The Fifth Amendment

A Double Standard for Immunity?
C. Dickerman Williams

History as Politics
Max Eastman

Berlin Merry-Go-Round
An Editorial
Tapping the Open Hearths at J&L's Pittsburgh Works

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Tapping the Open Hearths at J&L’s Pittsburgh Works
Contents

Vol. 4, No. 11 February 22, 1954

Editorials

The Fortnight ........................................ 365
Berlin Merry-Go-Round .............................. 367
The "Which Clause" ................................. 368
Taxation and Incentives ............................ 369
Preachers of Hate .................................... 369
Profit-Seeking Science .............................. 370

Articles

A Double Standard for Immunity? ............. 371
C. Dickerman Williams

Operation Penny-Pinching ....................... 372
Lt. F. R. Buckley

and Charles Zimmermann 373

England After Austerity .......................... 375
Freeda Utley

A Double-Indemnity State Department ........ M. K. Argus 377

Quarantine of Red Guatemala? ................. 378
Nathaniel Weyl

Pigs Is Free ........................................ 381
William G. Ferris

Mind over Matter ................................... 382
Eugene Lyons

Guilt by Association ................................ 383
Murray T. Quigg

Books and the Arts

History as Politics ................................ 385
Max Eastman

Case History in Propaganda ...................... Eugene Lyons 387

Another Look at World War Two ............... Jeanne Darnforth 388

Education for What? .............................. 388
Frank E. Meyer

The Way to Victory ................................ 389
Robert Donlevin

How We Lost Eastern Europe ..................... Michael T. Florsky 390

Briefer Mention .................................... 391

Codes and Morals ................................... 392
Serge Fleigers

Poems

Shadow or None .................................... 374
E. Merrill Root

Last Voyage ........................................ 374
Betty Page Dabney

This Is What They Said ............................ 380

From Our Readers ................................... 394

Our Contributors

Considerable debate has been going on recently
in the press and among political-minded citizens
on the subject of immunity legislation. It is
a mild herald of the more vociferous discussion
that may be expected in Congress when pending
measures which would compel witnesses in
Communist cases to testify despite the Fifth
Amendment reach the floor. In order to
acquaint our readers in advance with the facts
about immunity legislation and the reasons
for the furore over the present bills, we
asked C. Dickerman Williams, frequent con-
tributor to the Freeman and an authority on
constitutional law, to give us a briefing on
the subject. Among the various posts Mr.
Williams has held in a distinguished legal
career was that of law secretary to Chief
Justice William Howard Taft.

Lt. F. R. Buckley wrote us last fall in friendly
remonstrance against an editorial paragraph
we had published about waste in the armed
services. At one air base, anyway—one of the
largest, incidentally, in the country—he knew
there had been a determined effort to cut
down on the enormous cost to the American
taxpayer of operating such vast and complex
enterprises. In response to our go-ahead signal
he wrote, in collaboration with a colleague,
Charles Zimmermann, exactly what measures
had been taken in this voluntary economy
program. It is a practical example of the kind
of savings that are possible and effective.

Freeda Utley returned last month to England
for what she expected to be merely a visit
with old friends. However, having spent a
major part of her life living and studying
in London, she could not ignore the change in
the economic scene that had occurred since
her previous visit a year ago. "Everything is
seemingly so prosperous," she wrote us, "but . . ." It is the "but" she tells us about in
her first report from London.

When, some months ago, we learned that Guate-
mal was becoming the American Yenan Way,
we asked Nathaniel Weyl, specialist in Latin
American affairs as well as in the techniques
of Communism, to look into the matter for us.
He interviewed specialists and non-specialists,
tracked down facts and rumor. His thorough-
and report explains what lies behind the
current dispatches from our Central American
neighbor and suggests what we, in company
with the other American republics meeting in
Caracas next month, can do about it.

Among new poets to enter the Freeman group
we have in this issue Betty Page Dabney of
Norfolk, Virginia. Re our poets, we note that
at the annual dinner of the Poetry Society of
America Robert Hillyer received an award for
the best poem to appear in a magazine, namely
"The Bats," in the Freeman of May 19, 1952.

One modern city came near such paralysis. That was Berlin in 1948 when the Russians thought to strangle it into submission. Of all the cargo flown into Berlin, 64% was coal. Nearly 1,500,000 tons. Enough to fill 300,000 big, hopper coal cars. That coal was like new blood in a dying man's veins.

We don't fly much coal here in America—occasionally to an arctic defense base or a bag dropped to a storm-isolated farm house. Coal is something we have always taken for granted. There's plenty to last a thousand—maybe two thousand years. It is widely distributed; and the great coal-hauling railroads like the C&O are equipped to move it rapidly.

For instance, the C&O has invested many millions of dollars in great coal-handling docks at Newport News and Toledo to facilitate water shipments to Atlantic and Great Lake ports.

Coal is one natural resource you don't need to worry about. It is the one fuel that will always be plentiful.

Chesapeake and Ohio Railway

**COAL... FUEL OF THE FUTURE**
The Fortnight

As self-appointed saviors of the nation's economy the Democrats have come forward with a series of proposed "emergency" bills to forestall the depression they have been trying to talk us into. These measures, all of an inflationary nature, would boost the minimum wage rate, shorten the work week, broaden the Fair Labor Standards Act to cover several million more workers. The only possible result of such a program would be costlier production, therefore higher prices. Such a program as the Democrats are proposing would simply contribute to the grave crisis they are conjuring on the horizon. Practical observation should have taught them by now that whenever government meddles with the economy, you get exactly the opposite of what you set out to achieve.

The Democrats are rolling election ammunition for next November. They can be expected to make much, in the coming months, of unemployment statistics. The Census Bureau has announced that there were 2,360,000 unemployed in January. These figures are meaningless, unless they are viewed as a percentage of the vast number of employed persons in the United States. They must also be viewed in context with the whole picture of national prosperity.

Industry's expansion, highlighted by General Motors' $2,000,000,000 program, is one factor guaranteeing a high level of income. General Electric is entering the final two years of a postwar billion-dollar expansion program. Westinghouse Electric is engaged in a $300,000,000 increase in output. Bell Telephone spent $1,400,000,000 last year, and intends to proceed at the same rate. The electric power industry will increase its construction in 1954 to $3,000,000,000; and the iron and steel industry will spend another $775,000,000. These expenditures make jobs. So perhaps the Census Bureau should go slow in manufacturing unemployment hysteria propaganda for the Democratic National Committee!

Turkey has already demonstrated in policy and deed its adherence to the free enterprise system. The government has made this even more manifest in a proposal which would authorize foreign companies to develop Turkey's oil resources. After several decades of trying to do the job itself, the government finally admitted that private capital could do it better. This action backs up the words of Turkey's President, Celal Bayar, during a recent visit to New York. The Turks, he said, have "shown the world that the economic system called capitalism which is based on private enterprise is the best system to be employed in rehabilitating a country which is economically backward." Small wonder the Turks are among our most stable allies from both the economic and military points of view, and one of the strongest pillars of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., has told the House Foreign Affairs Committee not to worry about the employment of American Communists at the United Nations. It didn't matter much, he said, because there is "nothing to spy on" at the U.N. Mr. Lodge assured the committee that Communists in the United Nations could not harm American national security. But what about the subtle influence which such Communists can have on the establishment of policy within the U.N. Secretariat? What about the manner in which they can plant fellow-agents in other positions? Espionage, as Mr. Lodge must surely know, is only one facet of Communist activity.

Moscow's enclave in Latin America, Guatemala, has shown its character in two new outrageous actions. First it accused its four neighboring countries of conspiring with the United States toward an invasion "by land, sea, and air." Then it ousted two American correspondents, Sydney Gruson of the New York Times and Marshall Bannell of the National Broadcasting Company—calling Gruson "the most active agent of the campaign of defamation" against Guatemala. Our readers will find, elsewhere in this issue, Nathaniel Weyl's article "Quarantine of Red Guatemala?" These latest events show clearly that we can no longer ignore the extent and arrogance of Communist penetration in the Western Hemisphere, of which Guatemala is the nerve center.
In President Eisenhower's address at the Lincoln Day supper in New York City he made an unexpected modification in a famous remark of Abraham Lincoln. According to the New York Times the President quoted Lincoln as follows: "The legitimate function of government is to do for the individuals that what they cannot do for themselves" (Italics added). We are wondering if perhaps Mr. Eisenhower has developed a generalized antipathy to "which clauses." In the same speech he remarked that "every individual American . . . will have . . . a Big Brother partner in the government." This convinces us that his speech was at least spontaneous. Surely no ghostwriter could have been so ignorant of George Orwell's 1984 as to let him make this horrendous boner.

Columbia University is currently celebrating its two hundredth anniversary under the general title: "Man's Right to Knowledge and the Free Use Thereof." To judge by the first few weeks of ceremony, it would have been more accurately named: "Joseph McCarthy and the Right to the Free Abuse Thereof." Seldom has the collective professorial libido gone off on such an unrestrained jag. Nearly every speaker among the many who have swarmed from all quarters to Morningside Heights has lambasted McCarthy and McCarthyism, openly labeled or politely left implicit.

Now we willingly grant that the Junior Senator from Wisconsin is a formidable man, but we do not believe that he has yet reached an historical rank that deserves quite such an unrelied focus of attention from the world's scholars honoring the bicentennial of a great institution of learning. Even on the announced subject, there are other current problems that might seem to deserve a passing mention from some of the distinguished guests: the status of knowledge and the use thereof in the expanding section of the world taken over by the Soviet empire, for example; totalitarian indoctrination of the young through Communist infiltration of the world's educational system; Communist manipulation of the school systems of France and Italy, and of the many European museums that they now control; concepts evident in Soviet biology, psychology, and sociology, and the Soviet use of statistics; brainwashing as a method of education; what it means to be a student (teacher, scientist) in eastern Europe...

One of the comic features of international Communism is the straight face with which its representatives, Soviet or Chinese or Polish or Czech, scream "illegal" when anything is done not to their liking. The absurd implication is that Communism has always kept within the strictest legal bounds in revolutionary seizures of power and campaigns of organized subversion in foreign countries. In the Communists' upside-down language it is legal for them to press prisoners into their armies but "illegal" for us to give asylum and aid to fugitives from behind the Iron Curtain. The best answer to this kind of nonsense is to turn a deaf ear and press on vigorously with any and all forms of activity which make the Communists angry enough to raise their familiar cry, "illegal."

Why all the fuss and newspaper and pictorial publicity about the twenty-one Americans who deserted to the enemy in Korea? It is regrettable, but scarcely surprising that a few unfortunate men should have succumbed to Communist indoctrination techniques which they were unprepared by education, ill-equipped by nature to resist. Not one of them has given a humanly convincing reason for his action; all have talked like mechanical robots. In view of the more than 21,000 Chinese and North Korean prisoners who made the contrary decision, to say nothing of the still larger number of North Koreans liberated by President Syngman Rhee last June, the figure of these twenty-one deserters to Communism is not impressive. They have regrettably taken a step that automatically metes its own punishment. The hero-type publicity they have received in the American press only feeds their egos and gives their captors the sense of having brought off a neat psychological trick. The best course now is to leave them in silence to their chosen future. And not to forget the thousands who stood the test and came home.

In Horatio Alger's day newsboys rose from rags to riches. The Socialists tell us that they can no longer do that because the big corporations are in a monopolistic combination to hold the newsboys down. If it is really true that fewer newsboys make a go of it than in Alger's time, we don't think this is the explanation. We think it is because life has become too complex, the competition too tough, and the standards for successful newsboys enormously higher. Few of us realize how much the present-day newsboy has to know. For example, how does he know on what corner to stand, and what his probable sales and profits will be there? Of course he can't possibly know these things unless he has mastered calculus and has at least a nodding acquaintance with the Poison law. According to the last July-August issue of the Harvard Business Review (to which every alert newsboy will subscribe) this is how he must figure his probabilistic profit:

\[
E_k = \sum (4m - k)P(m) + \sum 3kP(m) \\
_{m=0}^{\infty} \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \}
Berlin Merry-Go-Round

The divided city of Berlin provided a suitable setting for a conference which, no matter how many vodka parties Molotov and his subordinates might throw, was predestined to be a prolonged diplomatic duel. Agreements on big international issues do not just happen as a result of off-the-cuff exchanges around the conference table. They require careful preparation and a large measure of preliminary understanding as to the terms of the bargain.

There was no such prelude to the Berlin conference. On the basic issue of the reunion of Germany, the exchanges of notes which preceded the meeting had established positions of total and irreconcilable disagreement. Barring an unthinkable lapse into Roosevelt appeasement policy, the United States could not accept the Soviet design of a neutralized Germany, separated from the West and exposed to constant subversive pressure from within by the hard-core Communist nucleus in the Soviet zone.

Nor was there any reason to expect that the Soviet government would acquiesce in the Western design for a Germany united in freedom, and associated with other countries of western Europe in common military, political, and economic institutions. Anthony Eden, speaking for the Western powers, and Molotov set forth these fundamentally opposed views about Germany with hardly the change of a comma.

There is always some danger that the basic issues at an international conference so lavishly reported as this one—including such items as M. Bidault's preference for vodka and the French and Soviet menus at diplomatic dinners—will become blurred. The heart of the Soviet-Western difference about Germany, key issue in the cold war, is summed up in these speeches of Eden and Molotov.

It is evident both from the proceedings at the conference and from every move that has preceded the conference that the Soviet Union cannot tolerate a Germany united in freedom and free to make its own decisions in international affairs. The Western powers cannot contemplate German unity on any other terms. The deadlock seems unbreakable until and unless one side weakens and cracks up.

The technical conduct of the conference on our side has been excellent. Once the conference became inevitable, it was the task of American diplomacy to hold the three-power coalition in line, to be firm in essentials and flexible in nonessentials, to speed up the proceedings as much as possible without giving the impression of wishing to break off the talks on some insufficient pretext, to avoid getting bogged down in the procedural wrangles so beloved of Soviet negotiators. It was not an easy assignment for any diplomat, but Mr. Dulles seems to have passed the test creditably.

The three-power positions were well rehearsed in advance; Bidault and Eden carried the ball for the Western side on important plays without fumbling. One could only wish that Bidault's opening speech, affirming faith in the E.D.C. and "German association with the West" and rejecting the idea of linking up Asiatic with European affairs could be sure of a vote of confidence in the French Chamber of Deputies. Eden presented a flawless, if somewhat frigid and colorless, exposition of the Western point of view about what would constitute free elections in Germany.

Dulles succeeded far better than some of his predecessors in coping with Molotov's delaying tactics. It was a substantial achievement to bring the Soviet Foreign Minister, so eager to talk about anything in the world except Germany, to a clear statement of the unchanged Soviet position on Germany within a week after the opening of the conference. The Secretary of State deserves special congratulation for his characterization as "cruel decisions, occasioned by hatred and bitterness" of such features of the Yalta Agreement as the dismemberment of Germany, the stripping from Germany of all removable assets, and the impression of German labor.

This is the strongest language any Western official has used in denouncing the Yalta decisions; it would have greatly improved the pale and bloodless resolution on this subject that was such an unhappy anti-climax to Eisenhower's first State of the Union message, which seemed to imply flat repudiation of the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements. By sharply criticizing both Yalta and the Treaty of Versailles Dulles exploited the anti-German approach of Molotov and gave useful backing to Chancellor Adenauer, who has staked so much on a pro-Western orientation.

Incidentally, this seems to have been the first time the world heard an American diplomat remind Molotov to his face of his pact with Nazi Germany. "I recall that Mr. Molotov was wrong in October 1939 when he condemned France and Britain as being aggressors and praised Hitlerite Germany as being a peace-seeking country," Mr. Dulles said.

It is always unwise to underestimate the enemy, and Molotov has unmistakably taken advantage of the opportunities of the conference. Moderating the truculence of his previous diplomatic performances, he has been deftly scattering apples of discord all over the Berlin arena. Like a skillful quarterback he has been directing most of his plays against the weak spot in the Western lineup, France. His boldest bid to French neutralist and fellow-traveler opinion was his open suggestion that France quit its Western allies: "France and
the Soviet Union, if they would act jointly, could safeguard the peace of Europe. Their different social systems should not be an insurmountable obstacle to such cooperation.”

One hopes that before the conference is over someone will be rude enough to recall that once before, in 1939, France and the Soviet Union, by acting jointly, had the chance to “safeguard the peace of Europe.” There was even a Franco-Soviet alliance on the record. But Stalin preferred to make his deal with Hitler, and Molotov was soon to exchange toasts with Ribbentrop, to exult in the obliteration of Poland, to send congratulations to the Soviet government’s Nazi partner on the conquest of France. This is something France should remember before it walks open-eyed into any such bear-traps as a new Franco-Soviet entente or a dubious deal for stopping the war in Indo-China.

There never was any chance that the Western statesmen and Molotov would convince or convert each other. The decision as to who won the duel of Berlin will be rendered only after the last talk has been delivered and it becomes clear whether France will go ahead with the policy, staunchly defended by Bidault at Berlin, of accepting Germany as an equal partner in a West European federation.

The “Which Clause”

The dragged-out argument over the Bricker Amendment has, by now, created more sound and fury than enlightenment. Speechifying and haranguing has reached a point where the general public stands by in bewilderment and confusion. Matters are not helped by irresponsible oratory from the sidelines, such as the unfortunate comment by Senator J. William Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, who referred to the proposed amendment as a “retreat from the world.” In the same speech he uttered dark words about the alleged “swinish blight” of “anti-intellectualism” in this country, which he compared to that of Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union.

The kind of headlines this sort of talk makes in Paris, Moscow, and New Delhi can be easily imagined. By comparison, cool analysis of the clauses of the Bricker Amendment is sadly lacking everywhere. Here at home, so much has been said about the so-called “which clause” of the amendment, that its very content has disappeared behind a cloud of allegations and synthetically generated fears, and it seems now lost entirely.

The enemies of the Bricker Amendment have spread the word that this “which clause” amounts to returning to the discarded and impractical conditions of the Articles of Confederation. This would mean that no international treaty or agreement could be entered into until three-quarters of the forty-eight states had given their consent to it. If this were indeed so, it would certainly make for a cumbersome procedure and would in addition handicap the Executive to the point of disaster in its proper constitutional functions.

But does the proposed amendment give the states such broad powers?

As things stand now, the Constitution vests the treaty-making power exclusively in the President and the Senate and expressly denies it to the states. The Bricker Amendment would not change this in the slightest degree. It is only after a treaty had been freely negotiated by the President and approved by the Senate that the Bricker Amendment would have any effect. Under the proposed amendment a treaty, though approved by the Executive, would be void if it should be in conflict with the Constitution. If valid, it may not necessarily be binding internally upon each state of the union. It is with this second point that the hotly debated “which clause” is concerned, and it is in grave need of clarification.

Contrary to most of the talk about it, the “which clause” would not apply unless the treaty affected domestic law in realms beyond federal legislative competence. Only then would legislation on the part of the states be required to bring domestic law into conformity with the terms of the treaty. For example, a treaty might concern a matter on which the Constitution is silent, in which case it would be valid. If it should be in an area in which Congress does not have constitutional power, then state legislation would be required to make the treaty domestic law in that state.

Unfortunately, the forces of sound and fury seem to have succeeded in splitting the Republican Party on the Bricker Amendment issue; they have managed to create the picture that the amendment is somehow designed to slap the wrists of President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles. This interpretation deserves to be debunked before it becomes fossilized into the history books.

The Bricker Amendment is not a device directed against the present Executive. Rather, it is to be viewed as an historic effort to forestall the possibly dangerous ambitions of any Administration that might ride roughshod over the wishes of the people at home.

If the amendment were adopted, the President and the Senate would retain their power to negotiate or ratify treaties. Such treaties will, as they have in the past, become binding on an international level—Senator Fulbright’s words about “retreat from the world” notwithstanding. Whether or not such a treaty then becomes domestic law does not affect its international legality.

Half-understood, misinterpreted, or willfully distorted, the original Bricker Amendment has at last been abandoned. It is hoped that in its rewriting, the provisions at least of the important “which clause,” however worded, will not be sacrificed.
Taxation and Incentives

The time is ripe and overripe for a sweeping revision of the American taxation system, with the objective of restoring the principle of individual incentive. This principle has been gravely compromised by the steady practice (slightly reversed in the proposed current budget) of taking more and more of what the individual may earn through the convenient mechanism of a sharply graduated and ever heavier individual income tax. How far this has gone is evident from a simple comparison.

A single man with an income of $5,000 would have been liable to a tax of $20 when the income levy was first introduced. Now he would have to pay $964, almost fifty times as much. The enormous increase in the burden (out of all proportion to increases in wages, salaries, and prices) is even more striking if one considers what the liability would be on an income of $12,000, which, at a conservative estimate, is about the equivalent of $5,000 in 1913.

The actual working of the progressive income tax has exceeded the gloomiest apprehensions of those who opposed the amendment to the Constitution which made this levy possible. Like many other measures conceived in the beginning as a scheme for harassing the rich, it has become a Frankenstein monster, oppressing the majority of the American people. It has paralyzed initiative, dulled incentive, pillaged the thrifty for the benefit of the thriftless, dried up normal sources of new private investment, and denied to great numbers of Americans in the middle income brackets the opportunity to provide for their years of retirement. This, in turn, has strengthened the movement for handout schemes that inevitably make the individual more and more the ward of the state.

What aggravates the burden of the federal income tax is that many states and some cities have eagerly leaped into the same field. The effect on the taxpayer is that he is constantly obliged to run faster merely to remain in the same place.

It is, of course, to be expected that in an age of global wars and schemes of world conquest through world revolution, taxation in general must be increased. But the apportionment of our federal taxes is in need of overhauling. No large nation relies so heavily as the United States on direct forms of taxation.

The distribution between direct and indirect taxation in Great Britain is about fifty-fifty. The United States, on the other hand, in the budget under consideration, raises 43 per cent of its revenue from the individual income tax, 31 per cent from the corporation income tax, 16 per cent from excise taxes, 6 per cent from customs, 4 per cent from borrowing. The establishment of a reasonable balance between direct and indirect taxation through the institution perhaps of some form of general or discriminating federal sales tax and a corresponding reduction in the rates of income tax would do much to amend this inequitable situation. Other inequities which should be corrected are the capital gains tax and the double taxation of stock dividends. There is no good fiscal reason why anyone should get either a penalty or a reward if he has realized a part of his capital at a gain or a loss. The capital gains tax is a first cousin to that notorious socialist scheme, the capital levy.

And it is nothing less than outrageous that the same income should be taxed twice, first as corporation earnings and then as a dividend paid to an individual recipient. The House Ways and Means Committee has approved a timid alleviation of this injustice. But the double taxation of dividends, like the capital gains tax (which does not exist in Great Britain or in Canada) should go.

Nationalization is not the only means by which our economy could be shifted from an individualist to a collectivist basis. The power to tax, as has been said, is the power to destroy. It is in this field of taxation that the deepest leveling inroads have been made against the right of private property, of superior reward for superior effort and achievement, against that principle that what a man honestly earns should be his own.

It is time for a change along lines compatible with the maintenance of a free economy based on private incentive, private risk, private enterprise.

Preachers of Hate

Patriotism is a noble thing. The true patriot, from Leonidas at Thermopylae to the latest winner of a decoration for exceptional gallantry in Korea, is an admired and cherished memory. Yet peppy old Dr. Samuel Johnson was not being altogether perverse when he wrote in his unique Dictionary that patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel. It is an old trick for a discredited politician to try to divert attention from his sins of omission and commission by beating the nationalist drum as loudly as possible.

The same observation holds good for anti-Communism. Intelligent, clear-sighted, relentless anti-Communism, alert awareness of the Soviet threat from without and the fifth column threat from within—these should be part of the equipment of every patriotic American. But the anti-Communist cause can only suffer from some undesirable camp followers it has attracted. Decent, reasonable anti-Communists should shake off and repudiate these camp followers as emphatically and decisively as possible.

Most obnoxious among these camp followers are those who circulate fantastic falsehoods for the purpose of stirring up suspicion and hatred.
on religious and racial grounds. A good example of this sort of stuff is the sadly misnamed Williams Intelligence Service, which circulates from a California address and is purportedly the handwriting of a Major Williams, a former Counter-Intelligence officer. One shudders at the thought of the kind of reports Counter-Intelligence must have got from this man, if he really was connected with that organization: for the sheet which he publishes easily averages a demonstrable falsehood per sentence.

Three big lies, among a multitude of lesser ones, which this sheet plugs in every issue are: that the Russian Bolshevik Revolution was made by Jews for sinister racial purposes; that “Jewish bankers,” in some mysterious way, are exploiting the Russian people under Communism; and that “as Communists conquered Russia and eastern Europe, they set Zionists up in charge of the key industries, the Red Army, the secret police, the finance and propaganda bureaus.”

Anyone with a reasonable knowledge of Soviet history knows that Jewish Communists have always been bitterly hostile both to the Jewish religion and to Jewish communal aspirations. A large reward could safely be offered for proof that Jewish or any other bankers got anything but liquidation and expropriation out of Communist seizures of power in Russia and elsewhere. And Zionists have been one of many proscribed groups in the Soviet Union throughout the existence of the Soviet regime. Confession of “bourgeois Zionist” sympathies was a regular prelude to the hanging of purged Communists in Czechoslovakia.

Unfortunately many people do not know these simple facts, and sensational charges of Communism as a Jewish plot, the alleged sinister role of “Jewish bankers,” and an imaginary “Communist-Zionist conspiracy” can do as much harm as the ritual murder charge that often served anti-Semitism in the past. What is especially repulsive about these apostles of religious and group hatred is that they pose as authentic American patriots, attacking “subversion.” Of course their preachments of hate are as un-American, as inconsistent with the broad generous idealism of the Declaration of Independence and the great speeches of Abraham Lincoln, as any ideological poison with the Moscow label.

Apart from these deliberate fishers in the foul waters of prejudice and ignorance, the anti-Communist cause derives no benefit from the professed support of assorted busybodies, bigots, and well-meaning but humorless persons like the lady in Indiana who saw the legend of Robin Hood as a secret weapon of the Kremlin. A good slogan for the intelligent anti-Communist would be this paraphrase of Calvin Coolidge’s credo: “Expect to be called a witch-hunter. But don’t be a witch-hunter. Expect to be called hysterical. But don’t be hysterical.”

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**Profit-Seeking Science**

We have grown accustomed to the idea that basic discoveries in science can come only out of university laboratories where dedicated men labor to probe the hidden secrets of nature—without thought of profit. This notion has been going the rounds for such a long time that it’s now boiled down to a formula: enter profit, exit science. Since most of us pride ourselves on living in an age of fundamental research and discovery, the power of that formula has been greater than we realize. It led many of our most distinguished scientists, men who might be expected to know what they were talking about, to guess again and again that because nobody was earning a profit in the Soviet Union, science was booming among the comrades.

Recent evidence on Soviet falsification and regimentation of science has opened the eyes of all but our most frenzied enthusiasts. However, the formula that profitless research is the only kind that can advance the frontiers of knowledge continues to flourish. It is still the handiest stick with which to belabor the free enterprise system in many a campus “liberal” group.

For that reason we offer a double cheer at the news that has come out of the R.C.A. Laboratories at Princeton, New Jersey. For the first time in history man has succeeded in piping the energy of the atom through a circuit to produce electricity directly. There is no need for boilers to produce steam to run turbines to drive dynamos—as in conventional power stations, whether the primary source of energy be coal or fuel oil or, as in the latest atomic reactors, a relatively huge pile of fissionable material. The new atomic cell generates electricity by a method as straightforward as if we were able to convert the energy of rainfall by attaching copper wires to a tin roof during a downpour. A wire is plugged into a piece of radioactive matter, and the current will keep flowing as long as the radioactivity lasts.

The first model of this new source of power uses an isotope of strontium; and such an atomic battery will run for about half the life of the substance, or twenty years. Strontium itself happens to be a waste byproduct of atomic piles, which consume the more costly radioactive isotope of uranium. Even more amazing than this, however, is the fact that the atomic cell utilizes still another invention that came out of an industrial laboratory, the transistor. This atomic cell, revolutionary as it is in principle, at its present stage produces only about a millionth of a watt of electrical power; its utility is just about detectable now, and profit from it is entirely in the future. So we should like to put this question to the campus “liberals.” How come it was produced by scientists engaged in a profit-seeking enterprise?
A Double Standard for Immunity?

By C. DICKERMAN WILLIAMS

Among the “controversial” measures expected to arouse “notable debate” at the present session of Congress are several generally referred to as immunity bills. These would enable grand juries and congressional committees to compel the testimony of witnesses to Communist infiltration and espionage, despite the plea of self-incrimination. In return, they would grant witnesses immunity from prosecution for any matter concerning which they had testified. In this way investigation could proceed without major frustration by the Fifth Amendment—the celebrated provision of the Constitution that “in a criminal case” no one may be required to testify against himself.

The serious opposition to such bills stems not from those who fear the escape of the guilty but from those concerned with the possible impairment of constitutional rights. Oddly enough, this anxiety is voiced by the very element of public opinion that only a few years ago appeared in general to regard the Constitution rather lightly, as an obsolete document that obstructed the people’s will. The Fifth Amendment was especially unfashionable. But in 1947 congressional committees began to probe deeply into Communism and espionage, and witnesses invoked the Fifth Amendment with increasing frequency. Thereupon occurred what was to the plodding constitutionalist an amazing reversal in intellectual fashion. Those who had come to scoff at the Constitution remained to pray.

To those who have believed in the Constitution all along, this swarm of worshippers, although most gratifying, is a little disconcerting. Unfortunately, there are none so righteous as the newly converted. The danger now is that this sudden passion for the Constitution may lead to a sweeping away of the balances that have been worked out during centuries of trial and error in the reconciliation of the safety of the community with the protection of individual rights.

One such balance, whose history in the United States goes back almost one hundred years and in Great Britain far longer, is the compulsory testimony immunity act. The Constitution’s new friends are apparently unaware of this tradition, for there runs through their criticism a suggestion that there is something novel about such legislation—that it is an untried experiment with which we should proceed most cautiously, if at all. Their ignorance is particularly remarkable in view of the fact that during the Administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt immunity acts poured forth in a torrent. Almost all the New Deal statutes regulating business included immunity clauses, provisions that went through without a ripple of protest. It is probably because the business community so quietly accepted immunity legislation during the New Deal that the present bills are widely regarded as unique.

When Witnesses Were Immune

In the United States the first measure to require testimony despite the Fifth Amendment, but providing immunity in exchange, was the Act of January 24, 1857, applicable only to congressional investigations. It was occasioned by the obduracy of Mr. James N. Simonton, Washington correspondent of the New York Times, who refused to reveal to a congressional investigating committee the identity of the source of one of his dispatches. This statute gave congressional investigations an excessive popularity. Miscreants, we are told, flocked to the Capitol, told their stories, and acquired immunity. The climax came when John B. Floyd, Secretary of War in the cabinet of President Buchanan, defied prosecution for various irregularities on the ground that he had testified about them to Congress. The statute was then revised, in 1862, as unduly lenient, and amended to provide not that the witness should be immune from prosecution, but only that his testimony could not be used against him.

In 1868 Congress enacted a law providing in substance with respect to court testimony what the Act of 1862 provided with respect to congressional testimony, namely, that testimony could be compelled despite the Fifth Amendment, but that the testimony so compelled could not be used elsewhere. The stage was now set for some twenty years of sensational legislation and litigation over the Fifth Amendment and immunity.

After the Civil War there was increasing agitation over railroad favoritism to large shippers and the rise of great corporations. Congress responded with the Interstate Commerce Act (1887) and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (1890) forbidding rate discrimination and unreasonable corporate combinations. Prosecutors summoned shippers and
He said in part:

There ensued a widespread public demand for a statute broad enough to compel testimony despite the Fifth Amendment. The railroads and the trusts were denounced. Combinations and conspiracies were denounced. The limitations of the Constitution were also denounced. It is some indication of the speed with which public opinion could be mobilized against the erring businessman, even in the horse-and-buggy days, that a sweeping immunity provision was added to the Interstate Commerce Act in February 1893, only thirteen months after the Supreme Court decision.

Nevertheless a railroad auditor, despite the immunity provision, pleaded the Fifth Amendment and refused to testify. In 1896 the Supreme Court finally denied his application for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that if he had immunity a recalcitrant witnesses could be compelled to testify. The opinion discusses at length and overrules arguments that one hears today. To the complaint that his testimony would expose the witness to disgrace, the Court said:

The safety and welfare of an entire community should not be put into the scale against the reputation of a self-confessed criminal, who ought not, either in justice or good morals, to refuse to disclose that which may be of great public utility, in order that his neighbors may think well of him.

There is a certain refreshing candor about this statement. After all, what right has a man, who affirmatively represents that he is a criminal in order to gain an advantage, to demand a further advantage lest his reputation suffer? He has not got much reputation left to lose.

In 1903 Congress provided immunity for witnesses testifying with respect to violations of the Anti-Trust Act. The businessmen nevertheless continued to struggle, and some additional years of legislation and litigation were required properly to delimit the Fifth Amendment, Grand Jury powers, and immunity provisions. One episode harked back to Secretary Floyd. A member of the Armour family got immunity through official inadvertence and thereby avoided a “Beef Trust” prosecution by President Theodore Roosevelt. There was widespread indignation, and the immunity statute was tightened to avoid such miscarriages in the future.

By 1910 the substantive and procedural law was apparently settled. Congress and the Department of Justice had learned how to get the testimony of conspirators. A section became customary in statutes forbidding various types of action. Twenty-four statutes, containing compulsory testimony-immunity clauses, were enacted from 1910 to 1942. These statutes for the most part regulated the business community, and included the New Deal acts dealing with investments, shipping, bituminous coal, labor relations, social security, and price control. The Mann White Slave Act and the National Prohibition Act also had such clauses.

Arguments Against the Privilege

During the years of controversy over self-incrimination and immunity in railroad discrimination and anti-trust prosecutions there was, of course, active public discussion of the considerations involved. A similar discussion accompanied the constant pleading of the privilege in the investigations of municipal corruption that occurred in the early part of the century. In these discussions leading intellectual commentators usually took a hostile attitude toward the privilege. Their arguments appear applicable to the Communist conspiracy of the present day.

For instance, Professor Terry, writing in the Yale Law Journal, earnestly demanded that the privilege be wholly abolished. He said in part:

Today . . . the crimes most prevalent and injurious to the community are crimes of a fraudulent and secret nature, generally with an element of conspiracy or combination in them. . . Such crimes are easy to cover up by various innocent looking devices, and in fact are rarely punished. The facts are usually known only to the criminals or their accomplices, who cannot be compelled to testify as the law now is...

Judge Samuel Seabury, foe of municipal corruption in New York City, exclaimed sarcastically:

As we look at some of the uses which the criminal classes have made of constitutional provisions, one might suppose that the far-seeing barons who wrung the Great Charter from King John at Runnymede were intent upon safeguarding the twentieth century racketeer, gangster, kidnapper, gunman, and corrupt political leader in the prosecution of their sinister vocations. . . Let me refer to the privilege against self-incrimination. It is not derived from Magna Charta, Bill of Rights, or other charters which have involved the progress of English liberty. . . As the privilege now exists in our state constitutions, it is a deterrent to the proper administration of public justice.

Presumably under the impact of reasoning comparable to that of the foregoing quotations, the Supreme Court said in 1937:

This [privilege against compulsory self-incrimination] too might be lost, and justice still be done. Indeed, today as in the past there are students of our penal system who look upon the [privilege] as a mischief rather than a benefit, and who would limit its scope, or destroy it altogether. . . Justice, however, would not perish if the accused were subject to a duty to respond to orderly inquiry.

This belittling language was written by Judge
Cardozo; it was agreed to by Judges Hughes, Stone, Brandeis, Roberts, and even the pious Black.

In the light of what we have now learned about totalitarianism, it is clear that these eminent scholars and jurists were wrong when they were so ready to abandon the privilege against self-incrimination. The privilege must be retained. That, however, does not mean that we should now discard the formulae by which individuals were protected and yet conspiracies suppressed. As the Supreme Court rhetorically asked in 1906 when a witness in an anti-trust suit refused to answer despite immunity: "Of what use would it be for the legislature to declare these combinations unlawful if the judicial power may close the door of access to every available source of information on the subject?"

It is difficult to find words that do not sound ironical to say that the suppression of Soviet espionage is as important as free competition in interstate commerce or honesty in the sale of bituminous coal. If there was no violation of civil liberties in adopting immunity statutes to secure the good behavior of businessmen, there can be no valid objection to similar legislation to enable the detection of traitors and spies.

**Operation Penny-Pinching**

**By LT. F. R. BUCKLEY and CHARLES ZIMMERMAN**

The President's recent defense budget will provide an answer, in part at least, to the frequent charge of waste in the armed services. Less heralded has been the answer already provided by a number of Air Force bases both here and abroad, which put into effect some time ago their own economy programs. With one of these the present writers are, by close personal experience, well acquainted. We write of it not to boast, but to show the critics who have cried "waste!"—and they have been many and severe—not only what can be done, but what has already been accomplished.

One of us is a second lieutenant, the other a civil service employee. Our sympathies lie with the philosophy of small government and the tight purse. We are not official propagandists, and the opinions and views expressed in this article do not necessarily represent those of the Air Force.

Olmsted Air Force Base at Middletown, Pennsylvania, is pinching pennies, in spite of formidable obstacles. Middletown is only one unit in the Air Force, but it is larger than many giant industries. Its operating costs total more than $11,000,000 a month. Its job covers the fifteen northeastern states, the North Atlantic Treaty nations, Greece, and Turkey. Its warehouses receive and issue more goods than the largest mail order house. It is a world-wide distributor.

There is waste at Middletown, but it is not intentional. There is red tape. But every business has rules of conduct for its own protection. In the Air Force these are known as regulations—which sometimes prescribe a roundabout way of doing something in words nobody understands—but which are intended for the protection of the Air Force and of the taxpayers. Regulations are designed to eliminate mistakes, and in a unit the size of Middletown, one mistake can be magnified many times.

Middletown started as a World War One base, was expanded during World War Two, and played a vital role in the Berlin airlift and in the air war over Korea. Its personnel rolls were cut, enlarged, then cut again. Key workers left government service for private aircraft industries eager to get trained technicians. Through all these fluctuations, Middletown kept in step with big 'business by overhauling its accounting systems and warehouse programs. Manual methods were succeeded by mechanization; electronic equipment now does work once done by a corps of employees, with consequent savings in man hours. Other changes are in the mill.

**World-Wide Supply Problems**

What Middletown is doing is being repeated at the various Air Force bases throughout the world. These bases are operated by military and civilian workers who are as interested in seeing where their tax dollars go as other taxpayers who work in stores and factories. They are being taught that public money is their money.

At Middletown supply problems are multiplied a thousandfold because of far-flung activities. Some articles are sought by bases in the Arctic, where cold is the enemy. Others go to the South Pacific, where the bases must reckon with heat and humidity. Equipment which does not work
properly under the conditions imposed by location is worthless. Most supplies, therefore, are packed for shipment anywhere—with cost proportionally higher than if packed for just one area.

In one field Middletown civilians have helped to cut this Gordian knot. They have eliminated heavy packaging and corrosion treatment of new instruments which are to be installed immediately in aircraft. This saving represents $46,000 a year at Middletown alone.

A series of controls set up by the military chief of the supply directorate (“red tape,” again) has cut the backlog of work from 22.6 days to 3.7 days in eight months, and cut processing time of line items from 2.86 man hours to 1.90 man hours—not bad when you consider that the work load increased from 127,858 items per month to 181,117 items.

Savings to the Taxpayer

Middletown's fuels and lubricants division alone is a $400,000,000 business. It buys yearly enough oil and gasoline to enable every automobile in the United States to travel 1,000 miles. Consumption of aircraft fuels is increasing steadily, and reached 2,041,996,404 gallons during 1953. The work load has increased in proportion, but the personnel required to do the job is remaining stationary.

Picking at random, three other examples of savings to the taxpayer show the efforts of the Air Force and of Middletown to conserve the dollar and at the same time provide a more effective supply procedure. For years it was customary to supply one government terminal on the Gulf Coast by means of oceangoing barges. Somebody got the idea that T-2 tankers could do the job better. A test was made, and it was found that only two tankers could replace numerous barges. The savings run into thousands of dollars monthly.

Another instance concerned an overseas shipment of drummed fuel, which was to have been shipped first from the Gulf area to the West Coast at a cost of $700,000 for transportation alone. Cooperation between the military units involved allowed the shipment to be made from Los Angeles. The resulting economy on this one deal netted Uncle Sam $500,000 in loose change to jingle in his pockets.

An improved program for use of storage terminals has lowered the per-barrel costs on fuel handled. It is estimated that 25,000,000 barrels will go through storage lines at a cost of nine cents per barrel less in 1954 than in 1953, an economy of $2,250,000 in through-put costs alone.

Mighty fine, you say, but how about the examples of glaring waste that are uncovered every day? How about the overprocurement of electronic equipment? How about the 10,000 miles of chain link fence you don’t need? Aren't economy efforts largely nullified by such mistakes?

We blush. Maybe for every ten dollars saved in one base, another base is wasting ten. Some men in uniform are still living in a golden world where budgets are for accountants, not for warriors. But the Air Force is trying to meet that situation, too. At Middletown a full-scale program to teach better management is in operation. This course is aimed at rising young executives, at the future of the Air Force. Any program involving as many as 10,000 workers is a big order. Selection of key men from such a group is difficult in itself. Getting those men interested in a theoretical study is still harder. But the project is starting to pay off. It has justified itself by the fact that of the $51,674,285 operational budget projected for Middletown Depot this past fiscal year, $47,210,554 was spent. That’s a saving of $4,463,731.

One thing many people forget is that the budget must be prepared three years in advance and therefore is subject to the vagaries of the world situation; the slightest quiver in the international wave length is disastrous to economical planning. In 1949 the armed forces were emasculated. From 1950 to 1952, a gigantic expansion was ordered, with heavy mobilization projected for the near future. In 1953 there was a cut-back. When such radical changes occur within a short time, it is not easy to avoid charges of overprocuring, overstocking, overspending.

There are motes in our eyes, but not cataracts. The public can help us clear up the conditions which produce waste by pointing them out wherever they are found.

Shadow or None

Beneath the blizzards that stride the world
The sleeping groundhog is snugly curled:
Who knows what blossoms of clover gleam
Across the field of his winter dream?

At least we know that no helter-skelter
Drifts can invade his frostproof shelter.
Wind and snow may hold fiesta—
They cannot disturb such deep siesta;
As cushioned and deep as the rooted flower,
He slumbers cozy beyond their power.

And yet when the suns of February
Warm the boughs of the chill wild-cherry,
And a secret nudge disturbs the world
Deep where the sleeping rose lies furled,
The groundhog opens his drowsy eyes
And ambles out for a look at the skies.

Shadow or none, may the groundhog find
The sun come near and the wind grown kind;
Shadow or none, may Nature say—
With a nod toward spring—“Happy Groundhog Day!”

E. MERRILL ROOT
England After Austerity

By FRED A UTLEY

Despite recent signs of prosperity, economic progress in Britain is threatened by a continuing demand for higher wages, coupled with excessive production costs.

London

The age of austerity is past in England. After fourteen years of rationing and stifling controls on almost every economic activity, the British public is today enjoying a well-earned spree. One can hardly walk along Regent Street or Oxford Street these first days of the New Year, so great is the crowd of shoppers. Entering a store to take part in the battle for bargains is an ordeal few Americans would face even though fur coats, woolen suits, and shoes of good quality can be bought cheaper than in New York.

The best restaurants serve a meal as good or better than in Paris for far less money. All places of entertainment are crammed. Unlimited supplies of Scotch whiskey are again available, and the price is about the same as in America. Food prices have risen as a result of the withdrawal or reduction of subsidies and the derationing of all but a few items, but you can now buy all you want of almost everything except butter at prices lower than those which prevailed in the black market before derationing.

Dr. Ludwig Erhard's remedy, which worked "the miracle" of West German recovery, has been applied to Britain with some of the same good results. Price controls over a wide range of commodities have been abolished and private trading restored. Imports from all sources are no longer a state monopoly, and market prices are now allowed to have a greater influence on the distribution of available resources. There has been a 25 per cent cut in purchase taxes on a wide range of consumer goods, and the standard rate of income tax has been reduced to sixpence on the pound. Some two million wage earners have been exempted from income tax, and another two million pay far less than before. Depreciation allowances have been restored with the hope that this may encourage the installation of more modern machinery.

Unfortunately, either because too small a dose of the Erhard medicine has been given, or because the British patient reacts differently as a result of the debilitating effect of the welfare state regime under which he used to live, the Conservative government's attempt to emulate West Germany is threatened with failure. Its efforts to stimulate enterprise and increase labor productivity, by affording material rewards for greater endeavor, may be wrecked by the demand for higher wages. The fact that prosperity seems to have returned to Britain, coupled with the rise in basic food prices and the opportunity to buy more of everything everybody wants, has removed the barriers which held back the pent-up demand for goods and for the higher wages required to buy them. In England, where the "right" to security has become accepted doctrine, and where no one any longer fears destitution even if he doesn't work at all, the partial restoration of a free market economy threatens disaster.

Fear of Increasing Production

Whereas in Germany as in America, both labor and management think mainly in terms of increasing productivity and the total national income, in Britain not only labor, but also employers, conceive it as their main interest to fight over the division of a cake which they envisage as more or less constant in size. True that, as a Treasury official said to me: "Everyone preaches the right doctrine, namely, that increased production should be the aim; but when it comes to action old attitudes and prejudices prevail." In this connection one has to take into account the fact that there was widespread unemployment in Britain long before the world economic crisis began in 1929. It is therefore natural, however regrettable, that British workers are obsessed with the fear that if they produce more they will eventually find themselves unemployed. And many employers seem disinclined to introduce new methods of production requiring both large capital expenditure and a new outlook, either because taxation takes away too large a proportion of their profits, or because it is easier to sell to the protected home market or the sterling area than to compete in the world market.

Demands for higher wages, and the threat of strikes to obtain them, are now jeopardizing the increased prosperity—which would seem to be the main cause for labor unrest. And one cannot simply blame the trade unions. For it would seem that in precisely those unions whose leaders and members have shown the greatest regard for the national interest members' wages are, or have been, most out of line. One example is the railway workers, awarded a four-shilling increase just
before Christmas after they threatened to strike. Generally speaking, the British workingman seems to have abstained from striking so long as he considered that it was necessary in the national interest, and so long as, at least in theory, everyone was living under an austerity regime. It can, of course, be argued that he refrained from strikes simply because until 1951 strikes were prohibited under the “Conditions of Employment and National Arbitration” order. However, it is a fact that this wartime law was prolonged by the Labor government with the consent of the trade unions. Moreover, even after 1951 there was a general tendency to accept the recommendations of the independent tribunals set up under the Industrial Disputes Order promulgated by the Labor government. Abstinence from strike action was in any case made acceptable by the fact that under the Labor government wage increases were greater than the rise in productivity, since need rather than economic realities determined awards so long as Britain’s welfare state was subsidized by America. Most important of all was the fact that basic foods were rationed and sold at very low prices, thanks to subsidies made possible by American aid. Many or most working-class families were better nourished than ever before, both during and after the war, thanks to rationing and price controls.

U. S. Subsidized Welfare State

As the Economist has pointed out, it is unfortunate for the Conservative government (endeavoring both to restore a free economy and make England independent of American subsidies) that “Labor should have run through its term of office without being compelled by economic circumstances to stand up to the unions.” It is perhaps even more unfortunate that the reduction of American aid to Europe should coincide with the end of Labor rule in Britain. For in effect this means that, whereas a near-Socialist British “welfare state” was liberally supported by American subsidies under the New Deal Administrations in Washington, the British Tories who are trying to restore a free-enterprise economy are receiving comparatively little help from our Republican Administration.

Although most trade union leaders would appear to be intelligent men who realize that wage increases unaccompanied by increased productivity may wreck Britain’s barely solvent economy, they cannot afford to ignore the pressure of the rank and file or the challenge of the Communists, who represent the employers as “the enemy” and point to the high profits earned in some industries, while obscuring the fact that taxation draws off the greater part of such profits into the national exchequer. The Communists are today spearheading the strike movement through the Electrical Workers Trade Union which they control and whose President, Frank Foulker, has proclaimed that “We are out to hurt the employers.” Since Britain has no Taft-Hartley Law, the Communists have influence in other unions as well as among the intellectuals of the Left, whose views are most clearly voiced by the New Statesman and by Aneurin Bevan’s Tribune, but also find expression in the “capitalist press.”

Talking to an English journalist the other day, I was informed of a curious factor which plays a large part in present labor disputes. He said that although the Tory government has abolished or substantially reduced taxation on small incomes, this has not produced any beneficial results or increased popularity for the Conservatives among the workers. Although the reduction in taxation more than outweighs the rise in food prices, working-class wives complain bitterly at the rise in the cost of living for the simple reason that their husbands give them only the same amount of money as before their take-home pay was increased. In other words, the tax relief afforded workers has led mainly to increased consumption of tobacco and liquor and more betting on the horses and the dogs.

To an American this seems fantastic. Among us everyone, including wives, knows roughly what a man earns whether he be a manual worker, clerk, civil servant, or business executive. But in Britain the income of the head of the family is a jealously guarded secret and no one properly brought up would ever dream of inquiring how much friends and relatives earn. Most wives do not know what their husbands earn (and are precluded from finding out by a complicated wage structure), so they have no idea that the Conservative government has increased their income.

Commenting on this peculiarly English phenomenon to an old friend of mine who is a member of the Labor Party and a lifelong Socialist, I was told: “Everyone knows that the Labor Party lost the last election because the women voted against the Labor government, in spite of wage increases, because of rising food prices unaccompanied by larger allowances from their husbands.”

There you have it. At every point where you try to understand what’s wrong with Britain you come up against some old-fashioned prejudices, practices, and attitudes. Long ago Nansen, the Arctic explorer, when asked where during his travels he had suffered most from the cold, replied: “In an English hotel bedroom.” No doubt the British system of heating with open fires was all right so long as people could waste coal. But today few can afford to do so.

The British not only love their ancient ways; they actually consider them superior. Thus one finds Americans who love England, or at least respect her, tearing their hair at the refusal of the English to learn better methods of production.
If the English had been compelled to face up to the realities of the world situation, instead of having received so much American aid that they did not need to do so, their innate courage and hardiness might have saved them. As things are, the majority of the British people remain in ignorance of their country's reduced circumstances. They simply do not know that the standard of life to which they are accustomed cannot even be maintained, far less improved, unless Britain produces more cheaply than in the past.

A Double-Indemnity State Department

By M. K. ARGUS

Mr. James Reston has come up with a suggestion in the New York Times that the United States government have two Secretaries of State instead of one. This is a most remarkable idea. Mr. Reston, already a Pulitzer Prize winner, deserves a bigger and better prize now.

This is exactly what our country needs—a double-headed State Department, or, better still, a double-indemnity State Department. Something of the sort has already been tried out and, I understand, rather successfully. In Belgium there are two Ministers of Foreign Affairs; one in charge of the Foreign part, the other in charge of the Affairs part. It works. I don't know whether the Ministers work, but the system certainly does.

For the United States the system would be a blessing in disguise—in two disguises, I mean. For one thing, we could get a truly bipartisan State Department, with a Republican and a Democrat as co-Secretaries of State. President Eisenhower could reappoint Dean Acheson to serve as Secretary of State alongside John Foster Dulles and the harmony would be edifying.

A double-headed Department of State would also eliminate a great deal of confusion, waste, and duplication. For instance, under the present set-up, the Secretary of State makes a statement one day and denies it the following day. This would not happen if we had two Secretaries of State: both statement and denial would be issued simultaneously by the respective Secretaries.

The other day the Defense Department had to cancel a television showing of films depicting Communist atrocities in Korea because the State Department was afraid that this would undermine the possibility of successful negotiations with the Soviet Union and its Communist satellites. If we had two Secretaries, that would never happen. One Secretary would be afraid of the Communists' reaction to our showing of Red atrocity films, and the other Secretary would not be afraid; one would issue an order to cancel the showing of the films, and the other would issue an order to proceed with the showing. The Defense Department would then say, "A plague on both your Secretaries," and show the film at once—not belatedly, as it finally did.

With two Secretaries of State the problem of Senator Joseph McCarthy would be solved in no time. Now, with a single Secretary, one man has to do all the work: he has to deny that there are any subversives left in the State Department, and he also has to discharge all the subversives that, according to him, are no longer left in the State Department. With two Secretaries it would be a cinch: one could always deny and the other could always fire. Senator McCarthy then would have to look into other fields of investigation and leave the State Department alone.

It would also be easier to regulate our relations with our own allies. That is where Mr. Reston's idea is especially valuable. In our dealings with our allies we really need a double-indemnity Department of State, for our friends will never remain satisfied with a single-indemnity American foreign policy. Some of our friends like our enemies better than they like us. They are annoyed with our refusal to make friends with our enemies. Two Secretaries of State would come in very handy in this case. One could treat our enemies as friends to the satisfaction of our allies; the other could treat our friends as enemies to the satisfaction of Moscow and her puppets, and everybody would be very happy.

It would be much easier for us to deal with the Soviet Union and other Iron Curtain countries if we had two Secretaries of State. Now, whenever the Kremlin proposes discussion of certain issues, the Secretary of State says: "We shall not enter into any negotiations with the U.S.S.R. until the Soviet government shows by deed its good intentions." Then, without waiting for the Soviet government to show by deed (or even by word) its good intentions, the State Department agrees to hold discussions. If we had two Secretaries of State, one could wait until Moscow showed by deed its good intentions, and the other could, in the meantime, negotiate with the Russians. There would be no loss of face. One or two countries, perhaps, would be lost to the Communists, but our State Department ought to be used to that by now.

The success of such parleys as the Berlin Conference of the Big Four Council of Foreign Ministers would be assured in advance. One Secretary of State could sit at the table with Mr. Molotov, the other could sit on the fence. One Secretary could agree to the participation of Red China in the discussions, the other Secretary could go back to Washington for consultations.

A brilliant idea. Mr. Reston's! He hit the nail on the head—on both heads, that is.
Quarantine of Red Guatemala?

By NATHANIEL WEYL

Communist control of this strategic Caribbean country will pose a question to the meeting of the Organization of American States in March.

When the Tenth Congress of the Organization of American States (O.A.S.) meets in Caracas next month, the most important single issue before it will be whether or not to impose political and economic sanctions against the government of Guatemala. While the power for such action has been explicitly affirmed by the Western Hemisphere nations, hitherto it has lain dormant. If Guatemala is quarantined, long-established precedents will be broken. But today Guatemala is a radiating center for the expansion of Communism throughout the Caribbean, and its government is fast becoming a mere projection of Soviet power. To prevent such collective action, the regime published on January 28 a false charge that the United States is plotting armed invasion.

The Guatemalan revolution of 1944 ended a dictatorship. The new regime at first assumed a liberal and nationalist guise. But during nine years of power, the Communist Party has moved steadily toward open leadership. It has progressively driven out the moderate elements that supported the 1944 coup. Moderate leader Cordova Cerna was arrested last April on suspicion of counter-revolutionary plotting, held incommunicado, tortured, and dumped across the Honduran border. Another victim was Colonel Arana, Army Chief of Staff and a member of the original revolutionary triumvirate. He was assassinated, and it is reported that his murderers were appointed to high government posts.

There is still an opposition press in Guatemala. But at least two anti-Communist leaders, Lemke and Meono, have been killed, and more than eighty-five prominent oppositionists have been jailed. Political suspects have been "shot while attempting to escape." Others have had the bones of their hands smashed by sledgehammers. Recently, a Guatemalan who congratulated President Eisenhower for his opposition to Soviet penetration was arrested for "traitorous" plotting. Anti-Communism is evidently considered subversion.

The Guatemalan Constitution bars internationally controlled political parties. The Communist Party, accordingly, changed its name to the Labor Party and the government was quick to accept the subterfuge for the substance.

The first nucleus of Red power was the trade unions. Shortly after the revolution, Lombardo Toledano, Mexican leader of the Communist-dominated Federation of Latin American Workers, went to Guatemala to direct local Communists in building a labor movement. The result was the C.G.T., which today has nearly 100,000 members, dominates the basic industries, is supported to the hilt by the government, and led by Victor Manuel Gutierrez—probably the ablest Communist in Guatemala. Threatened by an army revolt in 1949, the government gave weapons to the trade unionists. Since these arms have never been returned, the C.G.T. must be regarded as a paramilitary force under the direction of the Communist Party.

Communists have taken key positions in the government, the peasant federation, and the supposedly independent Party of the Guatemalan Revolution (P.R.G.). Recently, one of the leaders of this majority political movement expressed the hope that it would some day dissolve and form part of the "world Communist Party."

Communists Control Government Propaganda

Presiding over this bizarre regime is President Jacobo Arbenz, a professional soldier who is an earnest student of Marxism, a foe of "American imperialism," and a man who believes that "there is no middle ground today in Guatemala." Arbenz subsidizes the two Communist papers, and has placed Reds in control of the nation's press and radio propaganda. Soviet films on Korean "germ warfare" were carried on government trucks and shown in the public schools, whereas American anti-Communist films have been banned. Henry Winston and Gilbert Green, top American Communists who jumped bail following their 1950 conviction for seditious conspiracy, have reportedly found refuge in Guatemala.

Contacts between the world Communist movement and its Guatemala outpost are maintained by a constant interflow of leaders. Castillo Flores, boss of Guatemala's powerful peasant federation, was sent to admire the wonders of the Soviet fatherland. In addition to Lombardo Toledano, Pablo Neruda of Chile and Hubner of the Cominform have made protracted visits to Guatemala to advise the labor movement and the government. The country has become both a haven and a training ground for the Communists of Central America, the Antilles, Venezuela, and Brazil. It is the primary base for plots, infiltration, and insurrec-
tionary projects for the Caribbean and Panama Canal area. Even Guatemala's diplomatic representatives have been ejected from neighboring countries for their interference in local affairs and dissemination of Communist propaganda.

The regime has been held together by the fact that the long-range objectives of Guatemala's ultra-nationalists coincide with the short-run tactics of the Communist Party.

The most decisive step in the country's social revolution was the Agrarian Reform Law of June 17, 1952. During World War Two the Guatemalan government seized the lucrative German coffee estates and thus became the nation's chief landowner. German interests brought suit before the International Court of Justice in The Hague for recovery of their property. To forestall this, President Arbenz pushed through a law providing for distribution of these lands to the peasants.

The Agrarian Reform Law has few of the earmarks of Communist legislation. It permits expropriation of unused land in great estates, but specifically exempts acreage used to produce basic export and industrial crops. The seized land is to be rented by the state or transferred to farmers. The latter pay the government a modest 3 to 5 per cent of the harvest annually, and collectivization does not seem to be in view.

The Communists proposed to Arbenz that the Agrarian Reform Law be used to expropriate the uncultivated acreage of the United Fruit Company, and the President accepted the suggestion. United Fruit was stripped of 235,000 acres at Tiquisate on the Pacific Coast and faces loss of an additional 195,000 acres on the Atlantic. The Company believed that this seizure was illegal even under the Agrarian Reform Law and appealed to the Guatemalan Supreme Court for an injunction. When this was granted, Arbenz recommended and the Congress approved dismissal of the Supreme Court justices and their replacement by pliant politicians. The ouster was flagrantly illegal, as the constitution permits Congress to remove justices only for reasons of "crime, notoriously bad conduct, or manifest incapacity."

In the congressional debate on the removal of the judges, Communist leader Gutierrez announced a new principle of revolutionary law: "A people cannot live subordinated to a constitution." Increasingly, this doctrine that the justification of law is expediency has dominated the actions of the Guatemalan government. The fact that the Agrarian Reform Law contains safeguards is no longer relevant, since they are habitually disregarded. The law provides for fair compensation to former owners. United Fruit valued its seized land at $11,500,000, but what it received was $594,572, and even this in twenty-five-year bonds.

The economic consequences of the expropriation of United Fruit's banana lands will be fortunate for Guatemala. In the virgin plains opened up largely through its efforts, the United Fruit Company spent immense sums on drainage, road building, and combatting tropical diseases. It provided its workers with high wages by Guatemalan standards, subsistence plots, free education, and free medical care. Expropriation means condemning most of the area to jungle. The government cannot afford to develop this land merely for corn cultivation and cattle raising. It cannot organize its own banana industry because it lacks technical and managerial personnel, not to mention ships for exporting the bananas.

War on American Power Company

The process of nationalization has spread to the $60,000,000 International Railways of Central America and the U.S.-owned power company. The combined operation against the latter has a distinctly Kafka flavor. With growing demand for power, the company planned large capital investment in new hydro-electric stations. In 1952, it increased wages 20 per cent to the highest in Guatemala, leaving investors a modest return of 5 per cent. However, the power workers were ordered out on strike after Communist Party leader Fortuny's demand for "intensification of the struggle against foreign monopolies." The strike was followed by government intervention and seizure of the company's books. Then, in a 600-page report, Labor Minister Alfonso Bauer Palz declared that the enterprise could "unquestionably" afford both to raise wages 100 per cent and to reduce rates by one cent per kilowatt hour. At the same time, he demanded a payment of $3,000,000 to the government for alleged back taxes.

This is not all. Guatemala is considering a Five Year Plan for power development. One of its main features is to divert the course of the Michetoya River and impound its waters for a public power station. This diversion would leave two of the company's hydro-electric plants stranded on the dry stream-bed, and deprive Guatemala of about half of her installed generating capacity. There is no economic justification for this, as the country has abundant water-power resources.

The aim is to sever economic ties with the United States and thus remove the main block to intensification of the revolution. Since the United States normally takes 90 per cent of Guatemala's exports and supplies 70 per cent of her imports, this is a major surgical operation. Whether the ultimate purpose is to create a hermit state or impose a shotgun wedding between Guatemala and the Soviet bloc, only the leaders of Guatemalan Communism know.

The country has survived these and other economic wrecking activities because of the coffee inflation. Prices in Central America advanced from ten cents a pound in 1937 to fifty-seven cents in 1953. As coffee constitutes about 70 per
percent of Guatemala’s exports, the latter increased fivefold in value between 1937 and 1952. This has enabled the government to operate on a balanced budget, to curb inflation, to hold strong gold and foreign exchange reserves, and to weather a 1952 short-term capital flight of $13,700,000. Where other Central American Republics have used the coffee bonanza to develop new industries, transportation, and modern schools, Guatemala has thrown this chance away to follow the road of economic disaster and political servitude.

The Latin American Republics are awakening to the potential menace of Communism in Guatemala. Last summer the Organization of American States met to consider the problem. With Guatemala absent, it unanimously condemned international Communism and proposed concerted measures “to prevent, counteract, and to establish penalties with respect to subversive activities of Communist agents and to take steps to prevent unlawful use of travel documents”; to prevent circulation of Communist propaganda; to exchange information concerning Soviet agents; and to prohibit “the exportation of strategic materials to countries dominated by Communist governments.” On November 10, 1953, the Latin American countries voted nineteen to one, with Guatemala in opposition, to place the issue of Communism on the agenda of the forthcoming Caracas conference.

The 1947 Rio Treaty of Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance, which Guatemala signed but did not ratify, deems consultation appropriate if the “political independence of any American state should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack... or by any other fact or situation which might endanger the peace of America.” The concerted measures listed range from recall of diplomatic missions to “partial or complete interruption of economic relations” and, finally, “use of armed force.”

Today’s political environment is favorable to strong action. Communist influence in most Latin American governments has been substantially reduced. Thus, there is reason to believe that the O.A.S. will decide that the Guatemalan government is in fact a projection of the Soviet bloc and that this constitutes “an aggression which is not an armed attack.”

The choice of measures may lie between the Central American plan for political quarantine and the more far-reaching total economic embargo envisaged in the Rio treaty and the O.A.S. Charter. The latter would no doubt precipitate economic crisis in Guatemala, but it might also unite the nation behind Arbench. On the other hand, a political cordon may be the needed catalyst. If the O.A.S. brands Guatemala as a Soviet satellite, the Army and other patriotic Guatemalan groups may decide to strike for freedom before it is too late. The key to this situation lies in the hands of the Guatemalans and nobody else.

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**THIS IS WHAT THEY SAID**

**Our Wayward Professors**

The Adenauer government is not popular in Germany... It is charged with following a too doctrinaire free enterprise course... Its leader and its flag evoke no traditional or emotional loyalties... The Social Democrats are strong and they have considerable mass support.


Orthodox geneticists were discharged from their positions in Russia for studying “bourgeois” genetics. Those of us who have signed loyalty oaths... may well wonder what would happen here if by chance we should wish to broaden our concepts of world affairs by subscribing to the *Daily Worker.*

**Laurence H. Snyder,** Dean of the Graduate School, University of Oklahoma, in *Frontiers in Medicine,* 1951

Collectivism in the form of group action, social control, and social planning has been growing everywhere in modern societies. There is much in modern life that demands collective action. This trend is likely to continue... In many material, economic, and social affairs... collectivism can be a great boon... Good governments merely ask the surrender of some “personal liberties” in the interest of the common good of all.

**Harold H. Titus,** Professor of Philosophy, Denison University, Granville, Ohio, in *Living Issues in Philosophy,* a college textbook, American Book Company, 1953

**The Horse’s Mouth**

Few people realize that the Roosevelt administration has industrialized more industry in 18 months than the Socialist Labor Party ever did in Britain or the Social Democrats in Germany or even the more revolutionary Socialists in Spain—or all of them combined.

**Federated Press (Communist) release,** August 10, 1934

As for the religious workers, the Communist Party does not make the abandonment of their religion a condition of joining the Party, even though it carries on educational work which is anti-religious. We have preachers, preachers active in churches, who are members of the Communist Party. There are churches in the United States where the preachers preach Communism from the pulpits, in a very primitive form, of course.

From “Questions and Answers,” the *Daily Worker,* April 25, 1936
In the uproar over farm policy in Congress no consideration, I'm sure, will be given the pig. That's too bad. For the pig presents a little exercise in economics which should not go unnoticed by the experts hovering within government bureaus and, possibly, even the halls of Congress itself.

Pigs—unlike non-perishable farm products—do not have their prices supported by a government loan program. Pigs are strictly perishable. You cannot store them in a warehouse—at least not for any length of time, or without trouble. It's impossible to impound little piggies in a bin on a farm. When pigs are raised it is for one purpose: to be eaten.

This sheer inability of the pig to fit into a government support program has enabled the animal to show how the market place acts to get rid of a surplus.

Hog production reached a post-World War Two peak in 1951. By January 1, 1952, there were 63,582,000 hogs on American farms. The result of this big supply was a decline in prices, particularly in the spring of 1952 when hogs went to market in enormous numbers. By April of that year the average price paid for hogs was $16.40 a hundred pounds. That was only 76 per cent of parity—far below that 90 per cent at which the federal government, draining the Treasury, attempts to support so many other farm products.

Now, if this had been one of those other commodities, such as wheat or butter, the price would not have dropped so far. The federal government would have taken over much of the production and stored it—and farmers would have gone right on producing for the government's stockpile rather than the consumer's stomach.

Pigs Went to Market

Not so with hogs. When the price fell in the free market, the farmer had no federal price support plan to lean upon. He had to act on his own initiative to get rid of the oversupply. He did. He cut down pig farrowings. For all of 1952 pig production dropped 10 per cent. By January 1, 1953, the number of hogs on American farms had fallen to 54,632,000—the lowest inventory since 1948 and 13 per cent below 1942-51 average.

The result, as might be expected, was an upturn in prices. By April 1953 (I take that month as a comparison because it was the low in 1952) the average hog price was $20.70, or 102 per cent of parity. This past December—the last month for which official government statistics are available—hogs averaged $22.80 or 113 per cent of parity. One result: the Department of Agriculture estimates next spring's pig crop will be up 4 per cent from last spring.

What we have here is a classic example of the functioning of a free market. Price swings govern production. When the price falls, production is cut. When the lower supply causes a price rise, production is stepped up again. The farmer goes through a period when he gets less than the politician's cherished 90 per cent of parity, but there are compensating periods when he gets more than 90 per cent. And at all times the consumer eats what is produced—nothing is withheld from the market, piled in storage bins to rot.

But Wheat Piled High

Let's contrast this with wheat. It is supported at 90 per cent of parity by government loans and purchase agreements. Yet wheat has been selling below 90 per cent of parity for more than a year, partly because there just wasn't enough storage room to house the supply. Today, the government finds itself with a huge stock of wheat, all of which cost a great deal of money, and very little opportunity to get rid of it. The government now owns 439,000,000 bushels from crops harvested prior to 1953. It will come into possession of a great deal more when the current loan program matures April 30, 1954. In fact most, if not all, the "carryover"—the amount of wheat carried over from previous crop years when the new crop year starts July 1—will be owned by the government. The Department of Agriculture has estimated the July 1, 1954, carryover at 800,000,000 bushels, 25 per cent above the previous record of 631,000,000 in 1942. This alone would feed the entire population of the United States for one year even if not a single bushel of wheat were harvested in 1954. The outlook for the 1954 wheat crop is excellent.

Wheat is not a free market. It is a government-supported market. Consumers have not been able to obtain the price benefits of large crops because the government has withheld the grain from consumption. On that portion of his wheat the farmer sells, he gets less than 90 per cent of parity. The surplus is huge, with no apparent outlet either at home or abroad.

Hogs are a free market. The government gives them no direct price support. Consumers have been able to obtain the price benefits of large farrowings because all the hogs have come to market. Farmers have been getting more than 90 per cent of parity for more than a year. There is no surplus.

Memo to the Farm Bloc: Which of these two situations has been of more benefit to the farmer, the consumer, and the national welfare?
Mind over Matter

By EUGENE LYONS

While living in the Soviet Union and ever thereafter in the light of that experience, I have had almost daily occasion to marvel at the easy triumph of mind over matter. I have observed, that is to say, the great dexterity of the human brain in explaining away inconvenient facts and erasing reality.

I am not referring to the honest fraud practiced by partisans of the Moscow dictatorship. In juggling facts to save face for the Kremlin they make a knowing sacrifice of veracity on the altar of politics. Theirs is a strategy of disinformation to confuse "the enemy," on the ancient principle that all is fair in war and hate. No, I refer to the men and women who fool not others (except incidentally) but themselves; who in their fierce hunger for a dream manage to digest the most bitter and unpalatable realities. Their performance often seems comic to onlookers, but to those who have had their own time of anguished rationalization it seems closer to tragedy.

A particularly apt example is at hand in an article in the London New Statesman and Nation of December 26, by one John Berger. Mr. Berger got back from a recent pilgrimage to the Red Mecca, it is clear, wounded in spirit, his beliefs and hopes badly lacerated. In the article we watch his agile brain spread intellectual unguents on the raw wounds. Though I know nothing about Mr. Berger beyond the evidence of this essay, I would guess that he is without guile. Had it been his purpose deliberately to mislead readers, his trickery assuredly would have been less transparent.

Mr. Berger describes himself as an "English liberal or Left intellectual," and concedes at the outset that for this breed it is, alas, "a disturbing experience to go to Moscow." The rest of the article is given over to proving as best he can that the fault is not in Moscow but in himself. Unfortunately, as a Western "progressive" he had not been properly conditioned for the impact of what awaited him. Through no sin of his own he came to the Soviet capital mentally and psychologically handicapped by such nineteenth-century impedimenta as "an acute sense of morality," an "individual conscience," an endemic suspicion of "conformity" even when it is "Left" conformity. Small wonder, therefore, that he was confused and hurt—"disturbed" is his cover word for all his painful emotions.

Because he considers bourgeois morality "hypocritical," Mr. Berger explains to himself aloud, "he Western liberal tends to resent any generally accepted, official sense of morality." Having leaned all his life on individual conscience, he tends "to suspect that any limiting of complete freedom, any narrowing down of the paramount necessity of individual conscience, must be a deception." Because a critical attitude toward the status quo is in his blood, the poor "progressive" finds himself faced "with what seems a suspicious sense of conformity"; he "finds it hard to accept that the heretic is not always the same thing as the hero" and that where yesterday's heresy has become today's conformity, "his duty might be to expose heresy, not to profess or encourage it."

In short, Mr. Berger, prototype of the English Left intellectual, finds himself in a hell in the land where "the Left... has been solidly in power—never in Opposition—for thirty-six years." He cannot too easily adjust himself to the Soviet "reverence for the future" which presumably justifies all deprivations, oppressions, and horrors in the present. He must do some fancy logical acrobatics before he grasps that "in the resulting atmosphere of hopeful confidence, people put up with certain hard conditions fairly easily because they accept them as temporary"—only, that is to say, for a few more generations. Furthermore, "unused" to "a one-party, one-class system..." the Western progressive may tend to feel that fundamental principles have been forgotten simply because they are not disputed, or that the apparent unity about them is not genuine simply because, for him, unity has come to mean unity in the face of opposition. The "idolatry" lavished on Stalin or some Stakhanovite "may well strike a Western rationalist as odd"—yes, his word is "odd."

There is more of this extraordinary stuff, but the sampling should convey the flavor. To Mr. Berger's credit, I would underline that for all his pathetic rationalizing he is honest enough to own up to his acute discomfort. The Left liberal visitor in Moscow—he writes of himself in the third person to ease the pain—"will still remain puzzled by the general unity of opinion" he finds there. "Under any circumstances," he concludes in a final spasm, "it is a disturbing experience to go to Moscow; disturbing, above all, because in Moscow one is partly in the nineteenth century, partly in the twenty-first. From both angles one sees one's own society, one's own culture, one's own personality in a new historical perspective."

Unless Mr. Berger is far different from the average liberal, English included, this triumph of mind over matter will prove temporary. The doubts raised by his unhappy journey to Utopia will not down. That pesky individual conscience, that discomfort about unanimity of opinion, that sneaking sympathy for the heretic in the torture chambers—the heritage which in Moscow left him so brutally exposed and vulnerable—cannot, in the final analysis, be demolished by an act of will. Having been "disproportionately shocked by the wooden Moscow slurs or the Lysenko controversy," he may well be on the highroad to heresy and emancipation.
Guilt by Association

By MURRAY T. QUIGG

"Guilt by association" is perhaps a new cliché. Lately the phrase has been coined or revived by those who decry the current exploration of congressional committees into the Communist apparatus and its methods. But if "guilt by association" means that a man may be put to some penalty because, consciously or unconsciously, by association with evil-doers he gives aid to them, it is as old as evil-doers and fools. From time immemorial the innocent who have allowed themselves to be the dupes and tools of evil-doers have had to pay a penalty of some sort for their association, whether direct or indirect.

Dr. Henry Steele Commager, professor of history at Columbia University, presented himself in the New York Times Magazine of November 8, 1953, as a champion of the opposition to guilt by association. He calls it a doctrine. It is hardly that without some clear definition, but for brevity let us use his term.

For his first point, Dr. Commager says that the doctrine is unsound in logic "because it assumes that a good cause becomes bad if supported by bad men." On the contrary, it does not assume that men contaminate causes, but that causes contaminate men. So if the true cause of an organization is evil, though it hides under the cloak of virtue, those who knowingly or unknowingly supply that cloak are contaminated by the evil cause they help to hide—exactly as a criminal contaminates the man who, however upright otherwise, conceals the criminal from justice.

Dr. Commager's second declaration is that guilt by association is wrong legally. He says: "In Anglo-American law guilt is personal, not collective." Yet two sentences below he corrects himself and says: "There is, of course, such a thing as collective guilt in a conspiracy, but the laws dealing with conspiracy are ample to take care of this." The fact is that Anglo-American law has meted out punishment of one sort or another, criminal or civil, to those who by association with an evil-doer have assisted him or given him the opportunity for his wrongdoing, or subsequently endeavored to protect him from the consequences of his deed, even though they did not in any sense approve of it. Dr. Commager has but to acquaint himself with the common law and statutes dealing with the accessories to a crime, as well as the laws of conspiracy, to inform himself that by association guilt may be collective and not merely personal.

He says that "To punish, either by law or by destruction of character or by forfeiture of job, the joining of an organization in 1937 or 1945 which was not held to be subversive or even suspect until 1950 is a violation of the spirit, if not of the letter of the Constitution." It is, in fact, neither a violation of law nor the spirit of the Constitution that when a conspiracy is discovered those who allowed themselves to be used to conceal it, and to give to evil the appearance of good, should be condemned, even though the conspiracy flourished for a number of years before it was uncovered.

A Question of Practicality

For his third point, Dr. Commager calls the doctrine impractical in that it is neither possible nor desirable to engage in a check of the membership, past as well as present, of all organizations one is asked to join. Why should it not be practical before joining any organization to inquire into the character and background of the persons who are running it, and thereafter to give some attention to what they are doing? The more important a man supposes himself to be, the greater the moral obligation he has to look into what he is doing when he joins any association. For when men of high reputation allow their names to be used as supporters of organizations, it is assumed by others that they know what the association is about and are in control of its actual operation, when, as a matter of fact, they are not so at all.

It may be an unhappy commentary on our civilization that men of good will cannot safely give their approval and moral support to every sweet idea that is offered to them without finding later that they have led other men astray. Regrettable as that state of society may be, it cannot excuse them for their errors. On the contrary, it admonishes them that they must not do what they cannot take the time to understand.

Dr. Commager, after declaring that it is impractical to inquire into all organizations which solicit one's interest, is obliged to admit that "no one should give his name to an organization
gratuitously without some investigation or assurance of its character." The fact remains, however, that whatever investigation one makes or assurances one receives, he joins at his risk, (as indeed he does everything else in his life), and if it turns out badly he must suffer the consequences.

"When our whole society," says Dr. Commager, "operates to divorce membership from responsibility it is not fair to require that reformers or liberals be entirely different from the rest of us." There seems to be a notion here that a conservative does not pay for his mistakes, whereas a reformer or liberal is required to. The principle upon which this distribution of consequences operates, Dr. Commager does not disclose. He goes on, nevertheless, to a fallacy. After pointing out that those who own shares in a corporation are ultimately responsible for its conduct, he says: "Yet how many shareholders interest themselves in the labor policies or the taxation policies of their corporations?" Indeed, yes, and how many who failed to give heed have found themselves despoiled of part or all of the value of their investment when those policies proved to be wrong? Of course the stockholder pays for the errors of those who manage his property.

If, as Dr. Commager says, the methods of "the McCarthys and the Jenners" have made ordinary men and women timid about joining organizations, then Senators McCarthy and Jenner have at least taught ordinary men and women the danger of traipsing after those men of great vanity whom to solicit is to debauch.

Finally, Dr. Commager finds the doctrine of guilt by association wrong morally "because it assumes a far greater power in evil than in virtue." The professor does not support his assumption of what persons of different opinion assume. Probably the true assumption is that if the fools be got out of the way, men of greater foresight and vigor can cope with the evil and overcome it.

**Innocence by Association**

He goes on to inquire "Is there no doctrine of innocence by association?" Of course there is. Whenever men are joined in associations for business, for education, or for charity, and over the years these associations stand back of their products and remain loyal to their declared purposes, they acquire an asset of great value called "good will." The men associated with these organizations that have acquired good will in turn enjoy an innocence by association. It is assumed that if they were of evil intent they could not hold their positions. And it is exactly for that reason that men of evil intent seek to cloak their evil under the names of men of innocent reputation, based upon their positions of distinction in innocent associations. It is through the attempt of Communist infiltrators to trade upon the "doctrine of innocence" by boring into established associations of good character or by securing persons of good character to make a front for associations they control, that the practice of innocence by association is exploited.

Does Dr. Commager forget, for instance, the thousands of honest investors who, taking counsel from Lee Higginson & Company, one of the oldest, and most reputable investment firms in America, found themselves completely despoiled of their investments in the International Match Corporation when its head, Ivar Kruger, turned out to be one of the greatest rogues in the history of international finance? The partners of Lee Higginson & Company put up all their resources to pay the debts of their firm which followed upon the defalcations of the match company. Kruger had practiced with consummate skill innocence by association, and he had been able to do things which he could not have done were it not for the reputation for innocence of persons whom he misled into association with him.

Today America and Americans are faced with a deadly threat to the principles of free men. Due to the negligence of our political officials in the past, it is only recently that we have realized the full nature and the threat of this conspiracy. It is certainly unworthy of any advocate of freedom to attack those who try to expose this conspiracy because they have upset the lofty reputations of some leaders who lent their names to institutions and matters which they had not investigated—and thereby afforded support for and a cloak over the manipulations of America's deadliest enemies.

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**Last Voyage**

To that unvisited harbor I must bring
My vessel in at last.
From the thronged seaways and the smoky hum
Of traffic in the ports, surrendering
All but a shadowy cargo, I shall come
Where the slow ripple that spreads on that
cold strand
Shall beach me, light as a shell.
The brown grass on the hills, the birdless air,
The winter light that touches all that land,
I shall know well,
Accept the sand that drifts and sifts and covers,
Soft as a fleece and deep,
Let my last treasure slip from my strengthless
fingers
And in a frosty silence
Sleep.

*Betty Page Dabney*
Another important step toward the renaissance of liberalism has been taken in a scholarly little book, and yet one that will disturb the sleep of a good many scholars, treating of the working classes during the rise of the so-called "capitalist" system. (Capitalism and the Historians, edited with an introduction by F. A. Hayek. 188 pp., University of Chicago Press, $3.00.) To clear the road for a little factual thinking about that crucial period, it was necessary to displace the solidly fixed but totally erroneous opinion, that the phenomenal increase of wealth under this system was attended with an equally phenomenal deterioration in the life conditions of those who toil.

We owe this fixed opinion, as indeed we owe the word capitalism itself, to socialist theorists. Karl Marx's Hegel-happy proclamation that the dialectic development of this abstract noun would entail an "increasing misery" of the working class, and that this would lead with historic necessity to the revolutionary expropriation of the capitalists, has been refuted by history itself. During the nineteenth century "capitalism" raised the real wage of the British worker 400 per cent; the average wage of the American worker rose between 1840 and 1931 from 18 to 86 cents an hour. In view of this fact, there was nothing for Marxists to do with their dialectical key idea but hush it up and hope everybody would forget it.

But this other way that Socialists had of making "capitalism" abhorrent—saying it was a fiend of cruelty at birth—was not so easily got rid of. Like the word capitalism it passed out of the hands of the Socialists, came into general circulation, and has dominated the minds of two or three generations of social and political historians.

Apparently this legend about the past was just as wishfully dreamed up as the "increasing misery" theory about the future. But history was not going in the right direction to refute it. It had to be refuted by historians. And that is the task that Friedrich Hayek and his team of topflight experts have accomplished in this vitally interesting book.

Hayek himself leads off with a discussion of the general problem of the effect of currently held opinions upon the supposedly objective accounts that historians give us of past events.

Certain beliefs, for instance about the evolution and effects of trade-unions, the alleged progressive growth of monopoly, the deliberate destruction of commodity stock as the result of competition (an event which, in fact, whenever it happened was always the result of monopoly and usually of government-organized monopoly), about the suppression of beneficial inventions, the causes and effects of "imperialism," and the role of the armament industries or of capitalists in general in causing war, have become part of the folklore of our time. Most people would be greatly surprised to learn that most of what they believe about these subjects are not safely established facts but myths, launched from political motives and then spread by people of good will into whose general beliefs they fitted.

As an instance of the particular myth under discussion, Hayek quotes this from Bertrand Russell's latest book, The Impact of Science on Society: "The industrial revolution caused unspeakable misery both in England and in America. I do not think any student of economic history can doubt that the average happiness in England in the early nineteenth century was lower than it had been a hundred years earlier."

The first member of Hayek's team to take a crack at this myth is T. S. Ashton, who had already in his The Industrial Revolution 1760-1830 trained some heavy guns on it. He diversifies his present essay, "The Treatment of Capitalism by Historians," with quotations not only from the historians, but from the examination papers of some of his students at Cambridge who had sat at their feet. One that I have been unable to forget remarked profoundly that "in earlier centuries agriculture was widespread in England," but added sorrowfully, "today it is confined to the rural areas."

Next at the bat after Professor Ashton is Columbia University's Louis M. Hacker, who attacks with vigor and without undue respect for established reputations, "The Anti-Capitalist Bias of American Historians." He says of Charles Beard, for instance, that he "took over the agrarian prejudices of his own Indiana boyhood to the capitalist processes... He never showed an interest in these capitalist processes as such or in their economic consequences." Professor Hacker likes the word capitalism, once he has given his own definition of it: a combination of sound monetary policy as a public function with risk-taking as a private one. He thinks that the case for this system in American history, if properly put—as it never has been—would teach the present-day world some much-needed lessons.

From a literary point of view, the book rises to its climax in Bertrand de Jouvenel's discussion
of "The Treatment of Capitalism by European Intellectuals." Indeed this essay is a treat from every point of view. The rich fertility of De Jouvènel's mind, the closely woven fabric of diverse ideas he seems to toss off with such easy grace, although familiar elsewhere, is at its best in these pages.

So far as clinching the main thesis goes, however, the concluding essays are, to a mind filled with the reverberations of Marx's Capital and Engels' The Condition of the Working Classes in England, the most forceful. The facts and statistics contained in them are both surprising and entirely convincing. The first is by T. S. Ashton who goes to bat again with a judicious and profound study of "The Standard of Life of the Workers in England, 1790-1830." In the second, "The Factory System of the Early Nineteenth Century," W. H. Hutt tells us just how and why the myth arose that "the industrial revolution caused unspeakable misery both in England and America," and what a false and fabricated myth it is. The fact is that "compared to the factory workers, the agricultural laborers lived in abject poverty, and the work to which country children were put was far more exhausting than factory labor," although it was, as a contemporary remarked, "rarely witnessed by casual spectators except during fine weather."

One closes this little book with a feeling that a quietly final word has been said upon a question which, although concerned with long past history, has a lively importance today.

That the liberal renaissance will have a lot more reconceiving of the past to do before it can chart a clear course into the future is evidenced by another book on history just published. (Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, by Arthur S. Link. 351 pp., Harper and Brothers, $5.00.) This is the first volume in a "New American Nation Series" dedicated by the House of Harper to a "judicious appraisal of the findings of the new history... a large-scale effort to achieve a synthesis of the new findings with the traditional facts." So ambitious an undertaking one would hope to see presided over by a mind genuinely judicial, if one could be found—at least not hotly committed to the propaganda of a current political movement. Henry Steele Commager, the chief editor, is a notorious Roosevelt heeler, a New Deal, Fair Deal, and A.D.A. enthusiast, prominent among the weavers of the Fuzz Curtain. (I borrow the term from William Henry Chamberlin's Beyond Containment, a truly judicious and also fascinating history of the cold war.) It is no surprise, therefore, to see Wilson's relation to those who wanted the federal government to jump with both feet into the business of social reform described in the language of campaign oratory rather than "judicial appraisal."

Professor Link strikes his political keynote on the very first page, when he tells us that "by 1900 the ideal of an individualistic society had given way, at least in the minds of many intellectuals and political leaders, to the concept of a society..." That these intellectuals and political leaders might have been a little brash, that one might be entitled to a sigh of regret for that ideal of an individualistic society for which our fathers died, is nowhere suggested by Professor Link or allowed to enter his mind. He sides with what he calls "the social justice element," as automatically as a cheer leader sides with his Varsity team. The terms "reactionary" and "progressive" are used in his book as though they were definitive concepts like Lords and Commoners. I don't think that is the way to write American history. The facts are far more complex. Taft, it seems, was a "reactionary," and the important question about Wilson was whether he "could abandon his liberal, laissez-faire rationale and become a progressive statesman."

This liberal laissez-faire rationale led Wilson to say, in pitting his "New Freedom" against Teddy Roosevelt's "New Nationalism": "This is a second struggle for emancipation... If America is not to have free enterprise, then she will have freedom of no sort whatever." It made him hesitant to sign the bill giving labor unions immunity from the application of the Sherman Anti-Trust law. It made him slow to approve legislation giving special privileges to farmers. It made him deny that his party was "an enemy of business, big or little." "His strong conviction that there were definite limits beyond which the federal authority should not be extended" made him thwart "the campaign of the social justice groups to commit the administration to a positive program of social legislation." According to Professor Link such things merely "pointed up Wilson's limited view of the proper function of government," and we are left with the feeling that to defend the ideal of individual freedom against the advancing statism of the do-gooders was merely mulish and ignorant. It showed that Wilson had no "deep comprehension of the far-reaching social and economic tensions of the time."

Now, I think the men of the liberal renaissance may regard Wilson's concept of the proper function of government as revealing a deeper and more far-reaching comprehension of social tensions than is possessed by his biographer. At least I venture to hope that when the House of Harper undertakes a third "American Nation Series," and Professor Link comes to be replaced by a still more expert synthesizer of "the new findings with the traditional facts," the notion that Wilson might possibly have been wise in his disposition to defend the original ideals of the Republic will at least be permitted to enter his mind.

Professor Link himself questions whether Wilson's wholesale surrender to the "social justice
eielment” during the summer of 1916 was not motivated by pre-election considerations rather than a changed understanding of the social and economic tensions. At any rate it happened that by the fall of 1916, when he was up for re-election, Wilson’s democratic majority in Congress had, under his compelling leadership, “enacted almost every important plank in the Progressive platform of 1912.”

A week before the election, eleven out of the nineteen members of the Progressive platform committee at the convention that had nominated Roosevelt joined in a public appeal for Wilson. By that time the ideal of an individualistic society had, indeed, given way to the concept of a society organized for collective action. I do not see how a conscientious and brilliantly inquiring student of history could fail of a little philosophic and, to use his own term, far-reaching reflection upon the less obvious implications and remoter consequences of this monumental change.

I must add that only space is lacking to tell how brilliantly inquiring and conscientious Professor Link is. I found his comments on Wilson’s character truly judicious, and his documented revelations of what was going on behind the scenes in those exciting years 1910 to 1917 entirely absorbing. Perhaps it is because I lived through the period, had even some superficial acquaintance with Wilson and Colonel House, and shared in that incautious zeal for social justice that I am so affected, but I have rarely read a political book with more concentrated interest.

Case History in Propaganda

The Rosenberg Case: Fact and Fiction, by S. Andhil Fineberg. 159 pp. New York: Oceana Publications. $2.50

It is a remarkable and significant fact that not a single Communist voice, at home or abroad, was raised in doubt of the guilt of the atomic spies, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, until a year after their arrest; the vast international protest movement was not let loose until nearly two years after their arrest. Clearly, the Kremlin and its agents were waiting to see how the convicted Americans would behave, so that it could disown them as liars and stooges of Wall Street imperialism if they chose to confess as Harry Gold and David Greenglass had done.

But once the signal for an hysterical campaign was given, first in the United States and then on a world-wide scale, the resulting propaganda of protest surpassed anything of its kind around an American judicial conviction, not excepting the Mooney and Sacco-Vanzetti cases. It reached a frantic climax in the weeks before the execution, with virtually all of France and large segments of other countries howling imprecations against America. As a case history in planned propaganda the phenomenon deserves detailed analysis.

In The Rosenberg Case Dr. Fineberg has made a splendid beginning in that direction. He has done a forthright service to truth, justice, and the American reputation in this cogent study of the facts of the affair, the claims of the Rosenbergs’ defenders, and the mechanics of the anti-American drive. One by one he examines the fantastic charges against the American courts and government and shows them up as figments of purposeful propaganda.

The most valuable gift to the Communist manipulators of world opinion was provided by Dr. Harold C. Urey, in a letter to the New York Times which became the basic document of the whole campaign, and its value was multiplied when Professor Albert Einstein, ever ready to venture beyond his mental depth, associated himself with the letter. The Kremlin at last had two formidable names to play with. Dr. Fineberg effectively demolishes every one of the Urey-Einstein claims and charges and, moreover, underlines the obvious but too rarely noted truth that men who may be geniuses in their own sphere—in this case science—are not necessarily the best judges of matters outside that field. And indeed, physicists are no better qualified to judge a trial involving theft of atomic documents than watchmakers would be to judge the trial of a watch thief.

Dr. Fineberg was himself present at a defense rally at which Mrs. Sobell exclaimed: “Julie and Ethel could save their skins by talking, but Julie and Ethel will never betray their friends.” On March 19, 1952, the National Guardian reported the same woman as having declared: “We have not betrayed our friends.” The implied admission that they could betray “their friends” by talking is vital to the whole controversy. The Rosenbergs, while proclaiming their innocence, evidently had information which would have been deadly for some of their comrades or colleagues. The convicted pair themselves left little doubt on this score when they wrote, in a message to the defense groups: “We are not martyrs or heroes . . . but we will not pay the price that is asked of us to betray our hopes, etc.” The price, of course, was to tell what they knew, and the message was reassurance that they would hold their tongues.

In a frenzied anti-American tirade by Jean-Paul Sartre quoted in the foreword to this book, the French writer equates the Rosenberg and the Sacco-Vanzetti affairs. But there is at least one telltale difference—a difference which may give
the measure of what has happened to the world in the intervening thirty years. Those who initiated and led the defense movement for the Italian anarchists were with few exceptions deeply convinced of their complete innocence. But the organizers and pace-setters in the campaign for the atom spies labored so diligently precisely because with few exceptions they believed the couple to be guilty. Theirs was not a zeal for justice but a zeal for the Kremlin's cause.

The only serious complaint I would bring is that Dr. Fineberg repeatedly refers to "Russia" and "the Russians" when he obviously means the Soviet regime and the Communists. He refers to the Rosenbergs' "sheer love of Russia" and preference for "the Russian social and economic organization." That is one charge of which the Rosenbergs and Communists generally are innocent. But the flaw is quite minor and unintentional in a book for which all anti-Communists should be grateful.

EUGENE LYONS

Another Look at World War Two

Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, edited by
Harry Elmer Barnes. 679 pp. Caldwell, Idaho: The
Caxton Printers. $6.00

If there is one book that should be read by those who want a straightforward analysis of the official myths about the origins and aftermath of the Second World War, Professor Barnes has provided it. Here in a single volume is material that would otherwise have to be sifted from at least eleven separate works. The first chapter, by Professor Barnes, is a broad review of the background, from the beginning of this century to the present, with particular emphasis on the much more vigorous efforts to suppress critical historians of the recent war than of World War One. If it had not been for the efforts of a university press and two small trade publishers, practically no studies of this kind could have been published.

Charles Callan Tansill, one of our most competent diplomatic historians of the "revisionist" school, shows that it is highly probable President Franklin D. Roosevelt made up his mind to join in the European war about the middle of 1939, months before it began. Frederic R. Sanborn reveals that when a plausible pretext for entering the war in Europe could not be found by 1941 because the Germans refused to rise to a series of provocations of the most flagrant kind, such as the shipment of arms and ammunition to England in 1940, the famous destroyer-base deal later in the same year, the passage of the Lend-Lease Act, and the open intervention against German warcraft by American convoy patrols, an effort to arrange for a war with Japan began in 1941. William L. Neumann provides the diplomatic perspective for an understanding of the development of Roosevelt's bellicose attitude toward Japan. George Morgenstern and Percy L. Greaves, Jr., tell the story of Pearl Harbor and of the investigations that followed, congressional and otherwise. William Henry Chamberlin points out that we achieved none of our many war aims, with the exception of the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan—an achievement that was highly questionable in the light of subsequent events. George A. Lundberg ably summarizes all this material in the light of a realistic conception of our national interest: "Both the world wars, as world wars, would have been impossible without the participation of the United States."

JEANNE DANFORTH

Education for What?


Academic Procession, by Ernest Earnest. 368 pp. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company. $4.00

Not Minds Alone, by Kenneth Irving Brown. 206 pp. New York: Harper and Brothers. $3.00

The quasi-monopoly which the state has acquired over education is one aspect of statism which is seldom attacked by individualist thinkers today. Yet of the areas of intimate concern to the individual, this is the one where there has been the most blatant exercise of state power for the longest time. The condition to which American education has been reduced—particularly in the last twenty-five years, as the authorities who control it have come under the influence of John Dewey—is horrifying. A leveling egalitarianism, enforced by a powerful bureaucracy riding roughshod over the claims of the individual, has brought about a catastrophic decay of quality.

Arthur E. Bestor's Educational Wastelands, aptly subtitled "The Retreat from Learning in Our Public Schools," is a thoroughly documented account of the anti-intellectual practices which have captured the primary and secondary schools and invaded the colleges and universities. We are all too familiar with the results of these practices: in the muddled thinking of our school and college graduates, in their ignorance of basic Western and American traditions and values, even in their innocence of such simple skills as punctuation, spelling, and figuring. With the educational practices themselves, however, most of us have only the smallest acquaintance.

Professor Bestor leads us sadly marveling through these wastelands, where modern education discards intellectual discipline and replaces it with a "handful of helpful hints." The traditional subject matter, which centuries of experience have
proven necessary to educated men, is ripped apart and most of it left by the wayside. The bits of information remaining are thrown, together with a miscellany of trivia, into a “core curriculum” of whimsical “projects,” which serve the purpose neither of developing understanding nor of transmitting knowledge. Instead of being taught the clear intellectual and moral principles by which they can learn, as they mature, to judge political, social, and economic questions by themselves, children are thrown into “social-studies programs.” Here, without preparation and at the mercy of indoctrination in the collectivist spirit of the times, they “discuss” the virtues of the United Nations, or the activities of congressional investigating committees, and waste valuable time visiting local glue factories.

Although it would take a Swift to do full justice to the Laputan ingenuity by which our schools have retreated from learning, Professor Bestor does an admirable job of dissection. His analysis of the causes of the debacle and his proposals for reform, however, I think fall short of the problem.

He is a thousand times right when he singles out as a central weakness the principled opposition of modern educationists to intellectual discipline, to the training of the mind, as a basic aim of education. This is, in fact, one of the two basic aims of education. But the other—the transmission of the tradition of the culture—Professor Bestor very much underestimates. He seems to share to a considerable degree the scientific, instrumentalist outlook of John Dewey, whose philosophical principles have become the theoretical foundation of the education he deplores.

As Professor Bestor sees only one side of the weakness of contemporary American education, denying that the philosophical and theoretical causes are to be found in Deweyan progressivism and anti-traditionalism, even more strongly does he blind himself to the social causes. The quasi-monopoly of the state he would extend in the direction of absolute monopoly. “I believe that publicly financed education from the nursery school through the highest levels of graduate and professional instruction is essential to American democracy as we know and value it.”

Our Republic was created by men who were the product of a differentiated, liberal education. There is no reason to believe that it would founder if (what today seems an impossible vision) we could again achieve for some at least the quality of their education. Certainly everything should be done to improve the quality of public education by combatting the false and dogmatic theories of education on which it is based today. But, if we insist, as Professor Bestor seems to insist, on the same quality of education for everyone, we will achieve more of what we now have—the progressive lowering of all standards to the level of the least common denominator.

Despite these weaknesses, Professor Bestor has written a thoughtful book on a serious and critical subject. Ernest Earnest’s Academic Procession and Kenneth Irving Brown’s Not Minda Alone show what drivel can be written on the same subject. The first, an “informal history” of the American college from 1636 to 1958, is a series of anecdotal chapters of the slick-magazine type (but not so well written), spiced with the inevitable ill-informed attack on “witch-hunts.” The second, supposedly a discussion of “the recovery of religious values in our schools,” is a doughy collection of Pollyanna moralizings, in the social-worker spirit. There seems no conceivable reason why either of them should ever have been printed.

FRANK S. MEYER

The Way to Victory

Beyond Containment, by William Henry Chamberlin. 406 pp. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. $5.00

It is now seven years since George Kennan, writing in Foreign Affairs, outlined the policy of containment. Our diplomats had taken the first faltering steps away from the wartime policy of appeasing the U.S.S.R. They had found that a firm stand against the Soviets in Iran in 1946 resulted not in World War Three, but in a Soviet withdrawal from Iranian Azerbaijan. In 1947 they sped aid to Greece and Turkey to save those countries from Communist engulfment. Containment reached its apogee with the Marshall Plan, NATO, and, finally, intervention in Korea, after we had blunderingly written off that country. But a successful foreign policy must keep pace with events. Does containment still fill the bill in 1954? If not, what lies beyond?

For Mr. Chamberlin, who is one of our leading experts on Soviet affairs, the Kremlin’s strategic objective is world domination, whatever its intermediate tactics. He laments the fact that we have taken so long to discern this elementary idea which literally shouts itself from the writings of Lenin and the deeds of Stalin. But in carrying his argument beyond this point—beyond containment—the author is at a disadvantage. His book was finished just before the riots last June in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Thus, while he mentions the gulf between the masters and the slaves in the Communist empire, he appears to underestimate its significance, something he surely would not have done a month later. He rightly rejects the solution of preventive war and calls unwarranted the widely held belief that an all-out war started by the Kremlin would necessarily mean the complete destruction of Western civilization.

He concludes that we can only rid humanity of the scourge of Communism by attaining superior
military, economic, diplomatic, and moral strength. He writes:

This victory is assured, if only because of the inner weaknesses and contradictions of Communist theory and practice, weaknesses and contradictions which will come to the breaking point if the Soviet Empire sees everywhere a wall of united opposition.

We might wish that he had offered somewhat more precise and practical suggestions on how we are to hasten the arrival of this breaking point. However, this is no simple task for a writer or a strategist, and this well-informed book will certainly be invaluable to the latter. At a time when we are constantly advised to beware of treading on our allies' toes it is heartening to hear Mr. Chamberlin say that "Americans would do well to worry less about being liked, more about being respected for their firmness and consistency and purpose."

ROBERT DONLEVIN

How We Lost Eastern Europe


In the introduction to his massive volume, Mr. Lukacs quotes Sir Halford Mackinder's statement that "whoever rules eastern Europe, rules the world." One may well quarrel with this assertion, yet few would deny that Soviet expansion in eastern Europe is of paramount importance to the peace of the world and the future of Western civilization. How this unhappy situation came about is the theme of Mr. Lukacs' study, which deals with the relations of the eastern European countries among themselves, and with the policies of the great powers insofar as they bear upon this part of Europe.

The volume opens with a brief discussion of the position of the eastern European nations on the morrow of World War One, traces in greater detail the "diplomatic revolution" of 1934-1938, offers a meticulous analysis of the impact of World War Two upon eastern Europe, and winds up with a succinct, penetrating epilogue which brings the story to 1951. Essentially a diplomatic history, The Great Powers and Eastern Europe is conceived on broad and comprehensive lines. Mr. Lukacs pays close attention to the shifts in public opinion and official policies in a score of countries. And he gives illuminating glimpses of the attitudes, pre-dilections, and aberrations of statesmen, national leaders, and officials whose views, seemingly so unimportant in themselves, exercised nevertheless an influence, at times a decisive one, on the course of events.

As evidenced by his bibliography, the author has examined a huge amount of factual information; he has carefully separated the grain from the chaff, and in spite of the kaleidoscopic nature of the events with which he deals, he has succeeded in arranging them in an orderly and intelligible manner. Like every good historian, Mr. Lukacs has definite opinions, but he does not force them upon his readers and allows the facts, which he so well presents, to speak for themselves. The result is probably the most comprehensive and authoritative book on a crucial phase of recent history that has appeared in English, so far.

Only two of the many issues discussed by Mr. Lukacs can be mentioned here. Contrary to the prevailing opinion, he states: "That Russia was prepared to fight at the time of Munich is possible but not probable." And he adds that "the capacity of her intervention was very doubtful." This conclusion, which is supported by a searching analysis of available evidence, disposes of "the almost universally accepted thesis that... the German-Russian Pact was the direct outcome of Munich." Mr. Lukacs rightly notes that...

...after Munich, Western political thinking developed a veritable guilt complex, which manifested itself in the intellectual argument that it was Russia which was about to take the most righteous course and defend Europe in 1938, but which was spurned and shunned and discriminated against by the Western Powers and henceforth became disillusioned and distrustful. This tendency was especially manifest in the United States... The Kremlin exploited the undue Western "guilt complex" brilliantly during the Second World War...

Even more challenging is Mr. Lukacs' seemingly well-founded contention that the Churchillian plan for the invasion of the Balkans, which might have saved eastern Europe from the Soviet yoke, was frustrated by American opposition. He believes that the "dangerous illusions" held by President Roosevelt about the Soviet Union—illusions shared by his civilian and military advisers—and the determination of the American government to play the part of "the Third Power" between British Imperialism and Soviet Communism inexorably led to the debacle of Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam, and—with the notable exception of Finland—spelled the doom of democratic institutions in eastern Europe.

The Great Powers and Eastern Europe is extremely well written. It contains many eloquent pages, and its closing statement of the difficulty for the West to comprehend the countries forming the eastern "ramparts of Europe," which are now absorbed in "the great Asiatic plain," is both wise and deeply moving.

MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY
Briefer Mention

The Dark City: A True Account of the Adventures of a Secret Agent in Berlin, as told to Hartvig Anderson. 314 pp. New York: Rinehart and Company. $3.50

Aage Smith, or Schmid, as he called himself, went to Berlin via Denmark early in 1945. Trained as an agent by the OSS, he was supposed to send information about the morale, conditions, etc., in the German capital to London. Also, he was to prepare the way for some underground action, once the colossus of the Third Reich started to disintegrate. But, since he came rather late, there was little more for him to do than to sit by and watch the final agony of Germany’s defeat. Thus, the first part of his story, which he relayed to a capable Danish newspaperman, rises not much above the level of the usual well-spun secret-mission yarn, except, perhaps, for an occasional revealing glance at the particular German scene. The second part of the book, however, is most illuminating, lively, and real. For here the author gives a vivid and compassionate eyewitness account of the Soviet conquest of Berlin, and of his long and disheartening odyssey through Soviet confinement to the American demarcation line at Magdeburg. And though there is a touch of hindsight, as well as of naivété as to the dismal fate of “liberated” Russians in his account, there exists perhaps nowhere else a better and more enlightening description of the erratic mentality and indifferent attitude of the members and the machinery of the Soviet occupation army.


This newspaper version of the world’s history and thought will entertain scholars, inform students. Assembled with competence and journalistic skill, it presents the pageant of history in a series of dated, four-page newspapers, each issue including a number of years, which decrease in span as they get nearer the present. Events pile upon events without much indication of their far-reaching significance, their impact on the rise and fall of civilizations. As a supplement to the textbook teaching of history, this will no doubt be a useful volume. It can in no sense be regarded as a substitute.


Americans, says Mr. Stein, endanger the peace of the world by chasing after dollars at home and throwing away dollars abroad. They do not behave in that way because it makes them happy, but because they are driven by fears of the breakdown of the capitalist system. They are so hell-bent on saving capitalism that they give away the goods they can’t sell. Even though their poorer citizens lack adequate nourishment, housing, and medical care, even though they undermine the economics of other nations, and even though their constant talk of war may cause a global catastrophe, capitalism forces the Americans to persist. Mr. Stein, who incidentally once plugged the “agrarian reformer” line in China, proves all this by quoting hundreds of clips from American magazines, news stories, editorials, and even letters to the editor. If nothing else, this monumental abortion of a book at least shows that there is still freedom of the press.


The author of this charming and sensitive book is a woman who exchanged the warm security of her solid Swiss middle-class existence for the uncertain fate of pioneering on the dusty plains of Central Africa. Against the advice and protestations of her mother and of the Swiss boy who offered her a quiet and stable life amid snowclad mountains, she married a gentle Englishman and trekked with him in an ox-cart into Kenya’s rugged wilderness. Her book now traces the conflicting sentiments—the struggle between family ties, homesickness and childhood memories, and loyalty and devotion to her husband—that beset her in the primitive and strange world they set out to conquer. The scene gracefully moves back and forth between the two poles of her existence. And in the end she forsakes the lulling voices of comfort and security and casts her lot with the wide land where the howling of the hyena was “the loneliest of all sounds.”

The Golden Door, by J. Campbell Bruce. 244 pp. New York: Random House. $3.75.

On the last page of his book Mr. Bruce suggests that our present immigration law be completely revised and rewritten. This is the single intelligent sentence in a volume dedicated to an emotional denunciation of the McCarran Act, which the author considers deliberately hypocritical, malevolent, arrogant, filled with racial resentments reflecting “earlier” laws and moods. While barring Communists, the present law, according to Mr. Bruce, favors Nazis and Fascists, a state of affairs he does not prove or support by any case histories. As an advocate of a “liberal” immigration policy Mr. Bruce might have strengthened his presentation by a study of the scholarly studies Milton Konvitz has made on the subject. He might also have read history a little and learned something of the severe regulations democracies past and present have placed on the granting of citizenship.
The question of movie censorship has long perturbed those among us who have staunchly maintained their right to be entertained or educated without interference from government, state, or privately appointed bureaucrats. In the past few months, efforts to gain for the movies a measure of freedom comparable to that enjoyed by the press and other media of communication have been given significant assistance from two widely divergent quarters. In Washington, members of the Supreme Court gravely sat through private screenings of a French movie called La Ronde and another film cryptically titled M, then unanimously overruled the right of censors in New York and Ohio to ban these pictures because of alleged “immorality” or “incitement to crime.” In Hollywood some days later, veteran producer Samuel Goldwyn officially called for a revision and modernization of the Motion Picture Production Code, which has acted as an instrument of pre-censorship within the American film industry.

Trade sources supporting Goldwyn say the Production Code has kept a majority of American pictures down to a bland diet of front-porch romances and happy endings. The movie-going public, therefore, is developing an appetite for more seasoned dishes and is flocking to such continental imports as Bitter Rice and The Seven Deadly Sins. With the Supreme Court decision favoring La Ronde and M, further consignments of “realistic” pictures from abroad are expected.

For the record it must be noted that La Ronde is based on Arthur Schnitzler’s Reigen and is a romantic comedy of old Vienna. When Schnitzler finished the original play in 1900 it provoked a few politely raised eyebrows, but its over-all message was considered moral, since it proved “the futility of transitory relationships.” M is a remake of the German classic that propelled Fritz Lang and Peter Lorre to international fame and was presumably based on the case of a notorious child-murderer of Düsseldorf, who was brought to a grisly end.

Admitting that the morality of La Ronde may leave room for differences of opinion, it is absolutely unimaginable to this reviewer how M could incite anyone to crime.

A movie censor can be defined for purposes of this discussion as a person—or group of persons—who can forbid or restrict the normal distribution of a picture because it does not agree with the censor’s interpretation of a set of rules concerning human behavior. We have in this land of liberty no less than three different and separate sets of censors. On the federal level there are the employees of the Customs Bureau who can keep out of the United States any film which they consider “restricted merchandise” under Section 305 of the Tariff Act of 1930. On a state and local level we find a number of more or less bluenosed officials of licensing boards who, at the taxpayers’ expense, decide which movies the taxpayer should be allowed to see. Finally, there are the officials administering the movie Production Code.

Since the movie censor regulates not only our right to see and hear what we want but also rules in matters affecting the earnings of American businessmen, it might be wise to examine his history and development in our country. Legal precensorship of movies began in Ohio—the state, incidentally, that banned M—in 1915, when a judge ruled that the cinema was only a spectacle and a form of amusement, and thus was not covered by the guarantee of freedom of speech and press contained in the First Amendment. The Supreme Court upheld that decision and, at that time, was considered eminently justified in doing so, since moving pictures in their infancy were little more than a glorified form of penny-arcade entertainment. Censorship laws similar to the Ohio regulation were later promulgated until they blanketed eight states and fifty cities, including some of our major centers of population. While movie making developed into a major industry, an art, and a force in our country, censorship regulations affecting major screen dramas with sound, color, and a third dimension remained substantially the same as in the days of the flickering nickelodeon pictures.

Incredible as it may seem, it was only in 1952 that the late Joseph Burstin, through his attorney Ephraim London, won a measure of freedom for the movies with the now famous Miracle case. Lawyer London argued that movies were no longer pure entertainment like a circus or a side show, but a form of mass communication which should benefit from the First Amendment guarantee. The Supreme Court agreed with him, reversed its 1915 decision, and thus paved the way for its action in the case of La Ronde.

Curiously enough, this left American movie makers at a disadvantage because they had meanwhile set up their own set of censorship regulations.
The Production Code was adopted by the major Hollywood studios in 1930. Subsequently, Joseph Breen was appointed administrator of the Code. Since then, the Breen office has scrutinized the films under his jurisdiction from script to premiere. Production Code censors, some of whom have been described as "Savonarolas of the screening-room," use a set of twelve rules as their yardstick of morality. Antiquated at their best, and medieval at their worst, these rules still dictate the drinking of cocktails as a crime, lumping it with murder and the dynamiting of trains. In its specific prescriptions, the Code often skirts ridicule such as in Rule 5, "Profanity," which condemns, among other things, "The Bronx cheer: the sound"—a noise of disapproval familiar to most baseball fans, which is about as profane as the "rah-rah-rah" of a college yell. Rule 5 also bars "damn" and "hell," and a recent Korean war picture, Cease Fire, had to change its sound track accordingly. The fact that Cease Fire was filmed at the front lines, with real G.I.'s using these words in actual combat, did not sway the Code administrators.

In this instance, the Code's refusal to accept reality in the form of a swearing soldier is obvious. But on the whole, the Code's rules are vague and swathed in generalities. This, of course, leaves to Mr. Breen and his associates the power to rule Hollywood films according to their personal concept of morality. This concept can best be gleaned from the average films that bear the Code Administration's seal of approval. In these Code-rulled pictures, crooks are always caught (or meet a bad end); policemen are always good; marriage is almost inevitably happy, and divorce always brings unhappiness. But in real, twentieth-century life many crooks get away (and sometimes even make good in politics); policemen are not always honest (within recent years New York cops reputedly took over $1,000,000 in bribes from criminals); marriages are frequently unhappy, and divorce may prove a blessing all around. The head-in-the-sand attitude of the Breen office often leads to ridiculous situations.

In the excellent new picture Act of Love, producer Anatole Litvak had to change the end of his story, based on Alfred Hayes' novel The Girl on the Via Flaminia. The Code's unbending puritanism demanded that the heroine drown herself—because she had been accused of having loose morals. When a major producer wanted to purchase film rights to Robert Anderson's Broadway hit Tea and Sympathy, Assistant Code Administrator Geoffrey Shurlock flew to New York and reportedly quashed the deal—because Tea and Sympathy involves a boy who has been wrongly accused of homosexuality. That very word is taboo in the Code, despite the fact that homosexuality is becoming a widespread social problem.

Administrators of the Production Code apparently live under the happy delusion that you can make people lead a Pollyanna life by showing them Pollyanna pictures. After nineteen years of movie censorship, and nineteen years of nearly steady increase in statistics of murder, rape, and robbery, that theory has been effectively, as well as regrettably, disproven.

The fundamental mistake apparently made by Mr. Breen—and his colleagues in Hollywood and in the various state and city censorship offices—has been to confuse morals and mores. Like many other things, mores in our country have changed steadily since the turn of the century. If our grandfathers could visit Coney Island or Miami or Malibu Beach, they would certainly be deeply shocked by the briefness of the bathing suits displayed there. This does not mean that today's mermaids, in bikinis or two-piece bathing suits, are less moral than their precursors in ankle-length bloomers. It only means that times and styles have changed. Censors seem to have forgotten, or never to have known, that the moral fiber of a country depends on how its people think, rather than on how they dress.

It is true that in the vast activity of our public media, some marginal fields tended to become objectionable. But the checks inherent in a free democracy sooner or later came into action, and the worst excesses of bad taste were usually modified or abandoned. This was particularly true in the field of comic books and cheap fiction.

Yet there are still people who believe that movies—because they reach a greater audience—need censorship. This attitude, of course, is prejudicial to moviemakers and to their public. No major producer, for example, would invest money in a questionable film. As producer Otto Preminger puts it: "No one has ever gotten rich selling filthy postcards." Distributors would refuse to handle objectionable films, exhibitors would refrain from showing them in their communities, and it is our sincere belief that the public would stay away from them. Of course, there is always the ultimate safeguard in our laws providing for the arrest and punishment of those seeking to capitalize on obscenity.

With the Supreme Court decision in the La Ronde case hitting hard at the principle of movie censorship, and at the functions of our censors, the latter gentlemen recently met in New York to discuss their future. They decided that they still had one, and offered the idea that instead of banning movies, they now be permitted to classify them for adult, restricted, or general audiences. Such a system is presently in use in Great Britain, where pictures marked "A—Adult" attract a great number of curious youngsters.

As lawyer Ephraim London has very aptly stated the case: "A fundamental tenet of our democracy is that people may be and must be trusted. Whatever risk be involved, it must be taken."
government works well only when the electorate is alert, intelligent, and fit. It is believed by students of population that the fitness of the population in this country (and in many others) is declining at a rather alarming rate... Already, we have a dangerously large percentage of people in our population, on whom facts and sound logic make no impression, but for whom the promises and the oratory of a Roosevelt, a Huey Long, a Hitler, a Stalin or a Mussolini have an irresistible appeal.

Mr. Ebon has limited himself to the quantitative phase of the problem of population... The qualitative phase is at least as important... and directly related to the problem of maintaining a high standard of living and an honest, truly liberal government.

Arlington, Va.

Dean M. Jackman

I am not trying to be a pessimist, nor am I trying to discourage Mr. Martin Ebon, the author of "Foreign Aid: A Vicious Circle," but I do not see how he can accomplish his task of reducing the populations of several countries.

The only way I know of, is for him to get to know the Creator and give Him some advice... But then the problem confronts God. What should He do with all those lovable children that He has planned? He could send them to Mars, but then they might start wars with us after they grew up... 

Billings, Mont.

Charlotte Dillon

More Pink-Tinted Knowledge

I would like to add some observations of my own to Walter Newlin's article on The Reader's Encyclopedia (January 25). Any mistake in a book of this kind is annoying; bias and deliberate misinformation are infuriating. The bias and misinformation in The Reader's Encyclopedia are of that glib fellow-traveling brand which I consider the worst type of pro-Communist propaganda.

Here's what The Reader's Encyclopedia has to say about Maxim Gorki: "Russian short-story writer and dramatist, associated with Lenin in the Russian revolution of 1917. ... That is not so. Gorki was opposed to the Bolshevik revolution; his newspaper was closed by the Bolsheviks, he fled Russia and became a political émigré. According to the Columbia Encyclopedia, he returned to Russia in 1928.

Ivan Bunin, the only Russian Nobel Prize winner, an ardent anti-Communist, rates exactly four lines. The Soviet novelist and poet Konstantine Simonov, a considerably lesser figure in world literature than Bunin, gets twice as many lines. Simonov won the 1949 Stalin Prize...
The wonderful machine that can put us all in clover

HONK-HONK! Beep-beep! Honk-honk! Beep-beep!
Right now the motoringest nation in the world is bogged down in the world’s biggest traffic jam.

But there’s a wonderful machine all set to dig us out: the road building machine. Scraper, dozer, roller, grader, tractor, shovel. Monsters that play marbles with boulders, eat forests like cornflakes, lop off mountains to fill valleys.

Quick-like, they could have us in clover with a pattern of cloverleafs, like the one above, tying together a nationwide system of modern highways.

But honking your horn won’t get it done. Support the program to build the highways America needs. It’ll cost money. But just a drop in the bucket to what it would without today’s road building machines. We know, because we help make them; nearly all use Timken® tapered roller bearings.

To keep machines like these on the go, we control Timken bearing quality from start to finish, make our own steel.

Road machine builders could buy cheaper bearings. But because of the tough loads and high cost of delays, Timken bearings are favored. By helping contractors keep faster schedules, Timken bearings save the taxpayer money too. Makers of road building equipment, like the rest of industry, keep America on the go with Timken bearings.

The Timken Roller Bearing Company, Canton 6, Ohio.
Cable address: “Timroscia”.
At a meeting of scientists in 1938, several were discussing the use of nuclear energy as a possible source of large amounts of energy. Before the meeting was over, others joined in and the subject really became “hot”. Among those engaging in the discussion was Dr. W. E. Shoupp, then a Research Fellow at the Westinghouse Research Laboratories.

Dr. Shoupp went back to the Laboratory, determined to find some answers to the subject. Making use of the new Westinghouse atom smasher, he and other nuclear scientists did some pioneering research, culminating in the discovery that a uranium atom could be split into two equal fragments by the impact of high-speed gamma rays, with commensurate release of large amounts of energy. This they called “photo-fission”.

His work on the subject also included the determination of the amount of neutron energy required to cause uranium and thorium to fission. This contributed to the basic understanding of the nuclear fission process and to the development of the atomic bomb and atomic energy. Incidentally, the Lamp Laboratory of Westinghouse supplied pure uranium for the first nuclear reactor.

At the beginning of World War II, when radar was being considered, Dr. Shoupp and some associates built from scratch, a radar laboratory where tubes and application techniques were developed. They made a major contribution to radar, and equally important, radar jamming.

Dr. Shoupp is continuing his work regarding atomic energy as Director of Development of the Westinghouse Atomic Power Division. Current research work under his supervision includes developments in connection with an atomic energy plant for the first atomic submarine and another plant suitable for the propulsion of large vessels such as aircraft carriers.

A man of engaging personality, Dr. Shoupp has a keen sense of humor and the ability to inspire and develop those who work with him. He is particularly proud of the fact that Westinghouse has been able to attract to the work of atomic power development, scientists of the highest caliber. Westinghouse Electric Corp., Pittsburgh, Penna.