe, and America as boss. This gives the final and irresistible shove toward socialism to the west European masses—and the shove comes from America, not from Russia.”

Since this result obviously is what the Kremlin wants, we have a plausible explanation for Hiss's support of the Marshall plan.

Of course the Marshall plan was presented to Congress as a program to strengthen the capacity of western Europe to resist communism. The experience of the Greek-Turkish aid program had taught the State Department “crew” that Congress would underwrite foreign aid commitments involving outlays of billions of dollars if it could be persuaded that the purpose was to fight communism. Accordingly, George F. Kennan, chief of the State Department's policy planning staff, drafted a ponderous rationale for the Marshall plan, so recondite that any Congressman who presumed to question its authority would subject himself to ridicule as a simpleton. Kennan's opus, headed “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” first appeared under a pseudonym, “Mr. X,” in the July, 1947, issue of *Foreign Affairs*, but he later brought it out under his own name as an appendix to his book, *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950*.

Kennan wrote: “In these circumstances, it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long range, patient, but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward ‘toughness’ . . . the Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence.

The Russians look forward to a duel of infinite duration, and they see that already they have scored great successes.”

This is the containment policy. It is quite an order for a country with 160,000,000 people, 6.5 per cent of the world's population, less than 6 per cent of the world's total land area, and a national debt of 272 billion dollars, more than that of all the other nations in the world combined, a mortgage of \$1,700 against every man, woman and child. It promises an “infinite duration” of Marshall plans, NATO's, Koreas, shifting from point to point around the 25,000 mile periphery of the Soviet empire, with Moscow always dictating our strategy.

Kennan later went to Moscow as ambassador, but the Russians declared him *persona non grata* when he made some remarks at a stopover in Berlin which they regarded as un-diplomatic. Reston of the *New York Times* and the Alsop brothers have fostered the myth that Kennan is a 100-octane genius. Let us consult the record and see just what he knows about “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.”

In October, 1949, the State Department held a secret three-day “round table” discussion on American policy toward China, and the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, with great difficulty, obtained a transcript of the proceedings two years later. One of the participants was Kennan. The gist of his argument was that the Soviet Union had no interest in China. He said: “Vast sections of the Soviet Union today need very much the same sort of development that China needs and the things they have to offer to the Soviet government in the way of manpower, and so forth, are also similar. I mean the Soviet government is in no great real shortage of manpower, which would be what China has to offer. . . . I remember Stalin one time snorting rather contemptuously and vigorously because one of our people asked them what they were going to give to China when this was over and he said in effect, ‘What the hell do you think we can give to China?’ He said, ‘We have a hundred cities of our own to build in the Soviet Far East. If anybody is going to give anything to the Far East, I think it's you.’ And I think he was speaking quite sincerely.”

Kennan was asked what military role he thought the Russians would assign to the Chinese. He said he believed the Russians would allot the role of "provincial legionnaires" to the Chinese Communists but would not want them to become, "even if they could, a major military power." In less than four years after Kennan had expressed that opinion, these "provincial legionnaires," with Soviet weapons and tactical advice, had fought the United States to a standstill in Korea.

Testifying before the Internal Security Subcommittee on March 27, 1952, Professor David N. Rowe of Yale University recalled a conversation he had with Kennan early in 1949, when the Communists had not taken all the mainland. He said Kennan first told him China was not important because it never would be powerful. A little later, Kennan declared that "when the Chinese Communists get control of 450,000,000 people the Russians will never be able to control them."

Professor Rowe continued: "Now, if China is so weak that it doesn't count, this means that the Russians will be able to control them. If China becomes sufficiently strong and gets control of 450,000,000 people, strong enough to control the Russians, keep the Russians from controlling them, then you have to worry about China. . . . If any of my students ever presented me with anything that was so completely illogical as this I probably would flunk him, but I couldn't flunk Mr. Kennan." Kennan, with Einstein and other geniuses, is a lecturer at Princeton's Institute for Advanced Study.

From abject appeasement of the Soviet Union, even to the extent of sheltering American traitors, the Truman administration veered 180 degrees to a global policy of "containing" communism. But the shift was more apparent than real. The revolutionaries were using the communist menace as a pretext to spend the United States into collectivism. Meanwhile, they were actively promoting communism in Asia, as the next chapter will show.

X. The Far Eastern Treason

THE foreign policy of the United States in the Far East, from the Yalta conference to the Korean war, was anticipated by Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin in his book *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*, a collection of his speeches and articles during the 1920's.

Stalin declared that "the road to the victory of the revolution in the West lies through a revolutionary alliance with the colonies and dependent countries against imperialism." He named China as the most important of these countries, and he laid down a program for the Communists in China: (1) join Chiang Kai-shek in a "united front"; (2) work within and in the rear of Chiang Kai-shek's divisions in order to "disintegrate" them; (3) overthrow Chiang Kai-shek's government and establish a "Soviet China."

Addressing a Communist Party meeting in Moscow on August 1, 1927, Stalin said the Chinese revolution was in its second stage, and that the third stage would be "the Soviet revolution." Earlier he wrote: "If Europe and America may be called the front, the scene of the main engagements between socialism and imperialism, the non-sovereign nations and the colonies, with their raw materials, fuel, food and vast store of human material, should be regarded as the rear, the reserve of imperialism. In order to win a war one must not only triumph at the front, but also revolutionize the enemy's rear, his reserves."

Having been put on notice by Stalin himself that Soviet communism regarded the United States as an enemy, the downfall of which would be hastened by revolution in the Far East, officials of the Truman administration, particularly in the State

Department, nevertheless promoted the communist revolutionary cause in Japan, China and Korea.

The revolution failed in Japan only because General MacArthur, within the limits permissible by obedience to civil authority, modified the procommunist policies of the State Department. Korea might have been saved and China liberated from communism by an American victory in Truman's war, but when MacArthur sought to achieve that objective, Truman was induced to remove him from command. Now the Communists, having gained tremendous prestige in Asia by forcing the United States to sue for an armistice, appear to be permanently ensconced in China and they may yet win all of Korea. In that eventuality, Japan's position would be perilous.

The story of the State Department conspiracy to carry out a communist revolution in Japan has been obscured by just acclamation for the success of MacArthur's occupation program, and is not so widely known as the betrayal of China and Korea. As early as September 19, 1945, only seventeen days after V-J Day, Acting State Secretary Acheson rebuked MacArthur, who had predicted that the occupation army could be reduced to 200,000 men in six months. In a statement to the press, Acheson declared that "the occupation forces are the instruments of policy and not the determinants of policy." He said the purpose of the occupation policy was to change "the economic and social system of Japan, which makes for a will to war." A year later, in September, 1946, John Carter Vincent, head of the State Department's Far Eastern Division, rebuked MacArthur for issuing a public warning of the danger of communism in Japan. Vincent charged that MacArthur had violated State Department directives to use Japan "for building a bridge of friendship to the Soviet Union." Vincent was identified as a member of the Communist Party in sworn testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, which investigated the Far Eastern betrayal in 1951. He denied it.

On July 3, 1945, before Japan surrendered, the ubiquitous Owen Lattimore went to see President Truman and gave him a memorandum stating that "Japan hopes that fear of Russia

will induce Britain and America to be 'soft' with 'anti-revolutionary' Japanese big business and to wink at the fact that big business in Japan is as militarist as the militarists." Lattimore also advised the President that China, rather than Japan, would be the key to postwar Far Eastern policy, and that China-trained men should replace Japan-trained men in high policy-making positions. Lattimore, a self-appointed State Department consultant and former director of Pacific operations of the Office of War Information, was "a conscious, articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy," according to the Senate subcommittee's report. His campaign to get rid of the anti-communist, Japan-trained men in the State Department was taken up by the communist *Daily Worker*, which reported on September 6, 1945, that State Secretary Byrnes was shaping a stiff occupation policy for Japan and was replacing old-line policy makers with China experts. At that time the officials most concerned with Far Eastern policy in the State Department were Joseph C. Grew, Undersecretary; Joseph W. Ballantine, director of the Far Eastern Division, and Eugene H. Dooman, chairman of the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWINK). All were veteran foreign service officers with many years of experience in Japan. Grew announced his resignation on August 14, the day Japan surrendered, and Acheson took his place as Undersecretary. The day after Acheson took over his new job he announced that Vincent, Lattimore's closest friend in the department, would replace Dooman as chairman of the Far Eastern Subcommittee of SWINK. Vincent also replaced Ballantine as chief of the Far Eastern Division of the department.

For seven or eight months Dooman's subcommittee had been working on an occupation policy for Japan. It was adopted by SWINK on August 29 and telegraphed to MacArthur the same day. However, on September 22, after Acheson had replaced Grew and Vincent had replaced Dooman, the White House issued a new version of the occupation policy. Included among the changes was this statement:

"Policies shall be favored which permit the wide distribu-

tion of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade. To this end it shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander—

“(a) To prohibit the retention in or selection for places of importance in the economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely toward peaceful ends.

“(b) To favor a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of a large part of Japan’s trade and industry.”

Dooman, testifying before the Senate subcommittee on September 14, 1951, said: “It was on the basis of these two clauses that work was undertaken to destroy, first of all, to eliminate the capitalist class of Japan.”

“That was the Acheson-Vincent program?” asked Senator Eastland.

“Yes, sir,” Dooman replied.

Dooman said the first step carried out was a capital levy tax of from sixty to ninety per cent on all property in excess of \$1,000. “That almost at one stroke wiped out the capitalist class,” he declared.

The next step was the expropriation of all land in excess of five acres held by any one owner. Dooman said it was obvious, after the land reform program had been in operation for some years, that it was “not working.”

Senator Eastland: “That was a Communist system, was it not?”

Dooman: “Well, Senator, in Poland I think they put the limit at 200 acres at that time. But in Japan, where 85 million people are trying to make a living off an area—”

Senator Eastland: “I understand, but they were following the Communist system, were they not?”

Dooman: “Yes.”

The third step was the confiscation of all holdings by any individual in any large company in excess of three per cent. The holdings were transferred to a pool and the Japanese government was ordered to sell the shares on a priority basis to

farmers' cooperatives, labor unions, and shopkeepers. The government was ordered to disregard any relationship between the price offered and the real value of the shares, and was further ordered to finance any bids for the shares by farmers' cooperatives or labor unions.

"The net result," said Dooman, "was to destroy the previously existing capitalist class. As a capitalist class they no longer exist. Their places have been taken by hordes of black marketeers and Chinese and Formosan thugs of various kinds who have been engaged in illicit trade of various kinds and have amassed fortunes. The net result was to replace people who had traditionally had property with these black marketeers and thugs and blackguards of various kinds."

Dooman said the original occupation policy, prepared by his subcommittee, provided that militarists and suspected war criminals should be purged from positions of authority on the basis of their individual records, as brought out in some kind of judicial proceeding. Under the Acheson-Vincent policy, he said, "people were removed from office on the basis of their occupation. Practically the whole executive branch of Japanese business, from chairmen of boards down to section chiefs, practically the whole white collar element in Japanese big business was removed at one stroke—not because there was any record against them but because they occupied certain positions."

Senator Eastland: "Was it not an attempt to destroy Japanese capitalism?"

Dooman: "In my opinion, it was."

Senator Eastland: "As a matter of fact, to put it very mildly, there is a striking similarity between the American policy toward Japan and the policies laid down by Russia to the satellite states in Eastern Europe, is there not?"

Dooman: "I think that would be a fair statement."

On October 6, 1945, Vincent told a radio audience that all "democratic" parties would be encouraged in Japan. When Vincent testified before the Senate subcommittee he was asked whether the category of "democratic" parties included the

Communists. "That would include the Communist Party," he said.

All during World War II it was the publicly expressed official policy of the United States to aid Chiang Kai-shek's government and to keep the Nationalist armies in the war against Japan. Early in the war, however, Communists in the government began to undermine the official policy. Lauchlin Currie, an administrative assistant to the President, who was identified by Miss Bentley as a member of her Soviet espionage apparatus, was responsible for setting up a conference in Washington on October 12, 1942, attended by himself, Sumner Welles, Undersecretary of State, and Earl Browder and Robert Minor, leaders of the Communist Party.¹ This conference terminated with Welles handing Browder a memorandum declaring that the United States favored "complete unity" among all organizations and groups of the Chinese people and "viewed with skepticism many alarmist accounts of the 'serious menace' of 'communism' in China."

About November 20, 1942, Vincent and John S. Service, both foreign service officers in China at that time, met with Chou En-lai and Lin Piao, Chinese Communist leaders. According to Service's report to the State Department, dated January 23, 1943, the Communists requested intervention by the United States to improve their own situation in China. They wanted the United States to: (a) emphasize the "political nature" of the world conflict as a struggle between "democracy" and "fascism"; (b) reiterate the hope of seeing "democracy" established in China; (c) recognize the Chinese Communist army as a participant in the war against "fascism"; (d) apportion to the Communists a share of American supplies sent to China. American foreign service officers and the OWI launched a propaganda campaign to accomplish these Communist objectives.

General Albert C. Wedemeyer, commander of American forces in China from 1944 to 1946, told the Senate subcommittee that his political advisers, Service, John P. Davies, and

1. Senate IPR Report, p. 182.

Raymond Ludden, glorified the Chinese Communists and emphasized the "shortcomings, maladministration and unscrupulousness of the nationalist leaders" in their reports. In contradiction to the Service-Davies reports, Wedemeyer testified that military operations of the Chinese Communists against the Japanese "were not significant."

The mission of Vice President Wallace to China in the summer of 1944 intensified the pressure on Chiang's government to improve the situation of the Communists. Wallace was accompanied by Vincent and Lattimore. Vincent testified that he first heard about the Wallace mission from Currie. He said he met Wallace in Currie's office. Vincent acknowledged that he advised and influenced Wallace throughout his journey and particularly during his talks with Chiang. He steered the conversations between Chiang and Wallace toward a settlement with the Communists, and induced Wallace to emphasize that such a settlement was desired by the United States. Vincent's own notes on one conference with Chiang, published in the State Department's *White Paper* on China, said: "Mr. Wallace also pointed out that if, as President Chiang stated, the Chinese Communists were linked with the U.S.S.R., then there was even greater need for settlement."

In a report to President Roosevelt, dated July 10, 1944, Wallace declared: ". . . Chiang at best is a short-term investment. It is not believed that he has the intelligence or political strength to run post-war China. The leaders of post-war China will be brought forward by evolution or revolution, and it now seems more likely the latter."

Before leaving China, Wallace sent the President a cablegram recommending the replacement of General Joseph Stillwell by General Wedemeyer as commander of American forces in China. Apologists for the Wallace mission have maintained that this was an anticommunist recommendation, since Stillwell was procommunist and hated Chiang, while Wedemeyer was strongly anticommunist and pro-Chiang. However, the official Soviet policy at that time was to keep Chiang's armies in

the war against Japan, and the Communists desired an effective American military adviser for Chiang. The communist *Daily Worker* supported Wedemeyer's appointment.

The report of the seventh national congress of the Chinese Communist Party, dated May 1, 1945, called for "an independent, free, democratic, unified, strong and prosperous new China." On June 20, 1945, the national committee of the American Communist Party adopted a resolution calling for a "strong, united and democratic China." On June 10, 1945, Lattimore wrote a letter to President Truman warning that American aid to Chiang might encourage the Russians to support the Chinese Communists. He followed up his letter with a personal visit to the White House on July 3, when he left a memorandum urging "a settlement between Chiang and the Communists and simultaneously an agreement between America, Russia and Britain to build up China as a whole." Lattimore said the Communists would have to accept "minority status" but that Chiang "would have to give them real power within a coalition government, proportionate to their real strength, not just token representation."

Lattimore's proposal was the essence of the program laid down by Stalin, a program frankly designed to achieve a Soviet China. It was the policy demanded by Mao Tse-tung's Communist Party in China and by the Communist Party of the United States. After Lattimore's visit to the White House, it became the official policy of the United States government.

On November 28, 1945, Vincent, the new director of the State Department's Far Eastern Division, drafted suggestions for a course of action closely following Lattimore's recommendations to the President. On December 9, 1945, Vincent drafted a memorandum for the War Department for its guidance in sending directives to General Wedemeyer in China. This memorandum, signed by Byrnes, said the President and Secretary of State were anxious that "the unification of China by peaceful, democratic methods be achieved as soon as possible." It quoted a statement by Byrnes, made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on December 7, that Chiang's govern-

ment "must be broadened to include the representatives of those large and well-organized groups who are now without any voice in the government," and that American influence would be exerted to encourage concessions, both by the central government and by "the so-called Communists." Thus the Secretary of State had adopted the communist propaganda line that the Chinese Communists were not really Communists but merely agrarian reformers.

The Vincent memorandum to the War Department also stated that President Truman had asked General Marshall to go to China as his special representative in efforts to bring the Chinese Communists into the central government. The War Department was requested to issue instructions to General Wedemeyer that the transportation of Chinese troops to North China for action against the Communists was to be held in abeyance pending the outcome of Marshall's discussions with the Chinese leaders. This was directly contrary to General Wedemeyer's recommendations. On November 20, reporting to the War Department, the General said: "I have recommended to the generalissimo that he should concentrate his efforts upon establishing control in North China."

The memorandum to the War Department, signed by Byrnes but drafted by Vincent, together with a statement of policy issued by the President on December 15, 1945, constituted Marshall's instructions for his China mission. Vincent testified before the Internal Security Subcommittee that he wrote the original draft of the President's statement, that Marshall expanded it, and that final changes were made by the State Department before the President issued it. He admitted that it closely followed his outline of a suggested course of action, dated November 28.

Using language taken verbatim from the resolution of the Communist Party, the President's statement called for "a strong, united, democratic China." It proposed a national conference of Chinese leaders to unite China, and declared that "all armed forces" in China should be "integrated effectively into the Chinese National army." This meant, of course, that

Chiang should unite the Chinese Communist armies with his own, as Stalin had demanded. Finally the President's statement promised American assistance as China moved "toward peace and unity," implying that Chiang would get nothing if he refused to form a coalition with the Communists.

When Marshall arrived in China at the end of 1945, according to the State Department's own procommunist *White Paper*, the Nationalist government "possessed an estimated five to one superiority in combat troops and in rifles, a practical monopoly of heavy equipment and transport, and an unopposed air arm." The report of the Internal Security Subcommittee relates that Chiang's divisions were chasing the Communists northward and the prospect of a Nationalist victory was at its highest. It is inconceivable that the Nationalists, with all these advantages, could have been defeated by the Communists if the United States had aided them on a scale commensurate with American assistance to Greece. Instead of aiding Chiang, however, Marshall cut off all American supplies for a period of ten months and brought other pressure to bear in an effort to force Chiang to bring the Communists into his government. Even the shipment of war supplies actually purchased by the Chinese, including surplus materials on the islands of the Pacific, was suspended by Marshall. It was Marshall's boast: "As chief of staff I armed 39 anti-Communist divisions; now with a stroke of the pen I disarm them." He was authorized to grant a loan of \$500,000,000 to Chiang, and that was withheld. Marshall instituted truce teams, made up of one Nationalist, one Communist, and one American, and when the Communists were hard pressed they would agree to discuss truce terms. These discussions gave them time to regroup, bring up supplies, and prepare for new offensives.

Marshall and the Communists made their supreme effort to get a cease-fire when the Nationalists were advancing toward the Kalgan pass, through which the Reds were moving thousands of troops from China into Manchuria, where the Russians were waiting to equip them with arms captured from the Japanese. This was a critical phase of the betrayal of China.

In a treaty signed on August 14, 1945, Chiang had accepted the terms of the Yalta agreement, and the Russians had recognized the sovereignty of China in Manchuria. The Russians also solemnly promised to support the Nationalist government. In violation of this treaty, they refused to permit Chiang to land troops in Manchuria, either at the port of Dairen or on the Manchurian airfields. The Russians held Manchuria until the Chinese Communists could move in, equip themselves with Japanese, Russian, and American lend-lease arms, and prepare for the conquest of China.

In September, 1946, the Communists served notice on Marshall that a cessation of Nationalist military operations against Kalgan would be a prerequisite to their participation in peace negotiations. Marshall warned Chiang, according to the White Paper, that if the situation continued to deteriorate "the Communists would be driven to seek and be dependent upon outside support, such as Russian aid, which would make the task of peaceful settlement more difficult." Chiang replied that occupation of Kalgan was "absolutely essential to the national welfare." This so infuriated Marshall that he threatened to go home and sever American relations with China. Chiang, alarmed by Marshall's threat, submitted truce proposals of his own, but the Communists rejected them. On October 10, 1946, the Nationalists finally captured Kalgan. Marshall continued his pressure on Chiang for a truce, and on November 9th Chiang yielded. He issued an unconditional cease-fire which gave the Communists the breathing spell they wanted.

Admiral Charles M. Cooke, who commanded the United States 7th Fleet in Chinese waters in 1945 and 1946, testified before the Senate subcommittee that the thirty-nine Chinese divisions equipped with American arms were in effect disarmed when their ammunition supplies were shut off, and were defeated by the Communists.

Marshall's coalition plan, which never was accepted, called for the reduction of Chiang's army to ninety Nationalist divisions and the incorporation of eighteen communist divisions into that army. The communist divisions were to be trained

and equipped by the United States. At a hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 19, 1946, Acheson was asked by Representative Rogers (R., Mass.):

"Is there any way we could have an agreement with China whereby she would not use our arms against us?"

Acheson replied: "Well, I suppose we have that in the United Nations charter. . . . Under the principles and procedure of the charter, if anyone wished to employ force against us, I am sure that we would veto that." It cost the United States more than 145,000 casualties, including 30,000 killed, to "veto" the use of force against us in Korea.

Sumner Welles, in *Seven Decisions that Shaped History*, condones Roosevelt's part in the Yalta sellout, but he can find no justification for the Acheson-Marshall betrayal of China. Despite Moscow's tactics in imposing communist governments on Poland and other eastern European countries in the fall of 1945 and early 1946, Welles remarks, Marshall tried "to brow-beat Chiang Kai-shek" into bringing the Communists into his government.

Before he went to China, Marshall had been warned of the real nature of the Chinese Communist movement by a comprehensive report submitted on July 5, 1945, by Brigadier General P. E. Peabody, chief of the military intelligence service. This report was a major project of the service which studied 2,500 reports, pamphlets, and books in its preparation. It said: "The Chinese Communist movement is a part of the international Communist movement. Its military strategy, diplomatic orientation and propaganda policies follow those of the Soviet Union. They are adapted to fit the Chinese environment, but all high policy is derived from international Communist policy, which in turn depends on Soviet Russia. Throughout their history the Chinese Communists have loyally supported and followed the policies of Soviet Russia and have accepted the whole content of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism."²

When Marshall was asked about this report by Senator Bridges at the Senate MacArthur hearing on May 8, 1951, he

2. Senate IPR Hearings, p. 2305.

said he had no knowledge of it, a statement which seems incredible. He acknowledged, however, that the Chinese Communists "insisted" in his presence that they were devoted adherents of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, and that "there was never any doubt in my mind, and never any thought that there was any misunderstanding about it." Marshall knew this all the time, yet as late as January 7th, 1947, on his departure from China to become Secretary of State, he issued a public statement protesting that in Chiang Kai-shek's government there was a "dominant group of reactionaries who have been opposed, in my opinion, to almost every effort I have made to influence the formation of a genuine coalition government. . . . They were quite frank in publicly stating their belief that cooperation by the Chinese Communist Party in the government was inconceivable and that only a policy of force could definitely settle the issue."

In July, 1947, Truman sent General Wedemeyer to China to make an appraisal of the situation. Wedemeyer reported to the President on September 19th, 1947, that the situation was grave, and that its continued deterioration "may result in establishment of a Soviet satellite government in Manchuria and ultimately in a Communist-dominated China which would be inimical to United States interests. This spreading internecine struggle within China threatens world peace. Positive steps should be taken to end hostilities immediately. Soviet aims in the Far East are diametrically opposed to and jeopardize United States interests in China in that their aims envisage progressive expansion of Soviet control and dominant influence. Realization of their aims in China would threaten United States strategic security. . . . In order to preclude defeat by Communist forces, it is necessary to give the National government sufficient and prompt military assistance under the supervision of American advisers in special military fields. American aid to China should be moral, material and advisory. It should be an integrated element of our world-wide policy of military assistance to certain nations. . . . American military aid to China, ground, sea and air, would, if appropriately supervised,

contribute to gradual development of stability in the Far East and lessen the possibility of a Communist-dominated China.”

The only action taken by Truman and Secretary Marshall on this urgent and prophetic report was to suppress it for two years.

An official compilation prepared by the Defense Department showed that from June 30, 1946, the approximate time when Marshall's embargo went into effect, until Congress appropriated \$125,000,000 for arms aid in 1948, the only assistance received by China consisted of \$17,900,000 in lend-lease supplies and about \$4,300,000 worth of ammunition left behind by the marines. The \$125,000,000 arms aid program voted by the Republican 80th Congress was sabotaged by pro-Communists in the State and Commerce Departments. Admiral Cooke testified that when some rifles finally reached General Fu Tso-yi, the Nationalist commander in North China, at the end of 1948, they were without bolts and could not be used. The General was forced to surrender to the Reds.

On July 27, 1949, after the Communists had overrun half of China, Acheson announced the appointment of a three-man board to review the China policy of the United States. As chairman of the board, Acheson named Philip C. Jessup, who had been chairman of both the American and Pacific Councils of the communist-dominated Institute of Pacific Relations. The other members were Everett Case, who was active in the IPR, and Raymond D. Fosdick, who was active in the Rockefeller Foundation, a financial supporter of the IPR. On August 5, 1949, the State Department issued its *White Paper*, drafted by the Jessup board, which blamed the Nationalists for the fall of China. A covering letter by Acheson declared that the Nationalists were “demoralized and unpopular,” and that nothing the United States could have done would have changed the result in China. The issuance of the document jarred the morale of the Nationalists and weakened their hold on the territory which the Communists had not overrun.

Early in October, 1949, a three-day conference in the State Department, presided over by Jessup and attended by twenty-

five invited outsiders, as well as by State Department officials, reviewed the China question. Seventeen of the twenty-five invited participants, as well as Jessup and Case of the White Paper board, were active in the communist-controlled IPR. The invited participants included Marshall, then head of the Red Cross, and Lattimore. The prevailing view of the conference, as shown by an analysis prepared by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, favored recognition of Communist China, encouragement of trade between Japan and Communist China, economic assistance to Communist China, and recognition that communist conquests in Asia were the natural and inevitable consequence of a revolutionary ferment. Harold Stassen, one of the participants, testified that Jessup told him privately, between sessions of the conference, that "greater logic" lay with the views of the majority. Jessup's name is found in extraordinary company in the August 24, 1953, report of the Internal Security Subcommittee. When Frank Coe, a veteran of Miss Bentley's wartime Soviet espionage service, was questioned about his relations with some individuals, he answered without hesitation, but when asked about Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, Lauchlin Currie, the late Constantine Oumansky (former Soviet ambassador) and Philip C. Jessup, he refused to answer on the ground of possible self-incrimination.

On November 16, just six weeks after the State Department conference, Acheson denounced Nationalist China's action in firing on an American vessel, *The Flying Cloud*, which was running the Nationalist blockade and taking supplies to the Communists. On December 3, Acheson said the United States did not recognize the blockade. On December 23, the State Department sent a memorandum to foreign service personnel all over the world, minimizing the importance of Formosa, apparently with a view of preparing the way for its fall to the Communists. On January 5, 1950, Truman announced that the United States had no intention of defending Formosa. He said the island should be returned to "China," by which he clearly meant Communist China, pursuant to the Cairo agreement.

When the U.N. General Assembly met in September, 1950, the State Department was prepared to depose Chiang Kai-shek's regime on Formosa and admit the Chinese Communists to the U.N. The American delegation put the question of the future of Formosa on the assembly's agenda, and John Foster Dulles, who later succeeded Acheson as Secretary of State, wrote a speech advocating a U.N. trusteeship for the island.³ Such a scheme would liquidate Chiang's government and necessitate the admission of Chinese communist representatives to the U.N., for China is named by the U.N. charter as a member. Red China's intervention in the Korean War prevented this final act of betrayal. Dulles never got a chance to deliver his speech.

In the Cairo declaration, on December 1, 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek had agreed that Korea, which had been under Japanese domination since the Russo-Japanese War, should "in due course" become free and independent. In declaring war on Japan on August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union announced its adherence to this agreement. At the Yalta conference, in February, 1945, Roosevelt and Stalin agreed informally that Korea should be placed under four-power trusteeship (America, Russia, Britain, and China) during a transition period to prepare it for independence. When Japan surrendered, Washington and Moscow agreed that all Japanese troops north of the 38th parallel would surrender to the Russians and all those south of the parallel would surrender to American Forces.

How the decision was reached to divide that unhappy country at the 38th parallel is a much controverted question. Sumner Welles mistakenly reports that "subordinate officers in the Pentagon" hastily recommended the 38th parallel "because it was convenient." State Secretary Acheson, testifying at the Senate MacArthur hearing on June 8, 1951, declared that the dividing line was proposed by War Secretary Stimson and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State-War-Navy Co-

3. My information about the Dulles speech was received from a responsible member of the American delegation.

ordinating Committee, and the President. It is a reasonable conjecture that Marshall made the recommendation to Stimson, who was in an advanced state of decrepitude. It is possible also that the line was suggested to Marshall by Soviet generals at Yalta, when they discussed matters relating to Russia's entry into the war against Japan. At all events, the choice of the 38th parallel was not just something that popped into somebody's mind, and whoever first proposed it was thinking solely about Russia's interests. Senator Brewster of Maine, who had been delving into the diplomatic history of the Russo-Japanese War, reminded Acheson at the Senate hearing that in the negotiations preceding the outbreak of that war in 1904 the Russians proposed that Korea be divided at the 38th parallel. What the Czar could not get from the Japanese, Stalin evidently got from Marshall.

At the Moscow conference in December, 1945, Byrnes accepted a Russian proposal setting up a Joint American-Soviet Commission with instructions to form a provisional Korean government. In consultation with this provisional government, the Joint Commission was to establish a four-power trusteeship, to continue not more than five years. The Koreans, who had not been consulted, violently opposed the trusteeship scheme, and Byrnes expressed hope that the Joint Commission, working with the provisional Korean government, would find it possible to dispense with the trusteeship. The Joint Commission, which held its first meeting on March 20, 1946, reached no agreement and no all-Korean provisional government was established. The Russians refused to lift the iron curtain that divided Korea at the 38th parallel.

When General Wedemeyer was sent to the Far East in 1947 he was instructed to appraise the situation in Korea as well as in China. His report on Korea, submitted to the President on September 19, 1947, but not released until May 1, 1951, said: "Whereas American and Soviet forces engaged in occupation duties in South Korea and North Korea respectively are approximately equal, each comprising less than 50,000 troops,

the Soviet-equipped and trained North Korean Peoples' [Communist] army of 125,000 is vastly superior to the United States organized constabulary of 16,000 Koreans, equipped with Japanese small arms.

"The North Korean Peoples' army constitutes a potential military threat to South Korea, since there is a strong probability that the Soviets will withdraw their occupation forces and thus induce our own withdrawal. This probably will take place just as soon as they can be sure that the North Korean puppet government and its armed forces which they have created are strong enough and sufficiently well indoctrinated to be relied upon to carry out Soviet objectives without the actual presence of Soviet troops."

Wedemeyer recommended the organization, equipment, and training of a South Korean military force strong enough to cope with the threat from the north. He warned that a Soviet-dominated Korea would menace Japan and the strategic interests of the United States in the Far East.

This brilliant officer's report, as prophetic as his estimate of the China situation at the same time, was ignored by the Truman administration. State Secretary Marshall decided even before Wedemeyer returned from his survey to submit the fate of Korea to the United Nations. On September 17, 1947, two days before the Wedemeyer report was presented to the President, the American delegation put the Korean question on the General Assembly's agenda. Not only did the Truman administration reject Wedemeyer's recommendations, but the American policy on Korea in the U.N. facilitated achievement by the Russians of the objectives which Wedemeyer had attributed to them, as much so as if it had been designed for that very purpose. The first resolution adopted by the assembly, based on an American proposal, created a U.N. commission to facilitate (1) the establishment of a national government through nation-wide elections and (2) the withdrawal of occupation forces. In this resolution, adopted on November 14, 1947, the United States committed itself to the withdrawal of its occu-

pation forces, which was exactly what Wedemeyer said the Russians would demand.

When the Communists refused to permit the U.N. commission to enter North Korea, the General Assembly's Interim Committee authorized it to supervise elections in "such parts of Korea as are accessible to the commission." On May 10, 1948, the South Koreans elected a national assembly, and Syngman Rhee, whose party won a majority, formed a government. On December 12, 1948, the General Assembly recognized Rhee's government as the only lawful government in those parts of Korea where the U.N. commission was able to function. The Russians had set up a puppet regime in North Korea, headed by Kim Il Sung.

As predicted by General Wedemeyer, the Soviet government, on September 18, 1948, informed the United States that the withdrawal of its occupation forces from North Korea would be completed by the end of December, 1948. In the General Assembly, the Russians were demanding withdrawal of the American forces from South Korea. The United States soon complied. On June 29, 1949, the U.N. commission reported that it had verified the withdrawal of American occupation forces. It received no reply when it notified Moscow of its readiness to verify the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces.

The United States left a military advisory group of five hundred members in South Korea to help Syngman Rhee organize and train an army. In North Korea, the Russians left a North Korean army of 125,000 men, already trained and well equipped. The United States gave the South Koreans only small arms and automatic weapons. President Rhee repeatedly reminded the American advisory group that the North Koreans had artillery, tanks, and airplanes, and begged for similar equipment, but his requests were rejected. American officers explained that the State Department had ruled that Rhee was to get no artillery, tanks, or aircraft because he might be tempted to use them against the North Koreans.

Rhee, like Chiang Kai-shek, fought the Communists and was reviled by them with all the opprobrious terms in their lexicon. The State Department faithfully adhered to the communist "line" on Rhee. The official attitude was expressed with extraordinary candor by Lattimore, a State Department consultant on Far Eastern affairs, in a Washington dispatch dated July 17, 1949, which appeared in the *New York Compass*, a procommunist sheet now defunct.

Lattimore wrote: "As the record stands, it is now revealed that Secretary of State Dean Acheson made a strong appeal for the \$150,000,000 grant (to South Korea) before a closed session of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Unless South Korea gets the money, he warned, it will fall within three months. Simultaneously with this urgent appeal, however, it is also revealed that the evacuation of American occupation troops from South Korea . . . has now been completed. . . . For the logic we must go back to the sad precedent of China. . . . As it became more and more obvious that Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang were doomed, the conduct of American policy became increasingly delicate. The problem was how to allow them to fall without making it look as if the United States had pushed them. . . . Korea is another chapter in the same unhappy story. I have yet to meet an American who knows all the facts and believes that Syngman Rhee is either a popular or a competent president of South Korea. In spite of high-pressure elections, his legislature is more badly split against him than China's was against Chiang Kai-shek. The thing to do, therefore, is to let South Korea fall, but not to let it look as though we pushed it. Hence the recommendation of a parting grant of \$150,000,000."

If there was any doubt that Lattimore was expressing the official State Department attitude, it must have vanished when State Secretary Acheson, addressing the National Press Club on January 12, 1950, declared that Korea was beyond the "defensive perimeter" of the United States, which extended, he said, from Japan, to the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa), to the

Philippines. This was notice to the world that the United States would defend neither Formosa nor Korea. As Sumner Welles comments, in *Seven Decisions That Shaped History*, Acheson's announcement was "an open invitation to the North Korean Communists and to their Soviet and Chinese allies to invade South Korea."

They accepted the invitation on June 25, 1950.

XI. The United Nations Conspiracy

THE American people and Congress supported the United Nations, more hopefully than realistically, as an organization that would strive, by means of collective action, to maintain international peace and security. They never suspected that the U.N. was the principal instrument of a gigantic conspiracy to control both the foreign and domestic policies of the United States, subvert the Constitution, and establish a totalitarian society.

Washington revolutionists sought to vest direct control of American foreign policy in the U.N., which could be used by the Soviet Union and its satellites and the so-called "have not" countries to gang up on the United States. They planned to control American domestic policy indirectly through the U.N. and its specialized agencies, by means of "full employment" measures, trade concessions, and foreign aid which would necessitate excessive spending and taxing levels and gradually strangle free enterprise. Finally, the conspirators hoped to strengthen their control of American internal affairs by means of U.N. treaties, which could destroy the Bill of Rights and reduce Congress to the impotence of the German Reichstag under Hitler or the Supreme Soviet in Communist Russia.

Such a grandiose design for revolution seems fantastic, but the scope and purpose of the conspiracy are clearly shown by the official records of Congressional committees, the State Department, the U.N. and its specialized agencies. Some of the plans of the revolutionists have been frustrated. But their major objective—to tax the American people and spend their money on a scale undreamed of before World War II—has

been achieved, paradoxically, in the name of resistance to communism.

Alger Hiss, the State Department traitor, was the busiest of all the United Nations planners. According to the State Department publication, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation*, he was active in planning work as early as the summer of 1942. He was executive secretary of the Dumbarton Oaks conference in 1944, at which the preliminary draft of the U.N. Charter was approved, and he was secretary general of the San Francisco conference, which completed the Charter. He was President Roosevelt's advisor on U.N. affairs at the Yalta conference. As head of the Office of Special Political Affairs (later U.N. Affairs) he organized the American delegation to the San Francisco conference and the conference itself. Later he helped organize and staff the American mission to the U.N. and the secretariat of the U.N. itself.

Postwar foreign policy preparations also included planning in such political and economic fields as relief and reconstruction, occupation policies for Germany and Japan, currency stabilization, and international trade. Primarily concerned in these discussions, besides the State Department, were the Treasury Department, the Board of Economic Warfare (later Foreign Economic Administration), and the War Production Board (later Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion). All four agencies were infiltrated by Communists at policy-making levels.

In the State Department, besides Hiss, there were Laurence Duggan, head of the Latin American Division; Noel Field, close friend of Duggan and a highly placed member of the West European Division, and Henry Julian Wadleigh, in the Trade Agreements Section. Hede Massing identified Duggan and Field as members of her Soviet espionage apparatus. Duggan was killed by a fall from a window of his New York office and Field disappeared behind the Iron Curtain during the Hiss case. Wadleigh was working for a Soviet spy ring and so testified in the Hiss trials. When former Governor (now Senator) Lehman of New York became head of the State Department's

Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, in 1943, David Weintraub moved over from the War Production Board to be Lehman's chief of studies and reports. Weintraub, who later went with Lehman to the U.N. Relief and Rehabilitation Agency, and still later to the U.N. itself, was identified in sworn testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee as a Communist. Before the war he had been director of the National Research Project of the WPA, which the Communists used as a convenient cover and meal ticket for their secret operatives.¹ He was eased out of the Economics Department of the U.N. in 1953.

The FEA deputy administrator was Lauchlin Currie, who also was an administrative assistant to President Roosevelt. Currie was identified by Elizabeth Bentley as a member of a Soviet underground apparatus directed by her during the war. Frank Coe and Michael Greenberg, also identified by Miss Bentley as collaborators in the Kremlin's service, were FEA officials. Coe later became secretary of the International Monetary Fund, and was fired in 1953 when he refused to say under oath whether he was a Communist. Irving Kaplan, who had been deputy to Weintraub in the National Research Project and later went with him to the U.N., was in the FEA. Unlike Weintraub, who denied that he was a Communist, Kaplan refused to testify, invoking the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Still another FEA official was Max Lowenthal, a left-wing friend of Harry Truman who wrote a communist-line book attacking the FBI. Lowenthal denied under oath that he was a Communist. Some Communists refused, on the ground of self-incrimination, to say whether they knew Lowenthal.

Victor Perlo, identified by Miss Bentley as the head of one Soviet apparatus under her direction, was an official of the War Production Board. Harry Magdoff, Edward Fitzgerald and William Remington, also identified by Miss Bentley as members of the Soviet underground, were other WPB officials. After the war, Remington was convicted of perjury in denying his

1. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee Report, August 24, 1953.

Communist connections. Robert R. Nathan was head of the planning staff of the WPB and later became deputy director for reconversion of the OWMR. Nathan, although never identified as a Communist, was and is an extreme leftist. On leaving the government, he represented the CIO as a consulting economist.

The No. 1 Communist in the Treasury Department was Harry D. White, who became Assistant Secretary. Both White and Harold Glasser, another Treasury Department official, were members of Miss Bentley's Kremlin service and both were busily engaged in postwar planning. Another Communist in the Treasury Department was Kaplan, who came over from the FEA.

The State Department report declares that in May, 1942, White became chairman of a committee to formulate plans for an international monetary fund and a world bank for reconstruction and development. The report states that White "was primarily responsible for the Treasury's work in this field."

Hiss, White, Currie, Wadleigh, Glasser, Coe and Duggan, all identified in sworn testimony by competent witnesses as Communists, are mentioned repeatedly in the State Department's book on postwar planning as members of committees and subcommittees on economic and political problems. Also frequently mentioned is Dean Acheson, then an Assistant Secretary of State. Adolf A. Berle Jr., former Assistant Secretary of State, testified before the House Committee on Un-American Activities on August 30, 1948, that Acheson headed a "pro-Russian" group in the department "with Mr. Hiss as his principal assistant." Still another postwar planner frequently mentioned in the State Department publication is Paul Appleby, then assistant director of the Budget Bureau. Appleby is quoted in *The Congressional Record* of July 18, 1946, as saying: "A man in the employ of the government has just as much right to be a member of the Communist party as he has to be a member of the Democratic or Republican party."

Such were the credentials of the leading planners of our post-

war foreign policy. Now let us consider some of the things they did.

Article 55 of the U.N. Charter declares that the organization, among other things, shall promote "full employment." Article 56 obligates all U.N. members to take "joint and separate action in cooperation with the organization" for the achievement of the purposes set forth in article 55. When the Charter was under consideration at San Francisco, few Americans realized that this pledge, which seemed merely to express an aspiration, would be construed as a treaty obligation by which the United States could be held accountable to the U.N. for its domestic policies. Before the Charter had gone into effect the Truman administration's so-called "full employment" bill was introduced by Senator James E. Murray of Montana, a complacent dupe of the Communists. A Communist Party resolution said: "Push the fight for 60 million jobs. . . . Support the Murray full employment bill."² The bill was denounced by conservative economists as a blueprint for collectivism.

A brief submitted by the Machinery and Allied Products Institute declared: "If full employment means that everyone has a regular full time job at a remuneration satisfactory to himself in an occupation and location of his own preference then it may be put down as an impossibility in a free society or any other. Certain totalitarian states have attained what passes for full employment, but it is not of this character. It has been accompanied by impressment in labor camps, the forcible transference of workers from one vocation to another, the compulsory prescription of wage rates, and other forms of duress and coercion."

One of the bill's reputed authors was Nathan of the OWMR. It was clamorously supported by such New Deal Jacobins as Henry Wallace, Secretary of Commerce, whom the Communists supported for President in 1948; Chester Bowles, price administrator; and Isador Lubin, commissioner of labor statistics. The New Deal economists predicted that postwar unem-

2. House Un-American Activities Committee Hearings, July 7, 1953.

ployment would reach 6,000,000 to 9,000,000 by spring, 1946. They induced John Snyder, War Mobilization director, and Fred Vinson, Secretary of the Treasury, to support these ridiculous estimates. According to the official census reports, post-war unemployment actually reached a peak of 2,710,000 in March, 1946.

Congress drastically modified the Murray bill, even eliminating the phrase "full employment" from the title. Senator Barkley of Kentucky, the Democratic leader, sarcastically remarked that the measure, as passed, "guarantees everybody out of work the right to seek a job if he can find one."

While Congress was debating the "full employment" bill the State Department planners drew up proposals for an international conference on trade and employment, made public on December 6, 1945. Attention was directed to the U.N. Charter pledge of "joint and separate action in cooperation with the organization to achieve . . . higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development." Draft proposals were included for an International Trade Organization, to work for "an expanding world economy" and "the establishment and maintenance in all countries of high levels of employment and real income." The ITO charter, drafted at a conference in Havana in 1948, has never come into force for want of ratifications. The American Congress refused to approve it.

In August, 1949, the U.N. Economic and Social Council adopted a resolution directing the secretary general to appoint a group of so-called experts for a study of "national and international measures required to achieve full employment." David Weintraub, who had come to the U.N. from UNRRA and was director of the Division of Economic Stability and Development, recommended the following "experts," who were appointed by Trygve Lie: John Maurice Clark, professor of economics at Columbia University, who worked in association with Professor Arthur Smithies of Harvard University; Nicholas Kaldor, fellow of King's College, Cambridge; Pierre Uri, eco-

conomic and financial advisor to the Commissariat General du Plan, Paris; and E. Ronald Walker, economic advisor to the Australian Department of External Affairs.

This committee, interpreting the "full employment" pledge in the Charter as a treaty obligation, recommended adoption by member governments of a self-starting spending plan based on the theories of the late John Maynard Keynes, who was described before the war as "the Englishman who rules America." Once Congress had approved the scheme it would cease to have any responsibility, except the obligation to provide the money. Government spending and other compensatory measures would come into force automatically whenever unemployment exceeded a pre-announced level. The suggested level was five and one half per cent of the total working force. The committee recognized the inflationary dangers of such a program and recommended government controls to maintain price stability, such as "qualitative or quantitative credit controls, direct controls over inventories, and selective controls over prices."

This audacious attempt to dictate the domestic policies of member governments, particularly the United States, was solemnly debated and generally approved by members of the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly. Isador Lubin, United States representative on the Economic and Social Council, was mildly critical of the proposal, possibly because he thought Congress would never approve it, but he moved to place the full employment question on the Council's agenda each year and to call for periodic reports from member governments on their employment policies. This was approved and the United States gives the U.N. a periodic accounting.

The postwar plans of the revolutionists were based on large-scale spending on public works to maintain "full employment," and on foreign assistance, through UNRRA, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and direct American aid to foreign countries. The Communists must have foreseen the so-called cold war, for the inevitability of a death struggle between

the Soviet Union and the United States is an article of their faith, but it is unlikely that they expected this country to spend as much as fifty billion dollars a year on armaments and foreign aid. Now the U.N. planners believe they have a vested interest in continued American spending on an undiminished scale. Another group of experts selected by Weintraub and appointed by Lie, pursuant to an Economic and Social Council resolution, prepared a report on "measures for International Economic Stability." Professor James W. Angell of Columbia University, was chairman of this group.

Its report, submitted in November, 1951, said: ". . . we believe that in future the real danger to the economic stability of the rest of the world lies in recessions originating in the United States: partly because of the dominant position of the United States in international trade and payments, and partly because of the institutional and economic factors which make the United States economy more liable to internal fluctuations in effective demand than are the economies of other important trading nations. . . . Beyond the present problems of inflation and shortage lies the possibility of a post-rearmament recession, particularly in the United States. No one can say how long the rearmament program will continue, or how it may expand or contract. . . . But any substantial or sudden cutback in rearmament would clearly involve a serious risk of recession, and even a levelling off of the program would mean a drop in the secondary defense demands for inventories, plant and equipment."

Still another report by a group of "experts" appointed by the U.N. Secretary General, issued in May, 1951, declares that a two per cent increase in the per capita national incomes of the so-called underdeveloped countries of the world "cannot be brought about without an annual capital import well in excess of 10 billion dollars." This is an indication of the size of the burden these global planners would like to place upon the backs of the American taxpayers. And regardless of rebuffs and disappointments, they never give up. The proposed treaty on human rights contains an article requiring governments to adopt

policies "to achieve steady economic development and full and productive employment."

In the spring of 1946, the Acheson-Hiss group in the State Department attempted a *coup d'état*. Their plan was to seize control of the State Department's policy-making functions from the career foreign service personnel; to centralize control of all foreign intelligence in the department; to create a global propaganda machine in the department; to control the hiring and firing of department personnel; to shift control of American foreign policy to the U.N., and to control the U.N.

The buildup for the State Department D-Day began in September and October, 1945, when the Budget Bureau, controlled by the revolutionists, devised a plan by which President Truman, in executive orders 9608, 9621, and 9630, transferred the Office of War Information, the intelligence and research units of the Office of Strategic Services, the Office of Inter-American Affairs, the Foreign Economic Administration and the Office of Foreign Liquidation into the State Department. This involved a merger of 25,000 government employes. The State Department was inundated with the Communists and fellow travelers of the wartime agencies.

State Secretary Byrnes, who was away most of the time attending international conferences, was awed by the task of assimilating such a formidable mass of ideological freaks, so he brought in his former law partner, Donald S. Russell, as assistant secretary for administration, and hired J. Anthony Panuch as deputy assistant secretary for administration with the special job of "coordinating and integrating" the functions transferred to the department by the President's executive orders. Panuch, a dynamic New York lawyer, Republican, and unadulterated American, had been special advisor to General Lucius Clay, director of materiel in the War Department, and later special advisor to Director Byrnes in the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion.

On March 5, 1946, shortly after returning from the first ses-

sion of the General Assembly in London, where he was a senior advisor to the American delegation, Hiss submitted his plan to Byrnes. It was a charter to give Hiss' Office of Special Political Affairs: "Charge of international organization and security affairs, for the formulation and coordination of policy and action relating to such affairs, with special emphasis on the maintenance of international peace and security through organized action." Moreover, the plan proposed to elevate Hiss' office above the level of the geographic and economic offices of the department and place it directly under the undersecretary, who happened to be Dean Acheson. The geographic offices, staffed by foreign service officers, functioned under a charter giving them responsibility "for the formulation of overall United States policy toward the countries within their jurisdiction, and for coordination, as to these countries, of the programs and activities of other offices." Hiss was trying to grab all of this responsibility for himself.

On March 7, 1946, Panuch wrote a confidential memorandum on the Hiss plan to Russell, which was placed in the record of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee when he testified on June 25, 1953. It said: "I have read with mingled feelings of admiration and horror the outline of the Hiss plan. The plan's simplicity of design is admirable; its concept is grandiose. . . .

"In examining the plan and assessing its implications in terms of control, it should be remembered that Dr. Hiss exercises Svengali-like influence over the mental processes of Junior Stettinius, the United States delegate to UNO. Through Mr. C. Easton Rothwell, his designee for the post of secretary general of the United States delegation to UNO, Dr. Hiss will enjoy 'working control' over the flow of papers in and out of the secretariat of the United States group. The proposed plan would establish a similar control setup within the state department, where Dr. Hiss already wields considerable influence with the counselor, Benjamin V. Cohen, on UNO matters. This would be effected by the simple device of establishing a new office for United Nations affairs.

"If this ambitious project should be approved, it is obvious that the operations of the new office, as the 'initiating and coordinating center within the department' for UNO affairs, will, for all practical purposes, supplant and supersede the functions of the geographic and economic offices of the department. In such event, the question arises to what extent the de jure policy output of the department will be diluted by the day-to-day de facto policy product as established by Mr. Stettinius' counterpart of the State Department, functioning within the UNO orbit of influence in New York. If Dr. Hiss should succeed in causing Dr. Appleby to be designated as the UNO assistant secretary general for administration, the Hiss group will have achieved infiltration in, or control of, four critically strategic points: (a) UNO itself (Feller, Appleby); (b) the United States delegation (Stettinius and Rothwell); (c) the state department (Hiss, Ross, OUNOA), and (d) bureau of the budget (Harold Smith, Schwarzwaldner)."

(Cohen was counselor of the State Department. Rothwell, Hiss' designee for secretary general of the United States mission to the U.N., was appointed and held that job for about a year, while it was being staffed and organized. Abraham H. Feller was general counsel of the U.N. In the fall of 1952, when a federal grand jury and the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee were questioning American Communists in the U.N., he killed himself by jumping from a window of his New York apartment. There was no evidence that Feller was a Communist Party member, although as a former New Deal lawyer he had been closely associated with Hiss and other Soviet agents. Apparently he was a victim of schizophrenia, induced by a conflict of loyalties. Appleby, Hiss' friend in the Budget Bureau, did not get the U.N. job of assistant secretary general for administration. John C. Ross, Hiss' deputy in the State Department, became a deputy United States representative to the U.N. and still has that job. Harold Smith was director of the Budget Bureau and George Schwarzwaldner, one of Smith's assistants, was the candidate of the revolutionists for J. Edgar Hoover's job as director of the FBI.)

Panuch's memorandum killed the Hiss reorganization plan, but the influence of the Hiss-Acheson group was by no means destroyed. Hiss deftly outmaneuvered Byrnes and Panuch with a duplicitous plan to introduce American Communists into the U.N. Secretariat. Early in 1946, he obtained approval of a State Department rule that no recommendations would be made regarding American applicants for U.N. jobs. Whether this rule was approved by Acheson, in Byrnes' absence, or by Byrnes, on Acheson's recommendation, is not clear, but State Department officials told a House Judiciary Subcommittee in 1953 that such a policy was adopted. Trygve Lie, former U.N. Secretary General, told the General Assembly on March 10, 1953, that one of his first acts was to request the United States government for help in finding qualified personnel for the Secretariat. He said the United States refused, on the ground that it wished to avoid the appearance of influencing the selection of personnel.

If the State Department had complied with Lie's request for help, applicants for U.N. jobs would have been screened by the department's Security Committee, under Panuch's jurisdiction, by the Civil Service Commission, or by the FBI, and that would have been awkward for Hiss' communist friends. With the no-recommendation rule in force, however, Hiss clandestinely recommended job seekers to his friends who already held influential positions in the U.N. Secretariat. According to the report of the Judiciary Subcommittee, Hiss secretly recommended nearly five hundred persons for U.N. employment. Many of them were employed, and some of them later became "public issues," the subcommittee reported. The "public issues" referred to had refused, on the ground of self-incrimination, to tell the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee whether they were or had been Communists, or were engaging or had engaged in espionage or subversive activities against the United States. Eighteen Secretariat members and five others recently separated from the payroll took refuge under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution when questioned in 1952 and 1953 about communist activities. Lie fired these and about twenty

others as a result of hearings by the Senate subcommittee and a federal grand jury in New York. However, nineteen of those dismissed appealed to the U.N. administrative tribunal, which ruled that membership in the Communist Party or refusal to testify on the ground of self-incrimination is not a valid ground for the discharge of a Secretariat member. U.N. employes dismissed for refusing to testify about communist or espionage activities must either be reinstated or compensated, the tribunal ruled. If upheld by the assembly, this decision would cost the U.N. more than \$200,000 for "termination indemnity" payments to eleven employes whose appeals were upheld.

Lie disclosed that the State Department refused to give him any information whatever regarding reports of subversive activities by American members of the Secretariat until late in 1949, when the U.N. entered into a secret agreement with the department. Under this agreement, the department gave the U.N. no information except its bare opinion, and then only when the opinion was adverse on security grounds. Often the report would consist of a single word, Lie said. The House Judiciary Subcommittee reported that the department submitted only fifty-six adverse comments from 1949 to 1953, eight of them on applicants for jobs and forty-eight on employes. It reported that nearly 100 U.N. employes were questioned by the federal grand jury. It said the FBI reported highly derogatory information on fifty-three of these to the State Department, but in some cases the department refrained from making adverse reports to Lie and in others it waited up to three years before submitting such reports.

From its inception the U.N. was a fraud on the innate yearning of mankind for peace. Roosevelt originally opposed the creation of a new world league. According to Sumner Welles,³ Roosevelt declared at the Atlantic Charter conference in August, 1941, that "nothing could be more futile than the reconstitution of a body such as the assembly of the League of Nations." He believed that the United States and Britain should

3. *Where Are We Heading?*

police the world after the war was over. Later he became enamoured of the project of creating a new peace league to justify America's intervention in the war. He brooded over the stupendous cost of the war in blood and treasure, about the prospect that the United States would be called upon to spend far more for postwar relief and reconstruction than any vanquished country in history had paid in reparations, and about the danger, as he saw it, that postwar disillusionment would revive the isolationism that followed World War I. Accordingly he embraced the U.N. project in the hope that its promise of saving "future generations from the scourge of war" would be accepted by the people as justification for the deception by which he took the country into World War II.

Roosevelt also was obsessed by the delusion that he could enchant and bribe Stalin to cooperate for peace. Stalin, eager to be bribed, professed to be enchanted. On returning from Teheran Roosevelt was almost delirious with self-satisfaction as he told Miss Perkins how he charmed Stalin, how "the ice was broken and we talked like men and brothers."⁴

Roosevelt agreed to give the British Commonwealth six votes and the Soviet Union three in the General Assembly, where the United States has only one, although it pays one third of the cost of the 60-member organization. Roosevelt made territorial concessions to Stalin which gave the Soviet Union mastery of eastern Europe and eastern Asia. There can be no explanation save madness or treasonous intent for the professed belief that the Bolsheviks would cooperate for peace in the U.N. In writings that were reprinted and circulated throughout the Soviet Union all during World War II, both Lenin and Stalin had reiterated that the communist goal of world revolution could be achieved only by violence. In *Problems of Leninism*, of which 13,774,000 copies had been printed before a new edition was brought out in 1940, Stalin affirmed Lenin's dictum that "the existence of the Soviet republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end

4. *The Roosevelt I Knew*, by Frances Perkins.

supervenes a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable.”

Moreover, Stalin had demonstrated his perfidy by deeds as well as words. He had made his deal with Hitler in the hope that western Europe would destroy itself in war and the vulture of communism could batten on the ruins. He had pounced upon stricken Poland with the cowardice of a jackal, after Hitler had destroyed the Polish army. He had greedily swallowed Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, and he had launched unprovoked aggression against Finland. All of these territorial grabs were made in violation of solemn non-aggression pacts.

Despite these enormities, the American people were told that “Uncle Joe” Stalin was a benevolent patriarch whose most cherished desire was to be remembered by posterity as the co-adjutor of Franklin D. Roosevelt in the creation of a millenium of peace.

Stalin happily accepted an invitation to associate with representatives of the so-called civilized countries on terms of equality and mutual respect in a pretended peace organization. Such an association imparted an aura of dignity and respectability to his bloody tyranny. The U.N. was a perfect mask for his murderous plans for world revolution. He had written that “the revolutionary accepts reform in order to use it as a cover for his illegal work.”

Instead of peace and security, which was the promise of the U.N., we have a global cold war with Soviet communism. We fought a three-year, inconclusive shooting war in Korea in the name of the U.N., at a cost of 145,000 American casualties, 30,000 of them dead. We have shooting wars in Indochina and Malaya, and unresolved states of war in the Middle East (Palestine) and on the subcontinent of India (Kashmir). There is smoldering unrest among the colonial and semi-colonial peoples of Africa and Asia. The U.N. was supposed to “relieve mankind from the crushing burden of armaments.” The organization is in its ninth year, and the American people are paying fifty billion dollars a year for armaments and foreign aid.

U.N. apologists cannot dispute these facts, but they argue that the world situation would be even worse, that we might be engaged in a global atomic war, if the organization did not exist. The answer to that argument is that the U.N. has not solved a single political question which could not and would not have been settled by the traditional processes of diplomacy if the U.N. had never been created. We are told that the U.N. got the Soviet troops out of Iran. Actually they did not leave until the Kremlin's demand for an oil concession in northern Iran had been met by the Iranian prime minister. The Soviet Union pulled its troops out of Iran, pursuant to a wartime agreement, because it was not ready to risk war with the United States and Great Britain, not because of any respect for the Security Council. Concurrently with the Iranian dispute, Stalin was demanding bases on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. When Turkey threatened to fight and the United States and Britain said they would support the Turks, Stalin backed down. This dispute closely paralleled the Iranian case, and its settlement cannot be called a U.N. victory because it was not before the U.N.

In the Palestine war, both the Jews and the Arabs defied the U.N. when it appeared to suit their interests, and hostilities ceased only with the victory of Israeli arms. This was a triumph of force, not moral authority and not collective security. After the Israeli victory, the U.N. negotiated an armistice agreement, but in more than five years it has not been able to effect a peace settlement or to solve the problem of the 850,000 Palestinian Arabs who were displaced from their homes by the war.

In Indonesia, the Dutch defied the Security Council until Merle Cochran, a wise American diplomat, finally persuaded them that no matter what sacrifices they were prepared to make they could never subjugate the Indonesians. Yielding to American pressure, the Dutch granted independence to the Indonesians.

In Kashmir, India and Pakistan agreed to a cease-fire in response to U.N. appeals, but there is no reason to doubt that they would have responded similarly to conciliation efforts by

the United States and Britain. After more than four years of futile U.N. mediation efforts, India and Pakistan washed their hands of the organization and said they would try to settle their own differences.

The U.N. is credited with saving Greece from destruction by communist guerrilla forces supported by the Soviet Union and its Balkan satellites. Actually Greece was saved by direct American military and economic assistance, costing about two billion dollars, and by Communist Yugoslavia's break with the Kremlin. Yugoslavia had been the main base of the guerrilla operations against Greece.

The Security Council's attempt to end the Berlin blockade was frustrated by a Soviet veto. Months later the question was settled by direct negotiations. It is slightly ludicrous to give the U.N. credit for this settlement on the ground that it provided the diplomatic contact which resulted in the direct negotiations. The United States and the Soviet Union have diplomatic contacts in the major capitals of the world, and need not depend on chance meetings in U.N. washrooms.

The Security Council tried and failed to settle Great Britain's dispute with Egypt over the future of the Sudan and the defense of the Suez Canal. Aided by American mediation, a function of old-fashioned diplomacy, Britain and Egypt have happily reached an agreement on the Sudan. Despite recriminations and vicissitudes, it appears probable that negotiations for the evacuation of the Suez canal zone by British troops will succeed.

The Security Council also tried and failed to settle Britain's oil dispute with Iran. The General Assembly at first refused to consider Arab complaints that France was oppressing the Moroccans, in violation of the U.N. Charter, and the Security Council later refused to consider similar charges against the French in Tunisia. When the Assembly finally took up both questions, it sought to appease the French, who were staging a Soviet-style boycott of its sessions. The Assembly adopted resolutions inspired by the United States and sponsored by a group of Latin American countries, which expressed confidence

in France's intentions regarding the Tunisians and Moroccans. For its labors, the Assembly incurred the contempt of France and the resentment of the whole Moslem world from Morocco to Indonesia.

The response of the U.N. to the communist aggression in Korea is acclaimed by its supporters as a victory for the collective security principle in its first test. Actually it would be difficult to imagine a more convincing demonstration that such a system is not collective, and does not provide security. State Secretary Dulles, addressing the General Assembly on September 17, 1953, declared that when the Security Council called for help in Korea "almost every member responded in one way or another." This was an understatement, for all sixty members responded "in one way or another," including the Soviet Union, which boasted of its material assistance to the communist forces. Only fifteen U.N. members besides the United States sent combat units to Korea, and the United States, according to repeated statements by Winston Churchill, bore "nineteen-twentieths" of the burden. Of course this calculation excludes the sacrifices of the South Koreans.

Although called a U.N. operation, it was primarily an American war, Truman's war, as the late Senator Taft candidly dubbed it. Truman ordered American armed forces into action before the Security Council called for armed assistance to the South Koreans. The Council's first resolution, adopted on June 25, 1950, called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and called upon all members "to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution." Armed intervention was neither mentioned nor contemplated. On June 27, President Truman announced that he had ordered American forces into action. He said he had done this in conformity with the Council's resolution of June 25. About nine hours later, however, the Council adopted an American resolution recommending "that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area." Confronted by a *fait accompli*, and

lightly assuming that the United States could defeat the North Korean Communists without calling upon them for substantial help, the other Security Council members voted for armed action. So far as the United States was concerned, the U.N. served only as a convenient pretext for the President to enter the war without a declaration by Congress, as required by the Constitution.

The General Assembly stalled for three months after Communist China entered the war before adopting, on February 1, 1951, a resolution accusing the Peiping regime of aggression. It waited another three and one half months before adopting, with even greater reluctance, a resolution calling for an embargo on the shipment of war materials to Red China. It never called for a complete cessation of trading with the enemy, and some U.N. members, particularly Britain, never did stop such trade. On June 6, 1953, Senator McCarthy's Permanent Investigations Subcommittee listed the names of 96 ships of British registry, and 62 flying the flags of other noncommunist countries, as participants in trade with Communist China from December 29, 1952 to April 20, 1953. This information was confirmed by the Defense Department. On May 28, the Senate subcommittee made public a detailed account of three voyages by two British owned ships which actually transported enemy troops while the war was going on in Korea.

Defenders of the U.N., particularly State Secretary Dulles, are wont to extol its so-called moral authority. Dulles sanctimoniously discourses about "mobilizing and focusing the moral judgment of the world" upon aggressors. Yet the U.N. has never pronounced a moral judgment upon the Soviet Union. Former State Secretary Acheson told the Assembly's political committee on October 24, 1952, that the communist aggressor forces in Korea were "raised, heavily equipped and tactically and strategically advised by the Soviet Union government." Henry Cabot Lodge, United States representative, told the same committee on February 25, 1953, that "Soviet planning instigated the original aggression, which was subsequently maintained

by Soviet training and equipment . . . the flow of Soviet equipment is constant and steady and accounts for the increase of combat effectiveness of the enemy over the past year." On September 18, 1953, Lt. General Samuel E. Anderson, commander of the Fifth Air Force, announced in Seoul that entire Soviet air force units fought in the Korean war for two and a half years. He said the Russians used the war to gain combat experience for their pilots, just as they did in the Spanish Civil War.

When this writer asked Lodge why the U.N. did not condemn the Soviet Union for its part in the Korean aggression, Lodge replied: "It doesn't do any good to call names unless you are prepared to go to war." Since the U.N. did condemn the North Koreans and even the Chinese Communists, however reluctantly, as aggressors, it appears to have a double moral standard, one for small or weak aggressors and one for big aggressors.

A persistent and widely propagated myth about the U.N. is that the noncommunist members are united; that they are faithful to their obligations under the Charter, and that obstruction by the Soviet bloc is the sole reason for the impotence of the organization. The Soviet Union has flagrantly abused its veto in the Security Council, but the U.N. could do anything the Charter authorizes it to do, including the use of armed force, on a recommendation by the General Assembly, in which there is no veto. After the fortuitous, or perhaps deliberate, absence of the Soviet delegation permitted the Council to recommend armed action in Korea, the Assembly adopted the so-called "Uniting for Peace" resolution, proposed by former Secretary Acheson. This resolution authorizes the Assembly to meet on twenty-four hours' notice and recommend collective action against aggression whenever the Security Council is stymied by a veto. It also calls upon all U.N. members to maintain units of their armed forces so trained, organized and equipped that they could be made available to the U.N. on its call. The response to the Acheson plan demonstrated the futility of try-

ing to organize a universal collective security system which would bind its members to fight in remote parts of the world for some abstract principle, regardless of their national interests as conceived by their responsible officials. Only Thailand agreed to earmark a special armed unit for U.N. service. Only the United States made a blanket commitment to fight for U.N. principles whenever and wherever aggression might occur. Britain, France, and other members said they would fight for U.N. principles in defense of their own possessions.

U.N. members obstructed the prosecution of the war by repeatedly admonishing the United States against measures proposed by General MacArthur to defeat the Communists. In November, 1950, after the intervention of Red China, the General recommended the use of 50,000 to 60,000 Chinese Nationalist troops from Formosa, but was repulsed by Washington. The response was the same when he proposed to institute a naval blockade of Communist China, to attack its coastal cities and particularly to bomb its airfields and communications facilities across the Yalu river in the "privileged sanctuary" of Manchuria. The Truman administration heeded the lamentations of the Anglo-Indian appeasement bloc in the U.N., as well as the counsel of the revolutionaries in the State Department. On December 1, 1950, General MacArthur told the *U. S. News and World Report* that the limitations imposed upon his command constituted "an enormous handicap without precedent in military history." On March 24, 1951, he issued a public statement declaring that Red China would be "doomed to the risk of imminent military collapse" if the U.N. would depart from its policy of confining the war to Korea. Finally, on April 11, 1951, Truman peremptorily removed MacArthur from command, on the ground that he was "unable to give whole-hearted support to the policies of the United States government and the United Nations." Testifying at the Senate MacArthur inquiry on May 7, 1951, General Marshall, then Defense Secretary, said MacArthur "would have us, on our own initiative, carry the conflict beyond Korea against the mainland of Communist China, both from the sea and from the air. . . . He

would have us do this even at the expense of losing our allies and wrecking the coalition of free peoples throughout the world.”

There is impressive evidence that both China and North Korea could have been liberated from communism if MacArthur's program had been carried out. Mao Tse-tung's Red regime was in serious trouble and might have been wrecked. The war, famine, the pillaging of farmers and business men, and the systematic liquidation of millions of so-called reactionaries had created sullen discontent throughout China.⁵ A naval blockade, together with bombing attacks on China's railroad centers, might have disrupted its supply system and produced widespread havoc and chaos.

General Van Fleet, who commanded the Eighth Army in Korea for twenty-two months, declared in an article in *Life* magazine that our greatest mistake was that we “consistently underestimated the Koreans and overestimated the Chinese Reds.” He said the war was costing the Chinese Communists much more than it was costing us.

Even General Marshall acknowledged at the Senate hearing on May 8, 1951, less than a year after the war began, that the Chinese and North Korean Communists had suffered between 500,000 and 800,000 casualties and that “no people can continue at that rate very long.” Before the armistice was signed, the Chinese Communists alone lost more than 1,000,000 casualties.

Our so-called allies in the U.N. had no desire to defeat the Communists. They suspected that the United States was out to defeat communism in Asia, not just aggression in Korea, and this idea was abhorrent to them. Lester B. Pearson, Canada's external affairs minister, who was president of the General Assembly's seventh session, declared in a public speech at Har-

5. On October 23, 1952, the Free Trade Union Committee of the American Federation of Labor, basing its finding on announcements made by the Chinese Communists themselves, reported that no less than 14,000,000 persons had been put to death by Mao Tse-tung's regime in five years.

vard University on June 11, 1953, that some Americans regarded Asian communism as an implacable foe which must be defeated by every action short of war and even at the risk of war. "There are few countries inside the western alliance willing to accept this obligation, especially in the terms in which it is sometimes presented in this country," said Pearson.

While restraining the United States, the U.N. members gave aid and comfort to the Communists by addressing prayerful armistice appeals to Peiping and Pyongyang, thereby disclosing the weakness, disunity and timidity of the noncommunist membership. The most abject of these supplications, drafted by Pearson, Benegal Rau of India, and Nasrollah Entezam of Iran, was approved by the Assembly's sixty member political committee, with the support of Acheson's State Department, on January 13, 1951. In effect it offered the Chinese Communists both Formosa and admission to the U.N. in exchange for an armistice.

In June, 1951, the U.N. members induced the United States to walk into a bear trap by accepting Moscow's proposal for armistice talks, at a time when the Communists were hard pressed militarily and needed time to build up their forces. From May 15 to May 30 they had been driven back twenty miles and had suffered more than 100,000 casualties. Assured by U.N. spokesmen that they had nothing to fear, the Communists dragged out the truce negotiations for more than two years, while the United States made one concession after another and compromised one principle after another.

U.N. spokesmen maintained that an armistice approximating the 38th parallel would accomplish the organization's declared purpose to "repel the armed attack." Korean unification was a political objective but there had never been any intention to achieve it by force, said the U.N. apologists. This was a mendacious argument, for the General Assembly, on October 7, 1950, adopted a resolution clearly aimed at unification by force. It declared that the essential objective of the U.N. was the establishment of "a unified, independent and democratic Korea," and it recommended that "all appropriate steps be

taken to insure conditions of stability throughout Korea." Finally it declared that "United Nations forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving" the stated objective of unification. Moreover, the U.N. could not honestly claim that it had ended the aggression, for the armistice agreement left 1,000,000 Chinese Communist soldiers on Korean soil.

The major obstacle to an armistice agreement concerned the fate of some 50,000 anticommunist Chinese and North Korean prisoners of war, who had surrendered in response to leaflets distributed by the United States and promising that under no circumstances would they be returned to the communist authorities against their will. The question was important on strategic as well as moral grounds. In World War II, the German armies had been welcomed as liberators in Russia and hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers had laid down their arms. They stopped surrendering on a wholesale basis only when they learned that Hitler mistreated prisoners. At the end of the war the United States delivered hundreds of thousands of anticommunist war prisoners and civilians to the Russians. If the United States should break faith with the anticommunist prisoners in Korea, it could expect few soldiers to surrender in any future war with a communist country.

To his eternal credit, President Rhee settled the issue with respect to some 27,000 of the anticommunist prisoners by liberating them before the armistice agreement was signed. The armistice agreement, signed on July 27, 1953, states that no force or threat of force shall be used against prisoners, but the machinery set up for their repatriation could vitiate that principle. They were to be turned over to a so-called "Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission," consisting of communist Czechoslovakia, communist Poland, procommunist India (chairman), neutralist Sweden, and neutralist Switzerland. All but Switzerland, which is not a member of the U.N., voted against the U.N. resolution condemning Red China as an aggressor. The agreement provided that for three months the prisoners could be visited by "explaining representatives," or

communist brain-washing teams. The brain-washers, protected by the procommunist repatriation commission, would have time and opportunity to warn the prisoners of the horrors that would befall their families and relatives if they should refuse to return home. All disputes were to be decided by majority vote. After ninety days, the fate of any prisoners not repatriated was to be submitted to a political conference and if it failed to settle the question in thirty days they were to be released.

Militarily, the truce terms favored the Communists. The United States gave up the island of Cho, off the west coast of North Korea, and Yo, off the east coast. Radar installations on these islands gave early warning of approaching enemy aircraft and enabled American pilots to shoot them down before they could approach the battle lines. Helicopters based on the islands rescued many of our pilots who had been forced to bail out. The United States was denied the right to make reconnaissance flights over North Korea for the purpose of detecting possible enemy reinforcements in violation of the armistice terms. The Communists, however, won the right to "rehabilitate" their airfields for "civilian use," and consequently to bring their Migs as near as twenty-two miles from Seoul.

Although the armistice agreement provided for a political conference of "both sides," that is, the belligerents, the concept of a two-sided parley was repudiated by British Commonwealth and Asian countries when the Assembly convened in August, 1953, to call the conference. They demanded a "round table" conference, at which there would be no distinction between belligerents and nonbelligerents, aggressors and nonaggressors. Especially they demanded the inclusion of the Soviet Union and India. The Communists immediately joined in the clamor for a "round table" conference. The United States agreed to invite the Soviet Union "provided the other side desires it," but strongly opposed a British Commonwealth resolution inviting India. President Rhee had served notice that his government would not participate in any conference with India.

Dr. Y. P. Pyun, foreign minister of the Korean Republic, denounced "betraying and scheming India" in the Assembly's

political committee. India, he said, was "not only trafficking with the Communists but intriguing with them to make the free world look contemptible." Although posing as a "neutral," India's serpentine delegate, V. K. Krishna Menon, had repeatedly insulted the United States and defended the Chinese Communists. He abstained from voting on the composition of the conference, but declared that a Soviet proposal for a fifteen-nation "round table" parley was "basically the right approach."

Despite India's reprehensible record in a war in which no faithful U.N. member could be neutral, the political committee voted 27 to 21 with 12 abstentions to invite India to the conference. Since a two-thirds majority is required in the Assembly, India was not invited, but the committee vote was a shocking moral defeat for the United States. Both next door neighbors of the United States, Canada and Mexico, voted for procommunist India. Besides Latin-American countries, only Greece, Pakistan, and Nationalist China supported the United States by voting against India. Population-wise, the American defeat was even more staggering. Nations with a combined population of more than one billion refused to support the United States, while those which stood by the United States have a combined population of 360,000,000, including our own 160,000,000.

The Communists have rejected the U.N. conference decision and the United States, as agent for the U.N., has rejected a communist counter-proposal. At this writing it appears doubtful that a political conference ever will be held, and the possibility of any progress toward an agreement is even more remote. Korea apparently is to become another Germany, and the American people may have to decide whether to occupy it permanently or pull out and let the Communists have it. It may be that Senate Majority Leader Knowland was right when he declared on July 5, 1953, that "a divided Korea will be a Communist Korea."

President Rhee wanted to drive to the Yalu River and unite his country, but President Eisenhower dissuaded him. On June 2, 1953, Eisenhower wrote: "It was indeed a crime that those

who attacked from the north invoked violence to unite Korea under their rule. Not only as your official friend but as your personal friend I urge that your country not embark upon a similar course." It is interesting to speculate about the thoughts that might have come to Gen. Eisenhower's mind when the armies under his command were on the frontiers of Germany if Winston Churchill had said: "It was indeed a crime that the Nazis invaded France. Do not repeat that crime by invading Germany."

Organized ostensibly to relieve mankind from the "crushing burden of armaments," to maintain international peace and security, and to save future generations from the "scourge of war," the United Nations has fulfilled none of these promises. Instead it stands revealed as an instrument of subversion.

XII. Revolution by Treaty

A DISTINGUISHED legal scholar and member of Congress from Virginia, Henry St. George Tucker, wrote a book called *Limitations on the Treaty-Making Power*, published in 1915, in which he prophetically characterized the treaty clause of the Constitution (Article VI) as a Trojan horse, ready to unload its hidden soldiery into our midst, destroy the Bill of Rights and shatter the dream of the founding fathers that they were creating a government of laws and not of men.

The acuity of this lawyer-statesman's perception was demonstrated on June 2, 1952, when Chief Justice Vinson and two other dissenting members of the United States Supreme Court held that the United Nations Charter and other treaties adhered to by the United States authorized President Truman to seize and operate the nation's steel industry. Clarence Manion, former Dean of the Law School of Notre Dame University, told a Senate Judiciary Subcommittee that when the Supreme Court decided the steel seizure case, the United States was just "two justices short of revolution." He was not exaggerating. If two other justices had concurred in the Vinson dissenting opinion, it would be the law of the land and the president could take any measures he might deem necessary to prosecute a war pursuant to a United Nations recommendation. It is self-evident that if the president could seize and operate the steel industry on the pretext of a war emergency, he could seize all industry, nationalize agriculture, draft men and women into military service or labor battalions, and carry out a program of national socialism just as Hitler did in Germany.

The Chief Justice, in his revolutionary dissenting opinion, justified the President's action on the ground of necessity, which

was precisely the excuse given by Hitler when he subverted the Weimar Constitution of the German Republic. "Those who suggest that this is a case involving extraordinary powers should be mindful that these are extraordinary times," said Vinson. "A world not yet recovered from the devastation of World War II has been forced to face the threat of another and more terrifying global conflict." In requesting approval by the Reichstag of a law which became the foundation of his dictatorship, Hitler, on March 21, 1933, said: "The government will only make use of these powers insofar as they are essential for carrying out vitally necessary measures."

According to the Vinson argument, the uninterrupted production of steel was indispensable for the prosecution of the war in Korea, and the United States, as a party to the United Nations Charter, was obligated to carry out a resolution by the Security Council calling upon member nations to do everything necessary to repel the aggression in Korea. For good measure, Vinson threw in the Truman doctrine, the Marshall plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the mutual security pacts in the Pacific region, and even the technical assistance program in support of his contention that the United States had accepted "in full measure its responsibility in the world community" and could not hope to fulfill its obligations under a "messenger boy concept" of the president's office.

Senator McCarthy charged that Truman was persuaded to issue his executive order of April 8, 1952, directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate the steel industry, by Leon Keyserling, his left-wing chief economic adviser. Keyserling certainly supported it if he did not instigate the President's action. World War II taught the revolutionists that the people can be drawn into national socialism gradually if they are sufficiently frightened by an external "crisis" to endure destructive taxes, inflationary government expenditures, and encroaching economic controls. The Vinson doctrine would greatly accelerate the revolutionary process. Although rejected by the Supreme Court majority, it dramatically illustrated the use of foreign policy as a road to revolution.

Sixty-four senators, two thirds of the Senate, have sponsored a Constitutional amendment by Senator Bricker (R., O.) which provides that: “. . . A provision of a treaty which denies or abridges any right enumerated in this Constitution shall not be of any force or effect. . . . No treaty shall authorize or permit any foreign power or any international organization to supervise, control or adjudicate rights of citizens of the United States within the United States enumerated in this Constitution. . . . A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through the enactment of appropriate legislation by the Congress.”

Even some of the opponents of the Bricker amendment concede that certain proposed treaties might adversely affect the rights now enjoyed by Americans under the Constitution, but they argue that the Senate can be trusted not to give its advice and consent for the ratification of such treaties by a two-thirds vote of those present, as required by the Constitution. The fallacy of this argument was demonstrated by what the President sought to do, and what three justices of the Supreme Court said he could do, under the United Nations Charter, which was approved by the Senate by a vote of 89 to 2. It was further demonstrated on July 15, 1953, when the same Senate membership which had sponsored the Bricker amendment by a two to one ratio voted 72 to 15 in approving a treaty depriving American soldiers stationed in foreign countries of the protection of the Constitution in trials for criminal offenses. When such a revolutionary measure is approved by a Senate which is so conscious of the peril of treaty law-making that it sponsors the Bricker amendment by a two-to-one majority, there is no telling what some future Senate might do.

The agreement depriving American soldiers of their Constitutional rights is a supplement to the North Atlantic Treaty. It provides that treason, espionage, and offenses committed in the performance of duty shall subject a soldier stationed in a foreign country to trial by the authorities of his own country. For all other offenses, he shall be subject to trial in the courts of the foreign country where he is stationed. The American

Constitution provides that no person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense; nor shall be compelled in a criminal case to testify against himself; that the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury; to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses; to have assistance of counsel; that excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. Under American law the accused is presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. American soldiers, drafted and transported beyond the seas for the defense of foreign countries, are deprived of these Constitutional protections. One of the "injuries and usurpations" for which King George III was arraigned in the Declaration of Independence was this: "He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our Constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his assent to their acts of pretended legislation." Truman and Acheson, Eisenhower and Dulles, "combined" with the NATO countries to do exactly the same thing, and a supine Senate, devoid of the spirit that animated the signers of the Declaration of Independence, gave its assent.

Any civilian who goes to a foreign country, or any soldier who does so as a tourist or visitor, voluntarily subjects himself to prosecution in the courts of that country for offenses against its laws. Before the approval of the supplementary NATO agreement, however, soldiers stationed in foreign countries could be tried only by the military authorities of their own country. The great Chief Justice John Marshall, in the case of the *Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon*, declared that a sovereign who allows the troops of a foreign prince to pass through or be stationed in his dominions is understood "to cede a portion of his territorial jurisdiction." This was a universally recognized principle of international law. In World War II, the British Parliament passed a law recognizing the exclusive jurisdiction of American authorities to try American soldiers accused of offenses in Britain. American soldiers stationed in any

foreign country were subject to trial only under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, enacted by Congress pursuant to the Constitution.

One of the chief defenders of the new treaty before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was Walter Bedell Smith, Undersecretary of State, who might well have been court-martialed for dereliction of duty on the basis of the army board's report on the Pearl Harbor disaster. Smith boasted that the treaty was "precedent-making." He said senators of only one generation ago would have been "completely shocked" by such a proposal. When questioned about this he realized that he had put his foot in his mouth and corrected himself, saying he had meant to say that the treaty was "unprecedented." It was not necessarily a precedent for similar agreements with other countries, he said.

Smith distinguished himself on October 10, 1945, by telling the British Royal Service Institution that if he were required to organize another military headquarters he would get "my intelligence officers and my planners from the British war office." Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 8, 1953, he recalled that General Hastings Lionel (Lord) Ismay, secretary general of NATO, had described the organization as a sort of gentlemen's club which no government can enter until it proves that it is "housebroken" in the unanimous view of the members.

Senator Bricker, addressing the Senate on May 7, 1953, remarked that Clarence Streit, head of the so-called Atlantic Union movement, would exclude Greece and Turkey, both NATO members, from the proposed Atlantic Union because they are not considered sufficiently "housebroken." He asked whether Smith would dare to say that Dictator Tito is not "housebroken" if the United States should station troops in Yugoslavia and a question should be raised about trying them in communist courts.

"The United States has military forces stationed in about 40 countries," said Senator Bricker. "Are we to tell all but 14 of those nations that they are not genteel, not housebroken?"

Members of the Foreign Relations Committee noted that one of the countries in which the United States maintains troops is Saudi Arabia, and that the penalty for some minor crimes under Islamic law is the cutting off of a hand. There were references to the fact that many mayors and police chiefs of cities and judges in the courts of France and Italy, both NATO countries, are Communists, and therefore may be presumed to be sympathetic with the communist "hate America" campaign. Smith acknowledged that the United States already had agreed to negotiate a supplementary treaty with Japan, giving it the right to try American soldiers under Japanese law. What Smith knows about Japanese jurisprudence would be an interesting subject of inquiry. Herman Phleger, legal adviser of the State Department, acknowledged that American soldiers, under the supplementary NATO agreement, might be tried by military courts, and thus placed in double jeopardy, if their superiors were not satisfied with the punishment inflicted by foreign courts. He acknowledged that in the European countries, England excepted, there is no presumption of innocence; that most of them permit secret trials; that the NATO agreement does not require a jury trial; that it contains no ban on cruel and unusual punishment, and that it grants no right of review by American courts. The only rights safeguarded by the treaty itself are a speedy trial, advance information of the specific charge, confrontation of witnesses, compulsory process, legal representation, the services of an interpreter, and the right to communicate with a representative of the United States government.

The Constitution, in Article VI, declares: "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." It will be noted that while acts of Congress are valid only when made pursuant to the Constitution, treaties are the supreme law of the land when

made under the authority of the United States, that is, in the manner prescribed by the Constitution, which provides that the president "shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur."

In *Missouri v. Holland* (1920), known as the migratory bird and sometimes as the "wild goose" case, the Supreme Court held that Congress has power under a treaty to enact legislation which would be unconstitutional in the absence of a treaty. Congress had passed a law to protect wild fowl, and it was held unconstitutional by the federal courts on the ground that such power, not being delegated to Congress by the Constitution, was reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment. The United States thereupon negotiated a treaty with Great Britain in respect of Canada, and a subsequent law enacted pursuant to the treaty was held valid. The trend toward unlimited treaty power was further developed in *United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation* (1936), in which the court viewed the treaty authority not as a power delegated by the Constitution, but one that is inherent in sovereignty.

The purpose of Senator Bricker's Constitutional amendment is to safeguard the Constitution itself from destruction by abuse of the treaty power. Opponents of the Bricker amendment deny that our Constitutional government and the liberties of the people are menaced by treaty law-making, and they generally cite the Supreme Court's dictum in *Geofroy v. Riggs* that the treaty power cannot "authorize what the Constitution forbids." However, this case was decided in 1889 and therefore was superseded by the doctrine of the migratory bird and *Curtiss-Wright* cases. The late Chief Justice Hughes, addressing the American Society of International Law in 1929, declared that there is "no explicit limitation" on the treaty-making power in the Constitution and that he would "not care to voice any opinion as to an implied limitation on the treaty-making power." He noted that the Supreme Court, in *Missouri v. Holland*, had "expressed a doubt whether there could be any such" limitation. Hughes said there might be ground for implying a lim-

itation on the treaty-making power because its "appropriate object" is to deal with foreign nations, and "not to make laws for the people of the United States in their internal concerns."

Although refusing to deny the power, Hughes thus affirmed the impropriety of using treaties to make domestic laws, which is what the revolutionists are attempting to do. A State Department bulletin, issued in September, 1950, said: "There is no longer any real difference between 'domestic' and 'foreign' affairs."

Addressing a regional meeting of the American Bar Association at Louisville, Ky., on April 11, 1952, John Foster Dulles said: "The treaty-making power is an extraordinary power, liable to abuse. Treaties make international law and also they make domestic law. Under our Constitution treaties become the supreme law of the land. They are indeed more supreme than ordinary laws, for congressional laws are invalid if they do not conform to the Constitution, whereas treaty law can over-ride the Constitution. Treaties, for example, can take powers away from the Congress and give them to the President; they can take powers from the states and give them to the federal government or to some international body, and they can cut across the rights given the people by their constitutional Bill of Rights."

Despite this grave warning of the danger of treaty law-making, Dulles, as Secretary of State, appeared before a Senate Judiciary Subcommittee a year later, on April 6, 1953, and strongly opposed the Bricker resolution or any amendment of the Constitution. While acknowledging that there had been a tendency to use the treaty power to effectuate social reforms, Dulles promised that the Eisenhower administration would use it "only within traditional limits." On the very next day the Foreign Relations Committee began hearings on the NATO agreement depriving American soldiers of their Constitutional rights, which the Truman administration negotiated and the Eisenhower administration ratified. Dulles promised that the administration would not sign the United Nations human rights covenant or the convention on the political rights of women,

and would not press for Senate approval of the convention against "genocide." He insisted, however, that "national power to achieve free world unity of purpose and performance" is a matter of "national survival." He objected particularly to the provision that no treaty should become the law of the land except through legislation by Congress.

Members of the American Bar Association's Committee on Peace and Law Through the United Nations (a curiously inappropriate title), who had been warning the country of the treaty menace for years, charged that Dulles was asking the people to put their confidence in men instead of laws. They quoted Thomas Jefferson: ". . . it would be a dangerous delusion were a confidence in the men of our choice to silence our fears for the safety of our rights. . . . Confidence is everywhere the parent of despotism; free government is founded in jealousy, and not in confidence; it is jealousy and not confidence which prescribes limited constitutions, to bind down those whom we are obliged to trust with power. . . . In questions of power, then, let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution."

Bernard Bernstein, representing B'nai B'rith, argued before the Senate subcommittee that "we ought to continue to have confidence in the presidency, in the United States Senate, and in the democratic principles that we have been following in this country for well over 160 years. . . ." Bernstein, a wartime Treasury Department official and later a member of General Eisenhower's staff, was one of the instigators of the infamous Morgenthau plan to destroy Germany.

Senator Bricker told him: "If the First Congress had felt as you now feel, we would never have had the Bill of Rights. They did not trust anybody to deal with this inviolate, God-given human right, and I do not trust the President of the United States or the United States Senate to enter into a field that is to my mind sacred, the right of the individual citizen, which is beyond the power and reach of the government."

Supporting the proposal that treaties shall not become effec-

tive as internal law except through legislation by Congress, Alfred J. Schweppe of Seattle, chairman of the Bar Association Committee, reminded the senators that the United States is the only important country in the world where a treaty operates automatically as domestic law. Schweppe quoted the following from the *Canadian Bar Review* for November, 1951: "It is a well-established rule of Anglo-Canadian law that the provisions of a treaty, though binding upon the state under international law, do not become part of the law of the land unless they are implemented by legislation. A treaty that has not been implemented by legislation cannot be the source of legal obligations affecting private rights."

Frank E. Holman, also of Seattle, former president of the American Bar Association and one of the country's foremost authorities on the treaty law peril, invited the attention of the senators to a statement by John P. Humphrey, director of the Human Rights Division of the U.N., in the January, 1948, issue of *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. Humphrey wrote: "What the United Nations is trying to do is revolutionary in character. Human rights are largely a matter of relationships between the state and individuals, and therefore a matter which has been traditionally regarded as being within the domestic jurisdiction of states. What is now being proposed is, in effect, the creation of some kind of supernational supervision of this relationship between the state and its citizens."

Holman declared that the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter (articles 55 and 56) and the so-called Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly in 1948 already have had a considerable effect on judicial thinking in court decisions. He mentioned the Fujii case in California, in which an appellate court declared that state's alien land law invalid on the ground that it violated the U.N. Charter. The State Supreme Court, while holding the law unconstitutional, did not ascribe the same controlling effect to the U.N. Charter. Nevertheless, said Holman, the majority opinion was largely "influenced by what the court calls the

'moral commitment' of the charter. Thus, though in a technical legal sense the California Supreme Court holds that the charter is not a self-executing treaty, the charter is allowed to produce the same effect by projecting itself into the thinking of the court in a new construction of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States to the extent that earlier statutes and decisions (even of the Supreme Court of the United States) upon the identical issue that had stood the test of time and experience were swept aside."

Holman said the same judicial technique operated in the mixed marriage case of *Perez v. Lippold*, in which Judge Carter, now a member of the California Supreme Court, cited not only the Declaration of Independence and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution but also the U.N. Charter, and concluded: "In the face of these authoritative pronouncements the matter of racial equality should be a settled issue."

Holman cited a ruling by Judge Preston Thatcher of the Idaho Sixth Circuit Court at Blackfoot, on June 16, 1952, that the U.N. Charter takes precedence over the state's alien land law. He declared that the Warsaw convention relating to international air transportation, which was approved by the Senate some years ago when the United States was on friendly terms with Russia, contained a fine print provision depriving American citizens "of their full and proper right to trial by jury" and limiting the liability of carriers for personal injury or death of passengers to 125,000 francs (the equivalent of about \$8,300).

Holman concluded that if, as Dulles said, a treaty can override the Constitution, then it can:

"(a) Change our form of government from a Republic to a socialistic and completely centralized state.

"(b) Put us into a world government without the people either directly or through the Congress passing on the question.

"(c) Increase the powers of the federal government at the expense of the states. For example, in the so-called field of civil

rights, a treaty can do what the Congress has heretofore refused to do."

Referring to the third point, Holman recalled that a committee on civil rights, appointed by President Truman, reported: "The Human Rights commission of the United Nations is working on a detailed international bill of rights. . . . If this document is accepted by the United States as a member state, an even stronger base for congressional action under the treaty power may be established."

Addressing a regional meeting of the American Bar Association at Richmond, Va., on May 5, 1953, Holman noted that the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace had viewed with satisfaction the progress of the U.N. toward world government. He quoted from its recent booklet on the U.N. the following: "As additional conventions and treaties are added to the constitutional system of the United Nations over the years the member governments will be delegating more and more of their sovereignty to this world organization. . . . The greater the success in reaching political settlements and adjustments, the faster will be the progress toward a world rule of law and world government." Holman refrained from reminding his audience that Dulles was chairman of the board of the Carnegie Endowment; that Alger Hiss was president before he went to prison for lying about his espionage work for the Soviet Union, and that General Eisenhower was a trustee before he became President of the United States.

More than two hundred treaties and conventions have been spawned by the U.N. and the various specialized agencies affiliated with it. The International Labor Organization alone has submitted to member governments one hundred and three conventions, of which ten have been ratified by the United States. David Morse, the ILO secretary general, who was one of Felix Frankfurter's "happy hot dog" lawyers in the New Deal, declared in his 1949 report: "Today the role of the organization as an international parliament has become generally accepted." William L. McGrath of Cincinnati, for four years a member of the United States employer delegation to

the ILO meetings in Geneva, testified at the Senate hearing on the Bricker amendment that the 35-year-old ILO originally did constructive work, when its objective was the improvement of working conditions. With the ascendancy of state socialism in Europe, however, the ILO stepped beyond the field of labor into the province of government itself, and has put forward a mass of proposals which, if accepted, would force governments into a socialist mold.

The chief treaty-spawning organ of the U.N. itself is the Economic and Social Council, which has authority under the loose language of the Charter to draft virtually any kind of convention in the economic, social, and political fields. This 18 member body, the members of which are elected for three year terms by the General Assembly, has established commissions and sub-commissions on almost the whole gamut of human endeavor. Its Human Rights Commission has been working for years on an international human rights treaty, which in 1952 was split into two parts, one on economic, social, and cultural, the other on civil and political rights. A State Department bulletin reviewing the work of the 1952 session contained this effusion by Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, former chairman and United States member of the commission: "The U.N. campaign for the promotion of human rights must be continued and prosecuted successfully if our free way of life is to be preserved. . . . Neither of the covenants as now drafted contains any provisions which depart from the American way of life in the direction of communism, socialism, syndicalism or statism. When such provisions have been proposed, the United States has opposed them; every proposal by the Soviet Union and its satellites to write statism into the covenant has been defeated . . ."

Now let us see whether it is possible to believe the testimony of this obtrusive woman. Dr. Charles Malik of Lebanon, who has a Ph.D. degree from Harvard University, was chairman of the 1952 session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission. Writing in the *United Nations Bulletin* of September 1, 1952, he said: "I think a study of our proceedings will reveal that the

amendments we adopted to the old texts under examination responded for the most part more to Soviet than to western promptings. . . . The concept of property and its ownership is at the heart of the great ideological conflict of the present day. It was not only the Communist representatives who riddled this concept with questions and doubts: a goodly portion of the non-Communist world had itself succumbed to these doubts. A study of this particular debate will reveal the extent to which the non-Communist world has been communistically softened or frightened . . .” Dr. Malik declared that a “quiet revolution” had occurred in the commission since it began work in 1946. He said the emphasis had shifted “with a vengeance” from personal liberty to “the adequate standard of living.” He attributed this “materialistic revolution” in part to “the increasing impact of Marx and the amazing persistency of the Soviet representatives in harping upon their views.”

The covenant on economic, social, and political rights would obligate each government adhering to it to take steps “to the maximum of its available resources” for the realization of: “. . . the right to work . . . safe and healthy working conditions . . . a decent living (for workers) and their families . . . rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay . . . special protection (for motherhood and children) . . . adequate food, clothing and housing . . . an adequate standard of living and the continuous improvement of living condition . . . the highest attainable standard of health . . . medical service (for all) in the event of sickness . . . the right of everyone to education . . .”

The covenant, as Dr. Malik suggested, owes its inspiration to the Soviet constitution and the *Communist Manifesto* by Marx and Engels. It would vest full responsibility for the welfare of the people in the government, and consequently would require government control of all the activities of the people. What a far cry this would be from the traditional American philosophy of government! Grover Cleveland, in his inaugural address on March 4, 1893, said: “The lessons of paternalism ought to be unlearned and the better lesson taught that while

the people should patriotically and cheerfully support their government, its functions do not include the support of the people.”

The U.N. and the American concepts of human rights are as different as were the political philosophies of Cleveland and Karl Marx. In the U.N. concept human rights are granted by governments. In the American concept, governments may deprive the people of their human rights but they cannot grant them. Human rights are God-given. The Declaration of Independence states that “all men are created equal” and are “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights.” Before the Declaration of Independence was issued, the world had often heard of the “divine right of kings,” but not about the divine rights of human beings. The Bill of Rights in the Constitution does not purport to be a grant of rights. On the contrary, it is a series of prohibitions against government action which might violate the divine rights of the people.

The U.N. covenant on civil and political rights contains provisions which would permit violations of the Bill of Rights, if Dulles was correct in his contention that treaty law can override the Constitution. For example, Article 15 provides that: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art or through any other media of his choice.” The same article stipulates, however, that the exercise of these rights may be “subject to certain restrictions, but these shall be such only as are provided by law and are necessary, (1) for respect of the rights or reputations of others, (2) for the protection of national security or of public order, or public health or morals.” The First Amendment of the American Constitution states: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . .” Clearly, if treaties override the Constitution, the U.N. covenant would authorize Congress to make laws limiting freedom of speech and of the press. Article 2 of the

U.N. covenant provides: "In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation, and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the states parties hereto may take measures derogating from their obligations under this covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. . . ." In their dissenting opinion in the steel seizure case, Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Minton and Reed held that the emergency was so great that "the survival of the Republic itself may be at stake." This suggests how short and easy the road to dictatorship would be under Article 2 of the U.N. covenant.

The International Law Commission of the U.N. has drafted a so-called "Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind," which incorporates the principles recognized in the Charter and the judgment of the Nuernberg war crimes tribunal. Offenses set forth in the code would be international crimes, and individual offenders would be subject to trial by an international criminal court. If the United States should go to war with the Soviet Union and lose, President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles could expect the treatment received by the Nazi leaders at Nuernberg, for their use of free food to make trouble for the Russians in East Germany is a clear violation of the code. The code prohibits "The undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a state of activities calculated to foment civil strife in another state, or the toleration by the authorities of a state of organized activities calculated to foment civil strife in another state."

There is pending before the General Assembly a draft statute for an international criminal court, with jurisdiction to try individuals accused of violating the proposed code of offenses or other so-called world law which the U.N. is trying to develop. The British government has sought to kill the international criminal court scheme but the American State Department has kept it alive. George Maurice Morris, a pompous one-world Washington lawyer, represented the State Depart-

ment on this project under Dean Acheson and continued to do so under Dulles. He denies that the United States is committed to the ICC, but he resists all efforts to abandon it.

The late Vespasien V. Pella, who represented Romania in this country for some time after it fell under communist domination and was himself regarded as an international communist agent, was the chief proponent of a system of international criminal law superior to all governments and constitutions and applicable to individuals. Former Attorney General Francis Biddle, the American member of the Nuernberg tribunal, recommended to President Truman that the U.N. should reaffirm and codify the principles of the Nuernberg charter and judgment. In November, 1946, Truman directed the American delegation to put the question on the Assembly's agenda. A 220 page memorandum, written by Pella and published by the U.N. in 1950, indicates that he induced Biddle to make his recommendation to Truman. Pella wrote that "existing or future states will have to regard themselves as members by birth of the international community and as such forced to bow to those higher and universal rules of community life. . . ." Replying to a questionnaire sent to him by Pella, Biddle wrote: "It seems to me that the domestic law cannot be permitted to stand in face of the higher international law just as with us, the state statute which conflicts with the federal constitution is invalid. If any other result were achieved, international law, by definition, would become meaningless."

The implication is clear beyond mistaking. Unless the peril of law-making by treaty is averted by adoption of the Bricker Constitutional amendment, the United States may not long remain "two justices short of revolution." The Bill of Rights, palladium of our liberties, is in jeopardy.

XIII. Communism and the Eisenhower Administration

WITH the election of a Republican President and a Republican Congress in November, 1952, the revolutionary movement faced the peril that the full power of the United States government might be directed against it. That had been the promise of the Republican campaign orators.

Nine months later, it was apparent that the revolutionists had no cause for alarm about the intentions of the Eisenhower administration. Senator McCarthy of Wisconsin, Senator Jenner of Indiana, and Representative Velde of Illinois, with their respective committees, were doing their best to keep faith with the people, but their efforts were not encouraged and at times they were obstructed by the administration. On August 24, 1953, Senator Jenner's eight-member judiciary subcommittee on internal security issued a unanimous report declaring that the penetration of the United States government by the Soviet international organization "has not been fully disclosed." The report said: "Policies and programs laid down by members of this Soviet conspiracy are still in effect within our government and constitute a continuing hazard to our national security."

The report further stated:

"In addition to identifying more than 80 particular Communist agents, 37 of whom were in the United States government, Elizabeth Bentley testified before our subcommittee on May 29, 1952, that to her knowledge there were four Soviet espionage rings operating within our government and that only two of these have been exposed. . . .

"Despite the fact that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other security agencies had reported extensive information about this Communist penetration, little was done by the exec-

utive branch to interrupt the Soviet operatives in their ascent in government until congressional committees brought forth to public light the facts of the conspiracy.”

This report, written by Robert Morris, the subcommittee’s brilliant young counsel, was truly astonishing in its implications. The communist penetration of the government occurred in the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, but policies and programs laid down by the Soviet conspiracy were still in effect after the Eisenhower administration had been in office seven months, according to the unanimous report of eight senators—five Republicans, three Democrats. At least two Soviet espionage rings still were operating in the government. Moreover, there were indications that the Eisenhower administration would be little more diligent than its predecessors in exposing and eliminating the Soviet conspirators still remaining in the government.

A letter to Senator Jenner from William P. Rogers, Deputy Attorney General, dated July 6, 1953, disclosed that the Justice Department still had not decided whether to prosecute the notorious John P. Davies, Jr., one of the architects of the betrayal of China and Korea, for perjury. Senator McCarran (D., Nev.), then chairman of the subcommittee, first requested action by the Justice Department against Davies on September 21, 1951. The subcommittee repeated this request on July 2, 1952, and again on June 11, 1953. In the intervening two years, Davies had moved from the policy planning staff of the State Department to Germany, where he was deputy political adviser to the United States high commissioner, and thence to Peru, as counselor of the American embassy, which job he still held when the subcommittee report was issued.

Lyle H. Munson, a former official of the Central Intelligence Agency, and a CIA official whose name was withheld for security reasons, testified that on November 16, 1949, they were called to the State Department by Davies, who proposed that the following persons be employed by the CIA as Far Eastern consultants: Professor John K. Fairbank of Harvard University and Mrs. Fairbank, Professor Benjamin K. Schwartz of

Harvard, Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, and Anna Louise Strong. Professor Fairbank, Smedley, and Strong were identified as Communists and the others as procommunist, by witnesses before the subcommittee. The CIA officials testified that Davies recommended Prof. Fairbank as chairman of the proposed consultant group. They said Davies remarked that some persons regarded Fairbank and his wife as Communists, but that in fact they were merely "politically sophisticated." Admiral Hillenkoetter, then head of the CIA, consulted the FBI about the Far Eastern "experts" recommended by Davies and refused to employ them. Davies denied under oath that he ever made such a recommendation. It was possible that continued prodding by the senators would force the Eisenhower administration to act against Davies, just as the House Committee on Un-American Activities forced the Truman administration to act against Alger Hiss, but it was clear that the initiative would have to come from Congress.

Another example of incredible unconcern about the communist conspiracy on the part of executive agencies under the Eisenhower administration was brought out by Senator McCarthy's permanent investigating subcommittee. In August, 1953, McCarthy disclosed that Communists had penetrated and still were active in the huge government printing office, which prints thousands of secret documents for the army and navy, atomic energy commission, and other government agencies. In testimony before the subcommittee and in reports by the FBI, Edward Rothschild, an employee of the printing office, was identified as a member of the Communist Party and accused of stealing a secret United States merchant marine code book during the war, in 1943. When called before the subcommittee, Rothschild refused, on the ground of self-incrimination, to say whether he was a Communist or was engaged in espionage against the United States. The printing office thereupon suspended him. Testimony disclosed that the loyalty board of the printing office cleared Rothschild in 1948, despite an FBI report stating that he was a Communist and had stolen

secret documents. S. Preston Hipsley, personnel security officer of the printing office, testified that "mere membership in the Communist party" was not a ground for dismissal from the government service. This was true under the so-called "loyalty" program instituted by the Truman administration in 1947, but in 1951 Truman signed an executive order authorizing the dismissal of employes in case of "reasonable doubt" as to their loyalty. Although a second FBI report on Rothschild was received by the printing office in 1951, there was no action against him. Nothing was done by the new public printer, Raymond Brattenberger, appointed by Eisenhower in April, 1953, until Senator McCarthy's committee began its inquiry.

The subcommittee disclosed that Philip L. Cole, deputy public printer, cleared Bertha Lomack, a printing office employe, in 1948, after a loyalty board had recommended her discharge. Subsequently she was apprehended with a confidential paper in her apron pocket as she was leaving the printing office.

Cole acknowledged that he regarded the woman as "an undesirable employe" when he overruled the loyalty board, but refused to concede that he had made a mistake. Cole also implied that Senator McCarthy's investigation had done more harm than good by disclosing to the public "that secret material is printed here." Despite Rothschild's refusal under oath to deny the espionage charges, Cole said it might be difficult to remove him from the payroll. Rothschild finally resigned.

Cole disclosed that charges of disloyalty had been filed against thirty-five employes of the printing office since 1947, that fifteen were separated by discharge, resignation, retirement, or death, and that twenty, including Rothschild, had been cleared. Although a reinvestigation was ordered as a result of Senator McCarthy's disclosures, there was no indication that the Eisenhower administration would move to correct an intolerable situation by firing the printing office officials for incompetence or dereliction of duty.

The revolutionaries were alarmed about the possibility that the Eisenhower administration would support what they call

"McCarthyism," because the Congressional elections of 1950 and 1952 had demonstrated unmistakably that there is an overwhelming popular demand to smash the communist conspiracy. Such a decision by the President, who could order full cooperation of the executive agencies, including the FBI, with the Congressional committees could be a death blow to the revolution. To avert this calamity, the revolutionists launched a campaign of unprecedented fury and scope to destroy McCarthy. The same forces had tried to destroy Whittaker Chambers in 1948, after he had exposed Alger Hiss.

In his book *Witness*, Chambers writes: "The simple fact is that when I took up my little sling and aimed at Communism, I also hit something else. What I hit was the forces of that great socialist revolution, which, in the name of liberalism, spasmodically, incompletely, somewhat formlessly, but always in the same direction, has been inching its ice cap over the nation for two decades. . . . No one could have been more dismayed than I at what I had hit, for though I knew it existed, I still had no adequate idea of its extent, the depth of its penetration or the fierce vindictiveness of its revolutionary temper, which is a reflex of its struggle to keep and advance its political power."

A curious phenomenon of the revolution is that many of our so-called "best people," the bourgeoisie who would be the first to be liquidated under a communist regime, are allied with the left-wing "intellectuals." Chambers calls it a "morganatic bond between the forces of the left and the forces of the right." He recalls that it was the "clamorous proponents of the open mind" who "snapped their minds shut" in a pro-Hiss psychosis.

The same elements, the Communists, the Socialists, the left-wing intellectuals, the right-wing snobs, especially the "proponents of the open mind," have shut their minds in an anti-McCarthy psychosis. They have accused McCarthy and his anticommunist collaborators of "witch hunting," "book burning," suppressing all kinds of freedoms, creating a "miasma of fear," and instituting a "reign of terror." They have fomented hatred of America in Europe and other parts of the world by representing the United States as a nation in the throes

of hysteria. Repetition of these fantastic charges by the anti-anti-Communists of foreign countries is cited by the anti-McCarthyites as evidence that the senator is destroying the "unity of the free world," divesting the United States of its "allies," and thereby endangering world peace.

Stewart Alsop reported from London in the *New York Herald-Tribune* on August 17, 1953, that Winthrop Aldrich, the American ambassador, had "courageously and accurately" described "McCarthyism" in his cables to the State Department as "an immense liability to the United States." Aldrich, former chairman of the board of the Chase National Bank, is one of the "best people." In the dispatch from London, Alsop also reported that there were forces favoring appeasement of the Soviet Union on the right as well as on the left in England. So it appears that the morganatic marriage of the right-wing snobs with the left-wing revolutionaries is international.

Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, national honorary chairman of Americans for Democratic Action and a kinswoman of the Alsop brothers, declared on August 3, 1953, on returning from her latest trip around the world, that American prestige in Europe and Asia was suffering because of "McCarthyism." Everywhere she went, she said, the people were apprehensive about the senator's "methods," which they regarded as the same as Hitler's and Stalin's. What a pity it is that the people Mrs. Roosevelt met in communist Yugoslavia, or her procommunist friends in India, do not like Senator McCarthy's "methods!" Adlai Stevenson, another favorite of the ADA, returned from a trip around the world a little later and echoed what Mrs. Roosevelt had said about "McCarthyism" damaging American prestige.

In Italy, where the Communists recently polled 35.3 per cent of the popular vote and later helped overthrow the pro-American De Gasperi government, there is no McCarthy committee. In France, which votes about 30 per cent Communist and has been paralyzed by a general strike with the communist-controlled labor unions playing a major part, there is no McCarthy committee. In England, where the Churchill gov-

ernment tries to appease Communist China and the Soviet Union to prevent a return to power by the procommunist Labor Party, there is no McCarthy committee. Addressing the annual conference of the Conservative Party at Scarborough on October 10, 1952, John Eden, nephew of the foreign secretary in Churchill's government, said it had been estimated that "there are 11,000 Communists in the Civil service, that there are some 2,000 Communists in the teaching profession, and, believe it or not, that there are something like 200 Communist prelates and people in the church." Since the English are noted for understatement, it would appear that a McCarthy or a Jenner or a Velde committee could do useful work in that country.

Britain cleared Klaus Fuchs, an arch-traitor, for "security" when he came to the United States to work on the atomic bomb, although it was known at the time that he had been a member of the Communist Party. After he returned to England with America's atomic secrets, he continued to spy for the Russians while working on Britain's atomic project until the American FBI supplied the information that led to his arrest and confession. Then he was let off with a fourteen-year sentence. Bruno Pontecorvo, who was said to know about as much as one man can learn about making a hydrogen bomb, left England and disappeared behind the Iron Curtain. Donald MacLean and Guy Burgess, both known Communists, were entrusted with responsible posts in the American section of the British foreign office until they disappeared behind the Iron Curtain. Apparently oblivious of this frightful state of affairs in a country which has depended in a large measure upon American aid and military support since World War II, Aldrich has the impudence to report that "McCarthyism" is harming United States prestige in England.

The evidence available at this writing indicates all too plainly that President Eisenhower has been deluded by the anti-McCarthyites. Although committed to a policy of refraining from personal recrimination, the President, on July 9, 1953, personally took part in a campaign of misrepresentation and character assassination which forced the resignation of Dr.

J. B. Matthews, executive director of McCarthy's committee. Shortly after Dr. Matthews, a man of scholarly attainments, irreproachable integrity, and unsurpassed knowledge of the communist conspiracy, took the job as director of the committee's staff, the revolutionaries were presented with an "issue" on which they believed they could destroy McCarthy. Dr. Matthews, himself an ordained Protestant minister and a deeply religious man, had written an article for the July, 1953, issue of *The American Mercury*, titled "Reds and Our Churches," which declared that during the last seventeen years the Communists have "enlisted the support of at least 7,000 Protestant clergymen" as party members, fellow-travelers, espionage agents, party-line adherents, and unwitting dupes. This issue of the magazine appeared about the time Dr. Matthews took the committee job, and the anti-anti-Communists struck with fury and vengeance. They made no effort to disprove Matthew's charges but attacked him personally. Their object was to turn 250,000 Protestant ministers and tens of millions of Protestant church members against McCarthy, a Roman Catholic, for hiring a man who, according to their false propaganda, had imputed disloyalty to the Protestant clergy as a group.

Sensing an opportunity to make partisan political capital out of the anti-McCarthy furor, the three Democrats on the subcommittee—Symington of Missouri, Jackson of Washington, and McClellan of Arkansas—denounced Matthews, demanded his resignation, and themselves resigned after a row with McCarthy about his hiring prerogatives. The campaign reached a climax on July 9 when the White House released a telegram condemning the Matthews article, from the Rev. John A. O'Brien, Rabbi Maurice N. Eisendrath, and Dr. John Sutherland Bonnell, co-chairmen of the commission on religious organizations of the National Conference of Christians and Jews. In its anxiety to get the telegram published, the White House staff elevated Father O'Brien to the rank of Monsignor, an honor which the church had not bestowed upon him. He is a professor at Notre Dame University. The White House also released a reply by the President, declaring: "Generalized

and irresponsible attacks that sweepingly condemn the whole of any group of citizens are alien to America. Such attacks betray contempt for the principles of freedom and decency. And when these attacks—whatever their professed purpose be—condemn such a vast portion of the churches or clergy as to create doubt in the loyalty of all, the damage to our nation is multiplied.”

The President’s telegram was a flagrant example of the sweeping condemnation and misrepresentation it falsely ascribed to the Matthews article. Matthews did not “sweepingly condemn the whole” of the Protestant clergy or even a “vast portion” of it. On the contrary, he wrote: “It hardly needs to be said that the vast majority of American Protestant clergymen are loyal to the free institutions of this country, as well as loyal to their solemn trust as ministers of the Gospel. In a sense, this overwhelming majority is embarrassed by the participation of the minority in the activities of the most sinister conspiracy in the history of the world.”

Shortly after the Matthews article appeared, the Right Rev. James P. De Wolfe, Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Long Island, called upon church officials to purge their own houses of subversive clergymen but denied that the clergy as a class enjoy any immunity from Congressional investigations. He asserted that ninety-seven per cent of the clergymen with whom he had come in contact were loyal. The clear implication of his remark was that he had some doubt about the loyalty of three per cent of the clergymen he knew. Three per cent of 250,000, the estimated number of Protestant clergymen in the country, would be 7,500, and Matthews only accused 7,000, including “adherents of the party line in varying degrees” and “unwitting dupes” who would not be classified as disloyal. Thus the Matthews estimate was conservative, in the opinion of a distinguished Protestant bishop.

Joseph Alsop jubilantly reported from Washington in the *New York Herald-Tribune* that the attack on Matthews was the first blow in a White House war on McCarthy. Alsop’s wishes are often father to his thoughts, but as an eager attendant

at the Eisenhower court he enjoys the confidence of the White House staff, especially Sherman Adams, the major-domo. Alsop reported:

“. . . The President's chief of staff, former Gov. Sherman Adams, of New Hampshire, was the man who finally decided that Matthews offered the long awaited 'really good issue' on which the President could take his stand against McCarthy.

“Rather cleverly, the White House took steps to stimulate a telegram denouncing Matthews from three leaders of the Catholic, Protestant and Jewish faiths. This was to give the President a reason to speak. Before the planned answer to the invited telegram could be published, the Vice President warned that Matthews was about to be dropped by McCarthy. The only White House reaction was to give the press the President's fine statement without further delay. In short, the intention to strike at McCarthy was abundantly clear.”

This amazing report by an Eisenhower devotee, imputing base political motives to the President and the leaders of the National Conference of Christians and Jews, was never repudiated by the White House.

In another column Alsop reported that Eisenhower hated McCarthy. A few days later, on July 24, the President's brother, Arthur B. Eisenhower, a Kansas City banker, denounced McCarthy as “the most dangerous menace to America.” In an interview published by the *Las Vegas Sun*, Arthur Eisenhower said: “When I think of McCarthy I automatically think of Hitler. I would believe anything about him, and I think your paper and its publisher, Hank Greenspun, should be commended on the stand it has taken against this rabble rouser.”

The President, of course, cannot be held responsible for the aberrations of a brother, but there is a tie-in here which indicates that the revolutionaries are using the brother to get to the President.

The facts about Greenspun, who seems to be warmly admired by the President's brother, have been reported from time

to time by Westbrook Pegler. Greenspun is an ex-convict from Brooklyn, who went out to Las Vegas as a press agent for the Flamingo Hotel. The hotel was owned by Bugsy Siegel, the noted gangster, who was murdered in the Beverly Hills home of Virginia Hill. The printers' union had established a small paper to compete with the *Review-Journal* with which it was engaged in a dispute about a labor saving device. After Siegel's murder, Greenspun took over the paper, which he used in an unsuccessful campaign in 1950 to purge Senator McCarran. He even named the senator as a co-defendant in a suit for \$1,000,000 against his former associates in the gambling industry, whom he accused of conspiracy to withhold advertising from his paper. The suit ended in a "settlement" on undisclosed terms, but Senator McCarran never paid Greenspun anything and never agreed to anything.

Associated with Greenspun in his unsuccessful efforts to purge Senator McCarran was the mysterious and sinister Arthur J. Goldsmith, who from his headquarters in the Waldorf-Astoria Towers in New York operates a nation-wide purge and smear apparatus against Americans who oppose the Soviet conspiracy. Pegler disclosed that from November 2 to November 7, 1952, during that fateful week which compassed General Eisenhower's election to the presidential office, his brother Arthur occupied suite 30-D in the Waldorf-Astoria Towers, which adjoins suite 30-C, the residence and official headquarters of Goldsmith. Arthur Eisenhower conferred with Goldsmith daily during his stay at the Waldorf. Milton Eisenhower, the President's closest political adviser, visited his brother Arthur in his Waldorf suite and also conferred with Goldsmith.

Pegler called Arthur Eisenhower on the telephone but got very little information from him about his relations with Goldsmith. Eisenhower did say he found Goldsmith "charming and entertaining" and also "brilliant."

Pegler also learned that the President had signed a mysterious "testimonial" for Goldsmith, and had entertained Lessing Rosenwald, one of Goldsmith's contributors, at a White House

dinner. Rosenwald and his wife gave Goldsmith \$6,000 for use in a campaign against Representative Carroll Reece of Tennessee, former chairman of the Republican National Committee.

When I called Goldsmith to ask about the report that he had received a testimonial from the President, he said there was "ample evidence of it" but that he did not intend to discuss it. He had the impudence to say that it was "a private matter between the President and me."

"Where is this evidence you speak of?" Goldsmith was asked.

"In my safe, and it is going to stay there," he said.

The big purge and smear man did disclose that the tribute he received from the President was written in some kind of book, and that the names of many other personages were inscribed therein.

A 1943 report in the files of the House Committee on Un-American Activities declares that Goldsmith was an officer, a director, or a member of the advisory board of eleven propaganda organizations "stemming out of 8 West 40th St.," New York, where the Soviet Purchasing Commission was located. Some of these groups are no longer extant. Goldsmith's main activity is the so-called Committee on Public Affairs, 100 East 50th Street in New York City which is the address of the Waldorf-Astoria Towers.

In 1946, Goldsmith's committee sent \$4,250 to Montana to purge Senator Burton K. Wheeler, a Democrat, who had been a leader in the fight to keep the United States out of war, and who later had opposed appeasement of communist Russia. Testimony before a Senate investigating committee involved the late David K. Niles, alias Neyhus, an administrative assistant to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman and a "very dear friend" of Goldsmith, in the conspiracy to assassinate Senator Wheeler's character. A vile and scurrilous book, accusing the senator of "leading America's retreat from reason into the safe, ventilated hell of Nazi-Fascism," was circulated in Montana by the conspirators. Senator Edwin C. Johnson (D., Colo.) chairman of the Senate investigating committee, called the testimony to

President Truman's attention and said the character assassins should be "publicly horsewhipped."

The Republican campaign orators promised particularly to root communist influence out of the State Department. Donald Lourie, formerly of the Quaker Oats Company, was brought in as undersecretary for administration with much fanfare about the house-cleaning he was going to do. Scott McLeod, a former FBI agent and more recently an assistant to Senator Bridges (R., N. H.), was made administrator of the Bureau of Security, Consular Affairs, and Personnel.

McLeod, in a letter to this author dated August 5, 1953, estimated that "the number of cases separated from the department on whom some security question existed is 249 from Jan. 20, 1953, when the Eisenhower administration took office, through July 31, 1953." Only 117 were separated on security grounds in the last three years of the Truman administration. In addition, McLeod's office removed 74 homosexuals from the department from January to June 30, which raised the total of such separations to 381 in three and a half years. Homosexuals are notorious security risks because of their susceptibility to blackmail.

All accounts agree that McLeod has done an excellent job against those who can be separated from the department as subversives or security risks. He has done so well, in fact, that the Marshall-Acheson holdovers in the department are persistently reported to be after his scalp. However, the provable subversives and security risks constitute only part of the State Department problem. Marshall-Acheson holdovers in policy-making and policy-influencing positions still run the department. Lourie, the undersecretary for administration, was surrounded by the holdovers and submerged in the quicksands of bureaucracy.

Although they supported procommunist policies in the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, these middle and upper level holdovers cannot be fired as subversives or security

risks in the absence of evidence that they have participated in subversive activities. Most of them have a career status and cannot be fired at all except for cause. However, they could be transferred to consular jobs in remote places such as Madagascar or Zamboanga where they would not be such a menace to the national interest. John Carter Vincent, former head of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs and one of the chief architects of the communist victory in China, was transferred to Tangier under the Acheson regime as a result of Senator McCarthy's efforts. On March 4, 1953, Secretary Dulles accepted Vincent's "resignation" on the ground that his performance of duty had not measured up to the standards required by these critical times, but he rejected the finding of the civil service commission's loyalty review board that there was "reasonable doubt" of Vincent's loyalty.

Dulles himself was a holdover from the Truman administration, which he represented at international conferences or as a State Department adviser from 1945 to 1952. His record in the Hiss case and his frequently demonstrated predilection for expediency before principle were portents that Dulles would be no great improvement over Acheson. After observing him in office for six months, however, Republican leaders in Congress were inclined to go along with him in the belief that Eisenhower's choice of a successor, if Dulles should be dropped from the cabinet, almost certainly would be worse. Undersecretary Smith is said to be the candidate of the Acheson-Marshall cabal for Dulles' job. The egregious John J. McCloy, now chairman of the Chase National Bank, is another close friend of the President who might get the job. The consensus of Republicans in Congress is that either Smith or McCloy would be worse than Dulles and as bad as Acheson or Marshall.

It was not long after the Eisenhower administration took office before Smith came to be known as the real "boss" of the State Department. Most foreign policy moves were planned by Smith and C. D. Jackson, the President's assistant in charge of psychological warfare. Jackson, a product of Henry Luce's magazine enterprises, was in charge of the communist-infil-

trated Radio Free Europe when Smith was running the Central Intelligence Agency and the RFE was subsidized and guided by the CIA.

If Adlai Stevenson or some other Democrat had charged during the 1952 campaign that four "China-trained" Marshall-Acheson holdovers would be Assistant Secretaries of State, in charge of all the geographical regions of the earth, under an Eisenhower administration, the American people probably would not have believed it. Yet that was the lamentable fact seven months after Eisenhower took office. These assistant secretaries were: Walter S. Robertson, Far Eastern affairs; Henry A. Byroade, Near Eastern, South Asian, and African affairs; Livingston T. Merchant, European affairs; and John M. Cabot, inter-American affairs.

There were four other assistant secretaries with no jurisdiction over the geographic offices. These were: Robert D. Murphy, United Nations affairs; Thruston B. Morton, congressional relations; Samuel C. Waugh, economic affairs; and Carl W. McCardle, public affairs. McCardle was the Washington correspondent of the *Philadelphia Bulletin* before Dulles brought him into the State Department. A zealous One Worlder, he cultivated Dulles for years and finally landed on the government payroll as a sort of personal press agent for his hero. McCardle was the nominal successor of an Acheson favorite, Howland Sargeant, husband of Myrna Loy, but it is not to be supposed that he replaced Sargeant. McCardle got the \$15,000 a year salary that goes with the job, but Sargeant stayed on as his consultant at \$11,800 a year.

The alert Washington news letter *Human Events*, edited by Frank C. Hanighen, compared the classified State Department telephone directory, dated July, 1953, with the directory issued in November, 1952. It found that there were five subdivisions with fourteen chief functionaries listed under "Office of the Secretary." All fourteen of the chief functionaries listed in the directory for July, 1953, were in the directory for November, 1952, ten of them in the same jobs.

The *Human Events* report continues: "Likewise, in the case

of the Assistant Secretariat of Administration, all the present names were prominent in last November's directory of the Acheson hierarchy; same for the Foreign Building Operations, the Division of Foreign Reporting, the Office of Budget and Reports (with one exception), the Office of Finance, Office of Operating Facilities, Division of Communications and Records, Division of Central Services, etc., etc. All, with only minor exceptions, mirror the old setup under Acheson.

"When we turn to the roster of the chiefs of the International Information section, we discover why Senator McCarthy worked up such a rage with this section last week. For example, the nine chiefs of the USIIA Office of Policy and Plans are name for name identical with those in November, 1952. Leafing onward, through Intelligence, U.N. Affairs, Economic Affairs, geographical sections, etc.—almost identical without change during the passage of eight months. . . ."

When McCarthy sent two members of his staff, Roy Cohn and David Shine, to Europe to look into the operations of the International Information program, they were victims of a planned smear campaign which must have been inspired by the State Department. Wherever they went, they were met by swarms of European and American reporters, who questioned them derisively and wrote reports depicting them as unearthly freaks from the weird land of "McCarthyism." The European reporters included background information in their reports which obviously had been supplied by the overseas employees of the State Department.

Theodore Kaghan, deputy director of the public affairs division in the office of James B. Conant, high commissioner for Germany, denounced Cohn and Shine as "junketeering gumshoes." Although defended by Conant, Kaghan finally was forced to resign as a result of revelations by McCarthy concerning his procommunist activities. McCarthy also forced the resignation of Charles W. Thayer, consul general at Munich, on morals charges.

The peculiar sensitivity of the State Department, under the

Eisenhower administration, to criticism by the Communists and the anti-anti-Communists was demonstrated by its an-guished antics when the McCarthy sub-committee demanded the removal of procommunist books from the overseas libraries of the United States Information Service. Under the Truman administration, these libraries, maintained with funds appropriated by Congress to propagate American ideals in foreign countries, were loaded with books by Communists, including twenty-one who invoked the Constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and refused to answer questions of Congressional committees about communist activities. The overseas libraries included books by Earl Browder and his successor as boss of the American Communist Party, William Z. Foster. They even included one title by Ilya Ehrenburg, director of the Kremlin's propaganda machine. They offered the complete proceedings, from 1929 to 1947, of the notorious Institute of Pacific Relations, which was regarded by Soviet officials and by the American Communist Party as "an instrument of Communist policy, propaganda and military intelligence," according to the report of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. The works of Owen Lattimore, who was described in the Senate report as "a conscious, articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy," and many other communist IPR writers were prominently displayed in the 196 United States information centers overseas.

When the McCarthy committee launched its campaign to remove the communist books from the libraries, there was a great hue and cry about "book burning" from the communist *Daily Worker*, the *New York Times* and "liberal" academicians and theologians. The pretended liberals induced President Eisenhower to admonish the people against joining the "book burners" in his speech at Dartmouth College on June 14, 1953. At a press conference four days later the President indicated that he had learned something about the purposes of the act authorizing the establishment of the libraries. He said it would be "silly" to display communist books advocating the destruction of the United States on the shelves of overseas libraries

established to "advertise the United States." Such books should be eliminated, by burning or otherwise, he said.

Still later, however, the President, answering a question by a bleeding heart correspondent for a "liberal" paper, deprecated the removal of "whodunits" by Dashiell Hammett from the libraries. Someone must have been scared, the President said. The State Department, which had ordered the removal of all books by authors who had refused to answer questions about their communist connections, promptly ordered the reinstatement of Hammett's books. Hammett had defied not only a Congressional committee but also a federal court, and had served six months in jail for contempt in refusing to disclose the source of a bail fund for Communists, of which he was chairman. Just why the taxpayers' money should be spent to enhance the prestige of a Communist by buying his books and displaying them on the shelves of libraries maintained to promote American ideals in foreign countries was not explained by the President or by the State Department.

Apparently dazed by conflicting pressures from Congress on one side and the anti-anti-Communists on the other, the State Department issued no less than eleven directives revising its policy on the question of communist books. The final directive, issued on July 15, 1953, declared that works by avowed Communists, those convicted of crimes involving a threat to the security of the United States, and those refusing to answer questions about communist connections, would not be used "unless it is determined that a particular item is clearly useful for the special purposes of the program."

In July, 1953, Allen Dulles, head of the Central Intelligence Agency, who is a brother of Secretary Dulles, obstructed Senator McCarthy's efforts to question William P. Bundy, a CIA official. McCarthy told the Senate that Bundy, a son-in-law of former State Secretary Acheson, contributed \$400 to the defense fund of Alger Hiss, who was an Acheson favorite. McCarthy said Bundy had submitted, in writing, the following explanation for his contribution to the Hiss defense fund: (1)

it would help out Bundy's father-in-law, Acheson; (2) it was "imperative" to exonerate Hiss; and (3) the trial was "important" to the Democratic Party.

McCarthy heard that Bundy was to be appointed to a new job as liaison officer between the Atomic Energy Commission and the National Security Council, the nation's top strategic planning agency. When he summoned Bundy to appear for questioning about his fitness for this job, he was advised by Walter Pforzheimer, legislative liaison officer of the CIA, that Bundy had gone away on a vacation and that, anyway, Dulles had prohibited CIA personnel from testifying before Congressional committees.

McCarthy accused Dulles of "blatantly defying the authority of the Senate" and of "covering up" information concerning the activities of Bundy.

The super-secret CIA was staffed largely with personnel from the wartime communist-infested Office of Strategic Services. It handles large sums of money, ostensibly for espionage, counter-espionage, and overseas underground activities, and makes no accounting of its disbursements. Westbrook Pegler has presented impressive evidence, which Dulles has refused to confirm or deny, that the CIA has turned over about \$3,000,000 to the AFL and David Dubinsky's International Ladies Garment Workers' Union for use by Jay Lovestone and Irving Brown, both anti-Kremlin Communists, in promoting socialism in western Europe. Dubinsky's labor union appears to have its own foreign policy, foreign ministry, and ambassadors to foreign countries, supported by the taxpayers.

The Bundy incident called attention to a bipartisan interlocking directorate of One Worlders and protectors of revolutionists which retains a major voice in the control of the nation's affairs regardless of the party in power. Bundy is the son of Harvey H. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State under Secretary Henry L. Stimson in the Hoover administration and special assistant to War Secretary Stimson in the Roosevelt administration. Harvey H. Bundy is a trustee of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, of which John Foster Dulles

was chairman when it chose Alger Hiss, the traitor, as its president. McGeorge Bundy, brother of William P., wrote Stimson's memoirs, glossing over his part in the Pearl Harbor disaster and proudly assuming major responsibility for the lynching bee at Nuernberg and the atomizing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. McGeorge Bundy also wrote a book called *The Pattern of Responsibility*, which lauded Acheson's foreign policy and condoned his sympathy for Hiss.

"Mr. Acheson and my father have been close friends across the party wall for many years," he wrote. "More recently, to their shared pride, there has been a family connection." He expressed hope that "this record may one day be read with satisfaction by a young man who is Mr. Acheson's grandson and my nephew." Acheson and Hiss were leaders of the pro-Soviet group in the State Department. Donald Hiss was employed by the State Department before the war and, like his brother, Alger, was identified by Whittaker Chambers as a member of the Soviet underground apparatus. Later Donald joined Acheson's law firm.

Both Dulles brothers served the Truman administration. Allen was deputy director of the CIA under General Smith in the Truman administration, and succeeded him as director of the CIA when Smith became Undersecretary of State and John Foster Dulles became Secretary of State in the Eisenhower administration.

And the American people were promised a change!

XIV. A Program for Americans

AS WE have seen, the American Republic is threatened by revolutionary forces which, if not checked, will cause its downfall. The primary menace is that our economy, already gravely overstrained, will be ruined by taxing and spending, ostensibly for defense against a foreign foe. Remote control of this country's purse strings, and not the thermonuclear bomb, is the No. 1 weapon in the Kremlin's arsenal.

The revolutionary movement has made alarming progress in the last twenty years. Constitutional restraints on the power of the national government have been removed by executive usurpation, legislative aggrandizement, and judicial acquiescence. We have seen great "inroads upon the old social order," as advocated by Marx and Engels in the *Communist Manifesto*. We have seen the rise of the welfare state, which assumes responsibility for the care of the citizens and also asserts authority to control their daily activities. We are spending more than 70 billion dollars a year; the national debt is 272 billion dollars; taxes and inflation have depreciated the dollar to about one half of its pre-war value. Government support, and consequently control, of the national economy is no longer a socialist dream; it is a basic principle of an administration calling itself Republican. Government competition with private industry has expanded considerably, especially in the electric power field. However, the collectivist program no longer calls for a step by step nationalization of industry. Some of the British labor unions have been disillusioned by experience with nationalization. The revolutionary program is much bolder and much more dangerous than progressive nationalization. It calls for unbearable taxes and expenditures to create a revolutionary

crisis, which would provide a pretext for the government to take over the whole system at one stroke.

The first step, therefore, in a program to save America must be a substantial reduction of expenditures to balance the federal budget. Expenditures should be reduced to 60 billion dollars in the next fiscal year, beginning July 1, 1954, and to a maximum of 55 billion dollars in the following fiscal years.

President Eisenhower, before his election, promised to support precisely this program. After his Morningside Heights breakfast conference with General Eisenhower on September 12, 1952, the late Senator Taft issued a statement saying: "General Eisenhower emphatically agrees with me in the proposal to reduce drastically over-all expenses. Our goal is about 70 billion dollars in fiscal year 1954 and 60 billion dollars in fiscal year 1955. That would make possible a reduction in taxes to the 60 billion level for the year 1955. Of course I hope we may do better than that and that the reduction can steadily continue. In our opinion a free economy cannot continue successfully if the total burden for the purposes of all government continuously exceeds 25 per cent of the national income."

Instead of a reduction of federal expenditures to 70 billion dollars in the present fiscal year, the President proposed an outlay of 74.1 billion. On October 8, 1953, he told his press conference that a balanced budget would always be a goal of his administration, but he refused to say when he expected to achieve that goal. It was impossible, the President declared, to pick a specific date and say: "Here all things must give way before a balanced budget." This is exactly what Franklin D. Roosevelt used to say year after year, as the prospect of a balanced budget receded farther and farther beyond the horizon.

The estimated federal deficit this fiscal year is between 4 and 5 billion dollars. If new taxes are not voted by Congress, the treasury will lose about 8 billion dollars through the expiration or reduction of taxes now in effect. Therefore it will be necessary to decrease expenditures by from 12 to 13 billion dollars in order to balance the budget. Since current estimates of expenditures are running a little below the President's proposal to

spend 74.1 billion, such a reduction would balance the budget at around 60 billion.

Further reductions will be required in future years to bring the total cost of government, federal, state and local, down to 25 per cent of the national income, which is the limit for a "free economy," according to the Taft-Eisenhower agreement. Since a reduction of spending should halt the inflationary spiral, we cannot reasonably count upon a sustained national income of more than 290 billion dollars a year, which was the total for 1952. Since state and local taxes now aggregate about 20 billion dollars a year, a 25 per cent limit on the total cost of government would leave only 52.5 billion for the federal government. A federal outlay of 55 billion dollars, plus 20 billion for state and local governments, would be 25.8 per cent of a 290 billion dollar national income.

The President can keep faith with Senator Taft only by substantially reducing expenditures under the heading of "national security," including foreign aid, which are estimated at 51.7 billion dollars for the current fiscal year. It is obvious that all other expenses of government, including veterans' costs and almost 7 billion dollars annually for interest on the public debt, cannot be held below 20 billion dollars a year. This means that "national security" spending should be cut to 40 billion dollars in the next fiscal year and 35 billion dollars annually thereafter. An outlay of 35 billion dollars for the army, navy, and air force for the next fiscal year, and of 30 billion dollars annually thereafter, would leave 2 billion dollars a year for atomic weapons production, 2 billion for continental air defense, and 1 billion for foreign assistance.

Such a program would require basic changes in the foreign policy and the defense strategy of the United States, but it could be carried out while simultaneously strengthening our military position. It is self-evident that economic strength is a prerequisite of military strength. With a balanced budget and a limit of 35 billion dollars a year on expenditures for "national security," we can preserve our economic strength. Moreover, by basing our strategy primarily upon the retaliatory capacity of power-

ful air and sea forces we can deter, and if necessary punish, Communist aggression within the limits of our economic and manpower resources.

The program of the Eisenhower administration, which is a continuation of policies adopted by the Truman regime, calls for the simultaneous development of huge ground forces, naval forces, and air forces, for munitions and cash subsidies to other countries, and for local resistance to communist aggression wherever it may occur—in Korea, Indo-China, the Middle East, or Western Europe. There is no foundation for assertions that the Eisenhower administration has abandoned the “containment” policy of the Truman administration. In the 1952 campaign, John Foster Dulles talked vaguely about “liberating” the 600,000,000 people enslaved by the Soviet tyranny outside its own frontiers since 1939; but on September 17, 1953, Dulles told the United Nations that “our creed does not call for exporting revolution and inciting others to violence.” The delighted comment of a delegate from a British Commonwealth country was that Dulles had made “a fine Acheson speech.”

Regardless of semantic distinctions, the Eisenhower administration is continuing a policy of dispersion, of reacting to communist initiative. It is identical with the policy deplored by Demosthenes in the first Philippic: “Shame on you Athenians for not wishing to understand that in war one must not allow one’s self to be at the command of events, but to forestall them. You make war against Philip like a barbarian when he wrestles. If you hear that Philip has attacked in the Chersonese, you send help there. If he is at Thermopylae you run there. If he turns aside you follow him to right or left, as if you were acting on his orders. Never a fixed plan; never any precautions. You wait for bad news before you act.”

Former President Herbert Hoover, the greatest American of the twentieth century, is the foremost exponent of the air-sea defense concept. Although Mr. Hoover calls himself “a mere civilian,” the advice of the ablest generals and admirals in this country is available to him. Among others, he is advised by General MacArthur, Lieutenant General Wedemeyer (author

of the prophetic reports on China and Korea), and Brigadier General Bonner Fellers who was General MacArthur's chief planning officer in the Pacific war. The former President told the Republican national convention on July 8, 1952, that his program was "supported by seven of our most distinguished retired army, navy and air force officers" and "six of our most seasoned diplomats." In the same speech, Mr. Hoover said:

"The effective deterrent which American resources can contribute is not bayonets against overwhelming land forces, but the expansion of air power and navies to make up a great striking force, which could destroy the communist military potential if they started any aggression anywhere. And this striking force naturally includes strategic bases with a stretch of water in front of them over which communist armies cannot pass our navy."

Lest it be doubted that the Pentagon was relying on bayonets to deter or resist the communist hordes, Mr. Hoover quoted the following dogma, which might have been taken from a manual used in the Franco-Prussian War, but actually appeared in a War Department bulletin of February 1, 1952: "The individual rifleman is the most effective and most essential weapon against the enemy. All other services exist to support the infantry soldier."

In a speech on January 27, 1952, Mr. Hoover declared that "the only way to save Europe from destruction is to avoid the third world war." He advocated cooperation with the British to "expand our already strong air arms and navies up to a striking force" that would deter communist aggression. He would furnish "such munitions as we can afford to other nations who show a determined will to defend themselves," but ground armies would be Europe's own problem.

It was to be expected, of course, that Mr. Hoover would be smeared as a "defeatist" and an "appeaser" of world communism by some of those who had distinguished themselves as champions of collaboration with Stalin in the United Nations. Sumner Welles accused the former president of counseling "abject defeatism." Such a program, he wrote, would be "tanta-

mount to the scuttling of all forms of collective security," and a "cynical breach of all the obligations" entered into by us since 1945. He agreed with the statement of Elmer Davis that Mr. Hoover sounded "a clarion call to his fellow countrymen to crawl under the bed, shut their eyes, plug their ears and hope for the best."¹

If the American people could be deluded by such discredited prophets as Sumner Welles and Elmer Davis, the counsel falsely ascribed by them to Mr. Hoover would be as good as any, for our days as a free nation would be numbered. Instead of abandoning the noncommunist world, as Welles argues, the Hoover plan would serve notice on the Kremlin that "aggression against other noncommunist countries as well as Western Europe" would be punished by an air-sea striking force strong enough to destroy the Soviet war potential. Instead of cynically breaching our treaty obligations, as Welles contends, it offers the only possibility of carrying out our commitments to those countries. For, as Senator Taft declared in a speech at Cincinnati on May 26, 1953, no one has ever argued convincingly "that United States ground forces could effectively defend Europe."

From air force bases available now in Greenland, Iceland, Labrador, and Alaska, our B-36 bombers can carry atomic bombs to any target in the Soviet Union and return without refueling in flight.² Our new all-jet B-52 bomber, which can strike targets in Russia and return to North American bases without refueling in flight, will be available in quantity in 1955. From carriers now available, navy attack aircraft, also presently available, can reach any target in Europe, including Archangel, Murmansk, Finland, Leningrad, and western Russia to Kiev, Rostov, and Baku, and return to their ships. From carriers operating in Pacific waters, the same aircraft can reach targets well beyond Peiping and deep inland along the trans-Siberian railroad.³ The Russians know this. Fear of retaliation by American air power, and not the phantom army of the

1. *Seven Decisions that Shaped History*.
2. *Wings for Peace*, by Brig. Gen. Bonner Fellers, Henry Regnery Co.
3. Hanson Baldwin, *New York Times*, September 25, 1953.

NATO countries in western Europe, has prevented any aggression by the Soviet Union's own forces since World War II. They have instigated and supported aggression by satellite armies and guerrilla forces, but they have not attacked with their own.

The announcement that a thermonuclear explosion had occurred in the Soviet Union was followed by a series of alarming statements by administration officials, warning that it might be necessary to spend more money for national defense and increase rather than decrease taxes. President Eisenhower, speaking at Boston on September 21, 1953, declared that the "enemies of freedom" are equipped with "the most terrible weapons of destruction" and that "no sacrifice, no labor, no tax, no service" is too hard for us to bear to support "a logical and necessary defense of our freedom." Representative Cole of New York, chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, said the country should forget about trying to balance the budget and spend 15 to 25 billion dollars on continental air defense. Even then it would be possible to stop not more than half of a Soviet bombing force, he declared. The babbling Val Peterson, head of the Civil Defense Administration, warned that the Russians would use not only atomic and thermonuclear bombs but germ warfare, poison gas and "psychological panic." Then he made a contribution to the "psychological panic" by declaring flatly that such warfare was inevitable.

The hysterical clamor about the Soviet hydrogen bomb, which could only be described as subversive, apparently alarmed the country less than the President, who had started it. The President finally enjoined all members of his administration from making statements on Soviet nuclear capabilities without the approval of the Atomic Energy Commission. Even if the Russians have a "deliverable" hydrogen bomb, which most of our experts doubt, there are few military targets in the world which could not be destroyed by a super plutonium bomb. Therefore, possession of the hydrogen bomb by the Russians hardly alters the strategic power relationship. The Russians are believed to have 25,000 airplanes, of which the great majority

are fighters and not all of these are jets. Fighter planes are no offensive threat to the United States. They have more than 700 TU-4 bombers, an improved version of our World War II B-29s, capable of 5,000 mile flights. A longer range bomber, slightly smaller than our B-36, with swept-back wings and six jet engines, has been seen over Moscow but has not been produced in quantity.⁴ General Hoyt Vandenberg, retiring air force chief of staff, recently testified that the Soviet air force "has the capability of carrying atomic bombs for a distance of 2,000 miles and returning to its bases. It can also deliver the atomic bomb through staging bases already prepared in Siberia and Northern Russia to any target in the United States on a one-way mission. Whether the Russians are yet completely prepared to commit this force in a full scale attack against the United States we do not know."⁵

It does not require a "military expert" to determine whether the Russians are likely to commit this relatively small and relatively short-range World War II type "strategic" air force in a no-return raid against the United States. Simple reasoning shows that it would be an act of military madness. If they could destroy most of our major cities and war production centers and continental air bases, and thirty or forty million of our people, in a single one-way raid, they might temporarily paralyze our capacity for resistance to such an extent that they could land an occupation army on our shores, provided they had the ships to transport and protect it against the opposition of the American navy. They would have to do all of this to accomplish a reasonable military purpose. Anything short of such a success would subject the Soviet Union to immediate reprisal and probable ultimate defeat by the United States. If the Russians were contemplating an imminent surprise attack against the United States, it is more logical to assume that they would seek to knock out our strategic air bases, just as the Japanese wrecked our fleet at Pearl Harbor. That would give them freedom of action to invade western Europe or the Middle East

4. *Wings for Peace*, by Brig. Gen. Bonner Fellers.

5. *U. S. News & World Report*, July 10, 1953.

or both. However, our strategic air bases, dispersed in Greenland, Iceland, Labrador, Alaska, the Azores, England, Northwest Africa, the Middle East, Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines, as well as continental United States, presumably have modern air defenses, and it is inconceivable that a major part of them could be knocked out simultaneously by the existing Soviet air force.

One of the few officials of the Eisenhower administration who has shown any promise of breaking through the sonic barrier into the realm of reason is Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense. At a press conference on October 6, 1953, he conjectured that it would be at least three years before the Russians would have deliverable hydrogen bombs in significant quantity and airplanes with which they could drop them on the United States. Even then, he remarked, one might ask, "so what?"

"The final thing," said Secretary Wilson, "is this: Is there any reason for them to go to war, and if they did, wouldn't it be clear to them that they would meet so much opposition that they would finally lose?"

Dr. Marek Stanislaw Korowicz, who broke away from the Polish delegation to the United Nations, testified before the House Un-American Activities Committee on September 24, 1953, that the Soviet master plan calls for world conquest between 1970 and 1980. However, he declared that the Kremlin hopes to achieve its aims by "the progressive destruction of the cultural, economic and political foundations of the free world." The Soviet leaders know, he said, that "under present circumstances war is not the best and safest way to achieve their aims."

With all the trouble Malenkov's dictatorship now has on its hands in the Soviet Union and in the satellite countries, the suggestion of imminent war with the United States undoubtedly would cause shudders and convulsions in the Kremlin. The full effects of the mysterious Beria purge alone may not be known for years. The recent riots in Czechoslovakia and East Germany were symptoms of sullen discontent and potentially violent resistance. Dr. Korowicz testified that Poland is "one immense totalitarian prison camp," and that not more

than seven per cent of the population are even remotely sympathetic to communism. Dictator Malenkov himself, in a remarkable speech to the Supreme Soviet on August 8, 1953, acknowledged serious deficiencies in the production of goods for popular consumption. He said the Soviet Union was "still a long way from adequately meeting the increasing demand for meat, milk, eggs and other animal produce." There is even a "serious lag" in the production of potatoes and vegetables, he declared. With seventy per cent of all Soviet industrial workers employed in heavy industry, the long suffering Slavs are at last demanding butter instead of guns.

Advocates of higher taxes and increased spending for armaments conjure up scenes of indescribable havoc wrought by Soviet atomic attacks on our great cities. Yet the Joint Chiefs of Staff, according to press reports, do not believe that they could spend more than \$500,000,000 of additional funds on continental air defense in the next fiscal year without upsetting their whole program. Even if the danger of an atomic attack is not imminent, we should begin now to develop an air defense system that will deter such an attempt when the Russians have adequate strategic air power. It would seem that at least one third of the six billion dollars a year we are spending on aid to foreign countries could be more usefully devoted to air defense.

Many pretended experts have questioned the feasibility of defending our cities and munitions plants against airborne atomic attack. This is transparent nonsense. Duncan Sandys, Britain's minister of supply, announced on August 22, 1953, that Britain has developed 2,000-mile an hour anti-aircraft rockets which can outmaneuver any piloted aircraft, either by "riding" a radar beam or "homing" on the target by means of their own preset mechanism. Presumably the United States is abreast of such developments. General J. Lawton Collins, retiring Army Chief of Staff, recently testified before the House Appropriations Committee that the American anti-aircraft guided missile, called the Nike, is being produced "under normal American techniques of mass production," and that in

tests against remotely controlled drone planes, actual bombers, the targets have been "literally blown to pieces."

The effectiveness of anti-aircraft artillery in World War II was limited because a bomber could take evasive action in the time required for a shell to reach the predicted position of a target five to eight miles away (slant range). The radar guided and "homing" anti-aircraft rockets can reach targets at much greater distances and no evasive action can elude them. Moreover, "homing" or target-seeking air-to-air rockets, fired from jet fighters, can knock down bombers far beyond the range of aircraft guns.

With an early warning radar screen across northern Canada and Alaska from Greenland to the Aleutians, jet fighters can be alerted in time to intercept Soviet bombers from Arctic bases before they reach our cities. Bombers approaching our shores from the Atlantic or Pacific can be detected by radar picket ships. Some would get through, but they would have to contend with the guided missile batteries protecting major targets. Such a system would not insure complete protection in a war with the Soviet Union, but its existence would deter a surprise attack.

The feasibility of defense against airborne atomic attack does not mean that our own air offensive would be ineffective. If we keep ahead of the Russians in electronics we can jam their early warning and anti-aircraft missile-guiding radar. The United States and Britain successfully jammed the German gun-aiming radar in World War II, and by using higher and higher frequencies in the microwave region they prevented counter-jamming by the Germans. The success of the American electronic gunsight in the Korean war indicates that we are well ahead of the Russians in electronics.

How large should our air force be? Some air enthusiasts are sincerely concerned, and the socialist spending cult is shedding crocodile tears, about a reduction by the Eisenhower administration in proposed new money appropriations for the air force. Former President Truman, who withheld funds appropriated

by Congress in 1948 to increase the air force to 70 groups, on the ground that 48 was all the country needed or could afford, now has the effrontery to accuse the Eisenhower administration of sabotaging the 143 group program.

No one has demonstrated the absurdity of the Pentagon's ground defense concept more impressively than General Fellers, in his excellent book *Wings for Peace*.⁶ Yet General Fellers, like most air enthusiasts, is influenced too much by the air warfare of World War II. He believes that we need 250 groups (or wings, as they are now called), and he supports his judgment by the testimony of General Carl Spaatz, former Air Force Chief of Staff, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 21, 1951. Surely the advocates of a 250 wing air force are thinking in terms of World War II, when more than 1,000 B-17s and B-24s, each carrying about 3½ tons of conventional bombs, were flown in single raids on Germany, and up to 1,000 B-29s, each with a 10-ton bomb load, were used in single attacks on Japanese cities. A single airplane carrying an improved plutonium bomb is the equivalent of hundreds of B-29s, while the hydrogen bomb is said to be 50 times as destructive as the plutonium bomb.

According to Secretary Wilson, the air force had 106 activated wings, including 90 combat wings, on June 30, 1953, and will have 114 effective wings by June 30, 1954. A total of 60 fighter and 40 bomber wings, equipped with the most modern aircraft, would give this country a truly formidable air force. With 75 fighters and 30 bombers to a wing, this would be a total of 4,500 fighters and 1,200 bombers. With a 100 per cent replacement reserve, such a force would give us 11,400 first line aircraft. The actual number of wings in being, so long as it is adequate, is less important than our aircraft production and aircrew training rate. According to military intelligence estimates recently submitted to the House Appropriations Committee, our current production of both bombers and fighters exceeds the Russian production rate. We are producing about

6. *Wings for Peace*, Henry Regnery Co., Chicago, 1953.

1,000 aircraft a month for the air force, the navy and other nations. The air force is training pilots at the rate of 7,200 a year, and this is higher than the estimated Russian rate.

General Collins recently testified that the army has 20 combat divisions, 18 regimental combat teams (the equivalent of six additional divisions), and many separate anti-aircraft battalions. General Fellers maintains persuasively that the standing army should be reduced to 10 divisions, all of them airborne. He believes the mission of the airborne army should be limited to "providing anti-aircraft artillery defenses, and to defending bases and critical areas from sabotage or attack by enemy airborne troops." The six divisions now in Germany would be streamlined to become part of the airborne army, but the six army divisions now in Korea would not be immediately available for that purpose.⁷ Eventually we may be able to withdraw our forces from Korea, after we have completed South Korea's twenty-division army program. We have signed a security pact with the Korean Republic, warning the Communists that any further aggression by them will be punished by the United States.

We are obligated by the North Atlantic Treaty to defend western Europe, but we are not obligated to protect it with ground forces. Our six divisions are insignificant as a deterrent force and would be sacrificed or compelled to flee in a Dunkirk operation in the eventuality of a Soviet attack. The provision of ground forces, as Mr. Hoover says, is Europe's own problem, and the rearmament of Germany is the only answer to that problem. If the French continue to obstruct German participation in the defense of western Europe by refusing to ratify the so-called European Defense Community treaty, we should encourage unilateral German rearmament. That would help to restore the European balance of power which we destroyed by intervening in the last war. Moreover, it would expedite French rearmament. The French are not impressed by our concern about the Soviet menace, but they are pathologically afraid of

the Germans. They conceived the EDC scheme only as a means of thwarting American plans for the creation of a German national army, and now they are sabotaging it.

A national defense program based upon the concept of a powerful air-sea striking force to deter communist aggression could be maintained for 30 billion dollars a year, possibly even less. It would avoid intolerable taxes, inflation and eventual bankruptcy, the fate long predicted for this country by the Kremlin rulers.

In its global struggle with Soviet communism the United States needs friends, not only in western Europe but in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, where dependent peoples and those who have recently emerged from colonialism are in a ferment of revolt against the west. The peoples of these areas are struggling to throw off the last vestiges of imperialism, and to improve their wretched standards of living, the heritage of two centuries of exploitation. The prevalence of anti-American sentiment in western Europe, after all the billions of dollars we have spent there, is conclusive evidence that friends cannot be bought. Historical experience shows, however, that they can be won by enlightened example, intelligent cooperation, and a decent respect for their rights and aspirations.

The United States has lost, and must regain, the moral leadership of the world. Addressing the United Nations on September 17, 1953, State Secretary Dulles quoted Lincoln's statement that the Declaration of Independence gave not only liberty to the American people but "hope to the world for all future time." Unfortunately, recent American policies have not inspired such hope. Our prestige reached an all time peak when we granted independence to the Philippines, but in the short period of the so-called cold war it has sunk to an all-time low. Dr. Y. T. Pyun, foreign minister of the Republic of Korea, told the General Assembly's Political Committee on August 24, 1953: "The United Nations is fast becoming a hot place, not for the Soviet Union, but for its free world opposite number."

We have lost the moral leadership of the world largely because we have supported French imperialism in North Africa and Indochina, and British imperialism in the Middle East, in the hope of strengthening our NATO allies economically. Secretary Dulles, in the September 17 speech, mentioned the responsibility of the United States and the other noncommunist countries toward the non-self-governing territories. The Arab delegates regarded this as a sardonic joke, for it had been only two weeks since the American delegation voted to deny fifteen Asian and African nations a hearing by the Security Council on their complaint against France's oppression of the Moroccans. The United States also had been the decisive factor in preventing a hearing on a similar complaint against France in Tunisia.

By any reasonable construction of the relevant international law, the French are aggressors in Morocco and Tunisia, and the United States should exert all its influence upon the French government to grant full independence to those countries. This would not harm, in fact it would benefit, French economic and cultural interests. The Moroccans, grateful for America's good offices, would give us a treaty safeguarding our strategic air bases. In case of war, under existing conditions, we would have to station large ground forces in Morocco to protect the air bases.

For seven years the French have been fighting a costly, futile war in Indochina against native guerrilla forces led by Ho Chi-minh, a Moscow-trained Communist. Ho's Vietminh forces are supplied by Communist China. The Eisenhower administration's response to this situation was to increase annual aid to the French in Indochina from \$400,000,000 to \$785,000,000, in addition to great quantities of military equipment. Secretary Dulles, addressing the American Legion on September 2, warned the Chinese Communists that they could not send their own army into Indochina "without grave consequences which might not be confined to Indochina." The Eisenhower administration, like its predecessor, recoiled from a chance to defeat the Communists in Korea, but now seems to be prepared to

fight them on the mainland to save French colonial interests in Indochina. Addressing the governors' conference in Seattle, in August, 1953, the President declared that if Indochina should fall India would be outflanked. With Chinese communist forces in Sinkiang province and in Tibet, India already is outflanked. The President asked how it would be possible for "the free world to hold the rich empire of Indonesia" if Indochina should fall. A glance at the map suggests that sea power would be one way.

No matter how much support we give the French, the war in Indochina will not be won so long as the people there are offered only a continuation of French colonialism. A member of a western European delegation to the U.N. told me that even some native Catholic priests, educated in France, have gone over to Ho Chi-minh, not because they are procommunist, but because he is fighting the French. The French have promised independence to the associated states of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, but the examples of Tunisia and Morocco do not inspire confidence in such promises. Writing in the French military magazine *Revue de Défense Nationale*, General L. M. Chassin, commander of the French air force in Indochina until June, 1953, declared that "the key to victory will be the morale of the people of Vietnam."⁸ If the French could be induced to get out of Indochina, most of Ho Chi-minh's followers would desert him overnight, and even Bao Dai, who has been distrusted as a French puppet, could head a popular government in Vietnam. The United States then could train and equip a Vietnamese army capable of defending itself against the communist guerrillas, at far less cost than our present bootless aid to the French.

We should stop all subsidies to Europe, both military and economic. Korea, devastated by war, will have to be rehabilitated, and the United States can expect little help from other countries in that program. It probably will cost us 2 billion dollars. We should grant or lend a billion dollars or so to Japan,

8. Hanson Baldwin, *New York Times*, September 10, 1953.

to facilitate its rearmament as a deterrent to communist expansion in the Far East. Since the United States must defend Formosa in its own interest, there is no need for further expansion of Chiang Kai-shek's already considerable forces. Other foreign aid should be limited to loans by the Export-Import Bank for economic development projects, and appropriations of about \$50,000,000 a year for technical assistance. If properly administered, the technical assistance program, now costing \$180,000,000 a year, can be constructive and far less expensive. The Truman administration squandered the taxpayers' money and antagonized the people of some countries, especially in the Middle East, by loading the payroll with deadbeat bureaucrats who put on the airs of proconsuls. Under the Eisenhower administration, over-zealous administrators are spending too much for economic development projects on a program that should be limited to technical aid, with the United States paying only the salaries and expenses of the experts and the cost of demonstration projects. American specialists can help the countries of Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia increase their food production, improve health conditions, and institute teacher and nurse training programs.

Wherever possible, capital investment for economic development should be left to private industry. However, self-liquidating loans should be made by the Export-Import Bank for the development of natural resources when adequate private capital is not available. A recent Export-Import Bank loan of \$67,500,000 to Brazilian-American interests to exploit one of the world's greatest manganese deposits is a creditable undertaking.

Supporters of the NATO program justify endless handouts to the European countries on the ground that American industry is dependent upon raw materials controlled by them. We import raw materials from Canada, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, but not from Europe. Even if the Communists should overrun western Europe, that would no more shut off our sources of raw materials than did Hitler's occupation of those countries. Of the twelve materials listed

as strategic in the second world war, eleven—copper, manganese, chromium, tungsten, tin, antimony, platinum, mercury, iodine, sodium nitrate and bauxite—are available in Latin America. The vast continent of Africa is rich in raw materials. The Middle East has the world's largest known oil reserves. It is clear, therefore, that we should cultivate the friendship of these countries and not alienate them by supporting European colonialism. Their intense nationalism is a factor in our favor, for they are beginning to understand that communism, which poses as a champion of national liberation, actually seeks to enslave them.

The United States should assert its moral leadership by refusing to associate, in a pretended peace organization, with the Soviet Union, the worst menace in history to the peace and security of mankind. We should withdraw from the U.N. and break off diplomatic relations with the communist countries. Dr. Korowicz told the Un-American Activities Committee that the Communists use the U.N. only as a forum for their poisonous propaganda, by which they further their plans for world conquest. "The greatest defeat short of war for the Communists would be the loss of diplomatic relations with the west," Dr. Korowicz said. He is indubitably right. We should treat them as moral outcasts. It is an insult to the intelligence of our people to tell them that it may be possible to negotiate dependable agreements with these international public enemies. Despite the examples of Finland, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Stalin's cynical nonaggression pact with Hitler, his equally cynical nonaggression agreement with Japan, and his attack on that country while it was trying to surrender to the United States, we are told by French, British and even American leaders, including Secretary Dulles, that a nonaggression treaty with the Soviet Union might reduce tensions and effect stability. If there is anything under heaven the Kremlin does not want, it is stability and a reduction of tension. Where would these tension-reducers and stabilizers draw the line of demarcation? Would they guarantee East Germany against attack by

West Germany, and thereby condemn the East Germans to permanent slavery?

There is little hope that the present administration, the Republican Party, or the Democratic Party can be depended upon to redirect our foreign and military policies, to put our financial affairs in order and to halt this head-long charge into national disaster. The Republicans in 1956 will renominate President Eisenhower or a candidate of his choice. The Democrats will nominate Adlai Stevenson or some other candidate acceptable to Americans for Democratic Action. We must have a political realignment in this country, and a new political party, to express the will of millions of Americans who have been effectively disfranchised by a system which asks them to choose between New Deal Democrats and New Deal Republicans. Colonel Robert R. McCormick, editor and publisher of the *Chicago Tribune*, has proposed the only appropriate name for such a patriotic movement—the American Party.

The new party should appeal to the Taft Republicans and to the conservative Democrats of the South. General Eisenhower's personal popularity undoubtedly accounted for a large part of his support in the South. Nevertheless, southern Democrats in great numbers voted for him as a Republican, in the belief that he would satisfy their demand for a "change at Washington." He carried Virginia, Florida, Texas, and Tennessee, and received 4,103,673 popular votes in eleven Southern states, only 319,880 less than Stevenson's total. These conservative Democrats left their party for Eisenhower and they will leave it again, for without the two-thirds rule they cannot prevent the nomination of a socialistic candidate. After four years of the Eisenhower administration they should be ready for another "change at Washington."

The Whig Party died because it lacked the vision and moral integrity to fight the extension of human slavery. The Republican Party also will die, and it should, if those who control it temporize with the extension of programs and policies that will enslave the whole nation. A new party should bring about a

realignment. Let the New Deal Republicans join the New Deal Democrats. They should call themselves Social Democrats, the name used by their ideological counterparts in Europe—but that is their business. Let the free Republicans and the free Democrats join the American Party. The people should begin now, in 1954, just as they began in 1854 at Ripon, Wisconsin, and later in other cities and towns, to hold meetings and form committees for the organization of a new party. The Republican Party, founded a hundred years ago, did not elect a President until six years later. There is no time to lose. A committee of the American Party should be formed in every congressional district this year. Present members of Congress, Republicans and Democrats, whose record is above reproach, should be indorsed by the new party, but in other districts it should nominate its own candidates. By 1956 the party should be well organized. It should hold its first national convention and nominate candidates for president and vice-president. Even if it should run third in the popular vote, it could throw the election into the House of Representatives, where New York would have only one vote, the same as Nevada and all other states.

The Hoover-MacArthur-Fellers air-sea program of national defense should be a major plank in the new party's platform. It offers the only hope for a drastic reduction of taxes and expenditures. The party should support a proposal by Senator Everett M. Dirksen (R., Ill.) and Representative Chauncey W. Reed (R., Ill.) for a Constitutional amendment to put a ceiling on income taxes. Their proposed amendment, which has been indorsed by the American Bar Association, would limit individual and corporation income taxes to 25 per cent unless Congress, by a three-fourths majority of each house, should increase the rates. Congress could increase the rates to any point, but a maximum spread of 15 per cent between the top and bottom brackets would be permitted. This would eliminate most of the evils of the "heavy progressive or graduated income tax" advocated by Marx and Engels in the *Communist Manifesto*. The highest surtax rate on individual and corporate incomes when the Sixteenth Amendment was adopted in 1913

was 6 per cent. Now the highest rate on individual incomes is 92 per cent. The Marxist graduated income tax not only facilitates government extravagance, but also permits the majority, who pay little or no taxes on income, to rob the minority by pushing the top rates higher and higher. As James Madison remarked in No. 10 of the *Federalist Papers*, the majority are both judge and party in their own cause, and "every shilling with which they overburden the inferior number is a shilling saved to their own pockets."

The American Party should advocate withdrawal from the United Nations and adoption of the Bricker amendment to prevent subversion of our liberties by treaty law-making. It should support a bill recommended by the Jenner Internal Security Subcommittee, giving Congress the power to grant immunity from prosecution to witnesses who refuse, on the ground of possible self-incrimination, to testify about the Soviet fifth column in the government. Defiant witnesses then could be prosecuted for contempt, or for perjury if they should testify falsely. The Fifth Amendment provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," but it does not protect a Communist or ex-Communist from possible loss of his job or any embarrassment he might feel about naming conspirators against the nation.

Finally, the new party should promise to get the federal government out of business and to halt the expansion of its activities in other fields. The following statement by Mr. Hoover, in a speech at Cleveland on April 11, 1953, could well express the party's political philosophy:

"True liberalism is found not in striving to spread bureaucracy, but in striving to set bounds to it. True liberalism seeks all legitimate freedom, in the confident belief that without freedom, all other blessings are vain. Liberalism is a force truly of the spirit coming from a realization that economic freedom cannot be sacrificed if political freedom is to be preserved."

A new political party is essential for the realization of this program, but the preservation of our freedom will require also a spiritual reawakening. The creeping revolution, stimulated

by atheistic Marxism, has been attended by a rapid decline of moral standards in this country. More Americans should go to church. We need to rededicate ourselves to the spiritual purposes of our forefathers, which made this country great. Religion is an impregnable shield against Godless communism. If we have faith, the Lord will deliver us. This is the promise of the 33rd Psalm:

Blessed is the nation whose God is the Lord; and the people he hath chosen for his own inheritance.

The Lord looketh from heaven; he beholdeth all the sons of men.

From the place of his habitation he looketh upon all the inhabitants of the earth.

He fashioneth their hearts alike; he considereth all their works.

There is no king saved by the multitude of an host: a mighty man is not delivered by much strength.

Behold the eye of the Lord is upon them that fear him, upon them that hope in his mercy:

To deliver their soul from death, and to keep them alive in famine.

Our soul waiteth for the Lord: he is our help and our shield.

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