Investigation and Civil Liberty
C. Dickerman Williams

Soviet Trade: Who Gains?
Leo Dudin

Articles and Book Reviews by Wilhelm Roepke, Max Eastman, Harold Lord Varney, John T. Flynn, Fletcher Pratt, Eugene Lyons, William Henry Chamberlin
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Among Ourselves

The revelations of Igor Gouzenko in 1946 concerning an espionage ring operating in Canada gave rise to an investigation that has been universally regarded and much-lauded as thorough, effective, and just. In connection with the present heated debate in this country over the procedures of our own investigations into Communist activities, C. DICKERMAN WILLIAMS re-examined the report of the Royal Commission. What he found (p. 551) should give pause to those both here and in Canada and Britain who are denouncing the efforts of our congressional committees as a flagrant violation of civil liberties. Mr. Williams brings to the debate the knowledge of years as a legal expert, and as a careful student of constitutional law and the processes of government. FREEMAN readers will remember his previous discussion on another aspect of congressional investigations ("The Duty to Investigate," September 21, 1953).

Amid all the agitation about the European Defense Community many observers ignore the equal urgency of a successful European economic community of free nations. WILHELM ROEPKE in his article on p. 554 tells us why the European Payments Union is failing to achieve this and what steps are necessary to bring it about.

We had just put on our agenda the item: inquire into Communism in Hawaii and its effect on statehood, when HAROLD LORD VARNEY telephoned and proposed a piece on that very subject. Mr. Varney's acquaintance with the problem goes back to 1938 when he went to Hawaii for a two-year study of Communist penetration into the labor unions and other vital institutions. Since then he has remained in constant and close touch with developments there, and it is from firsthand information that he presents (p. 557) the drawbacks to Hawaiian statehood at this time.

LEO DUDIN, analyst of Soviet affairs, and our regular contributor, EUGENE LYONS, have united their points of focus in dealing with the economic, practical, and political questions involved in trade with Soviet Russia and the area under its control. Mr. Dudin gives the facts and figures of such trade (p. 561) and on the basis of these shows how it is used for political ends. Mr. Lyons' words (p. 564) are directed to the American businessman and are in the nature of advice as well as warning.

Since 1929 MAX EASTMAN has headed the crusade against "the Cult of Unintelligibility" in poetry. He now takes up the cudgels in favor of the communication of clear values in art (p. 571). To illustrate his thesis we reproduce on the inside back cover a famous picture by Picasso discussed in his article.
Radical Commentators

I was interested in Eugene Lyons' "The New Heroism" (April 5), pointing up the misuse of press and radio by radical commentators. It seems to me an important group must assume its share of guilt for this misuse—the editors and radio sponsors who buy the radical commentaries.

A weird situation has developed in this era. Private enterprises now seem willing to support the advocates of their own destruction. . . . Many newspapers buy and publish radical writings which tend to nullify the healthy influence of responsible editorials.

This is not to say radicals should be silenced. In this country, radicals as well as conservatives are free to finance their own mediums of information. . . . MABEL G. BLISS Fort Lauderdale, Fla.

The Case of Clarence Manion

Mr. Eisenhower's call for "fair play" in congressional dealings was most admirable. It's just a pity that he didn't remember his own dictum of "fair play" when his assistant, Sherman Adams, called to the White House and in the rudest fashion, without the least prior notice, summarily fired the brilliant constitutional expert and courageous patriot, Clarence Manion.

The Administration has also poured forth many fine words about the right of every American to freedom of thought and freedom of expression. Why was Mr. Manion fired? What was his fault? He openly disagreed with the Administration on the Bricker Amendment. Clarence Manion was taking the Administration at its word. He was practicing freedom of thought and freedom of expression!

San Francisco, Calif. ELIZABETH LIPPITT

On Censorship

I have been an avid FREEMAN reader for about two years now and, as a college student, find your magazine very useful in my political science and economics courses. The FREEMAN is more than a collection of opinions, however. It is one of the few consistently conservative, anti-regimentation publications around today. Thus, while I rarely agree with your views, I can certainly respect them as the most honest espousal of today's conservative viewpoint.

Most right-of-center journals of opinion tend, as do their left-wing counterparts, to adopt the views of those who would curb many of our basic freedoms. These attitudes can be synthesized into one, which is a basic premise of all "isms": a deep-seated distrust of the people. . . . The political snobs seem to think that the people. . . are so hopelessly inadequate that some sort of Big Brother is needed to plan out every phase of existence.

One of the most common manifestations of this tendency is the recurring craze for various boards of censorship—a mania which afflicts conservatives as well as left-wingers. Those who advocate censorship of the books we read, movies we see, etc. seem to me just this side of authoritarianism. . . . I am therefore very happy to see Serge Flieger's ("Codes and Morals," February 22) take the censors to task in a lonely stand for the free dissemination of ideas.

Syracuse, N.Y. ROBERT HECHT

There's only one blemish in the FREEMAN. That's Mr. Flieger's. All the rest of the paper is for freedom. Flieger is for license. . . . His answer to the Breen office (April 5) sounded like childish prattle.

Port Orange, Fla. SOUTHERN OBSERVER

Recognition of Red China

The past few issues of the FREEMAN have caused us to realize that not only is there a deliberate move under way to minimize the dangers of Communist infiltration in our government, but that the admission of Red China into the U.N. is possible.

While many people are seemingly lethargic about the dangers of communism, there are many such as we who do not know what course to follow to impress upon our government that Red China—as an aggressor—is not to supplant our ally Nationalist China in the U.N. Definite leadership of some kind is sorely needed.

BARBARA WARNOCK and DOROTHY SERRAVALLI

Floral Park, N.Y.

"Tops"

Your April 19 issue is tops. The Max Eastman review of McCarthy and His Enemies is the best one I've read so far, and I think it deserves to be reprinted by itself. I also liked Freda Utley's article on Berlin-Geneva and Argus' satire, "Rules for Red-baiting." BROOKLYN, N.Y. ABRAHAM GLICKSMAN

No Coddling

One of your editorial writers suggested the slogan, "Eggheads of the world unite—you have nothing to lose but your yokes." But what would we have if they did unite? Scrambled eggheads! No. We must smash them. They have been coddled long enough.

Delta, Utah DICK MORRISON
The Fortnight

It is surprising that the chief reaction to Vice President Nixon's off-the-record statement on Indo-China is rather about the propriety of the manner in which he made it than in what he said. That our government is in fact considering sending ground troops to fight in Indo-China is serious indeed. That our newspapers and many legislators already are considering Indo-China in terms of "another Korea" is even more serious. To think in those terms, in effect, is to think in terms of stalemate, to avoid any concept of victory, and to accede to the dreary prospect of a world in which compromise has replaced forthrightness and hope.

No matter what decisions we reach on Indo-China, it is to be hoped that they will be arrived at on some more honest basis of discussion than that of "another Korea." Beyond that problem, reaction to Nixon's statement has posed another. Russia now knows how unsure is our policy. France now knows that there is at least the hope of shoving the whole fight off onto other shoulders. It is against this troubled background, with all its political overtones, that our representatives will sit down with the Reds at Geneva. And, as though to make sure that no advantage of dissen­sion is overlooked, the Communists have loosed a new propaganda barrage telling the French that there still is a chance for "a settlement" in Indo-China. It is obvious that the Russians realize the value, to them, of "another Korea."

The suspension of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer as a security risk, pending a thorough investigation of some curious circumstances in his record, was a well warranted, if somewhat belated step. While protesting his entire loyalty, the distinguished scientist admits that over a period of years he associated with Communists, made no check on the Communist affiliations of persons whom he employed in the atomic bomb project, contributed to Communist causes. "Because of these associations...and contributions," he says, "I might well have appeared at the time as quite close to the Communist Party—perhaps even, to some people, as belonging to it." In such a vital field as atomic and hydrogen research the American people have a right to be protected against political naiveté well as against treason.

Forty years ago it might have been plausibly argued that the Communist sympathies of a distinguished scientist were a matter of no public concern. At that time there was no powerful foreign state to which a Communist sympathizer could have handed over security secrets, even if he had been so minded. The line of distinction between Communism as a legitimate heresy and an illegitimate conspiracy is fragile when matters of primary security are involved. For ideas have consequences, and in too many authenticated cases heresy has opened the door to conspiracy. The action in the Oppenheimer case and Attorney General Brownell's recommendations for stronger anti-Communist legislation are welcome indications of a new spirit of vigilance in high places. This might never have developed if it had not been for the much abused delving of congressional investigating committees.

The expected howls have gone up in the expected quarters over Senator Knowland's report of sentiment in Congress in favor of delaying until after the Geneva Conference action on appropriations for North Atlantic Treaty countries, "particularly those that have dragged their feet so far as the European Defense Community is concerned." But the longest merry-go-round ride must come to an end some time. Alliances must be two-way streets. A country cannot have it both ways, playing the role of a lukewarm neutral and collecting the subsidies which could reasonably be allotted to a wholehearted ally. So long as France continues its four-year sit-down stall on German rearmament, so long as Great Britain and France maintain an ambiguous attitude toward cooperation in resisting Communist aggression in Asia, Congress is entitled to take a long look at appropriations earmarked for these two countries.

When hard choices must be made, a nation needs a spokesman whose moral force is unimpeachable and whose wisdom is undeniable. On the matter of choosing high taxes to deficit government spending there have, by and large, been more...
voices of dissension than agreement. Now, from former President Herbert Hoover, has come the strong, sure voice we have needed. Speaking to a meeting of editors in Washington, he said: "The tax question which stands out today is whether bearing the pains of holding up taxes is worse than the greater pain of the undermining of our economic health from Government borrowing."

Mr. Hoover's answer was clear: our first duty, painful perhaps, is to meet our deficit.

The State of Texas has just enacted a law outlawing the Communist Party and providing penalties up to twenty years in prison for violations. Similar legislation has been in effect in Massachusetts, where a leading local Communist, Otis Archer Hood, has been indicted under the state law. In logic and common sense there is no reason why the Communist Party, a criminal and seditious conspiracy devoted to furthering the aims of a foreign power, should not be outlawed. It would simplify many necessary security regulations and do away with the familiar excuse: "But the Communist Party is legal." There have been two main objections to proposals for national legislation outlawing the Communist Party. The first, which possesses little validity, is that such a move would drive the party underground. But the conspiratorial segment of the party has been underground for a long time, as we know from the testimony of reformed ex-Communists like Whittaker Chambers, Elizabeth Bentley, Louis Budenz, and Benjamin Gitlow.

The second objection, which is purely one of expediency, is more serious. This is that the Communist Party could lead the authorities a merry chase through the courts by the simple device of changing its name. It could reappear as the Jeffersonian Democracy Party, with the same actors reciting the same lines. As soon as the courts caught up with the new name, another innocuous sounding camouflage would be substituted. It will be interesting to watch the results of outlawing the party in Texas, Massachusetts, and perhaps in other states. There is also a strong case for putting through the specific additional legislation requested by the Attorney General, authorizing wiretapping in cases of subversion, providing the death penalty for treason in peace time, extending the statute of limitations in disloyalty cases, and plugging other loopholes in a legal system that was framed before the Communist conspiracy reached its present dangerous state.

International harmony quickly turned into discord at a recent government luncheon given for the purpose of publicizing a new international airmail stamp. A rabbi injected a polemical note into the proceedings by speaking of Israel as the only democracy in the Near East and referring to "murders by Jordanians" and the alleged bias of the United Nations against Israel. Representatives of four Arab nations ostentatiously stalked out in protest. The affair focused attention on the difficulty of composing a troubled situation where few on either side of a harassed frontier can see any justice in the other's point of view. It also showed how the best meant plans for promoting international good will can shipwreck.

The rabbi is quoted as expressing surprise that his extemporaneous remarks had given offense. "I merely spoke in what I considered to be the spirit of the stamp," he said. Which somehow recalls the old-fashioned Irish nationalist orator who was in the habit of starting his addresses as follows: "My friends, it's a matter of great pride that in all my years of service to Old Ireland I've never uttered one unkind, uncharitable word, not even about Britons and Orangemen, tyrants, bigots, and reactionaries though they be."

Some weeks ago Anthony Eden was asked in the House of Commons how relations with Red China were coming along. He replied that those relations were far from satisfactory. To the unfortunate fellow in Peiping who went there as His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Envoy Plenipotentiary to the "People's Government of the Republic of China," it must seem that Mr. Eden was putting it mildly. We have at our elbow now a little volume in English entitled A Guide to New China. It is an official publication printed in Peiping by "The Foreign Language Press." Beginning on page 78, it lists the names, ranks, and addresses of foreign diplomats accredited to the so-called "People's Government." The British simply are not included! Apologists in Hong Kong for the British recognition of Red China, as long ago as January 6, 1950, say that the British set-up in Peiping is recognized as a "negotiating agency"; but, according to this official list, it enjoys recognition as nothing whatever. No wonder the British are so eager to have us establish a "negotiating agency" there, too. Misery loves company.

The cat who was fished out of the ocean in the harbor of Wellington, New Zealand, and given a round-the-world cruise as the ship's pet displayed the traditional feline gift for recognizing his home grounds. After resisting the allurement of a score of distant ports he deserted the ship where he had become a pet and mascot as soon as it docked at Wellington again, and went back to his war on the rats in the dock area. He furnished new proof of the adage that there is no place like home. No doubt his reaction was that of the returned soldier from a small town in southern Illinois whose views were recorded in the local newspaper under the headline: "Prefers Carmi to Paris."
The Test of Geneva

There is every prospect that the conference at Geneva will represent a much more severe test of American diplomatic firmness and skill than the earlier meeting of Foreign Ministers at Berlin.

Geneva opens under much more doubtful auspices. This meeting will place a severe strain on the durability of the American-British-French alliance. For more than four years the United States and Great Britain have been out of diplomatic step in their attitude toward Red China. Great Britain has recognized Mao Tse-tung's regime (although it has received no recognition in return).

Obsessed with the delusion that Red China (which has squeezed out the British firms that tried to continue business activities) represents a great potential market and concerned about the fate of Hong Kong, the British government did not modify its position even after Chinese Communists attacked British and other U. N. troops in Korea. Here is a made-to-order breach between the United States and Great Britain which Molotov, as advance Soviet press comments indicate, will do everything in his power to widen and exploit.

Still more complicated is the position of France. What is America's stake in this distant part of Asia? By this time we should know that every time any area anywhere falls under Communist rule, so much manpower, so many natural resources automatically deployed against us. A passive, of folded hands in the face of this steady build-up of an empire that already controls one third of the population of the world would be like postponing a necessary operation until it becomes extremely dangerous, perhaps fatal.

And Indo-China is not an isolated area. The prestige of a Communist victory there would have swift repercussions in neighboring Siam and Burma and Malaya. Should the whole of Southeast Asia go, the economic position of Japan, already precarious, would become almost hopeless because of Japanese dependence on the raw materials and export markets of this region. Failure to act effectively now to save Indo-China means, almost as certainly as anything can be foreseen, the necessity to act later, against greater odds and less favorable conditions.

President Eisenhower seemed to recognize this crisis and apparently sent Mr. Dulles to England primed to prepare the way for a forceful and unyielding position on the part of the United States, Britain, and France at Geneva. Judging from what has been reported of that brief preparatory visit, out much success, to seal off the more productive areas, such as the delta of the Red River, against guerrilla infiltration.

The Indo-Chinese anti-Communist nationalists have been lukewarm because they distrust French assurances of ultimate liberation. In contrast to Korea, where the United States had no past, present, or future desire to rule the country, the issue of colonialism has compromised the struggle in Indo-China. For some time there has been a strong mood in France in favor of getting out of Indo-China on any terms that could be represented as honorable. The war has already cost France far more than any conceivable benefits from a preferred trade and investment position in what is an economically retarded country.

There is grave danger of the war being completely lost if the French should pull out before strong, well-equipped native forces, with suitable training and leadership, could be organized to take up the fight. That is why Indo-China has been occupying so much of the attention of the National Security Council, why President Eisenhower has spoken with increasing gravity of the consequences of defeat, why Secretary Dulles is trying to create some machine for united international action against Communist seizure of the country.

For more than four years the United States and Great Britain have been occupying so much of the attention of the National Security Council, why President Eisenhower has spoken with increasing gravity of the consequences of defeat, why Secretary Dulles is trying to create some machine for united international action against Communist seizure of the country.
it was not reassuring. Mr. Dulles had scarcely
got off the plane before he was talked out of his
proposal to issue a stern pre-conference warning
to Peiping against further aggression. In its
place he agreed to a suggestion by Mr. Eden to
examine the possibility of a Southeast Asian NATO
—furthermore, one excluding Nationalist China and
the Republic of Korea, both of which have a
vital interest in opposing Communism in Asia.

This and other minor concessions by Mr. Dulles
may be wise, in spite of our dim view of what
has transpired these last few days. He may have
extracted promises of which we cannot yet have
knowledge. It seems more likely, however, that
he has succumbed, as so many of his predecessors
in the diplomatic field have, to the blandishments
and maneuvers of the adroit and experienced
British and French. Compromise is not possible at
Geneva. Once more, perhaps for the last time, we
have the opportunity to state our position, stand
firm, leave the conference if our elementary
demands for an uncompromising policy in Indo-China
and an acceptable peace in Korea are not adhered
to promptly. We see no reason for Mr. Dulles to
waste his time in futile talk in foreign cities.

Hydrogen Hysteria

There is an awesome quality about the unprece-
dented destructive power unleashed by the hydrogen
bomb explosions in the Pacific. Here is a formid-
able new link in the long chain of violence that
started with World War One forty years ago.
Out of this tremendous slaughter emerged not
Wilson's dream of universal democracy and an
international association of nations capable of
preventing war, but an infernal cycle of violent
revolutions and totalitarian governments. This, in
turn, produced a second world war, more terrible
than the first, and waged with methods of un-
precedented ferocity by both sides.
Out of World War Two came the atomic bomb.
Out of the arms race that was an inevitable part
of the cold war has come the hydrogen bomb. How
and when this infernal cycle will or can be broken
is not clear, especially when one third of the
population and one fifth of the resources of the
globe are at the service of a ruthless and expand-
ing totalitarian empire.

However, there is no excuse for the hydrogen
hysteria that broke out in the House of Commons,
so often recommended as a model to the American
Congress, and that finds occasional individual ex-
pression in this country. A good example of the
latter was a long letter published by Mr. Lewis
Mumford in a recent issue of the Sunday New York
Times, calling for "Love Malenkov" as a substitute
for further experiments with atomic weapons.

A very brief examination shows that the courses
of action recommended by people who have let the
hydrogen bomb drive them into a state of panic
are worse than futile. Is there the slightest pos-
sibility, on the basis of the known record, that
unilateral stoppage of research by the United
States would cause similar action by the Soviet
Union? There is not.

The British Parliament, although there is a
small Conservative majority, passed a Laborite
resolution calling for "top-level" talks on the sub-
ject of the bomb between Eisenhower, Malenkov,
and Churchill. Is there the slightest possibility,
on the basis of the known record, that such talks
would or could lead to anything except surrender,
as at Yalta and Potsdam, or deadlock, as at the
more recent Berlin Conference? There is not.

Finally, there has been the proposal, put for-
ward in the Disarmament Commission of the U.N.
by Great Britain with the support of the United
States and France, for private disarmament dis-
cussions with the Soviet government. All such
discussions in the past have foundered on Soviet
objection to the essential principle of mutual
thorough inspection. But is it not time to face
the hard truth—that there is no such thing as
foolproof inspection, that any disarmament agree-
ment, given bad faith and bad will on one side,
can be evaded?

Only recently Secretary Dulles charged that there
have already been more than forty violations of the
Korean armistice, which is supposed to be
under international supervision. Would the Amer-
ican people ever trust their national security,
perhaps their national existence, to Malenkov's or
Molotov's signature on an international arms
limitation convention, even if this did offer some
reassuring phrase about mutual inspection? Not
unless they had lost their wits.

The logic of the situation is to perfect our own
strength and knowledge in the use of these fear-
ful weapons, in the certainty that the enemy is
doing the same, to concentrate on defense as well
as offensive preparations—and to be thankful that
the latest demonstrations of the hydrogen bomb's
destructive power have been in the Pacific, not in
Siberia.

Struggle and conflict between the vast Com-
munist empire and the peoples that wish to
remain free are inevitable. Mutually suicidal
methods of waging war are not. Perhaps Winston
Churchill had a prophetic hunch when he recently
remarked: "It may be that when the advance of
destructive weapons enables everyone to kill every-
body else, no one will want to kill anybody at all."

Meanwhile, the safest position for the United
States in the atomic arms race is to remain in
the lead. Sentimental pleas to stop further re-
search or to take the Soviet word at its face value
on schemes of limitation and prohibition only make
a grim situation worse.
The Unofficial Plebiscites

America, one continually hears, must ride with the tide of history, change its ways, and begin to compete “progressively” in the market place of ideas if it is to win “the battle for men’s minds” against Soviet Russia. Thus, it sometimes is said, we are losing the propaganda war because we simply cannot compete with the Utopian baits held out by the Communists. If we do not set everything straight here at home, the argument goes, we just cannot win friends abroad. It has not, apparently, been convenient for the backers of that position to relate the position to facts. If they did, they would observe one of the most compelling truths of our time—that America, and America just the way she is, remains overwhelmingly the favored land of hope and opportunity for all who wish to strike out and begin a new life, and that there is a tremendous and uniform movement of people, often at great hardship and even at the risk of their lives, away from countries which are ruled by Communists.

These massive facts often are obscured by headlines that deal only with details, such as the individual defections which recently have brought to the sanctuary of the free world Soviet diplomats from Japan and Australia. These individual defections are impressive and valuable, but they are not the whole story. That may be better conveyed if we consider eight major tests of the drawing power of the Communist countries versus America.

Test Number One occurred after the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-40. The Soviet government annexed Finnish territory inhabited by about 400,000 people. They were given the option of remaining as Soviet citizens or departing as penniless emigrants to Finland. Practically all the 400,000 opted for Finland.

Test Number Two was provided by the refugee situation after the Second World War. There were in UNRRA camps in 1946 about 800,000 “DPs”—uprooted, homeless people, who stubbornly refused to go home. There were no representatives of free countries in that army of refugees; the French and Belgians and Dutch and Danes and Norwegians who were brought to Germany for war labor had gone home as fast as transportation was provided. Every one of these 800,000 registered refugees (and there were probably as many more hiding out on false papers) was a fugitive from Communism. They were Poles, Russians, and Ukrainians, Letts, Lithuanians and Estonians and Yugoslavs.

Test Number Three was the ability of the Germans during the war to raise the equivalent of twenty divisions for their army out of Soviet war prisoners and inhabitants of occupied areas.

Test Number Four was the movement of refugees in Korea. Before the war and during the war this movement was invariably away from, not toward, the Communist areas.

Test Number Five was the refusal of almost fifty thousand North Korean and Chinese war prisoners to return to Communist rule.

Test Number Six was the steady flow of fugitives, on foot, by boat, on commandeered trains and airplanes from the Iron Curtain countries, from Poland and Hungary and Czechoslovakia to the West.

Test Number Seven was the overwhelming east-west movement of Germans. During the first two months of 1953 about 70,000 East Germans, leaving behind their homes and jobs and almost all their property, crowded into West Berlin.

Side by side with this plebiscite goes another: a pathetic, desperate effort to reach the United States at any cost. The Mexican laborer in the American Southwest has not drawn one of the richer prizes of American life. But it baffles the resources of the authorities of the two countries to check the enormous influx of “wetbacks,” of illegal migrants who sometimes risk their lives swimming the Rio Grande.

If immigration is the sincerest form of flattery, America remains well at the top as a country in which people, given a choice, want to live and work. On this tremendous and undeniable contrast between the universal flight from Communism and the equally general flight toward America the United States might well be content to rest its case in the great debate that rages back and forth across the Iron Curtain.

Adlai Sounds Retreat

Adlai Stevenson is the recognized idol of the eggheads. His Godkin lectures at Harvard were delivered to capacity audiences. In some intellectual circles his critical quips are accepted as a substitute for a policy. And a few philosophical observations, cribbed from Toynbee and other rather obvious sources, pass for profound original wisdom.

But, although Stevenson may blow a silver trumpet of eloquence, that trumpet always sounds one call in foreign affairs: Retreat. The 1952 Democratic candidate has taken over the neutralist Nehru-Bevan view that the world’s troubles are largely due to American “inflexibility,” that we must be prepared to negotiate and compromise. As he put it in a typical passage in his Harvard speeches: “Compromise is not immoral or treasonable. When we negotiate we have to have something to negotiate with as well as for.”

Of course negotiation and compromise have their place in international affairs. But time and circumstances are all-important in determining when negotiation is fruitful and when compromise is distinguishable from retreat and appeasement. There would not have been much advantage in
“negotiation” and “compromise” with the Axis at the height of its power, in the summer of 1942. Unfortunately, the Moscow-Peiping Axis is in that position today.

Mr. Stevenson has been industriously cultivating the fallacy that there is some mystical virtue in merely sitting down around a conference table with the Soviet or Chinese Reds. But neither he nor anyone else can cite a single example when such conferences led to any result except deadlock or surrender on the non-Communist side.

Amid all his negative sniping at the foreign policy of the Eisenhower Administration, Stevenson never comes clean with a frank statement of what he would “negotiate with” at the conference table. He says that he does not advocate the admission of Red China to the United Nations or diplomatic recognition of the Peiping regime. What, then, would he give up? The nationalist government on Formosa? The independence of South Korea? German rearmament? On this very important subject the trumpet quavers off. The oracle is silent.

What is most disturbing in Stevenson’s speeches is the emphasis on negative notes, the absence of any will to win the cold war. The best he can offer on this point—after constant warnings not to be too rough and to take careful account of the feelings of our most neutralist “allies”—is empty generalities, of which the following is a good specimen: “Encourage, aid, and inspire the aspirations of half of mankind for a better life...guide these aspirations into paths that lead to freedom.”

Which is not of much practical help in saving Indo-China from Communist conquest. The more Adlai Stevenson speaks as a private citizen, the more reason there is for satisfaction that he is not in the White House.

Catcher in the Eye

President Eisenhower’s performance at the opening-day baseball game was not only dexterous, it was significant. When the President broke precedent to toss and then catch the first ball, it set a lot of people to thinking. In the first place, a cable from Peiping informed us, the razzle-dazzle was to divert attention to the fact that the fans from the Chinese People’s Republic couldn’t get past the bleachers. Prime Minister Nehru’s special delivery came in next. Something about an Almost-All-Asia conference on seating conditions. Nehru himself was observed sitting on a shooting stick midway between the box seats and the boards. Chap from the A.D.A. spotted the play immediately, too: Eisenhower “caught” the ball, didn’t he? McCarthy “catches” innocent Communist spies, doesn’t he? See! And if the Yankees win again, we hope Mr. Brownell will prefer anti-trust charges.

Just Print Enough Money

Once upon a time there lived in the congenial atmosphere of California a good hearted, mushy-minded lady of great wealth named Kate Crane Gartz. She had an assorted variety of ill-digested extreme left-wing ideas and an irrepressible urge for self-expression. Her favorite diversion was writing what she was pleased to call “letters of protest” to everyone, from the President of the United States to the local politicos of California, who had incurred her displeasure by some action or inaction.

Ultimately, these letters were published in book form by the author’s expense, and distributed among a limited audience of Mrs. Gartz’s friends and admirers. The gist of one of Mrs. Gartz’s numerous epistles to Herbert Hoover (it was a strictly one-way correspondence) was:

Dear Mr. President:

There is such an easy way out of this depression. Just print enough money so that everyone would have ten thousand dollars. Then there would be no depression.

One suspects that neither mathematics nor economics was a strong point in the author’s educational background. Otherwise even such an ardent crusader as Mrs. Gartz might have balked at the consequences of injecting $1,500,000,000 of new currency into the national financial bloodstream.

This artless venture in amateur economics is worth recalling because a period of recession always brings a spate of crackpot alleged remedies which would aggravate the disease rather than cure it. One such proposal is to force up wages in the face of declining consumer demand, notably by raising the minimum wage. This has the support of the A.F.L. and the C.I.O.

This suggestion is not as fantastic as the printing of unlimited amounts of money. But, despite its plausible appeal, it would almost certainly have the effects of diminishing, not increasing purchasing power, of increasing, not reducing unemployment. An artificially decreed rise in the wage level in a time of tighter competition would be a sentence of death for marginal undertakings which are barely keeping their heads above water at present cost levels (in which wages, of course, are an important element). It would be a sentence of dismissal for many marginal, “expansible” workers.

The most hopeful antidotes to depression are tax reduction and elimination or alleviation of the many features of our fiscal legislation which tend to penalize and discourage private investment of risk capital. If one may paraphrase an old Scotch proverb, “Look out for the pennies and the pounds will look after themselves,” it would be sound to say: “Look out for the incentives and the jobs will look after themselves.”
Investigation and Civil Liberty

By C. DICKERMAN WILLIAMS

The current hurly-burly over the Army-McCarthy affair has revived consideration of possible alternatives to congressional investigations into subversive activities. One such alternative, frequently advanced, is a commission of eminent jurists and lawyers modeled on the Royal Commission which so successfully investigated espionage in Canada a few years ago.

It is certainly to be recognized that our methods do not create an atmosphere of dignity and decorum. The accusation most vigorously leveled against congressional committees, both here and abroad, is, however, that they deny civil liberty and have brought about semi-fascist conditions in this country. Before we discard our present institutions in favor of those of Canada it is appropriate to examine the powers and procedures of the Canadian Royal Commission with special reference to what we generally accept as principles of civil liberty.

What is a Royal Commission? According to the Commission on Espionage, it is

"... a primary institution, though of a temporary kind, and... upon a formal equality with the other institutions of the State such as the Courts, Houses of Parliament and Privy Council... It is independent in every sense. It is not subject to, or under the control of, the Courts... Its report is not subject to review by any Court, and, as it is the sole judge of its own procedure, and may receive evidence of any kind in its discretion, it is sometimes in a better position than a Court subject to strict rules as to the admissibility of evidence, to ascertain facts."

The Commission on Espionage was created by an Order-in-Council of February 5, 1946. Its members were two justices of the Supreme Court of Canada, Robert Taschereau and R. L. Kellock. The Commission was supplied with a staff including officers of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and lawyers, as well as clerks, stenographers, etc. The Order-in-Council explained the need for the Commission as follows:

"It has been ascertained that agents of a Foreign Power have been engaged in a concerted effort to obtain from public officials and other persons in positions of trust secret and confidential information.

The Commission moved quickly. On February 14, 1946, it arrested and imprisoned twelve suspects. One was a British national, and consent to her arrest had been granted on the same day by the British High Commissioner to Canada. At the time of their arrests no charges were made against any of the suspects for the very good reason that the Commission lacked evidence sufficient to warrant charges. The imprisonment was not for purposes of punishment, as they had been convicted of no crime, nor to assure presence at trial, as they had not been accused of anything. As the Commission explained in its report, the objective was partly to prevent the suspects from committing crimes in the future, and partly to make sure that their evidence was available for the Commission's investigation. The Commission thought that if the suspects had been at large, "it would have hampered the work of the Commission."

No Privilege against Self-Incrimination

The imprisonment, or "detention," as it was euphemistically characterized by the Commission, was originally incommunicado, although eventually those held were permitted limited access to legal counsel. With the suspects thus continuously and readily available the Commission examined them at length. The suspects were permitted no privilege against self-incrimination. Nor did the Commission believe it necessary to warn the suspects that what they said might be used against them. The Commission observed that the purpose of a warning is to enable the witness to remain silent if he so chooses; it reasoned that there was no point in such a warning when the examiner proposed to disregard the privilege against self-incrimination. Although testimony of some of the suspects incriminated other suspects, the latter were not allowed to cross-examine those who implicated them; in fact they were not even permitted to be present.

The Commission's way of obtaining documentary evidence was also forceful. The Canadian Mounted Police searched the homes of the suspects and seized whatever evidence of espionage they found. No one bothered about search warrants.

Under these circumstances— indefinite imprisonment, prohibition of communication with friends and counsel, denial of the privilege against self-incrimination and rights of cross-examination— most of the suspects confessed. Two did not, but
simply refused to testify. Since the recalcitrants were already in jail, the only thing the Commission could do about their refusals was to keep them there. Enough confessed, however, to satisfy the Commission of the existence and nature of a widespread Communist espionage network.

These procedures were a key feature and not an insignificant detail of the work of the Commission, and to them the Commission's Report largely attributed the success of the investigation. In support of this conclusion the Commission pointed out that when several of the suspects who had testified freely in its investigation were subsequently released and “had the opportunity of discussing matters with others and receiving instructions from others,” they refused to testify at criminal trials that followed the Commission's investigation.

One may ask, what of the Bill of Rights? What of that protection of the individual which is the cornerstone of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence?

As the Commission put it: “The disclosure of secret or confidential information to a foreign power is a subject which is not regarded either here or in England as on a level with what may be called ordinary domestic offenses.” The Commission elaborately expounded this thesis with many references to and quotations from statutes and judicial opinions, and went to the trouble of demonstrating that in so far as the detection and punishment of espionage are concerned the traditional Bill of Rights does not apply in Canada. Salus populi suprema lex and the reasonable implications of the theory are the law in Canada, declared the Royal Commission, and they practiced what they preached. The Commission was at pains to show, incidentally, by frequent citation of statute and judicial opinion, that the law of Great Britain was the same.

The Question of “Smearing”

Congressional committees in this country are often accused of “smearing” by making derogatory reports and statements that injure reputations, although in finding facts they do not observe the safeguards of judicial procedures. The number of such reports has been somewhat exaggerated, but it is undoubtedly true that congressional committees have not hesitated to condemn those whom they have investigated. Such condemnations were especially characteristic of the congressional investigations conducted by the New Dealers, which, according to Harold J. Laski, were inspired by President Roosevelt. A notable example is the shipping investigation run by Justice (then Senator) Hugo L. Black, rewarded by his appointment to the Supreme Court.

The Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage does not suggest that investigation by commission will prevent such “smearing.” Despite its failure to follow rules of judicial procedure and the ex parte and in many instances hearsay character of its evidence, the Commission dogmatically found “that the following public officials and other persons in positions of trust or otherwise have communicated, directly or indirectly, secret and confidential information. . . . to the agents of a foreign power,” naming fourteen individuals. Such conduct constituted a violation of the Canadian Official Secrets Act. Four were named as “media of communication between espionage agents,” also in violation of the Official Secrets Act. Three additional individuals were said not to have taken “any active part in the subversive activities but would have done so if required”—such willingness apparently not being a crime.

Reputations Were Damaged

All fourteen of those said to have betrayed their trust were subsequently prosecuted. Eight were convicted; six were acquitted. Of the four “media of communication” two were tried and acquitted; in one instance the Crown withdrew the prosecution prior to verdict; in the other the Crown did not prosecute at all. Thus in ten cases there was a conflict between the results of judicial and Commission procedure; the same individuals were held innocent by one and guilty by the other. If the thesis be accepted that only judicial procedures can correctly arrive at facts, these ten were unjustly smeared. On the other hand the eminent judges who composed the Commission thought that because they were not bound by the rules of evidence in judicial proceedings, they were better able to arrive at facts. In any event severe damage was done to the reputations of people who could not be shown in a court of law to have committed any crime.

Two of those acquitted were Squadron Leader F. W. Poland and Professor Israel Halperin. Poland and Halperin, withstanding the pressure of imprisonment and isolation, refused to confess or even to testify. The Commission thought they refused because “they had been purposefully educated to a condition of mind in which they regarded obedience to the rules of Communist bodies as their highest duty and that, if their immediate objects could be advanced by mendacity or concealment. . . . they were quite prepared for such a course.” In other words, the Commission regarded refusal to testify as showing the hardened nature of the suspect. This view suggests that the acquittals were due not to the innocence of these suspects but to their greater degree of guilt.

It is frequently argued against congressional investigations that when followed by criminal trials, the defendant is at a disadvantage because the jurors have been prejudiced by reading of the investigation in the newspapers. Alistair Cooke pressed this point in *A Generation on Trial*, describing the prosecution of Alger Hiss. Yet which would
lead to the greater prejudice: a report by two justices of the Supreme Court, or public hearings before a congressional committee? It can hardly be doubted that their greater experience in weighing evidence and their detachment from political motivation and conflict would lend the greater weight to a report by judges. The subsequent acquittal of so many of those who had been definitely found by the Commission to have violated the Official Secret Acts indicates that the prejudicial effect of congressional hearings is minimal.

Another criticism of congressional investigations is that committee members bully witnesses. Senator McCarthy's rudeness to General Zwicker aroused indignation in many quarters. But that indignation could not have been aroused if stenographic minutes had not been kept and made public. The Commission made public only selected excerpts from its interrogations. Although we may assume that the justices themselves were never rude, it is conceivable that the lawyers or Mounted Police of the Commission's staff were on occasion rude to some of the suspects. But because the full minutes have never been released the public has no basis for indignation. It is fair to say that, taking the United States as a whole, there have been a few months several, perhaps numerous occasions on which police officers have spoken rudely to private citizens in greater need of protection than General Zwicker, who was not without powerful champions. Yet there has been no protest, if for no other reason than that the evidence was not available. All this is not to excuse Senator McCarthy's discourtesy to General Zwicker, but to demonstrate that the publicity of congressional investigations provides a major safeguard against oppression, a safeguard not available in investigations such as those conducted by the Royal Commission of Canada or by the ordinary police.

Effectiveness through Sacrifice of Civil Liberty

An additional criticism of congressional investigations is that on the whole they have not been effective. Compared with the Royal Commission they have not turned up many who could be shown in a court of law to be spies. A possible answer to this criticism is that congressional committees have not had the legal and other equipment available to the Royal Commission. If they had the Mounted Police (who, according to the Report, worked "day and night"), powers of indefinite imprisonment, the rights to disregard the plea of self-incrimination and to conduct proceedings in secret and to make public only such testimony as they pleased, it is possible that the committees would be considerably more effective, especially since the success of the Royal Commission was so largely based on confessions.

It is readily apparent that the advantages of the Commission were achieved at a sacrifice of civil liberty. If we chose to surrender individual rights in favor of collective safety, as have the Canadians and the British, we would probably have better rooted out Communist infiltration and espionage, and moreover, we would have done so without the turmoil that our present methods have caused.

The enthusiasm of so many of the liberal intelligentsia for the Commission strongly suggests that they are indifferent to methods, provided they do not have to know the painful details of their operation.

The intelligent and sincere champion of civil liberty, although freely critical of individual members of Congress, nevertheless realizes that the ill-temper and exaggeration which are the inevitable concomitants of dealing with controversial matters in the open are more compatible with civil liberty than dealing with them in secret. So also a furore over the privilege against self-incrimination is better than no privilege at all, and the subpoenaing of suspects than their imprisonment. In short, he does not confuse the shadow with the substance.

And although he is shocked at the procedures permitted by the laws of Great Britain and Canada and is determined to adhere to our own constitutional protections, the true civil libertarian will recognize that ultimate wisdom has not been confined to the United States, and that Great Britain and Canada are civilized countries entitled to do things their own way. Consequently, his comment on the methods employed by Great Britain and Canada may include expression of regret at their retreat from the Bill of Rights but not a proposal that we pay them the flattery of imitation.

Eastward, Ho!

The Kremlin declared its willingness to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but the Western powers quickly rejected the idea. Sounds like a poor deal. Why not welcome Soviet Russia into NATO but demand that, in return, we be admitted into the Cominform?

Dispatches from Moscow report an acute shortage of ironing boards. The idea is that if anything has to be ironed out, the police will do it.

The followers of the party line in this country complain that, because of the atmosphere of fear and suspicion, noted scientists refuse to work on important atomic projects. Shouldn't the Comrades be happy about that?

Will someone please tell us why the Communists fight for freedom only in free countries?
Exchange Controls Must Go

By WILHELM ROEPKE

Erroneous monetary policies and illusions about the E.P.U. prevent European governments from returning to free convertibility, which is essential to the revival of healthy international economic relations.

Throughout monetary history exchange control has been almost unknown. Only occasionally has an exceptionally ruthless ruler—like Philip the Fair in early medieval France—tried it with some measure of success. The classical economists, such as Ricardo and Say, declared it impossible because they assumed people would never permit the state to impose on them the degree of slavery that an efficient system of exchange control implies. It is logical, therefore, that it was realized substantially only after the Bolsheviks took power in Russia in 1917. From there it spread in the early thirties to central Europe, together with the police state which is requisite to it.

When, during World War Two, exchange control was adopted by nearly all countries along with the other concepts of total war, it was assumed it would be abolished when the war was over. This belief was certainly implied by the Bretton Woods Agreement, though it is in flat contradiction to the whole inflationary and collectivist ideology behind that agreement. Almost ten years have now elapsed since the cessation of hostilities, and exchange control is still the practice of the overwhelming majority of countries. There are few today in the free countries who would openly defend this barrier governments have put up around their national systems of money, trade, and production. They do so rather by declaring a return to convertibility “premature,” by warning against a “rush to convertibility,” by setting conditions that would make it impossible, or by so distorting the concept itself that it becomes as empty as that of democracy behind the Iron Curtain. This has proved a highly efficient way of making sure nothing is done to abolish exchange control.

The reluctance to defend exchange control openly is quite comprehensible. For by now almost everyone understands exactly what it means—not only red tape and intrusion upon the most elementary rights of men but also intolerable disorder in international trade. To the extent that the working machinery of exchange control has been made subtler and smoother and its more flagrant aspects mitigated, the latter consequence has become even more important than the former. Without removal of exchange control (it is a pity that instead of this soft and ambiguous expression there is no English equivalent for the strong and straightforward German expression, Devisen-Zwangswirtschaft—coercive economy of exchanges) there is no possibility of reconstructing an international trade system worthy of the name. Without free convertibility there can be no world-wide multilateral trade; without world-wide multilateral trade there will be no world economy. Without free convertibility of currencies, there is no prospect whatever of reviving international capital movements and investments, but without this revival no world system of economic relations and development is conceivable.

Two Maladies of the E.P.U.

But have we not already gone far on the road to general convertibility? What about the European Payments Union? Is it not the answer to the problem, at least for a large and important part of the world?

In the United States as in Europe many people, more well-meaning than well-informed, view the E.P.U. with the same tenderness as the Schuman Plan, that is, as one of the many wonderful achievements in what is confusedly called European economic integration. Unfortunately, the situation is quite different from what they imagine. E.P.U., for example, far from being a step toward convertibility, actually presumes the continuance of the exchange control systems of its member countries, at least for payments within the E.P.U. area. It is true that the arrangement was created to serve as a makeshift until full convertibility could be restored. Its very purpose was to make itself superfluous. However, human nature and institutions being what they are, it was unlikely from the outset that the E.P.U. would work for its own extinction.

The very concept and nature of the E.P.U. defeats any hopes that it might open the door to convertibility of currencies. By offsetting the deficits and surpluses of the balance of payments between the member states, it has undeniably rendered a great service in re-establishing multilateral trade within this bloc and removing the larger part of quantitative import controls (always with the exception of exchange control). However, from the beginning it was inevitable that the E.P.U. would be afflicted with two diseases, one perhaps curable,
the other not because it is inherent in the constitution of the plan. The first was a lack of monetary discipline on the part of several important members so great as to jeopardize the minimum equilibrium among them all that the working of such a payments scheme implies. The countries with reckless monetary and fiscal policies and internal inflationary pressure would go on living beyond their means, while the others would be compelled, by the mechanism of the E.P.U., continuously to fill the gap in the balance of payments the spendthrifts engineered by their inflationary and collectivist policies of "cheap money," "full employment," and what not. The E.P.U. would then be split into one group of "excessive" debtor countries contriving by their own policies a permanent passive balance of payments and another group of "excessive" creditor countries footing the bill.

Creditor and Debtor Countries

Theoretically, this disease of the E.P.U. could, as I said, be cured. But in spite of various efforts to do so, it is now worse than ever. Those countries that always stood for or found their way back to economic balance and discipline have long since emerged as the involuntary bankers of the E.P.U.: Switzerland, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, and, less markedly, Sweden and Portugal. For most of these countries the sums involved are enormous, and the moment is near when they must stem this mounting tide. Two of these countries, Germany and Austria, were the ones most severely devastated by the war and its consequences. Since Germany is now the main victim of the payments plan, her impatience with it and her insistence on a return to convertibility is comprehensible.

The permanent creditor countries are, in addition, victims of this system on another score. The debtor countries, instead of removing the internal inflationary pressures that are causing a deficit in their balance of payments, try to restore the balance by restricting imports from the creditor countries. At the same time the latter are exhorted to open their gates as widely as possible to all E.P.U. countries (discriminating thereby all the more against the dollar area). What this amounts to is using the variations in the degree of "liberalization" and "deliberalization" (import restrictions in the name of collectivist "austerity") for restoring the equilibrium of the balance of payments. Normally, the balance of payments is regulated by changes in the discount rate of the Central Banks. This policy has been replaced by the so-called "liberalization program," with the deficits or surpluses of a country with the E.P.U. arbitrarily dictating the discount rate.

Nobody outside Europe can have an adequate idea of the absurd and increasingly unbearable consequences of this vicious system. One occurred recently in connection with Germany's offer to repay her debt to Switzerland, which had been long awaited. But Switzerland feels compelled to restrict this repayment severely in order to avoid an undue increase of her credits in the E.P.U., for which the Swiss taxpayer must pay. Another absurdity is that the more extreme the creditor and debtor positions are, the more the E.P.U. increases its gold reserves, since debtor countries have to pay their full deficits in gold, whereas the creditor countries can take out only 50 per cent of their surpluses in gold, the other half going into the treasury of the E.P.U.

An answer to the pertinent question as to how the debtor countries are able to pay their deficits in gold is that, to a considerable extent, the gold comes in various forms (grants-in-aid, offshore purchases, etc.) from the United States, without whose continuous contributions the whole system would long since have ceased to work. Another is that some debtor countries are already nearly at the end of their tether. The worst case is that of socialist Norway, which now sets her last hopes on the World Bank to bail her out once more so that she may go on with such projects as building steel works in the Polar circle. Meantime she retains the inflationary interest rate of 2 per cent.

Discrimination Against the Dollar Area

In the highly improbable case that all members of the E.P.U. would adopt the sound course of the creditor countries, there would still be the incurable disease of the E.P.U. Were there even a greater balance between the member states, the lack of balance between the bloc as a whole and the rest of the world would remain. This cannot be removed because it is inherent in the system itself—unless we take seriously the utopian eventuality of extending the E.P.U. into a payments union of the whole world. Some countries of the E.P.U. have, by the natural structure of their foreign trade, an excess with E.P.U. countries and a deficit with the rest of the world; others have a deficit with E.P.U. countries and a surplus with the rest of the world. Germany is the chief example of the former, Italy an example of the latter. It is not possible to offset these surpluses and deficits, as they are normal in a world-wide multilateral trade system with freely convertible currencies.

The E.P.U. is a regional monetary bloc, with all the evil consequences of such a bloc, including in particular the discriminatory treatment of countries outside it. The main sufferer is the dollar area. Much as a country like West Germany may wish to free American imports from restrictions to the same extent as European imports, she is hampered by the shackles of the
E.P.U. With only half of her monthly surplus from the E.P.U. convertible into gold or dollars and therefore available for purchases from the dollar area, the more she liberalizes American imports the more her position as an extreme creditor country of the E.P.U. would be aggravated, since then she would import even less from E.P.U. countries (while probably exporting more to them).

If this discrimination against the dollar area is to end, the present system of regional monetary blocs, of which the E.P.U. is the most important, must be replaced by a return to freely convertible currencies. There is some irony in the fact that the United States is becoming more interested in such a course. Until quite recently the notion of “scarce currencies” (with the “dollar shortage” as its main example) has confused the issue on both sides of the Atlantic. Throughout the first postwar years the Europeans were exorted to “save dollars” by buying as much as possible from each other. That was called “European economic integration.” If it should now be recognized that this is little else than a name for a discriminatory bloc, for autarky and planning on a continental scale, and for lifting the problems of bilateralism to an intracontinental level, that will be a step forward of benefit to all concerned.

**Essence of the Problem**

I have explained in detail the imbroglio of the E.P.U., even at the risk of seeming too technical, because only thus can the imperative necessity of a return to genuine and free convertibility be fully seen. The greatest obstacles to that return today are the illusions about the E.P.U. and the tendency to muddle on, together with vast vested interests in the status quo. That is why the emphasis must now be on the side of convertibility.

In order to achieve this a good many technical complications must be overlooked, and we must get down to the simple essence of the problem. We have inconvertible currencies because we have exchange controls. Exchange control, however, is merely a policy that defends by police force a disequilibrium on the exchange market which would not exist without erroneous monetary and fiscal policies of the national governments. Change these policies, and you can remove exchange control and thus make your currency freely convertible again. Avoid inflation, restore the “good will” of your currency, use the instruments of credit policy in order to contract or expand the volume of money as equilibrium requires, make the climate hospitable to capital, do not live beyond your means, and, if necessary, adjust your exchange rate so that it becomes a true expression of the real purchasing power of your currency, in which case the balance of payments and the exchange market will look after themselves.

Convertibility begins with the right monetary policy for each national government. It requires that the collectivist controls of foreign trade which put the balance of payments into the Procrustean bed of unsound internal policies be replaced by the well-tested classical instruments of a balance of payments policy as outlined above. The collectivist “austerity” of forbidding the importation of things the consumer likes to have must be superseded by the liberal “austerity” of adjusting the volume of money and incomes to the real resources of the country.

**Countries Must Act Independently**

There is, therefore, no reason why the return to convertibility should be sought by international conferences, agreements, and institutions. As exchange control has been introduced independently by each individual country it surely can be removed in the same way if only the governments also rid themselves of the wrong internal policies to which exchange control corresponds. Every country is “ripe” for convertibility that earnestly wants to fulfill its conditions.

The example of Canada proves it can be done. There, on December 14, 1951, the government decreed “that effective immediately all foreign exchange controls are being terminated.” That was all there was to it. Since then, the Canadian public has been permitted to hold foreign currencies and to dispose of them in any manner it sees fit.

Unfortunately, present conditions in the countries of Europe are not quite so favorable to this single solution. Belgium and West Germany have, by their efforts in monetary discipline, hardened their currencies to such a degree that they could seriously consider the return to free convertibility (in the case of Germany at least on current account until the Sperrmark bloc has been unfrozen). Other European countries, like the Netherlands, Austria, and Denmark, are not far from this stage. But none of them would dare to take the initiative because of the tangle created by the E.P.U. All know that the E.P.U. has to be replaced by freely convertible currencies, but all are waiting for leadership and common action.

The spell would be broken at once if Great Britain would restore convertibility. Since that is today even less likely than a year ago, must the continental countries wait indefinitely for convertibility? Each country can, of course, progressively dismantle its system of exchange control, after the Swiss pattern of a lopsided convertibility that is compatible with the working of the E.P.U. The countries in question have already made considerable advances in this respect. But then the question arises as to what to do with the E.P.U., which cannot operate indefinitely.

To this end, the main creditor countries of the E.P.U. should agree on a plan for common action, preferably in consultation with Great Britain and
the United States, with a view to forming a nucleus of free convertibility among themselves and with the dollar area. Meantime they would continue their payments relations with the other countries through E.P.U. and, at the same time, insist on more severe conditions for the debtor countries within that group. This would make the

E.P.U. and the reckless policies of the debtor countries less attractive and in time allow the E.P.U. to peter out. Thus the present deadlock could be overcome in the most gentle fashion. The hope does not seem unwarranted, and this project would also stimulate Great Britain into action and bring the United States into closer cooperation.

The Risk in Hawaiian Statehood

By HAROLD LORD VARNEY

Hawaii’s gallant nineteen-year fight for statehood is again threatened with disappointment. Kamaainas who were getting out their victory leis for the celebration are now talking sadly about another year. If Hawaii loses this time, the cause will be found in many crisscrossing Washington political factors. But underscoring the opposition has been one persistent issue which would not down. That issue is Communism.

In the final Senate debate, the dwindling opponents of statehood dampened the assurance of the majority by their recital of an appalling list of facts indicating unhealthy Communist strength in the Territory. The Senate chose to ignore these disclosures, but after the vote, it was apparent that a calculated risk had been taken. Some of the facts are:

1. That 26,000 of Hawaii’s wage earners, with tight job control over the Territory’s sugar and pineapple plantations and over inter-island transportation, are disciplined members of Harry Bridges’ International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union (I.L.W.U.) under the local rule of Jack Hall, a convicted Communist, at liberty on bail. During the six years since the C.I.O. expelled the I.L.W.U. as Communist-controlled, the 26,000 have clung faithfully to Bridges and Hall in the face of repeated A.F.L. and C.I.O. efforts to annex them.

2. That approximately 2,000 Territorial employees, some of them in sensitive jobs, are enrolled in another of the unions expelled because of Communist control, the United Public Workers.

3. That the voting power of these 28,000 and their families could conceivably give the political balance of power to the Communists in the election of Hawaii’s first two United States senators.

Jack Hall and his henchmen have discreetly kept in the background in the present statehood campaign, but on a previous occasion Hall sounded off unmistakably on his plans for statehood. “Do not forget,” he told his followers, “we are aching for statehood, and then we will be able to elect our governor and our judges, and we will have control of the police.”

There is nothing chimerical about these Communist Party hopes. Already, the I.L.W.U. has established strong beachheads in the Hawaiian Democratic Party. American-minded Democrats have tried to block them, but there are others who have welcomed them.

One of these beachheads is the Mayor’s office in Honolulu. Octogenarian Mayor John H. Wilson actually appeared at a Jack Hall defense rally, and was a character witness for Hall at his trial later. The Mayor’s administrative assistant, W. K. Bassett, a former editor of a pro-Communist newspaper in California, acted as a reception committee to greet Harry Bridges when the latter visited Honolulu in 1952, after his own San Francisco conviction as a Communist. So potent is the Hall faction in Hawaii’s Democratic Party that, according to the report of the Hawaii Commission on Subversive Activities, “Forty-one Communist Party members had credentials in the 1948 Territorial Democratic convention,” five of them members of the executive board of the Hawaiian Communist Party.

Such infiltration would not be a matter of deep concern were the Republican lead in the islands copper-riveted. All discussions of statehood start with the postulate that the election of two Republican senators, after admission, is certain. But this is purely conjectural. At this moment, island politicians would certainly make book on the G.O.P., but if there were a sudden national swing back to the Democrats, the Republican margin would be much too slim for comfort.

In the 1952 election, in the face of the Eisenhower landslide, Republican Delegate Joseph R.
Farrington won by a majority of only 9,303 out of a total Territorial vote of 126,193. His opponent, significantly, was former Judge Delbert E. Metzger—the famous bail reducer in the 1951 Communist case. Judge Metzger later traveled 6,000 miles to New York to accept an award from the National Lawyers' Guild, named as the "legal mouthpiece" of the Communist Party by Attorney General Brownell on August 27, 1953. That such an I.L.W.U. favorite should come so close to victory in 1952 after Hall and his six comrades had been indicted as Communists was ominous. In fact, in 1946, Delegate Farrington himself, a dedicated anti-Communist, found it necessary to accept the support of Hall's Political Action Committee in order to win re-election.

Jack Hall's Influence on Voters

The thought of what could happen politically after statehood if Hall and his Democratic fellow-travelers made a successful demagogic racial appeal to the have-nots among the 398,377 non-Caucasians (85.2 per cent of Hawaii's total population) is a haunting specter to the statehood seekers. So far Hawaii, by its wise racial policies, has avoided racial bloc voting. But there are plenty of explosives in the disproportion of races on the Islands, and no one can predict how present tensions would work out, if statehood were instituted.

Although the great majority of the responsible people in Hawaii have long favored statehood, a few important voices have been raised against it. One is that of Walter F. Dillingham, outstanding business leader. A Republican, Mr. Dillingham has pointed out that the voting power of the Communist-led unionists is so great that both Republican and Democratic candidates for office under statehood will inevitably take a soft attitude toward Communism. Both parties will "have to appeal to them" in elections, he argued. "This is only political good sense."

Mr. Dillingham here raises the undisputed issue which is at the heart of any long-range consideration of the statehood question. That issue is the capillary attraction to politicians of both parties of a great deliverable bloc of 50,000 or so Hall-controlled votes. Hall does not need to poll a majority of Hawaii's votes to win his ends. By clever brokerage of his votes he can make certain that the anti-Communism of the candidates of both parties will be softened and emasculated. There have already been painful examples of this wooing of the I.L.W.U. vote by Territorial senators, legislators, and supervisors of both parties.

Another impressive voice is that of Judge I. M. Stainback, who was Governor of Hawaii when the Communists won their foothold there. Judge Stainback is both a former advocate of statehood and an unwitting former Communist collaborationist (he appointed Jack Hall to the Territorial Board of Public Instruction in 1945). He has learned his lesson the hard way. Judge Stainback told the Senate Committee, at the statehood hearings: "I do not think that there is any question that they [the Communist leaders] would have influence in the election of the Senators and Representatives, just as they have in the members of the Legislature."

Admittedly, such voices are a small minority in Hawaii's present clamor for statehood. Important Hawaiian spokesmen take a confident view of the Communist danger. They realize that the Communist-controlled union is still a harrowing problem, but they regard it as a receding one. They point out that the Hall-Bridges coterie reached its peak in 1946 when it almost captured the Legislature, and that its political power has been steadily subsiding ever since. The conviction of the seven Communists in the Smith Act case in 1952 was the final shattering blow, they reassure themselves. This assurance was badly shaken by the spectacle of 26,000 plantation workers and longshoremen walking out on a three-day political protest strike, following Hall's conviction. But the great majority of Hawaiians in business and the professions whom one encounters on Merchant Street these days believes unquestioningly that the Communist situation is safely in hand.

Lost Opportunity

The story of how Hawaii acquired its present formidable Communist junta is a disheartening chapter in the chronicle of America's anti-Communist fight. The business leaders who make decisions in Honolulu were elaborately forewarned against just what has happened. During the period in the late thirties, when Communism was making its first stumbling starts, they spent patient days consulting experts in labor and Communist problems who came to the islands in a steady parade through the pre-Pearl Harbor years. They considered plans and programs which were expensively drafted to forestall Communist infiltration. And then, by some strange palsy of will, they did nothing about it.

This is not to say that prominent Hawaiians of that period were any more apathetic and irresolute toward Communism than their counterparts on the mainland. The thirties was the decade of the Great Unbelief, when high-placed Americans spent more time in criticizing Martin Dies than in detecting the Alger Hisses. Hawaii was a microcosm of this national attitude.

I myself directed one of the major efforts to alert the Hawaiian public to the Communist danger between 1938 and 1940. At that time, Communism was so feeble in the islands that it could have been snuffed out like a candle by a community leadership that was realistic. The mawkish.
Eleanor Rooseveltian attitudes which had already gained some foothold among the intelligentsia and the middle classes in the islands, and which was the nourishing soil of the Communism which was to come, had not yet succeeded in driving permanent roots into the community. Everything which later burgeoned poisonously in the Territory was already existent in embryo form, but could have been stunted. The opportunity was lost.

Early Communist Cells

Jack Hall was already in Hawaii, living precariously on the McBride plantation in the outlying island of Kauai, with a handful of Japanese-American followers. At that time, he did not even have the support of Harry Bridges, but was an unpaid organizer for the now extinct Agricultural and Cannery Workers Union. In Honolulu, Prof. John E. Reinecke, one of the convicted seven of 1953, was posing as a Rooseveltian “liberal” and was maintaining a Communist cell which masqueraded under the deceptive guise of the Interprofessional Association. Other tiny Communist recruiting points were the Nuuanu bookshop of Howard Clark and the Manoa residence of a writer. The point was that every important Communist was known. A system of community control of the activities of the Communists, which would have been impossible in the mainland states, was in the grasp of Hawaii’s leaders. Unfortunately, they never employed it.

The larger task, in the thirties, was what may be described as the “war of the mind.” Under the impulsion of the New Deal in Washington, leftist ideas were seeping into the minds of island teachers, territorial employees, social workers, newspapermen, and professional workers. One memorable project of the 1938-40 effort was the drafting of a master community chart, pointing out the entrance points of all these agitational ideas, and indicating agencies and methods of refutation. Hawaii at that time was singularly free from public feeling against business in its more virulent Roosevelt-epoch form. It was the thesis of our program that, as long as no deep gap was permitted to develop between business leadership and the community, the Communism of the Hall and the Reineckes would find no nurturing soil for lodgement in Hawaii.

Able men, who have since been conspicuous in other social activities, participated in the ambitious undertaking. John W. Vandercook came to the Islands to write an inspired plea for the sugar industry. Dr. William Robinson, former President of City College, hot from his controversies with Mayor La Guardia, came to wage a stimulating public debate with exponents of progressive education who had fastened themselves upon the Hawaiian schools. Joseph Barber, John McCarten, William M. Camp, William Cogswell, Earl Welty, and Lawrence Greene turned out polemical copy. And the strategic stockpiling of metals is frankly admitted to be a price-propping operation for “sagging” markets. The U.S. taxpayer, already sagging under his global burden, must now pick up a load of lead and zinc.

Needling the News

A writer on the United Nations notes that “no problem is too small or remote for U.N. notice.” Unfortunately, almost any problem is too big and too real for an effective U.N. solution.
Will the South Secede?

By GEORGE S. SCHUYLER

The Supreme Court's promised decision on five cases dealing with racial segregation in public schools means many things, apparently, to many people. To a very few Southern legislators it means a call to arms; such as the plea for secession, if segregation is ended, made last month by a Texas state representative. To a few worried Northerners it seems to mean the possibility of widespread unrest: witness the eagerness of Northern reporters to stress every random (and rare) comment favoring segregation that comes from the South.

Actually, the end of segregation in the school system of the South is already an accomplishment that is in progress. The Supreme Court's decision might hasten the process; it scarcely could stop it. For the truth of the matter is that the South by its own enlightened efforts has made perhaps greater strides in race relations than many of the troubled "non-segregated" cities of the North. Race riots, for instance, show up today as a Northern, and not a Southern, disturbance.

In education, however, the example of the South's reaction to the end of segregation already is clear. In a New York Times survey presented last month, it was shown that between 2,000 and 3,000 Negro students now attend Southern white colleges. The number began growing significantly after a previous Supreme Court decision in 1950 held that equal educational opportunities had to be provided for all races. (The latest court consideration deliberates whether the idea shouldn't be, not simply equal facilities, but the same facilities.)

What has happened as a result of the effective ending of segregation in the colleges? Nothing at all unpleasant, the Times reports. The students eat together, study together, even go to social affairs together. And, no incidents. No secession. No riots. Not a Southern disturbance.

The South is no longer provincial nor is it Mencken's Sahara of the Bozarts. Its people have been the most mobile of Americans and readily adjusted themselves to non-segregated institutions elsewhere without becoming apoplectic. They write to and visit their kinfolk who stayed behind. Ideas are contagious.

The "institution" of lynching has vanished. Peonage has gone with the wind. Police brutality, once endemic, is now virtually extinct. The cultural gap between the two racial groups, which was wide at the turn of the century, has been narrowed by the dramatic expansion of the public school system, travel, movies, radio, and now television, to say nothing of newspapers and magazines.

Most significant has been the growing rap­orchement and cooperation between white and colored spokesmen for the "new South" since the mid-twenties. Today they labor openly and strenuously to bring their region in step with the North, East, and West. For over thirty years Southern churchwomen, white and colored, have played a powerful role in ameliorating the antagonism and misunderstanding which made for violence and injustice, and have cooperated on civic projects to an extent often not realized outside the area.

To cap all of these efforts the federal courts have been consistently hacking away at the structures and foundations of racial segregation. They have outlawed disenfranchisement, white primaries, segregation in interstate travel, residential segregation in tax-supported higher education. Then came the dramatic abandonment of racial segregation in the defense forces. Boys and girls of different colors who had gone to separate schools and been conditioned by the etiquette of Jim Crow, suddenly found themselves working, living, and fighting together in the same uniform. Do they forget these experiences when they return home?

Others, as shown, have fared similarly on Southern university campuses, and there have been neither riots nor marriages. Hitherto barred from county medical societies, Negro physicians are now widely accepted in Dixie. Where once the specter of black policemen gave whole regions the shakes, they are now viewed without comment in literally scores of Southern communities. The opportunity for assessing Southern citizens on merit alone has been fully taken.

It is a daily occurrence for Negro and white travelers to eat together in dining cars, drink in club cars, and sleep in Pullman cars, with not an untoward incident reported. Last summer Miami Beach opened all its hotels and restaurants to a Negro Baptist convention—and neither the skies nor anything else fell. The Governor of Georgia posed shaking hands with the head of the Negro Elks whom he welcomed to Atlanta. Recently a Negro football hero received the keys to a South Carolina metropolis.

Clearly, this is not the South of the professional racists. Why expect it to react as of yore: that is, as a red light on the highway of progress? It is as law-abiding and patriotic as any other section. True, a Supreme Court decision that Jim Crow education must go may evoke some shrill howls, frenzied moves, and loud threats, but who doubts that common sense will prevail? Significantly, nobody is urging defiance but only discussing evasions, which most people will ignore.

After perhaps some initial shock, the South will conclude that since black and white children play together, they can learn together: that if Negro girls can successfully mind white children in homes, they should, if qualified, be permitted to teach them in school. Any other supposition is a canard.
What is the real purpose of the Kremlin rulers in seeking more trade with non-Communist countries? Do they genuinely want to improve their relations with the West, or are the recent trade agreements just an additional Soviet attempt to undermine the free world?

The only way to answer these questions is to find out whether merchandise supplied by the West is actually indispensable to the Soviet economy. But here one must distinguish between the population and the nationalized economy of a Communist state. For the Soviet people everything is scarce and badly needed: from shoe laces to refrigerators. But if one tries to determine realistically the vital needs of the Soviet Union as the stronghold of the world Communist movement, then the list of Western goods desirable and even indispensable shrinks to two categories: strategic matériel and military secrets.

In return for such “merchandise,” Malenkov and his colleagues would be willing to pay almost any price and go to any length to meet the demands of their Western partners in trade. But since these Western goods are not for sale—at least, in theory—can any commodities at all be purchased whose importance to the Soviet economy would induce the Politburo to go halfway in meeting Western demands? If we are not influenced by wishful thinking, the answer is No.

Today the territory open to Communist economic exploitation extends from the Elbe River to the jungles of Indo-China. Of the people in these countries all but a few million of the Communist elite experience acute hardships in the struggle for existence. But the only consideration that matters to the men in the Kremlin is whether the territory can fulfill its role as the stronghold of world Communism without any outside assistance. From this point of view the Communist-dominated territory is almost completely self-sufficient: it can exist indefinitely without any substantial imports from the non-Communist world. It has more than enough manpower; it possesses all kinds of natural resources and raw materials, from iron ore to uranium; it has immense areas of arable land and a highly developed industry. Such postwar additions to this empire as industrial Czechoslovakia, eastern Germany and Austria, Polish Silesia, and Manchuria not only helped to restore the war-damaged Soviet industry, but supplied industrial brains and millions of skilled workers.

It is certainly true that Communist management of industry is poor and sometimes even barbarous by Western standards. The cost of production is high; the results by no means justify the efforts and sacrifices; the orders of the central planning bodies are often contradictory and stupid; the cost of maintaining a swollen bureaucracy is tremendous. Under a system of free competition any enterprise run in this way would soon be bankrupt. But no Western standards can be applied to an economy where the Party-State owns everything, including the manpower, where prices, wages, and even the purchasing power of money are arbitrarily set by the rulers.

Government Gold Profiteering

Take the purchasing power of money, for example. Three years ago the Soviet government officially put the ruble on the “gold standard,” established an official gold content for the ruble of .222168 grams, and fixed the gold purchasing rate at 4 rubles 45 kopecks per gram. No official change in the rate has been made since then. Nevertheless, recent dispatches from Moscow disclose that in March 1954 the government undertook to sell gold to Soviet citizens at 90 rubles per gram, twenty times more than the price of gold printed on the government-issued money with which the citizens are supposed to pay for this government-owned gold.

This example helps to show why it is always cheaper for the Soviet government to produce any commodity at home than to buy it from a non-Communist country. It also shows that whenever the Soviets decide to undersell any of their Western competitors they can easily reduce their export prices five- and even tenfold without any noticeable deficit. They can put down the prices of their export goods almost as far as they please because at home they pay their producers only a negligible part of the actual cost of these goods.

Here is another instance. In the autumn of 1953 the Soviet government issued a number of decrees designed to raise food production on collective farms. One such decree provided a 200 to 500 per cent increase in government prices paid for milk, butter, meat, lard, eggs, poultry, fruits, and vegetables delivered by collective farms
and by individual farmers. Would such a drastic increase be feasible in any country where the government pays real instead of arbitrary prices?

For these reasons the Kremlin has never been really interested in increasing its trade with the Western world. At no time during the 37-year Bolshevist regime has the amount of Soviet exports and imports surpassed 2 or 3 per cent of the world total. Soviet exports at their peak in 1932 represented only 2.3 per cent of world exports, and by 1935-37 they had fallen to 1.3 per cent of the total. Imports showed a similar trend, amounting to 2.7 per cent of the total in 1931 and .9 per cent in 1937. Many Western observers tended to explain the increase in Soviet exports and imports in 1932-33 by the requirements of Stalin’s industrialization policy alone.

Two additional purposes behind this increased foreign trade were of a political nature. One was to “assist” the great depression of 1929-33 by means of sharply increased Soviet exports at prices much lower than even those which existed at that time in the capitalist countries suffering from an acute surplus of goods. The hope was, first, to bring the economic crisis of the West to such a point that millions of unemployed would start a revolution. Second, by means of increased exports of food and such luxury items as caviar and furs, the Kremlin hoped to conceal the catastrophic famine of 1932-33 at home. As soon as economic conditions grew better both in the West and the U.S.S.R., the amount of Soviet trade with the free world began to decrease until it dropped to a volume smaller than the foreign trade of Tsarist Russia.

Hidden Political Motives

No logical explanation could be found for this phenomenon. Stalin’s policy of forced industrialization continued at ever-increasing tempo. Western machines and other industrial goods were as badly needed as before. Western countries could offer much better prices for Soviet agricultural exports than they could during the depression, and the U.S.S.R. could export these goods at less sacrifice for its own population. Had Soviet foreign trade been motivated by economic considerations then, it would have increased steadily during the late thirties. But any substantial trade with the West did not coincide with the goals of Soviet political strategy at that particular period.

Because of hidden political motives, the U.S.S.R. has sharply and without warning reduced its trade with some countries, while increasing it with others. For example, during the same early thirties when Soviet exports and imports reached all-time peaks, Soviet imports from Estonia (then a free country) shrank to only 4.2 per cent of the previous average. This unexpected cessation of almost all Soviet purchases was meant to crush Estonia’s national economy. It was due only to the exemplary discipline of the Estonian people that the Kremlin did not succeed in its aggressive plans at that time.

Another example of the use of trade as a political weapon occurred in 1946. France was short of grain and was importing large quantities from the Western Hemisphere with the financial assistance of the United States. This threatened to undermine the prestige of the French Communists. So Moscow promised to sell some 500,000 tons of wheat to France. Grain was sold for dollars and carried from Odessa to Marseilles in American ships. But Jacques Duclos and other French comrades accompanied that sale with such a propaganda barrage about “fraternal aid” that many French people tended to believe all the wheat came from the U.S.S.R.

No Increase in Soviet Imports

A study of the present Soviet trade dispels the mirage that there has been any substantial increase in Soviet purchases abroad, and that Malenkov is seeking consumer goods, driven by his sincere desire to improve the living standards of the Soviet people. Data compiled last December by the Statistical Office of the United Nations show that total Soviet exports to the free world in 1953 were less than $320,000,000, as compared with more than $420,000,000 in 1952. Soviet imports in 1953 were something over $300,000,000, as compared with about $450,000,000 in 1952.

Recently a group of U.S. officials, drawn from the Foreign Operations Administration, State Department, and Defense Department, published estimates of contracts concluded by the Soviet Union in the free world during the eight months prior to February 1954. According to these estimates, the Soviet purchases amounted to: butter, $40,000,000; lard, $2,000,000; cheese, $3,700,000; herring, $15,000,000; meat, $22,000,000; sugar, $1,400,000; textiles, $28,000,000; citrus fruit, $7,000,000.

At first glance these figures seem to be substantial. But what do they mean for the Soviet Union? Let us assume that only the urban population (about 80,000,000 according to Malenkov himself) will benefit from these imported consumer goods. It appears, then, that a resident of Soviet urban areas in eight months could buy the following amount of imported goods: 50 cents worth of butter, 2.5 cents worth of lard, 4.5 cents worth of cheese, 20 cents worth of herring, 28 cents worth of meat, 2 cents worth of sugar, 35 cents worth of textiles, and 9 cents worth of oranges or lemons. It is safe to assume that the Soviet man in the street had no chance to taste these imported goods, and that Australian butter, Norwegian herring, and Italian oranges graced the tables of the Communist elite.

Soviet exports, too, serve special goals of Com-
munist foreign policy. In addition to such standard items of export as timber produced by forced labor, Moscow offered for sale in 1953 such strategic goods as chrome, manganese, asbestos, coal, oil, steel, and pig iron. Careful analysis of all available Soviet data reveals that there was and still is an acute shortage of these vital materials, especially of crude oil and petroleum products, which are still rationed. Yet the Soviet government is pushing the sale of oil through both private importing firms and trade treaty agreements with various governments. In virtually every country of western Europe brokers acting for the Soviets are offering oil and petroleum products at prices generally under those prevailing in the free market. Barter agreements have been made with the governments of Finland, France, Argentina, Iceland, and Israel. In some cases Soviet offers of oil were quite substantial: 500,000 tons to Argentina, 400,000 tons to France, 75,000 tons to Israel. What did the Kremlin hope to get in return for this strategic commodity? Frozen meat from Argentina, herring from Iceland, citrus fruits from Israel, silk and perfume from France. Who in his right mind would believe that Malenkov is making such deals just for the sake of trading, even if they are a source of ruble profit from internal sales?

The political goals in all these cases are quite evident: to help undermine the economic position of the United States in South America, to support those Frenchmen who seek "neutrality" and oppose NATO and EDC, to induce the Icelandic government to refuse air bases to the U.S., to stir up trouble in the Middle East. And, in addition, to send new cadres of spies disguised as trade agents to these countries. It must not be overlooked that the Beria affair forced the Kremlin to rearrange its subversive network abroad. This kind of "trade deal" pays even if oil has to be dumped abroad at low prices and at great sacrifice to the home economy. Its basic purpose is to serve the imperialistic ends of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The immediate goals of the present Soviet trade offensive are twofold: 1) to help split the non-Communist world, and 2) to assist in bringing about a new depression in the United States and western Europe. It can be argued that the present amount of Soviet trade is still too small to accomplish these goals. But this trade is a monopoly, directed from a single center by those who do not care whether they make or lose money in their transactions. Under no conditions will the Soviet rulers permit exports and imports to play any substantial role in the national economy of the vast empire they dominate, and they will cut short even the most profitable trade agreement if it tends to develop contrary to their political goals. In their commercial transactions the Soviets are assisted by their fifth columns abroad, and by those Westerners who are always eager to swallow any new propaganda bait from Moscow. This makes even a small volume of trade with the Soviet Union potentially dangerous for the free world.

[For comment on the current urge to do business with Malenkov, see Eugene Lyons' "A Second Look" on page 564.]

**THE EDITORS**

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**THIS IS WHAT THEY SAID**

The House Un-American Activities Committee is using the methods of a police state. That committee is keeping files on a million Americans and would keep more if it had the funds.

**BISHOP C. BROMLEY OXNAM, at a Lenten Service, First Methodist Church of Detroit, April 7, 1954**

With all these great material advances we are growing poorer and poorer as a nation. We are consumed with fear of the Soviet Union, and instead of rising up in our might to prove to the world that democracy works and that it can foster human happiness and goodness, we spend our time looking in corners for bogey men who might have belonged to the Communist Party.

**MILLEDENT C. MCINTOSH, President of Barnard College, speech at Industry-College Conference, November 19, 1953**

As matters stand today a little group [of steel officials] in Pittsburgh, answering to no one, determines how many automobiles, washing machines, apartment houses, wire fences, and oil refineries we shall have, and whether or not we shall be able to live up to the promise of the Marshall Plan. The Thomas committee tells us that the greatest menace to the private enterprise system lies in a handful of American Communists. In my opinion an infinitely greater threat is the monopolists, who have long since forgotten what the American system is all about and who insist on inflicting their economic defeatism on the rest of us.

**CHESTER BOWLES, letter to Life Magazine, March 29, 1948**

**Cut the Accent, Comrades**

The existence of the H-bomb makes the peaceful co-existence of capitalist America and the socialist Soviet Union an inescapable national necessity. . . . This is what the Soviet leader Malenkov meant when he told humanity that neither "side" can win [sic].

**DAILY WORKER, April 2, 1954**

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**MAY 3, 1954 563**
More Rope for Our Hanging

When it comes to hanging capitalists, Lenin is credited with saying, “We’ll have them bidding together for the rope.” Whether he said it or not, it’s uncomfortably close to the truth.

The bait of Soviet trade is again well deployed, and capitalist profit-glands are watering. European drummers, with the suicidal Britons in the lead, are in Moscow angling for deals. Big posters on the walls of the London Underground read “MOSCOW ORDERS: £400,000,000 worth of British goods.” The figure is a big lie; the thinking behind the appeal is a slur on British character and a reminder of Munich. Some Americans, too, are breathing hard, that hungry gleam in their eyes.

The picture is familiar enough. I witnessed part of it myself more than two decades ago. The press-agented fairy story then had it that with the ferocious Trotsky eliminated, a sober-minded Stalin (“really more like a businessman than a revolutionary”) was concerned only with the well-being of his beloved subjects. Socialism in one country, you know. We need only get behind his five-year plans to turn the raging beast into a household pet. Only “anti-Russian extremists” any longer take the palaver about world revolution seriously. It is up to the practical-minded Americans, the industrialists and bankers and traders, to scotch silly fears and unseemly prejudices.

The most ardent spokesman for that view was not some fuzzy-minded professor or liberal. No, it was the late Ivy Lee, the loudest voice of corporate capital. I am indebted to Joseph Anthony of Spadea Syndicate for the quotations which follow. On August 1, 1930, at Williamstown, Mass., Mr. Lee said:

“Is it not strange that those who could be called most nearly friends of Russia in the United States are our largest and most progressive industrial corporations? Why is this? Does anyone suppose that these intelligent businessmen would trade with Russia even to gain a few momentary profits, if they thought that the prosperity of Russia would mean their doom?...”

“I was struck in reading Mr. Stalin’s ex cathedra utterances before the Communist party on June 27th last with the absence of any of the old suggestions that the workers of the world should unite. It was distinctly a Russian speech, devoting itself to Russian problems. I am impressed with the thought that the chief preoccupation of Russian leaders today is with their own affairs, that such Communist propaganda as is conducted in foreign countries is stimulated by the less responsible men in Moscow...”

The blessed innocence of the man! He and his kind stuck to their foolish self-delusion year after year, while Soviet Russia in its deepening Iron Age was flooded by terror and death, while Red conspirators burrowed under the foundations of all free lands, while Kremlin poisons penetrated the marrow of American society.

“At heart,” Ivy Lee wrote on April 13, 1933, “the changes that are progressing in Russia aim at the same objectives as those at work here. They all revolve around the question: how far can you go in encouraging the profit motive, the initiative of the individual,” and so on.

Nor was it all words. In the early 1930s our businessmen were so eager to pick up trade in a new market that they failed to notice, let alone think about, the horrors of that market place or the agonies of the Russian people. In November 1933, a committee on Russian-American relations of the American Foundation put out a plea for recognition of the U.S.S.R. and Soviet trade signed, among many others, by the presidents of General Motors, Baldwin Locomotive, Remington Rand, Curtiss-Wright, and Thomas W. Lamont of J. P. Morgan & Co. It has been conveniently forgotten that the pressures for “normal relations” came largely from business interests, with the opposition led by the American Federation of Labor and the American Legion.

The ugly consequences of Ivy Lee’s success in selling America on a miraculously “reformed” Kremlin under a benign Stalin need not be rehearsed here. Suffice that the five-year plans, the material foundation of the power which now threatens a world at bay, would have been impossible without the collaboration of American, German, and British businessmen.

Today we are again being assured that Malenkov, providentially rid of the bull-headed Stalin, wants only to improve living conditions for his subjects. Peace through trade is the neat and comforting slogan in a world that surely needs both badly. We are counseled to remove roadblocks to “coexistence” and, in the words of a conservative industrialist, Ernest T. Weir, “establish an atmosphere of agreement—a relaxation of tension, a dissipation of the present suspicion and distrust.”

Mr. Weir’s pamphlets on the subject sound remarkably like Mr. Lee’s. He, too, appeals to “the more level-headed among us,” to “businessmen in particular, because they are accustomed to meeting and solving problems on a factual basis.” But is it “factual” to ignore the thirty-six-year record of the Soviet regime and the nature of the Communist animal?

Not only British businessmen, it seems, are panting to sell some more rope for our hanging to Lenin’s inheritors.
Here are two more books to add to the very considerable library of volumes which give the lie to the left-wing clichés that we are living under a “reign of terror” (Bertrand Russell) or “a black silence of fear” (Supreme Court Justice Douglas) or that all Americans are living in a state of craven fear of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (The first book is The Test of Freedom, by Norman Thomas, 211 pp., New York: W. W. Norton and Company, $3.00, and the second is The Urge to Persecute, by A. Powell Davies, 219 pp., Boston: The Beacon Press, $2.75).

Both Mr. Thomas and Mr. Powell are concerned about the state of American civil liberties under the pressures and stresses of the cold war. Both are clearly not admirers of the junior Senator from Wisconsin; both are critical of some aspects of congressional investigations of Communist subversion. (Mr. Thomas’ criticism is much more discriminating, restrained, and factual; Mr. Davies has a tendency to go off the deep end emotionally.) Both these books, like scores of others of the same type, have been freely published and circulated; neither author has suffered nor seems likely to suffer any of the dire consequences that a dissenter would certainly face if a true reign of terror were in progress.

Although Norman Thomas was six times candidate for President on the ticket of the now virtually extinct Socialist Party, there is no dogmatic Marxism in his thinking and writing. For the last twenty years his record of fighting Communism has been honorable and consistent. He has not reached the point of recognizing the close integral connection between liberty and private property; but not very long ago a book of his was published recognizing the extreme dangers of bureaucratic stagnation under socialism.

Thomas is keenly aware both of the reality of the Soviet imperialist threat to American national security and of the utterly unscrupulous methods of Communist termites on the home front. And his range of critical fire includes not only Communists, but also the fellow-traveling “liberals” who, in the author’s well-chosen words, “may have been finally and reluctantly persuaded of Alger Hiss’s guilt, but cannot forgive Whittaker Chambers.”

The author is clear and outspoken in denying the right of Communists to teach:

Communists have no right to teach, because in becoming Communist Party members or adherents they have performed an act of surrender of their own conscience and of their freedom to serve truth, an act which unites them for their high task.

And when he criticizes Senator McCarthy or some aspects of congressional investigations (he accepts investigation as a necessary legislative function), he never loses his sense of balance or perspective. He points out, for instance, that the people who cry out against investigations of Communism seldom took this attitude when the targets of congressional committees were bankers, oil magnates, and “merchants of death.”

And out of his long experience of American left-wing movements he seems to strike a pretty fair balance between overestimation and underestimation of Communist penetration of churches and synagogues:

I have known a handful of clergymen and rabbis who may not have paid regular dues to the Communist Party, but who gave every indication of complete loyalty to the Communist line. I have known, or know, of many more whose continuing sympathy with Communism did little credit to their understanding of the basic conflict between their own religious philosophy and the philosophy of Communism.

Where Thomas’ position is perhaps most vulnerable is in his attempt to draw a hard-and-fast line of distinction between Communism as a heresy and Communism as a conspiracy. Heresy, he argues, should be tolerated in a free society, conspiracy not. The difficulty with this proposition is what to do about a heresy that breeds conspirators just as a pestilential marsh breeds mosquitoes.

The Reverend A. Powell Davies, a Washington minister, approaches the same subject as Mr. Thomas, but with far less balance and factual authority. Although he disclaims any sympathy with Communism, he can find no worthier motive for congressional committees which have been investigating Communist activities than “the urge to persecute.”

The book is superficial as well as one-sided. There are some slick exercises in elementary psychology and psychoanalysis; there are some hortatory sermons which do not always stand very well the test of transfer to the printed page, and
there are some regrettable inaccuracies or highly questionable dogmatic statements.

How does Mr. Davies know, for example, that by the end of World War Two it was too late for the United States to intervene effectively in China, when this policy was never tried? There is no evidence for the author's view that there was a close connection between American failure to join the League of Nations and the growth of Communism in China. And the intimation that the America First Committee was in sympathy with Hitler is refuted by the fact that no adherent of nazism, fascism or Communism was permitted to join America First.

A General's Presidency

U. S. Grant and the American Military Tradition, by Bruce Catton. 201 pp. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. $3.00

This is the first volume in a new series of biographies designed to "analyze the relationship of the man to the events in which he is involved, viewing him neither as the maker of his times nor their product, but instead seeing each as a force reacting on the other." The plan may not work out in every case, but for a demonstration of its potentials there could not have been a happier choice than the combination of Bruce Catton and U. S. Grant. The subject abounds in those changes of fortune and apparent changes of character which always attracted Plutarch; the author is peculiarly qualified to make the most of his material by human sympathy, military knowledge, and power of analysis.

The total result is not only a supremely readable book, but one which in a very brief space manages to contribute new ideas and new material to a subject already exhaustively examined. Mr. Catton points out that Grant the soldier was both admired and blamed for the wrong reasons. "Butcher Grant," the South called him, with some tacit agreement from the other side, which spoke of his grim persistence; whereas Grant actually achieved his effects through speed and deception, even in the campaign that led from the Wilderness to Petersburg. No one was more surprised than Lee when the Union army turned up on the south bank of the James River.

Similarly, Grant as President has been viewed as an innocent in politics, who failed to see through designing men. Mr. Catton makes the point, and backs it up with the evidence, that this is looking at the wrong thing. Rightly or wrongly, Grant believed that Congress was the supreme power in the land, and the President an executive of its orders, as Lieutenant-General Grant had been the executive of over-all orders from Washington. If the reconstruction program was no better and financiers were permitted to hoist the Jolly Roger, it was less Grant's fault than that of the Congress he conceived of as representing the whole people. Indeed, if there is any detectable flaw in this fine book, it is that Mr. Catton rather slurs over the fact that this Congress was confirmed in its course by the election of 1866; that is, the electorate of the North approved what was being done in the South.

Yet it is rather in its examination of the factors that made Grant a great general than in the analysis of what happened to the general as President that the peculiar merit of the book lies. Grant himself had little to say about it in his memoirs, for the reason that no one knows what screws and bolts go into his personal assembly. Lloyd Lewis died before he could complete the job of integration he began; now the lack has been supplied and the gap closed in such a manner that the job will not have to be done again.

FLETCHER PRATT

America's "Day of Infamy"


Truth, crushed to earth, is reputed to possess recuperative powers of great dependability. There is much evidence that this is so, but she is generally appallingly slow in getting to her feet. I have been waiting these many years for an account of the truth about Pearl Harbor to rise and confront us on terms which defy doubt. This job has now been done, I think, definitely for history by an eminent naval officer who had a peculiar training for the task. Rear Admiral R. A. Theobald was an officer at Pearl Harbor the morning of the attack. He has been subjected to no such assault upon his honor and his professional judgment as President Roosevelt, General Marshall, and Admiral Stark used to smear Admiral Kimmel and General Short in order to discredit them and hide Roosevelt's own shame.

The day after the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt referred to it as that "Day of Infamy." It was, indeed, a Day of Infamy. But the infamy rested upon the names of Roosevelt and Stimson, Stark and Marshall, all of whom knew the attack was coming—almost the very day and hour—yet withheld from their commanders in Hawaii any warning. Thereafter those commanders were saddled with the whole blame and punished by retirement.

I myself had a hand in provoking the congressional investigation of Pearl Harbor after which I attempted to put into a pamphlet the truth about that shocking episode. But the orders, the dis-
patches, the goings-on behind the scenes are such that a technical knowledge of naval and army management and warfare are essential to translate all this professional material into an understandable narrative. This Admiral Theobald has now done in a clear, sharp, completely convincing account of the dramatic movements and events preceding the attack.

On the night before December 7, 1941, President Roosevelt and his commanders, Admiral Stark and General Marshall, knew the attack was coming. Our armed services had performed a miraculous job of breaking the Japanese mechanical code which the Japanese believed was invulnerable even up to the day of their final defeat. The breaking of this code was one of the most carefully guarded secrets of the war. For weeks the Japanese high command had been giving orders to their agents in Washington, Pearl Harbor, and the Philippines which made it abundantly clear they were preparing to attack Pearl Harbor, that the attack would in all likelihood be made on a Sunday, that it would be made from the air, and would be directed at the destruction of the United States fleet in the Pacific.

To Roosevelt and Stimson, in Washington, there was but one source of fear: that Admiral Kimmel and General Short in Pearl Harbor would learn of the Japanese plans. If Kimmel were warned, he would be required by the agreed war plans to take his whole fleet immediately out into the open sea, while Short would dispose his war planes for defensive and counter-action. In this case the Japanese plans would be frustrated, for they contemplated the fleet moored cold at its wharves like so many sitting ducks, and Roosevelt’s long hoped-for attack by Japan might be called off. Therefore he kept Kimmel and Short in the dark and permitted the fleet and the army to remain undefended, inviting the Japanese assault. In other words, the Japanese supplied the attacking force; Roosevelt supplied the living target—the fleet destroyed, 3,000 men killed.

The blackest part of this plan for entering the war was the pretense of Roosevelt, Marshall, and Stark of surprise and indignation when the blow came. Kimmel and Short were charged with the responsibility for the disastrous defeat, and were retired.

Having been through this shameful episode myself more than once, I cannot withhold my admiration for the dramatic clarity with which Admiral Theobald has unraveled the story of this conspiracy to get unwilling America into the war. Roosevelt’s aim was to involve us in the Pacific as a means of bringing us into the war in Europe. The witnesses to these events are now coming forward. Among their books none is more important than Admiral Theobald’s The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor.

JOHN T. FLYNN

Cuba’s Dictator


Mr. Chester's biography opens with a colorful account of his hero's first known act of earnest patriotism, at the rather tender age of a year and six months, when his parents took him to the festivities which marked the inauguration of the Cuban Republic, on May 20, 1902. "A good citizen he was, this little 'Beno' Batista," writes Chester without the slightest tremor. "Not a single whimper out of the little Cuban throughout the long night of revelry... . Maybe it was at this point in his infancy that the spark of revolution came into the life of Fulgencio Batista."

Now if an author stumbles across a personality so stupendously gifted as to get the "spark of revolution" in his infancy and to brief his biographer on this distant and uncanny reminiscence, the writer may be forgiven if he inures numerous exaggerations and significant omissions.

To anyone slightly familiar with the unfolding of the historical events in which Batista doubtless played a striking, though not always a creditable role, Chester's treatment of history appears rather farcical, not to say outright amusing. His monotone of unqualified praise for the man who has again assumed the ominous responsibility of setting himself up as the dictator of his country is so manifest that the reader wonders what purpose could an experienced newspaperman—as Chester reveals himself to be—entertain with 270 pages of tireless incense. The answer may be in the fact that Chester is Batista's friend and press agent.

The issues involved with Cuba's fate are so serious, however, that someone should spotlight some of the author's most glaring and most significant omissions. For example, the bland silence about the fact that Batista ran for President on the Communist ticket in a Communist front coalition, that he legalized the Communist Party, that he delivered Cuban labor to Communist control, and that, in 1940, when Chester says that "it was fortunate for the cause of democracy that Cuba's, a vital factor in the defense of the Western Hemisphere, was in the hands of a friendly government," Batista had just campaigned arm-in-arm with the Communists, under the Soviet-inspired slogan: "Keep Cuba Out of the Imperialist War."

The resurgence of such an opportunist (despite his present lip-service to anti-Communism) as the head of a police state, at a moment when Soviet Russia is again casting out for the dominant position she held in the days of the Soviet-Nazi "nonaggression" pact, gives food for more serious thoughts than those reflected in Mr. Chester's entertaining piece of political mythology.

KARL HESS
Crime vs. America

 Syndicate City, by Alson J. Smith. 290 pp. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. $4.50

 Nobody can spend twenty-four hours in Chicago and not do business with the Syndicate. This is the point which Alson Smith has sharpened so that it penetrates every page of his book.

 Senator Estes Kefauver said it this way: "Chicago is, in many respects, ruled not legally but extralegally by Stone Age criminals who are themselves untouchable by law." In this meticulously documented indictment, Smith tells why, and what might be done about it.

 Chicago has been "the wickedest community" since the 1890s, Smith reminds us. It has therefore attracted the kind of people who "whether they admitted it or not liked the atmosphere of the wide open town." Smith has attempted to avoid the entirely one-sided view which has discredited other authors. He believes in Mayor Kennelly's integrity, though the Mayor, reared in the jungle, "knows the score which means that he knows his limitations." Smith concedes the accomplishments of the "tough-cops" and their resistance to corruption. Ninety per cent of the police force is good, but "the honest ninety per cent try to cover up for the crooks [dishonest ten per cent]." So "no top hoodlum has ever been convicted of a serious crime in a local court."

 The Chicago crime cartel's political tentacles reach into Washington, D. C., and respond instantly to a directive from Palermo, Sicily. (Smith believes Lucky Luciano is still Mister Big.)

 Smith describes that fraction of Syndicate City which is comprised largely of citizens of Sicilian extraction and lays much of this evil on their doorstep—slum dwellers "in America . . . but not of it." Smith, barging into this neighborhood where most recent writers have feared to tread, explains the strange dual-citizenship of this Sicilian fraternity and the Mafia which disciplines it. The manner in which they accept charity, then auction it off. The way in which they honor their criminals.

 In his conclusion and recommendations, Smith spells out a wide variety of constructive reforms ranging from replacing ragged police uniforms to a new criminal code and sweeping judicial reforms. Mostly, he believes the final choice will be with the citizen, presently apathetic. The reformers are punch-drunk from the beatings they've taken. But the little fellow can effect a change when he stops his own petty lawbreaking (slot machines in the Legion Hall, two dollar bets with the cigar store bookie). Until then, the selfish indulgence of these pretty good people will continue to spawn the larger operations (narcotics, vice) on which the Chicago underworld flourishes. Chicago needs a new City Charter, says Smith. With fifty "little mayors" (Detroit has nine, Los Angeles seven) the opportunity for graft and favoritism is vastly increased.

 Officials of every city of 200,000 and more will learn from this book, and thus may be deterred from barging past the danger signals which Mr. Smith so plainly identifies. But as far as reforming Chicago is concerned, it is unlikely that the mass, whose cooperation is required, will read this gospel of good government, and so they will not hear or heed the warning that if the Communists ever ally themselves with the Mafia, we are lost. "Indeed, a nation whose moral fibre and ethical standards are eaten away by termite-criminals in its great cities will be an easy prey to any dynamic barbarism that appears to challenge it.

 The Age of the Borgias

 The Life and Times of Lucrezia Borgia, by Maria Bellonci. Translated by Bernard and Barbara Wall. 343 pp. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company. $5.00

 Lucrezia Borgia lived in an age and mental climate which was very much like our own. There was the same intellectual curiosity, the same willingness to experiment, the same social fluidity, and the same widespread doubt and distrust of traditional values. Men were being liberated from old restraints. But with the restraints went many of the old landmarks that had given order, direction, and meaning to their lives. To the men and women of the Renaissance life was no longer an orderly pilgrim's progress along the road to salvation that had been mapped out by the spiritual guides of the church. It had become an adventurous voyage of discovery over uncharted ground.

 Thus the historical figures of the Renaissance took on larger than life-size proportions in the eyes of later generations, which had their feet once again more securely planted. And, due to a unique combination of circumstances, the members of the Borgia family came to loom even larger than the other figures of their age. Yet by Renaissance standards they were not at all untypical.

 It just so happened that Alexander, Lucrezia's father, became Pope in the year in which Columbus discovered America and changed the face and future of the Western world. Lucrezia's brother, Cesare, happened to have his political career written up not in the customary manner of a eulogistic biography but in the guise of a sociological treatise by that first neutral scientist of politics, Machiavelli. And Lucrezia herself happened to spend her life in high places where she attracted the eye and stirred the gossip of the age. Thus the family lived in the limelight and, as their fortunes faded, became the butt of vituperation and zealous moral condemnation.

 Mrs. Bellonci's study reduces the Borgias to human proportions. No doubt, they were wicked,
but not more so than many of their contemporaries who had lost their moral bearings and were floundering in a morass of cruelty and crime in which vice might be looked upon as virtue and generous impulses and noble instincts channeled to serve ignoble ends.

They were not "a tainted stock"—Alexander's great-grandson, Francisco Borgia, found a place among the Saints of the Church—and Lucrezia herself emerges as an appealing and even attractive personality. She was the typical Renaissance lady, cultured, self-possessed, with a taste for poetry and beautiful things, also warm-hearted, affectionate, and loyal to her family and her chosen friends. Yet she was caught in the net of stronger circumstances. All her life she searched for peace and harmony, and there is perhaps some poetic justice in the fact that she found it finally in the faith whose spirit had been so memorably outraged by Alexander Borgia.

Mrs. Bellonci has recreated all this in a well-written and carefully-documented volume. Only the lack of illustrations, especially of the portraits referred to in the text, detracts from its value. And its unevenness—detailed discussion of minor controversial points but few quotations from Lucretia's own utterances—may perhaps be blamed on the fact that the book is an "abridged translation."

HUBERT MARTIN

A Brief for Bravery

These Men My Friends, by George Stewart. 400 pp. Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers, Ltd. $6.00

During the most recent of the world wars, the two principal Allies tried unprecedentedly hard to extend mutual understanding down to the lowest troop level. In furtherance of these efforts, George Stewart, a pastor of Connecticut Presbyterians and an Anglophile, was assigned to the British Army as a kind of roving font of information on America and Americans.

These Men My Friends is a collection of Stewart's reminiscences about the men and the places he got to know on this unusual mission, and it is aimed at the reciprocal of the mission's result; that is, a better understanding of the British by the Americans.

Some Americans will not want to understand Britain and the British, however, in quite the way Stewart intends. For one thing, he has a good word to say for the Empire, especially for some of its policies in India. And when writing about the Empire's soldiers and airmen—whom he met in all manner of martial circumstances, in all the theaters of action—he makes no anguishing biopsy of whatever animosities there may have been between officers and enlisted men. Nor does he distinguish between regulars and what we over here call in our own army "citizen soldiers." In both cases he breaks the "modern" literary precedent, according to which the military must be viewed with distaste.

Stewart himself is something of a new departure in war writers, by virtue of a rare combination of experiences in his background. As a boy of fifteen, he was operating his own ranch on the rough, man-hating terrain of southwestern Idaho. When World War One came along, his B.A. and LL.B. degrees from Yale might have got him a commission simply for the asking. Instead, he enlisted as a private and during the fighting rose to the rank of battalion commander.

Between the wars Stewart acquired a Ph.D., entered the Presbyterian ministry, and wrote eighteen books. He is now a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Air Force.

These Men My Friends is composed in a style as bland as a rectory tea, but it manages to leave a pungent impression of war as interpreted through its impact on the men involved in it. Much of this puts one in mind of the late Ernie Pyle's syndicated "GI Joe" dispatches. Stewart, however, has gone deeper into his Tommies.

When he backs away for more of a panoramic view of the war and its implications, the author makes one feel he is listening to the final, fading notes of "Rule, Britannia," the last time it will ever be played.

In India, for instance, at the Red Fort of Delhi toward the close of the war, five native soldiers are being invested, some posthumously, with the Victoria Cross. Never before have so many awards of this most coveted British medal been made in a single ceremony. The medals are presented by the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, in a ritual that features all the awesome pomp and splendid costumery of the Raj. Outside the walls of this enclave at the very same moment, men in bed sheets are brazenly hurrying the Raj to an inglorious finish.

Another British election, another war, and scores of war books have intervened between Stewart's experiences and his writing of them. He, of course, is aware of this. But he is a man who is obviously anxious about the future of the qualities that have made men, armies, and nations of the Western world great. Maybe he intends his book as a deposition to be filed in evidence should it ever be necessary to hold an inquest at some future date (in some "progressive" or "people's" court) into the demise of these convictions, traditions, and virtues.

RICHARD M. PALMER

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James Joyce’s Friend


The genius of James Joyce is still modern literature’s Number One enigma. Fresh material on the quixotic Irishman’s life is eagerly welcomed as a potential source of light on his work. The author of Silent Years was a lifelong friend of Joyce; he is the Cranly of Joyce’s novels. His autobiography is a treasure trove of new insights into Joyce’s complex and baffling personality.

In Silent Years, Mr. Byrne’s account of his life at school and college, even when it does not directly involve Joyce, has a significant bearing on the Joyce story. Throughout childhood and youth the two young Dubliners were reared in the identical background of the sort that gave birth to Ulysses. The peaceable Byrne residence in Eccles Street, for instance, became the less peaceful Bloom home in Ulysses.

But Silent Years is by no means all Joyce. John Francis Byrne, in his own right, has led a full and interesting life. He toiled on Wicklow farms, lectured on Spinoza, and shuddered at Irish ghosts. He was in the forefront of Ireland’s fight for freedom. Although he left Dublin for New York in 1910, he continued to work for the nationalist cause, endangering his life by returning to wartime Ireland. He tells the inside story of the tragic Easter Rebellion of 1916 and England’s savage reprisal in wrecking Dublin’s historic business district and promoting a reign of terror throughout the land.

In New York, the erudite Mr. Byrne worked as reporter and editorial writer. In a short story published in 1917 and reprinted in Silent Years, he foretold the discovery of the H-bomb. On the Monday before the Wall Street crash he wrote for his Daily News Record column a prediction of Tuesday’s stock-market calamity. His A Parable in Gold, written in 1930 to expound his concept of international debt, was intended to head off such transactions as Lend-Lease. And no cryptographer yet, it would seem, has caught up with a code he devised in 1919.

It is easy to see why the lonely Joyce clung to Cranly-Byrne, finding comfort in his kindliness and stimulation in the flight of his unorthodox thought. The author of Silent Years is no even-tempered optimist. Fearless, he loves a challenge; honest, he comes right out with names and dates. To be sure, there are frustrating gaps in his roll call. He says nothing about Yeats, Russell, Colum, and their Irish Renaissance. And what became of lovely Norah?

ANN F. WOLFE

Gift and Gush

Stay on, Stranger!, by William S. Dutton. 79 pp. New York: Farrar, Straus and Young. $1.75

The Journey, by Lillian Smith. 256 pp. Cleveland: The World Publishing Company. $3.50

Twenty-eight years ago, Alice Lloyd went to a mountain town in Kentucky, “where no man worth shootin’ went unarmed.” A graduate of Radcliffe, a newspaper woman but half paralyzed with a lifelong disability, she went off to Caney Hollow to find a milder climate. What she did find was a life career for herself and a mighty surge of promise for 100,000 people. In Caney Hollow there was no decent school, no good road, no window pane, a background of the sort that gave birth to endless turgid long-bearded jokes.

Today Alice Lloyd is past seventy-seven. She owns two cotton dresses and a worn-out typewriter. She works hard and long and she looks on the fruit of her work. For a person in the seventies it is a rich gift indeed. Caney Hollow now has a famous college, thanks to Alice Lloyd; it has engineers, doctors and nurses, lawyers and teachers, and each of them is home-grown. This is a remarkable story. A sidelight is its encouragement to those disabled who suffer from frustration.

Miss Smith’s book is quite another matter. You can sicken over anything with gush. This is not a novel but the account of a soulful journey, destination vague, object to help the handicapped. The actual war to lighten this tragedy is being fought with grim will, scientific knowledge, and long patience. It is being fought by doctors, psychologists, parents, and the victims themselves. They are doing a good job. But this writer is so ecstatic that she loses her way, and so did this reader.

Miss Smith even meanders into a side road to take a crack at Senator McCarthy. Once Miss Smith wrote a best-seller about miscegenation which annoyed many Negroes and delighted “liberals.” This new book may delight a few intensely subjective readers. It probably will annoy many more, including the handicapped.

HELEN WOODWARD
Non-Communicative Art

By MAX EASTMAN

My friend Bernard Berenson, prince of art critics, has written an astute little book called Seeing and Knowing in which he reviews the history of artistic conventions as a series of compromises between conceptual knowledge and visual experience. He does not conceal his low opinion of the present convention culminating in what is called "abstract art." He feels sure, he says, that the "confusion, struttings, blusterings, solemn puerilities that are now practiced, taught, admired, and proclaimed," will not last forever. But he does not say why he feels sure of this.

To my mind these manifestations in the world of art associate themselves with what is happening in the political world, and I feel evangelical about it. Although I admire Berenson profoundly, I never could quite imitate the serene detachment with which he dwells among ideas—and among pictures, and books innumerable, and a beautiful garden and a too beautiful sky—in his shrinelike villa on a hill overlooking Florence. I feel we have to descend into the plain and raise an army and go to war for civilized values in art as well as politics and economics.

So far as poetry is concerned, I did go to war for these values twenty-five years ago in an essay called "The Cult of Unintelligibility." I was defeated, and very soon disappeared under a flood of extremely erudite and awfully overwhelming language which goes by the name of the New Criticism, but none of my arguments were answered.

I am not going to trundle out all the old cannon I employed in that purely literary engagement, but I do want to recall one maneuver which has especial relevance to modern art.

I was talking about Gertrude Stein as the Founder and high priestess of the Cult, and I adduced this example of the Gertrudian prose:

"I was looking at you, the sweet boy that does not want sweet soap. Neatness of feet do not win feet, but feet win the neatness of men. Run does not run west but west runs east. I like west strawberries best."

One can hardly deny, I remarked, a beauty of ingenuity to those lines. They have a fluency on the tongue, a logical intricacy that is intriguing. And no doubt anyone who dwells with idle energy on their plausible music will find thoughts and impulses from his own life rising to employ them as a symbol or pattern for a moment of thought or imaginative realization. But the impulses that rise to those lines from the reader's life will never by one chance in a million be the same as those that dictated them in the life of the author. Communication is here reduced to a minimum. It is a private art, just as private as the emotional life of the insane. In fact the passage I quoted was not from Gertrude Stein, but from the stenographic report of the ravings of a maniac cited by Kraepelin in his Clinical Psychiatry. Here is a passage that is from Gertrude Stein:

"Any space is not quiet it is so likely to be shiny. Darkness very dark darkness is sectional. There is a way to see in onion and surely very surely rhubarb and a tomato, surely very surely there is that seeding."

It is just the same thing, you see, only perpetrated voluntarily—and in my opinion not quite so well.

Turning to Art

It seems to me that exactly the same maneuvers might be executed, and with a like success, against present tendencies in the plastic arts. The essential thing that has been disappearing from both fields is intelligible communication. The artist mulls around with patterns, diagrams, and symbolic entities that contain both thought and emotion for him, and then leaves it to the beholder to invest them, if he can, with other thoughts and emotions that belong to him. Once more it is private art—and once more just as private as the emotional life of the insane.

In the spring of 1950 the University of Vienna put on an exhibition of thirty paintings, half of them by well-known surrealist or abstract painters, the other half by patients from a mental hospital. (Among the well-known were Picasso, Miro, Erico Donati, Max Ernst, and the American, Yves Tanguy.) An audience of presumably normal persons, 158 of them, were unable to say which was which. Their answers, that is, were 50 per cent wrong and 50 per cent right, as pure chance would predict. Before another audience of 105 persons a test was made with ten poems. Five of the poems were of "surrealist origin," three had been written by schizophrenic patients, and two were arbitrary sequences of detached words and phrases. Here again the guesses were 50 per cent wrong and 50 per cent right, as pure chance would predict. Before another audience of 105 persons a test was made with ten poems. Five of the poems were of "surrealist origin," three had been written by schizophrenic patients, and two were arbitrary sequences of detached words and phrases. Here again the guesses were 50 per cent wrong, not one of the listeners being able to identify the two "poems" faked from haphazard words and phrases.

Functional insanity, in its most general form,
as everybody knows, is an extreme withdrawal into a world of private values and meanings. However, I am not saying, and neither did the Viennese experimenters, that the artists in question are insane. My thesis is that they might just as well be, so far as the social or communicative values of their work are concerned.

This does not fully apply, of course, to the values of what is called pattern or design. Here the difference between literary and artistic talking-to-oneself is considerable. It is impossible to put paint on canvas, or lines on paper, or mould a figure in clay, without creating a pattern. Whether good or bad, the pattern is objective, it is accessible to all beholders. But no one would have the hardihood to call these modern artists "designers." Designers make linoleum, tablecloths, dress goods, wallpaper, paper for Christmas packages. To identify abstract art with their craft would defraud and destroy the whole revolution. It would deprive the artist of the excited thoughts and emotions he experiences while creating his work. It would deprive the beholder of the thoughts and emotions he experiences while contemplating it. Neither of these experiences is necessarily insincere. That is not my implication, but merely that, apart from the perception of design, these experiences are not, by a million chances to one, the same. They are not, by a million chances to one, in any important respect, similar.

The insincerity lies in the pretense on the part of the critics, patrons, guardians of our culture, and provincial, half-educated, half-alive aspirants to a reputation for expert familiarity with it, that any part of this experience is conveyed by the artist to the beholder. In so far as the most renowned "abstractions" are anything more than the art of the designer, this pretense is false; it is phony. It has filled the world of culture with poses, lies, hypocrisy, false claims to eminence, and fatuous bombast posing as esoteric knowledge inaccessible to the simple mind. It has enthroned mountebanks and bunk-shooters where men of the highest mind and most refined perceptions used to sit.

**Impostors Exposed**

Every little while this fact is demonstrated, and the impostors exposed, by a press dispatch such as this:

A 17-year-old artist admitted today that an abstract painting a Toronto art gallery had placed on exhibition was only an old piece of cardboard on which commercial painters had cleaned their brushes. Curator Sydney J. Key of the Toronto Gallery had written to Bob Nealess a glowing letter expressing his admiration for the youth's novel effects.

Curator Sydney J. Key of the Toronto Gallery had written to Bob Nealess a glowing letter expressing his admiration for the youth's novel effects. "You seem to be aware of the accidental effects that can result from lines, calligraphy, blots, and the use of a spray gun," Mr. Key wrote. He said that Nealess seemed to be "considerably interested in a variety of effects that can be arrived at through experimental use of your materials."

Nealess said he took a piece of cardboard on which artists at a local engraving plant had cleaned their brushes, and sent it to Toronto under the title, "Melancholia in A Swamp."

Here is another similar dispatch:

Artist Thomas Warbis does not take much trouble over his painting. He splashes the colors—dozens of them—with a bold brush or his bare fingers or an old stick with a chewed end.

He lets his cat Jill pad over the fresh paint and swish her tail over it. And while turning out his masterpiece "Figure 8: Skegness," he spilled a saucer of paint on it by accident, smudged it, tried erasing it, and finally gave up the attempt.

But the sponsors of a local art show thought "Figure 8: Skegness" was good enough to exhibit. Critics praised it... "A fine specimen of modernism by the Barrow-on-Soar artist Thomas Warbis."

They found later that artist Warbis is six years old. When Tommy himself turned up at the exhibit, a caretaker threatened to throw him out—he tried to stand on his head in a corner.

And let us read one more of these typical dispatches, this time from London:

Three abstract paintings displayed today at the Tate Gallery are hanging sideways because their owner prefers them that way. To casual visitors, the unusual positions of the artist's signatures on canvas is the only clue to the ninety-degree divergence in viewpoint between painters and patron.

One of them, William Gear, already has gone through a similar ordeal—except that it was accidental, not intentional. His "Autumn Landscape," bought by the Art Council for £500, appeared upside down in a catalogue of the exhibition at last year's Festival of Britain.

A 90 per cent divergence between the experience the artist meant to convey, and the experience received by the appreciator and purchaser of his painting! I find it astonishing that artists cannot perceive the ignominious position in society to which this reduces them. The divergence is not usually 90 but nearer 100 per cent, and the dignity of the artist in the transaction is thus properly to be estimated at zero.

We must, of course, be tolerant of the aberrations of creative genius in any field. As Plato observed of the poets, they have to be a little crazy in order to escape from the near-sighted practicality that life forces on us all. At least they have to be childlike. They have to play seriously. They have to experiment. They have to fool around with all sorts of ideas and non-ideas a good deal of the time. But this is not true of the critics, the aestheticians, the directors of galleries, the art dealers, the editors of art magazines, the writers of books about art. The professional art critic is a breed of being that the world got along without well into the nineteenth century. We could get along without him again if he fails to defend the unquestionable and enduring values against commercial fads and frauds and
fashionable fake-evidences or superior culture. The artists, I believe, would soon get back on the path of good sense and dignity and social communion and hard work, if the critics held the standards firm.

To prove that, with hardly an exception besides Berenson himself they are not holding standards firm, let us recall a costly and convincing experiment. In 1948 Life Magazine assembled a group of sixteen eminent art critics and connoisseurs from all over the world to debate the question "Whether modern art as a whole is a good or a bad development." So far as Life's eighteen-page report of the debate reveals, not one word was said on this question by any of them. They disagreed about all the pictures presented to them, not only about whether they were good or bad, but about what they were and what they had to do with.

The one thing upon which they did unanimously agree—with a single half-hearted exception—was the magnificence of the painting by Pablo Picasso entitled, "Girl Before A Mirror." [reproduced on the inside back cover of this issue]. It is "accepted on every hand as a great modern classic." according to Life's editors. "However," they add, "it is not an extreme example of modernism." ... The form of the girl is still recognizable; hence the layman can see the physical distortions to which the artist has subjected it, and thereby learn much about what the artist was trying to do."

That allusion to the layman, I must pause to remark, is of the essence of the trick by which this cult of non-communication is propagated. The pretense that an experienced critic and connoisseur can tell the difference between the work of a schizophrenic or a dabbling schoolboy, and that of a Master of Modernism, has been refuted above. But it was still better refuted in this same experiment conducted by Life. That not one of these learned connoisseurs assembled at vast expense from all over the world had the slightest idea what Picasso had in mind with his "Girl Before A Mirror" was frankly acknowledged by all of them in the very same conference in which it was hailed as a 'great modern classic.' Remember this when tempted to say, "I don't understand modern art." Say instead: "I like art which can be understood."

Let us consider briefly what happened in this conference of super-sensitized aestheticians when Picasso's picture was placed before them. To begin with, Meyer Schapiro, Professor of Fine Arts at Columbia University, hurst forth with an exposition which, according to Life's reporter, "held the conference spellbound." As everything was taken down by a stenographer, we are privileged to know just what it was that held them spellbound.

Schapiro began by saying that there are two images of the human body: one as it is seen from the outside, the anatomical image, and another, the image we form of it from the inside. As imaged from the inside, it is "full of distortions and strange relationships," owing to the way we feel about it. "For instance, when you have a toothache, one side of your face feels bigger than the other. . . . In a similar way, in fantasy, our conception of the bodies of others is affected by our feelings. It is this kind of personal, internal image that Picasso is portraying here."

Ingeniously Complicated Explanation

Now it does not happen to be true, at least in my case, that when you have a toothache one side of your face feels bigger than the other—not unless the dentist puts novocain in the gum, which of course alters the purely sensory experience. It is certainly not true, in general, that an emotional interest in some part of a body, whether your own or another's, entails an enlargement or distortion of the image of that part. No such correspondence between emotional interest and imaginary shape and size has ever been established, or, so far as I know, even proposed as an hypothesis by any psychologist. It is just one of those irresponsible remarks that professional talkers about art feel free to make. However, it gave Meyer Schapiro a good start, and from that point on he read things into this picture that I am sure nobody else would ever think of in a million years.

Picasso, he averred, has "discovered for art the internality of the body, just as the impressionists discovered blue shadows, which were at first a scandal." And more scandalous still, in this picture the girl's body is seen from the inside and the outside both at once! The girl is in "a state of tension which is highly sensual in character," and Picasso also, it seems, is amorously excited about the girl. And that accounts for all these various loops, lobes, and protuberances inhering in her body in the similitude of a toothache as seen from the inside looking out.

I am not meaning to ridicule what Schapiro said about the picture, although I cannot conceal the fact that I think it was old-maidish, academical, purely cerebral, and unrelated to any real facts. No live man feeling adolescent about a girl's body would want it to protruberate like that in various places. I cannot imagine anything that would kill a passionate feeling more quickly. Picasso, I'm sure, would jump out of the bedroom window if a girl developed any of these manifestations, whether inside or outside. However, all I meant to prove is that Schapiro's interpretation is too ingeniously complicated to have occurred to any other human being on examining the same picture.

For that purpose, let us have a little more of it. "Thus the body is represented both from outside and within, and in the mirror is still another image of the body." Schapiro did not say whether this other image is an outside or an inside one,
and I for the life of me cannot tell. But at any rate it is a different image, and Schapiro thinks it is a “wonderful magical, poetic idea, to show the human body which is ordinarily represented in one way ... as belonging to three different modes of experience within one picture.”

“I don’t know of another painting in all history which does that,” he exclaims.

And I must say that I don’t either. Nor do I think this painting does it, or any painting could possibly do it. He seemed unaware that he was harking back to “representative art” to explain a phenomenon that rose out of a revolt against it.

“The shapes,” he continued, “are forcibly contrasted and tied together. The repeated form of the breasts, and what we may take to be the womb. . . .” (A layman, of course, might want to know whether it is a womb before drawing any important conclusions about it, but not so the connoisseur.) “The breasts . . . and what we may take to be the womb, and the form at the elbow—the green circle—are all clearly related.” How related he does not say.

“The roundness of the face belongs with these circles.” What “belongs with” means he does not explain. “But in the face is also a moon crescent which occurs elsewhere on the body and there is a large contrast like that of the sun and moon in the relation of the real body and the mirrored body and indeed the moon has a reflected light.” And he concludes: “Whether the symbolism is deliberate, unconscious or accidental, I would not dare to say. . . .” In any case “These contrasts and repetitions . . . have a manifest purposiveness which to me is grand.”

Artist or Lunatic?

That was what held the experts spellbound—an elaborate invention on the part of Mr. Schapiro, and one characterized by what to his mind was a grand purposiveness. But he quite frankly acknowledged that he did not know whether the purposes in question existed, even unconsciously, in the mind of the artist or not. The whole thing may have been purely accidental. That is, it may have been made up by Meyer Schapiro, as in my opinion it undoubtedly was.

Indeed when the question was raised explicitly whether, as a matter of fact, Picasso had intended to express any of these notions with which Schapiro had held them spellbound, those experts agreed that the question was “of course unanswerable,” and that it was also “irrelevant to the enjoyment of the picture.”

Thus we have reached a phase in the development of the plastic arts where it does not make any difference to the high-up critics and connoisseurs what, if anything, the artist was trying to convey. They have no criteria by which they can decide whether he was, in fact, an artist or a lunatic. They can be hoaxed into reading “advanced” values into a painting composed by a six-year-old boy with the help of his cat’s tail and a saucer of paint accidentally stepped on while the cat was at work. They write glowing tributes to a piece of old cardboard on which painters have wiped their brushes. We need no further proof, it seems to me, that the essential thing which has disappeared from the field of art as well as poetry is intelligible communication. And I need hardly add that when art is unintelligible and people go right on forming judgments about it, the basic thing that is disappearing is intelligence. In art and poetry, alike, the net result is a consecration of the mental blur, a benediction upon the vice of cloudy and confused thinking.

The relation of this to what is happening in the political world seems fairly obvious. That so many highly placed critics have accepted a return to mumbo-jumbo, and even helped to put it over on the public in the name of intellectual culture, is to me but a part of that general surrender of mental and moral integrity to crude primitive and unillumined states of passion which threatens our whole Graeco-Christian civilization with ruin. I think this will seem quite obvious to future historians if history survives.

The State of Poetry, 1954

not they do not like sense in poetry any more nor nonsense either just posture they are intent upon s p o r t y i let them have it

WITTER BYNNER
"Thus we have reached a phase in the development of the plastic arts where it does not make any difference to the high-up critics and connoisseurs what, if anything, the artist was trying to convey."

See “Non-Communicative Art,” page 571
"THE FUTURE BELONGS TO THOSE WHO PREPARE FOR IT"

The choice of engineering as a career leads many young men to International Harvester. Here I. H. Hallberg (left), A. E. Snyder (background) and E. Freudman conduct research on an experimental diesel engine at the IH Metals Park Works near Chicago.

These words speak for democracy. Preparation for the future begins with democratic freedom . . . the freedom of choice which American youth enjoys in the selection of careers.

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Freedom of choice in the selection of a career . . . wars have been fought and won in its defense, ambitions have been realized by its application, families have been happier and more secure as its result. For each individual to build his own future is the solid foundation for a prosperous America.

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