

How to Integrate Europe

The Fallacy in the Schuman Plan

Wilhelm Röpke


Russia's Three Bears

Maneuvers of Malenkov, Beria, and Bulganin

Alexander Weissberg

Peace Without Victory?

An Editorial



We built our own Pikes Peaks

to engineer better car transmissions

THEY'RE called—in engineering language—"electronically variable dynamometers." And—when this picture was taken—a transmission was being given the works under precisely the same conditions it would meet on a Pikes Peak climb, including every single hairpin turn and road grade.

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
formance of General Motors famous automatic transmissions—Powerglide in Chevrolet; Hydra-Matic in Pontiac, Oldsmobile and Cadillac; Twin-Turbine Dynaflo in Buick. Not to mention GM's automatic Army truck and tank transmissions now proving their worth in Korea.

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THE Freeman

A Fortnightly
For
Individualists

Editor HENRY HAZLITT
Managing Editor FLORENCE NORTON

Our Contributors

ALEXANDER WEISSBERG, former member of the Communist Party, was arrested in Russia in the Great Purge of 1937 and charged with having recruited Nazi terrorists to assassinate Stalin and Voroshilov in the event of war, and to sabotage industrial plants. He "confessed" to these crimes and lived to tell the tale in his book, *The Accused*, published in America by Simon & Schuster in 1951. "Russia's Three Bears" appears in the FREEMAN by arrangement with *Time and Tide* of London.

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L. D. MCDONALD, a native of Kansas and an engineer, is well qualified by personal experience to speak authoritatively on both sides of the flood control question. From 1942 to 1951 he was chief engineer and chief of construction for the Kansas City District of the Corps of Engineers. During those years he witnessed and fought floods from the head waters of the Missouri to the lower Mississippi. He resigned from the Corps of Engineers in 1951 so that he might be free, as he wrote us recently, to speak publicly of his "lack of agreement with the enormous and wasteful spending in both civil and military programs of the Army."

BURTON CRANE is a financial and business news writer for the *New York Times*.

JEROME MELLQUIST, art critic and lecturer, sent us his tribute to Raoul Dufy from Paris, where he is now living.

GUSTAV DAVIDSON has won a number of awards in poetry, among them the gold medal of the Alexander Drutzkoy Memorial given annually by the Poetry Society of America. He is founder and director of the Fine Editions Press in New York City.

WITTER BYNNER, one of America's most famous poets, is author of some twenty-odd volumes of verse and plays, in addition to a number of translations of French and Chinese poets. His most recent book is *Journey With Genius* (1952), in which he presents a character portrait of his friend, D. H. Lawrence, and describes their travels together through New Mexico and Mexico.

ANDERSON M. SCRUGGS, the third of our trio of distinguished poets in this issue, truly leads a double life, for besides writing poetry, he is a full time Professor of Dentistry at Emory University in Atlanta, Ga. With the sonnet, *To a Lovely Lady* (page 595), he makes his first appearance in the FREEMAN.

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Recommending:

5 MAJOR POINTS

**of legislative reform
essential for the**

TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY



1 Improve the machinery for adjusting railroad rates—either upward or downward—to do away with the long costly delays that the present system entails.



2 Change the "rule of rate making" in the Interstate Commerce Act, directing the Interstate Commerce Commission to consider the effects of proposed rates on the maintenance of railroad credit—rather than on railroad traffic volume.



3 Write into law a statement of policy that all users of transpor-

tation must pay the full cost of that form of transportation, including their fair share of the cost of whatever public facilities they use.



4 Eliminate the long-and-short-haul clause of the present law, which applies only to the railroads and on that basis alone is discriminatory.



5 Grant greater freedom for the railroads to abandon passenger trains which do not and can not be made to pay their way.

This legislation can not be considered a panacea for all the ills of railroads and railroad management, which only alert, progressive management and uninhibited thinking can cure.

CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO RAILWAY

THE Freeman

MONDAY, MAY 18, 1953

The Fortnight

It is difficult to find much consistency in the decision of Federal District Judge Luther W. Youngdahl which dismissed four counts of a seven-count perjury indictment against Owen Lattimore. A large part of the decision consisted of an irrelevant oration on freedom of speech, whereas the question at issue, as Senator Watkins has pointed out, was simply whether Lattimore had lied to a Senate committee and, if so, whether he had lied about material matter.

When Judge Youngdahl threw out four counts of the perjury indictment, it is a little hard to see why he failed to throw out the other three on the same reasoning. He seems to have been a little puzzled about this himself. Even these three counts may not "pass the test of materiality so as to present a jury issue," he said. "But this must await the trial." Well, why couldn't the jury have had the opportunity to hear all seven counts, and make its own decision on each at the trial? The original perjury charges against Owen Lattimore were made by a bi-partisan Senate committee with some good lawyers on it. Lattimore was indicted for perjury on seven counts by a Federal grand jury last December 16. To our lay mind, it would have seemed logical to allow the jury at the forthcoming trial set for October 6 to decide for itself which of these counts, if any, it wished to sustain.

Not until further facts are in will we know whether to greet President Eisenhower's promised reduction of \$8,500,000,000 in the national budget for the fiscal year 1954 with gratification or misgiving. The reduction is from the terrific Truman estimate of expenditures of \$78,600,000,000. Even after it was made, expenditures would still be more than \$70,000,000,000. This would still leave an estimated budget deficit—even if, for example, the excess profits tax were continued instead of decently buried on June 30. Apparently, moreover, the cut would involve a saving of only \$1,800,000,000 from the \$7,600,000,000 that Mr. Truman had asked

for foreign aid in new money. We still don't know just what the justification is for the other \$5,800,000,000. Apparently the Truman 1954 budget needs a more realistic scrutiny than it has yet received.

In our last issue we recalled here the apparently forgotten statement of November 15, 1951, by Colonel James A. Hanley, Judge Advocate General of the Eighth Army, that 3,600 United States prisoners of war were slaughtered by North Koreans and another 2,513 by the Chinese Communists. There was a mysterious silence in Washington about this statement when negotiations on exchange of prisoners were recently resumed. Now that some of the American prisoners of war are back, Colonel Hanley's statements have received sickening confirmation. In the *New York Times* of April 30 appeared an Associated Press dispatch quoting a few of these prisoners: "One said 800 helpless wounded had been shot or bayoneted in a forty-truck convoy in 1950. Another prisoner said 300 Americans, out of 4,000 to 5,000 who started, died in a 'death march' that same winter. The sick and laggard were clubbed with rifle butts and left on the road to die in the great cold, this prisoner added. Still another returned American said that in the North Korean prison stockades some United States prisoners went berserk under the propaganda dinning of loudspeakers and endless lectures."

Left-wing Laborite Aneurin Bevan has taken on the job of volunteer adviser to the American people on foreign affairs. Addressing us through *The Nation*, he warns us that Red China will give us peace, but only at a price. "A necessary condition for the consolidation of peace in the Far East is the immediate disbanding of Chiang Kai-shek's army on Formosa. As for Formosa itself, return it to the Chinese government, to whom it belongs." That this would involve the massacre of most of the mainland Chinese on the island does not seem to worry the humane Mr. Bevan a bit. One fears, however, that he has mistaken the timing of his new role. He would have been perfectly cast as an adviser at Teheran, Yalta, or Potsdam. Had he applied for a job when Alger Hiss was riding high,

he might have become Assistant Secretary of State and certainly could have counted on a good UN appointment. Now, however, Mr. Bevan seems most useful as an adviser in reverse. We will not go far wrong if we do the precise opposite of whatever he may recommend.

Ex-American citizen Stefan Heym seems to deserve two cheers of appreciation for what he has done, if not for his reasons for doing it. He has renounced American citizenship acquired during the war and become a citizen of Soviet-dominated East Germany. There, he tells the world, he proposes to work for peace and democracy, something he could not do in the United States. In short, he feels that he will be better off without the United States. As 99 per cent of Americans will feel better at not having Stefan Heym as a fellow-citizen, there should be contentment all around. One only wishes others of his way of thinking would follow his example. Happy purges, Steve!

Must we again go through the silly business of seeing accepted as an "authority" on Russia anyone who makes a quick brief trip to Moscow without being knocked down, arrested, or otherwise mistreated in the Soviet capital? Anyone who has been stationed in Moscow as a correspondent will remember with a shudder the know-it-all quick tripper who, immediately after checking in at a Moscow hotel, would announce: "I have been in Moscow twenty-four hours and I know that all the stories about slave labor are lies." A group of newspaper and radio executives, not one of them known as a Russian linguist or a specialist in Soviet affairs, showed a tendency to call off the cold war on the basis of a stay of a few days in Moscow and glimpses of Moscow's well-advertised subway and of standard dairy equipment on a collective farm. A forthright editor in Wisconsin was not diplomatic when he greeted these latest tourists to Moscow on their return as "the editorial jackasses of the century for falling for this Soviet peace trickery." But thoughtful Americans will begin to be impressed if and when the Soviet authorities provide facilities for unhampered travel and observation in the scores of places which have been pinpointed as locations of Soviet concentration camps.

Persons who take seriously the picture of America living in a "black silence of fear" and a "reign of terror" should have had their eyes fixed on television sets when there was a parting exchange of verbal shots between Senator McCarthy and Earl Browder. McCarthy told Browder he did not admire him; Browder rasped back that the sentiment was fully reciprocated. Do such interchanges take place in Moscow or Prague or other capitals where there is a genuine reign of terror and a real black silence of fear? It is a long way from the

frequent typically American duels in hearty public disparagement which occur between "Grand Inquisitor" McCarthy and his supposedly helpless victims and the tirades of us on one side and the cringing fear on the other which are the invariable trademark of the totalitarian trial.

A welcome visitor is scheduled to arrive in this country this month. He is Spyros Markezinis, Number Two man and Minister of Economic Coordination in the Greek government of Field Marshal Alexander Papagos. Mr. Markezinis has worked long and hard to put his country's economy on a realistic basis. On April 9 he announced that the Greek currency, the drachma, would be devalued to curb inflation that threatened to "bring the country to economic disaster." So now the U. S. dollar is worth 30,000 drachmas. One important result will be a lowering in dollar price for Greek export goods. Until now, such items as tobacco were being offered at prices well above the world market.

At Luxembourg, with great ceremony, the nine members of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community solemnized the opening on May 1 of an alleged "single market" for steel. But elsewhere in this issue we publish an article by the eminent European economist, Wilhelm Röpke, expressing his doubts about the Schuman Plan as a means of "integrating" Europe. How justified his suspicions are is indicated by a dispatch in the *Wall Street Journal* of April 27. "French, German, Belgian, and Luxembourg steel producers," it reports, "bypassed the Schuman Plan authorities earlier this month and held secret talks in Paris to set their own uniform export prices. Many producers now plan to follow this up with domestic price boosts when the single market begins in steel. Steelmen say most producers had their costs boosted when the Schuman Plan officials, in an effort to end discrimination in freight rates, had these jacked up to a higher uniform level. . . . Administrators of the coal and steel pools are threatening to strike back at the recalcitrant steelmen. They say they may fine them for conspiring privately to fix prices and then slap maximum price ceilings on them to limit future price rises." All of which hardly sounds like an approach to free markets, free competition, and free trade.

A friend of ours who spent some years in China brought back a colorful description of the bureaucratic itch to regulate every little detail. For home application he calls it "Washington minkie-pidgin."

Another friend, hitherto in private life, is getting his first taste of what it feels like to be a Washington bureaucrat himself. "What we need," he says, "is a Sherman Anti-trust Act to bust up the government."

Peace Without Victory?

The war in Korea is the first the United States waged as a mandatory of an international organization, the United Nations. It was also the first that was carried on without a firm will to win in high places in Washington. The results are not encouraging: a ruined and devastated Korea, a military stalemate which in all probability means a divided Korea, and a whole Pandora's box of awkward Far Eastern problems that would not exist or would be much more manageable if the challenge of Red China had been accepted and the war had been fought to a definite military decision.

That such a decision could have been obtained is scarcely open to reasonable doubt—given the enormous disparity between the United States and China in modern weapons and industrial technology. What was lacking was the will to use these weapons without stint or limit against legitimate military targets in Manchuria and on the mainland of China. On this point there is the direct first-hand testimony of one of America's greatest soldiers, General Douglas MacArthur.

In the course of his recent letter to Senator Harry F. Byrd, General MacArthur recalls his military estimate of 1950: that no Chinese commander would have dared to commit large forces to the Korean peninsula in view of "our largely unopposed air forces, with their atomic potential, capable of destroying at will bases of attack and lines of supply north as well as south of the Yalu River."

But this formidable weapon was made impotent in American hands, partly because of pressure from timid "allies" whose back seat driving far outweighed the value of their token military contributions, partly because of infirmity of purpose in Washington. General MacArthur was writing for the historical record when he observed to Senator Byrd:

Such a limitation upon the utilization of available military force to repel an enemy attack has no precedent either in our own history or, so far as I know, in the history of the world. . . . The overriding deficiency incident to our conduct of the war in Korea was not in the shortage of ammunition or other materiel, but in the lack of the will for victory.

This lack of the will for victory has been the curse of the American conduct of the cold war in other fields besides Korea. What is one to think when the best man found available for the important strategic appointment as Ambassador in Moscow is an open defender of the Yalta Agreement? Yalta is not an inspiring flag to hoist when a new period of Soviet diplomatic maneuvering is in prospect. Or when another leading State Department Soviet expert deprecates any political or psycho-

logical warfare behind the iron curtain, although Soviet activity of this kind behind the political frontiers of the non-Communist world has never ceased during the thirty-six years of the existence of the Soviet regime?

The Red Chinese attitude on the resumption of armistice negotiations suggests that the familiar dreary run-around about the return of unwilling prisoners has begun. Here surely there is a simple remedy, which should have been applied long ago. This is to release immediately and unconditionally all Chinese and North Korean prisoners who make a convincing impression of being anti-Communist. The North Koreans could merge with the South Korean population; the Chinese should be sent to Formosa or to Chinese communities overseas. Humanity and common sense should long ago have dictated this simple procedure, which would have averted an enormous amount of haggling and attempted blackmail. It is inconceivable that a further dragging out of this issue should be permitted.

Had General MacArthur been permitted to use all weapons at his disposal to win the war against Red China the Chinese invasion of Korea might have ended in one of the greatest military debacles in history. In this case the authority and prestige of Mao Tse-tung would have been gravely shaken and a favorable condition would have been created for Nationalist landings on the mainland.

Now the prestige of Red China has been enhanced. It can claim victory in the Korean war, since the line of the front is farther to the south than it was when Chinese intervention in force took place in November, 1950. Assuming that the Chinese Reds are willing to conclude an armistice on tolerable terms as regards the prisoner repatriation issue, we shall be on the defensive, and exposed to pressure from the powers which have always favored appeasement of Red China, in the political conference that is supposed to follow the armistice. We shall have to stand firm against such impossible suggestions as handing over Formosa, in one form or another, to the Chinese Communists, or according recognition to a regime which has run up a long and consistent score of barbarism in its treatment of American residents of China.

It is not only in the Far East that the Soviet peace offensive opens up the prospect of a diplomatic war of movement, instead of the stiff trench warfare which prevailed so long as the Kremlin maintained an attitude of complete intransigence. In this prospect there are both opportunities and dangers. Germany is the key position in the European sector of the cold war. It would be a great opportunity to win back 18,000,000 Germans in the

Soviet zone from Communist servitude. It would be a great danger if some overhasty scheme for German unification, without the fullest safeguards as to the genuinely free nature of voting for a constituent assembly or a parliament, would lay a united Germany open to the threat of a coup d'état on the model of Czechoslovakia.

There are several probable motives for the Soviet peace offensive. There is the need for consolidation of what seems to be a rather precarious balance of personal power in the directorate that seems to have inherited Stalin's one-man absolute power. There may be a desire for a lull until some definite point in Soviet atomic or other arms build-up is reached. And there is almost certainly the calculation, too well justified, that traitorous or ignorant voices of appeasement will be raised at any signal, however slight and insubstantial, of a less bellicose trend in Soviet policy. The *Economist* of London put a valuable thought into a few words when it recently observed in this connection: "What is surprising and alarming is to see how little has to be said from Moscow to obscure the memory of so much that has been done."

Americans should be on guard against taking any wooden rubles, against accepting for one moment the suggestion that bargaining and horse-trading on the basis of the present abnormal situation, in which the Kremlin dominates one-third of the population of the world, can lead to a secure or permanent peace. Eisenhower's speech of April 16 was a demand for the dismantling of the Soviet empire. It was a blueprint for victory in the cold war. Public opinion should be alert to see that it is not watered down or compromised. For in dealing with the threat posed by this empire, it is wise to remember the words of General MacArthur: "There is no substitute for victory." So long as this empire stands, nothing short of maximum preparedness in the free world will be enough.

Built-in Bureaucrats

If a weather forecaster persistently predicted rain for shine and sunshine for rain he would presumably be encouraged to look for another job. If an economic analyst made a practice of foreseeing a boom on the eve of a slump and *vice versa* he would soon run out of clients, as would a lawyer with a reputation for losing cases. If a baseball team got in the habit of floundering in last place one would expect new faces both on the team and in the front office.

In other words, a penalty for failure, in most fields, is taken for granted in a competitive society. To this generally accepted rule there has been an attempt to make an unwarranted exception; and

this is why there has been so much sound and fury in Washington in recent years, especially in connection with the State Department. The idea has gained currency, and has been vigorously promoted by left-wing commentators, that a career diplomat, like a king, can do no wrong, or at least cannot be held responsible if he does make a disastrous mistake.

Hence the tears that have been shed over alleged deterioration of morale among State Department employees. A main cause of this deterioration, so the story goes, is the dismissal of John Stewart Service and the more recent forced resignation, with pension rights, of John Carter Vincent. What is the background of these two cases?

The United States suffered one of the greatest and most disastrous political defeats in its history when China, in the postwar years, fell under the hostile rule of the Chinese Communists. An important if not decisive factor in this defeat, which was the prelude to over 130,000 casualties in the Korean war, was the attitude of critical hostility toward Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist regime, the only feasible alternative to Communist rule, which prevailed at policy-making levels in the State Department. Two conspicuous exponents of this tendency were Service and Vincent.

Service was arrested by the FBI in the curiously quashed *Amerasia* stolen documents case, when large quantities of highly confidential government documents were found strewed about the office of a notorious pro-Communist magazine, with a small circulation and an elaborate photographing apparatus. His case was not prosecuted; but he admitted selecting Philip Jaffe, editor of *Amerasia*, who has a record of Communist-front affiliations dating over many years, as the recipient of confidential information about China.

It took a ruling of the Civil Service Loyalty Review Board to pry Service loose from the State Department, which persistently tried to shield him. The same story was repeated with Vincent. A panel of the Loyalty Review Board found "reasonable doubt" as to Vincent's loyalty on the following grounds: "Studied praise of the Chinese Communists and equally studied criticism of the Chiang Kai-shek government . . . Failure . . . to supervise the accuracy or security of State Department documents . . . Close association with numerous persons who, he had reason to believe, were either Communists or Communist sympathizers."

After further study of the case Mr. Dulles absolved Vincent of disloyalty, but found that his work had not been up to the proper standard of a foreign service officer and that he could not usefully remain in the service. Whether Vincent was deficient in loyalty or was merely incompetent, he certainly was not a happy selection for a key post in an important and critical situation.

When all the facts in the case are considered,

facts which those who beat their breasts over the Service and Vincent cases make a point of ignoring, it does not seem that either of these men was harshly or unfairly dealt with. Morale, in government or private service, should not depend on permanent tenure for a built-in bureaucracy. Public service is a privilege, not a right. It should not be necessary to prove that a man is a Benedict Arnold before he can be dismissed from a post in a government agency of high strategic importance.

What Point Four Leads To

The free world may be lured into a temporary lull in the cold war. Pressure for increased uplifting of so-called underdeveloped countries is likely to follow. The arguments can be expected to emulate the pattern set in a speech by Dr. Charles Malik, Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations and Delegate of Lebanon to the Fifth Session of the General Assembly.

The following excerpts are from a statement of Mr. Malik's before the Political Committee of the General Assembly on December 11, 1950. The statement was published in book form in 1951, under the title *The Problem of Asia*.

Asia may fear the Soviet Union or the West; she may even envy them their technique and might. But envy and fear are one thing, and respect is quite another. Today Asia's respect . . . can only be earned . . . We throughout Asia will never know rest, nor participate effectively in the determination of events, until the humanity of our broad masses is fully asserted. . . But social and economic justice does mean, and the actual Asian situation requires that it mean. . . that the apportionment of the material goods of life must be based on merit. . . .

Has Mr. Malik any ideas about the source of the goods to be redistributed? He has, and very pointed ones. Among his concluding remarks we find this:

I might remark in this connection that, in my opinion, the *present magnitude* of operations of the *Point Four* programme *must* be multiplied by about *one hundred times* before it can *begin* to be adequate for the crying needs of the *moment*. For what are five billion dollars devoted to the restoration of the balance of justice between the meaning of Moscow and the meaning of Washington in the mind of the eternally dispossessed of the World?
[Editor's italics]

It may come as a shock to the humanitarian Point Four utopians to hear from a presumably competent observer this estimate of what is needed to give Asia the feeling of "social justice."

Mr. Malik's remarks are open to the interpretation that he thinks even \$500,000,000,000 a year would not be quite enough to relieve Asia's most

pressing needs of the moment. Someone should tell him that this is almost double the official estimates of our entire national income, and equivalent to the total military expenditures of the United States at the present rate for *ten years*.

In another part of his speech Mr. Malik said: "If the death rate could be lowered to the level of the United States, India would fill five earths as full as ours in a single century."

Unfortunately, however, the planned programs in underdeveloped countries are mostly likely to achieve a lowering of the death rate before the productivity of the area goes up. Thus, even if it were possible by turning over the whole United States economy to a committee run by Asians to approach a kind of world-social-justice by, say, 1960, the "balance of justice" would be destroyed again by 1980.

The unchallenged emergence of so vague and explosive a concept as social justice on a world-scale may be fatal to whatever chances there are for a sound world economy. Mr. Malik's lack of inhibition or economic knowledge has one good aspect. It should kill every conceivable argument in favor of large scale and blanket aid to Asia on terms of "social justice" to abolish poverty.

One Plan for Economy

Two southern Democrats have come up with an idea that seems to fit the plans and ideas of the new Republican Administration. They are Senator Harry F. Byrd of Virginia and Representative Charles E. Bennett of Florida. Messrs. Byrd and Bennett want to put something into the United States Constitution that was part of the Confederate Constitution of 1861.

The Byrd-Bennett plan, emphasizing its importance to everyone in the North and the South, has been called the "all-American economy measure." It would give the President power to veto individual items in a big, all-inclusive appropriation bill. As it is now, some wasteful or eccentric rider can be attached to an appropriation—and there is no way for the President to express his disagreement, except by vetoing the whole bill.

This business of adding riders to appropriation bills makes for legislative muddles. Last year, a rider to a Defense Department appropriation restricted the ratio of officers to men in the armed forces. Maybe the restriction was a good one. But it should have been handled by itself.

Here is an instance where the U. S. Congress would do well to imitate the state legislatures. Thirty-nine of the states have the item veto. In Michigan, from 1909 to 1947, the governor's item veto kept \$24,000,000 worth of expensive pet proj-

ects from burdening the state budget. Taking all the states together, such vetoes saved \$38,000,000 in 1947. Only if a disputed item gets a two-thirds vote in the state legislature can the governor's item veto be overruled.

The *Freeman*, in fact, would prefer to have Congress go even farther, and propose a self-denying amendment to the Constitution, under which, like the British Parliament, Congress would retain the power to reduce but give up the power to increase the expenditures proposed by the executive. This is the only way in which competition between the executive and the legislature for extravagance could be turned into competition for economy. But giving the President the power to veto individual items in appropriation bills would provide at least a partial solution.

Play Ball!

From the mild days of spring until the crisp days of October hundreds of thousands of Americans, from small boys on sandlots to the élite who compete in the big leagues, will be playing America's supreme national game, baseball. Millions of addicts known as "fans" will be watching the performances, in the ball parks, to accompanying refreshments of peanuts, hot dogs, and beer, or on television screens.

From the moment when the season is officially inaugurated in Washington, with the President or Vice-President throwing out the first ball, and most members of Congress in attendance, until the last play in the "World's Series" between the winning teams in the two major leagues in October, baseball will be our unchallenged king of sports. Baseball is uniquely American, even if it did develop out of an old English game known as rounders, and even if the Soviet Russians, in one of their more amusing efforts at claiming credit for being first with every important discovery, insisted recently that baseball was plagiarized from a Russian village game known as *lapta*. (So far as any resemblance exists, *lapta* is more like cricket than baseball, but bears little visible similarity to either of these western sports.)

The American "egghead" has been defined as the man who doesn't know the baseball scores. But baseball is a national, not a class addiction. One finds "fans" in the most unexpected places. A professor who must be two hundred and ten years old by the Binet-Simon test may show amazing grasp of baseball strategy and a close knowledge of the batting averages of the Brooklyn Dodgers. A nice old lady may stay up half the night waiting for the final outcome of a fifteen inning game.

It is the foreigner who usually fails to respond

to the fascination of baseball, even though a distinguished recent visitor, Viscount Montgomery, expressed a keen desire to see a "baseball match, game, I believe you call it" and carried away a ball and bat as souvenirs after being initiated into the rules of the game at West Point. But the cultural influence of baseball is mainly confined to the American continent.

Canadians take to the game readily and some flashy players have been coming up from the Latin American countries that are closest to the United States. But the only overseas people who seem to have assimilated baseball are the Japanese. And they have not really grasped the American spirit of the game, because the Japanese player doffs his cap and bows to the umpire when he comes up to bat.

The attitude of the American crowd toward the man in blue uniform who decides whether it is a strike or a ball, whether the runner is "safe" or "out," is amusingly ambivalent. Traditionally "Kill the umpire" is a popular slogan. Actually it is only in the more exuberant Latin American countries that umpires and referees are occasionally in physical danger. Still the umpire, when he calls a close decision against the home team, is not exactly a popular figure.

Yet he inspires enormous subconscious respect, because he is the nearest thing to a dictator in the United States. His word is law. In absolute authority his only rivals are the traffic cop and the majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court, when they agree on a ruling.

A modern Rip Van Winkle, awaking after a sleep of fifty years, would find baseball one of the unchanged landmarks. You are still out after three strikes and you go to first base if you get four balls. The home run, with the ball usually disappearing over the fence, is still the offensive masterpiece. The home run with the bases full (four runs after one mighty blow) is the equivalent of a royal straight flush in another great American national game.

Baseball is America in action. It has a good claim to being the best sport in the world to watch for those too old and infirm to play. It is more complex than racing or soccer, less brutally simplified than boxing, infinitely swifter than cricket or golf. There is a nice balance of skill, brawn, and luck that makes every game a little different from every other game. The swift changes of fortune, the spine-tingling tense situations that come up in a close game, the ability of the underdog to rally: all these characteristics of baseball are unmatched, for the fan, in any other sport.

So this year, as every year, a good many Americans of both sexes and all ages will be on hand when the umpire sounds the traditional call to arms: Play Ball.

Russia's Three Bears

By ALEXANDER WEISSBERG

Stalin's death ended personal dictatorship in the USSR. Will the struggle for power among his successors result in freedom for the Russian people?

When Stalin died some people expected to see dramatic changes in the Soviet Union. Now, disappointed that power has been so smoothly transferred, they swing to the opposite extreme and believe that everything will go on as it did before. Their early hopes seem as unjustified as their present disappointment. In point of fact an event has taken place which is no less important in the history of the Russian Revolution than was the Petrograd Revolt of October, 1917, or the death of Lenin in January, 1924. The stroke which Josef Vissarionovitch Stalin suffered on the evening of March 1, 1953, brought total dictatorship in the Soviet Union to an end.

To justify so sweeping an assertion it is necessary to analyze the conception of total dictatorship. It has two obvious characteristics: ideological control and the concentration of absolute power in the dictator, answerable to no one.

Ideological control underwent a change of meaning under Stalin. It was no more a question of his being the propounder of a scientific or pseudo-scientific doctrine, as was the case in the earlier years of the Revolution, but of something far more primitive. Every word spoken by anybody in the Soviet Union in recent years was judged by the Secret Police according to whether or not it was favorable to Stalin—a proceeding which implied that the same words spoken at different times were judged by different standards. The assertion "Hitler is a bandit" was good from the Stalinist point of view until the pact with Ribbentrop in August, 1939, and after the outbreak of war between Russia and Germany. During the period between pact and war a man could be arrested for making that statement.

Now it will be necessary to judge every spoken word according to whether it is favorable or unfavorable to Malenkov, Beria, or Bulganin, and a single sentence might be favorable to one of them and unfavorable to the other. The unified ideological control of the whole country, and above all of the upper grades of the party is therefore an objective for which the new rulers must contend.

More important, however, is the disappearance of the sole power of a single person to give orders. After collectivization took place in 1933, and even more after the so-called "Great Purge" in 1937, no discussion of any kind took place in the Soviet Union. Even in the Politburo itself decisions were

reached without debate. Whenever a new problem arose Stalin summoned to his office the responsible People's Commissar and a few experts whom he had personally selected through his Secretariat. The problem in question was thrashed out with these people; if Stalin reached a decision it was placed on the agenda of the next Politburo meeting. Stalin's decision was already known before the meeting took place and at the actual session one member after another sprang up to voice his agreement with the dictator. There was not the slightest question of any difference of opinion although this, perhaps, was modified for a short time when the Germans were battering on the gates of Moscow and the empire threatened to collapse.

House without a Master

Prominent members of the Communist Party used to call the dictator *Khosain*, which means "Master of the house." Now the house no longer has a master to direct its life. It is not even known which of the new rulers is the strongest. The fact that Malenkov has inherited the post of Prime Minister is of no decisive importance. For twenty years Stalin was undisputed master of the country without being Prime Minister, while on the other hand the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party which he occupied was entirely without meaning in Lenin's time.

There is now no reason to assume that Malenkov is regarded by the other members of the Politburo as more powerful than, say, a coalition between Beria and Bulganin. There is no longer a "Party Line." For the first time in twenty years members of the Politburo are forced to express their own opinion in debate. It is entirely conceivable that differences of opinion have arisen in the Politburo and that a majority and minority party are forming. It is conceivable that the more powerful members including, perhaps, even Malenkov, belong to the minority. It may be that the minority would not be willing to submit to the wishes of the majority and might appeal to the Central Committee of the party.

The Central Committee is a body of about two hundred people whose plenary debates are reported in the Soviet press. Its members come from all parts of the country and they do not yet know who

is the strongest man in the Politburo, since that problem is still unresolved. In the circumstances outlined above, they would have to decide whether they were for Malenkov, Beria, or Bulganin, and since they are unaware which of these men was the most to be feared, they would have to bring themselves, for the first time in their lives, to say what they really meant. Then, for the first time since 1937 a genuine discussion would take place in Russia—a battle of opinions instead of a parroting of orders received from above. This first free discussion in the Central Committee of the Communist Party will come and it will be the beginning of the revival of democracy within the party.

Passing of One-Man Control

Stalin ruled through the apparatus of NKVD which controlled all other organizations in the Soviet Union—the party, the Administration, the Army, and even the Comintern. In order, however, to protect himself against a palace revolution which the NKVD might have organized, Stalin maintained a small, highly secret, body of men who formed part of every branch of the NKVD. Officially, no more than ordinary civil servants subordinated to the People's Commissar for the Interior, these people had no other duty than to keep Stalin informed of any unusual happenings within the NKVD. A few of them were also posted to the Army. Within this *Apparat* there was no hierarchy. All its members were personally linked with Stalin only, and, on his death, their connection with one another ceased completely.

Total dictatorship is distinguished by the centralized control of all the sources of power within a country by a single man—and with Stalin's death this absolute power was ended. Now Malenkov directs the party and the Administration, Beria the Secret Police, and Bulganin the Army. Each of the three will be ready to work peacefully with the others, but none of them will be prepared to concede to the others even indirect control of their own organizations. Each knows that Malenkov, if he is to be the true heir of Stalin—that is to say, the new dictator—will be forced to tread the path which Stalin trod and to destroy physically every potential rival.

Five years ago Stalin removed the most powerful members of the Politburo from office as ministers. Molotov was forced to give up the Foreign Ministry, Beria the Ministry of the Interior, and Bulganin the Ministry of War. Their places at the head of their ministries were taken by insignificant party members. The purpose of these precautions was to deprive Beria of the command of the Secret Police and Bulganin of that of the Army. Stalin feared that after his death a struggle would take place between the satraps and sought to prevent it by making it impossible for the chief personalities to give direct orders to the troops. The Police and the

Army were to have one collective commander—the Politburo. A few hours after Stalin's death this ruling was annulled, Beria got the Secret Police back and Bulganin got the Army.

Last autumn Malenkov persuaded Stalin to agree to the dissolution of the Politburo and to its replacement by a party Praesidium. The change of name is of no importance, but the new Praesidium numbered thirty-six members, almost three times as many as the old Politburo which it replaced. The advantage of this arrangement for Malenkov was obvious. The old hands sat in the Politburo. Five of them—Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovitch, Andreyev, and Mikoyan—belonged to the original Politburo which Stalin had set up after the destruction of the opposition twenty-five years before. Three further members—Kruschev, Bulganin, and Beria—came in at the time of the "Great Purge." Malenkov, on the other hand, joined the Politburo only during World War Two and the *parvenu* was bound to come up against the opposition of the "old hands."

The new men in the Praesidium of the thirty-six members were Malenkov's creatures, since from 1946 onward Malenkov was in charge of the Central Committee Appointments Bureau and brought only his own adherents to the top. Twenty-four hours after Stalin's death Malenkov was forced to disband the enlarged Praesidium and to re-establish the old Politburo. Of its ten members only two—Zaburov and Pervuchin—are Malenkov's men. Four—Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovitch, and Mikoyan—belong to the old guard of the party and of the remainder Malenkov can count only on Kruschev.

Why Hasty Reversal?

What had happened? Why, immediately after Stalin's death, was a measure reversed which had been taken only six months previously at Stalin's request by the party Congress, the highest organ of the Communist Party? To adopt that measure, which altered the statutes of the party, it was necessary to summon the Party Congress, after an interval of thirteen years; to reverse it requires, according to the statutes, that the party Congress be reconvened. In actual fact not even a plenary session of the Central Committee was held.

The office of President of the Supreme Soviet is of no more than formal significance but, constitutionally, the President can be elected and deposed only by a plenary session of the Supreme Soviet. Why then, one day after Stalin's death, was the replacement in that office of Shvernik by Voroshilov announced.

There can be only one explanation of this haste. The reversal of the measures devised by Stalin and the reorganization of the chief organs of the party and state is the result of a deal concluded behind the scenes. In order to secure the position of Prime

Minister, Malenkov was forced to make very considerable concessions—concessions which block his road to sole dictatorial power, or at least make its attainment more difficult.

It may be deduced that events moved in the following way: Malenkov demanded that he should head the new Government and his colleagues agreed under certain conditions. They desired that the party and the country should be collectively led and would not tolerate the dictatorship of a single man. If Malenkov wished to be head of the Government he must provide solid guarantees against that possibility. Beria demanded the Secret Police, Bulganin that the Army should be restored to him, and Malenkov agreed. Only the "old hands" also insisted upon controlling the principal organs of the party. This was a bitter pill, but Malenkov swallowed it and the Politburo was re-established.

There are various explanations for Voroshilov's appointment. Either Malenkov had to buy his vote, or the "old hands" wished to protect themselves against a coup d'état, organized by the Prime Minister, by putting one of their own men into office as President.

Had Malenkov desired to carry out this reorganization he would have taken his time. That it occurred immediately after Stalin's death is evidence that it was a concession to rivals. They themselves wanted to occupy positions affording guarantees and security before allowing him to take over the reins of Government.

It is in these conditions that Malenkov has taken up his duties. Control by a single man of the whole apparatus of power is a thing of the past. Malenkov rules the Government and the party, although he is now reported to have been obliged to surrender the post of General Secretary of the latter. Bulganin commands the Army, Beria the Secret Police. In the Politburo Malenkov cannot count upon a majority. Total dictatorship has ended.

Task of New Leader

It might be objected that, when Lenin died, Stalin had less power than Malenkov has today. A bitter battle against the opposition of Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Bukharin still lay ahead of him; but three years later he was nevertheless dictator. This argument, however, only supports the view that total dictatorship has ended. If it is to be re-established the new dictator, like Stalin, must face a period of fighting for power, of open discussion, the formation of rival groups and the emergence of a majority and an opposition. It appears doubtful that totalitarian rule would result from this conflict.

The success of the new leader of Russia is rendered improbable by his own personal characteristics and by other considerations. Malenkov is not only a less important person than was Stalin—he is also less important than many of his present

colleagues. Beria and Bulganin are more intelligent than he, Kaganovitch and Mikoyan more gifted as organizers. This in itself is not decisive. Stalin too was a less impressive personality than some of his rivals. Trotsky possessed a higher form of genius, Bukharin and Piatakov were more talented, Muralov was more courageous and Zinoviev more eloquent than Stalin. All these men were endowed with higher mental qualities than he, but none with his strength of character.

Genius at Intrigue

Stalin was certainly not a great historical figure, but he was a man of iron energy, who had made in the course of his life one single discovery from which he knew how to draw profit. He had found the key to the secret of the "apparatus." Bernard Shaw said of Napoleon that he had discovered that when a man is hit by a cannon ball he is infallibly killed. We may doubt if Bonaparte's philosophy stopped there, but Stalin's successes are entirely due to the fact that he understood how to gain control of the machinery of power and to employ it for his purposes.

In achieving this Stalin did not choose to resort to a coup d'état, but to the principle of infiltration. He was able to employ the lowest instincts of human nature for his own purposes, since he was a master of intrigue. He allied himself with Zinoviev in order to strike down Trotsky, with Bukharin in order to destroy Zinoviev, with Yagoda in order to bring the whole opposition to the scaffold and with Yezhov in order to rid himself of Yagoda. He was a master blackmailer. He hunted through the dusty dossiers of the tsarist Ochrana in order to find compromising material about the Bolshevik revolutionaries which he could use against them. He secured the allegiance of Kalinin, Voroshilov, and Lunacharsky by threatening them with "revelations." He altered the balance of power step by step. Dzerzhinsky, the head of the GPU, had too much authority. He died suddenly at a party meeting, and his place was taken by Menzhinsky, who became a willing tool in Stalin's hands. Frunze, the Commissar of War, supported the independence of the army. He was forced by Stalin to submit to an operation against which his doctors had warned him and died under anesthetic. The leadership of the army was taken over by Voroshilov, Stalin's confidant.

Through the Commission of Control which he dominated, Stalin organized a campaign against the members of the opposition. He hounded them from the party and from their offices, while his supporters were rewarded with positions of privilege. Like a mole, unperceived by his enemies, he undermined the foundations of the party and each new position gained increased his boldness. When his opponents perceived his intentions, three years after Lenin's death, they were too late.

In 1927, Stalin's enemies tried for the last time to break through the ring of iron which was closing about them. Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Smilga went to Menzhinsky, the head of the GPU, under whose cover all Stalin's machinations were conducted. They appealed to the conscience of that old revolutionary; but Menzhinsky said no word and they left him empty-handed. Kamenev, an old friend, went back alone to Menzhinsky: "Do you really believe that Stalin alone is capable of fulfilling the purposes of the October Revolution?" Menzhinsky faltered. "Why did you allow him to gain so much power? Now it is too late, I cannot turn back," he said at last.

Had Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Bukharin anticipated the course of events after Lenin's death, Stalin would have ended his days in a concentration camp and not in the Kremlin. He surprised them while they slept. They fought for the victory of their ideas, he for power and for the physical destruction of his enemies.

Instability of Triumvirates

History does not repeat itself. The men who now sit in the Kremlin have been warned. Perhaps Malenkov is scarcely less skillful as a "mole" than his master, but he has no monopoly of that skill. Beria, Krushchev, Kaganovitch have all passed through Stalin's school. They will not allow themselves to be taken by surprise.

Parliamentary democracy is a stable form of government and total dictatorship no less stable; it can be shaken only by war, or by the death of the dictator. A triumvirate is the least stable regime of which history has any record. The first Roman triumvirate ended with a civil war between Caesar and Pompey, the second with the destruction of Mark Antony and the assumption of sole power by Octavian. The French Directorate was destroyed by Bonaparte's coup d'état.

It has been pointed out that the principle of infiltration has lost its effectiveness precisely because Stalin employed it with such success. That road to power is closed to any pretender to dictatorship. There remains the appeal to force of arms. A coup d'état is not inconceivable but it is very improbable; the chief actors in this hidden drama are too cautious. All are between the hammer and the anvil. They fear that open warfare between the satraps might lead to a rising of the people and they fear that the people, victorious, would call them to account for their part in Stalin's crimes.

The rise of Stalin took place during the NEP period. It was the best time of the Russian Revolution and the country was peaceful and satisfied. In such times those who are at the head of affairs can entrench themselves in power. The struggle for the succession of Stalin must, however, be fought over the body of a nation which has been

tortured and oppressed by its rulers for a quarter of a century. What have the Russian people not been forced to endure? Collectivization and the Great Famine claimed eleven million victims, the "Great Purge" ten million more. The war added to these dead a toll which cannot be computed. A people which has gone through these experiences is a dangerous partner in a game for power. Even more than the people the satraps fear the dictator who threatens to emerge from their midst.

Conflict Must Break Out

Faced with this dilemma there remains for the rulers of Russia no alternative but to renounce any idea of armed conflict and to submit their disagreements to the arbitration of the Central Committee of the party. They will be obliged to breathe new life into the shattered body of the Bolshevik Party. Step by step, and very cautiously, democracy will advance, at least in the state, and perhaps also among the people. In conditions of total dictatorship the struggle for power and influence is fought in the dictator's anteroom. Intrigue is the only weapon employed. The revival of democracy within the party makes different demands upon the rivals for power. There are catchwords which would be alarmingly popular—the dissolution of the collective farms with the people living in the country, an amnesty for political prisoners with the people of the towns.

Who could prevent Bulganin or Mikoyan, fighting against the influence of Beria and Malenkov, from suggesting the liberation of political prisoners as a demand which should be debated. Whoever made such a proposal would secure the support of ten million Russian families who have relatives in the slave labor camps of the Arctic Circle. Another contender might demand the liberalization of the *Kolkhoz* policy in agriculture in order to win over the peasants to himself. When politics advance beyond the point of stagnation those who seek power are forced to compete with one another. The fulfillment of any such proposal would be a milestone on the way to freedom. The return of the political prisoners would fundamentally change the political climate.

To sum up, we need expect no dramatic developments in the near future. The interests of a large privileged class demand that existing conditions be maintained, but those conditions have become extremely insecure. In the long run, conflict must break out and, in order to decide that conflict, the rulers may appeal either to the force of arms or to the people. A combination of the two is possible but in any case the nameless, hitherto oppressed masses, will be drawn into the arena.

The solid armor which enclosed and constricted the life of a great and gifted people has been cracked. Now at last the Russian people have some hope of freeing themselves.

Austria's Elections

By JOSEPH MEISER

In attempting to unite conservatives and Leftists in a European anti-Communist front, America has lent support to the spread of collectivism there.

VIENNA

This is an important year for democracy in Europe, with popular elections in three key countries. On February 22, Austria elected a new parliament. Before the summer is over there will be elections in Italy and West Germany.

The election campaign in Austria was preceded by serious arguments over the future economic policy of the country. This finally brought about the long-expected clash between the two unequal partners in the former government—the anti-Marxist People's Party and the Socialist Party. The main point of contention was whether an inflationist policy should be followed; this would enable the socialists to continue their economic and credit controls. A policy of stabilization, on the other hand, would lay permanent foundations for free enterprise.

Austria came through her elections with honors—at least in the eyes of the free world. After eight years of occupation by the four Allied armies, she still had sufficient stability to reject the extreme parties—both Right and Left. The Communists, though camouflaged, lost one of the five seats they had in the previous parliament. The Independent Party, often referred to as neo-Nazi, which according to predictions should have won several additional seats, dropped from sixteen to fourteen seats. On the other hand, contrary to all predictions, the Socialist Party won six new members, and is now only one seat behind the People's Party, which, after seven years of leadership in the coalition, has lost "only" three seats. These are the numerical facts. Before analyzing them to see whether they have strengthened or weakened Austria's position, it is necessary to point out certain tendencies in American foreign policy that have influenced Austrian development.

American foreign policy aims primarily at establishing anti-Communist solidarity in Western Europe. This can only be achieved, however, if all the anti-Communist forces can be united in a common front. This united front would, of course, contain various groups, with certain political differences. European society still falls into two main groups politically: conservative and Marxist. The former are traditionally anti-Marxist. The latter have both Communist and anti-Communist elements.

Socialists in Europe are anti-Communist, and there is no doubt of their position in the front line

against Communism. It is not, however, their anti-Communism which is of primary interest to the free world, but their effort to maintain the present anti-Communist and anti-Soviet status quo. This means that any anti-Communist policy on the part of the West must try to prevent the two Marxist camps—socialists and Communists—from uniting. It must hold socialism firmly in its ranks.

U. S. Policy Encourages Socialism

American foreign policy has set itself this task with almost too much zeal. In doing this, it has overlooked the fact that in politics situations are always changing, and that therefore an indefinite adherence to a status quo is impossible. There is no question that the Truman-Acheson regime tried to consolidate European socialism on the rather naïve assumption that unionized socialist workers will, if firmly controlled, be a guarantee of anti-Communist stability. This viewpoint, however, completely overlooked the fact that European socialists are only one part of the front, and that their ideological relationship to Communism often leads to breaches in its ranks. With clumsy force the breaches have so far been closed against Communism, but only at the expense of building bridges for the transmission of socialist ideas. Free Europe is thus compelled to face a slow development toward complete socialism which threatens its anti-Communist principles, and which is actually supported by the United States.

The results of this policy can be seen more clearly in Austria than anywhere else. Austria had put its entire faith in the coalition between the anti-Marxist People's Party and the Socialist Party. This was a matter of economic necessity and a result of the military occupation—Soviet troops occupy a considerable part of the country. In this coalition the People's Party was the stronger, both in parliament and the executive, but the coalition with the socialists led to concessions which violated all the principles of free enterprise. The People's Party had to see Austrian basic industry nationalized, and then, with the help of the Marshall Plan, turned into political bastions against private ownership. It also had to look on when under the very eyes of the MSA mission a national policy of planned inflation was introduced which supported the socialists in their movement

toward state control. Moreover, there have been instances of open American intervention in favor of the socialists which caused bursts of bitter indignation in anti-Marxist circles against the Truman-Acheson regime.

At the American radio station Rot-Weiss-Rot (Red-White-Red) trade union programs dominate all others and trade union posters are printed with American money. The People's Party, which once held a unique position among non-Marxist voters, cannot forget that the Truman-Acheson regime, probably also in order to strengthen the Socialist Party, helped the extreme Right wing—the Independent (VDU)—to become an official and legal party. This was done in the Allied Council, and was a first step toward the splitting up of the anti-Marxist parties in Austria. The fact that the Communists have not raised the slightest objection to this move should have caused the Americans to give it further thought.

A Dangerous Crossroads

Today we have reached a dangerous crossroads. Austria's freedom and freedom in Europe generally have come to a critical turning point. The socialists have become extremely strong in Austria. The calculations of the State Department about maintaining the socialist status quo have proved incorrect. The Independent Party, which in 1949 won sixteen seats in the first round, passed most of its votes to the Socialist Party in 1953. Today the socialists are only one seat behind the People's Party and thus very close to taking over the leadership of the country.

This political situation in Austria is partly a heritage of the years between the two world wars, when the forces of the center had to fight the two fronts of radical Marxism and the fifth column of Nazi Germany. It is also influenced by the present position of the Communists in Austria. So far as numbers are concerned, they are, of course, not dangerous. As agents of the Soviet power in a state where there is as yet no economic stability, however, and where Communist armies are in partial possession, they present a serious latent danger. The slightest change in the price policy gives rise to a flood of new wage demands on the part of the Communists, demands that would destroy the entire economy if conceded. In order to resist these attacks, the Socialist Party has had to put up an opposition to the People's Party even though as a part of the coalition government it is itself responsible for the price policy.

Since February 22, however, the problem has become much more difficult. The radical elements will demand far more from the enlarged Socialist Party; the Socialist Party will be increasingly harassed by Communist demands.

The only practical countermove is a rallying of all anti-Marxist forces in government and parlia-

ment. This attempt is now being made by the leader of the People's Party, Julius Raab, who is one of the strongest men in the anti-Marxist camp. He encounters heavy opposition, not only from the socialists, but also from the American representatives. Nobody seems to recognize the socialist danger, which, if unchecked, will lead to an even greater measure of collectivization. It remains to be seen whether in such a case Austria can still remain the bulwark against Communism that she has been so far.

In Western Germany the decision will be made in June. It is predicted that the socialists will also be strengthened there, which would mean danger that German foreign policy would fall back into its old neutralism. The selfless policy of Adenauer, which aims first and foremost at the unification of Europe, never had proper American support during the Truman-Acheson era. If Adenauer loses in the next elections, the whole movement toward European union will suffer a severe setback.

In Italy the development which the State Department feared has already taken place. The Left and Right wings have sharply separated and present two strongly opposed camps. Whatever lies on the so-called Right is by and large European and democratic; the other side represents the Soviet camp. The enemy has declared himself and one can see him face to face. In Italy the Western forces are growing, and the Communists and Left Wing socialists have suffered a severe defeat.

Europe is thus faced with great decisions in the coming weeks. The present American policy is failing in Austria, and unless there is a change in the near future, Austria will be but one instance of the general failure in Europe.

Mortality

I like to follow her around
In this ancient burying-ground
And say to her, "Why be so glum?
Why not relieve your tedium,
Open an eye and ear and come
Back into sight and sound?"

And once or twice her voice has said,
"Yes, you are right, I am not dead,
And yet what would the mourners do
If I should dare return to you
And if the proper retinue
Found me alive instead?"

But I have seen her nonetheless
And felt the stirring of her dress
In the shadow of a cypress tree.
I know that she would come to me
If she could lose anxiety
For whom it might distress.

WITTER BYNNER

How to Integrate Europe

By WILHELM RÖPKE

The Fallacy in the Schuman Plan

In the history of international economic relations there are a few memorable dates which mark dramatic liberations from confining bonds. New Year's Day of 1834, when the tariff boundaries between the states of the Prussian Customs Union were abolished, is one of these dates. February 1, 1849, when the British corn laws were changed is another. And there was February 1, 1850, when Switzerland abolished its inland tariffs. In the first and third case something happened *within* the framework of a national economy that today is described with the often misused and misinterpreted expression "economic integration." At that time the liberated people celebrated the event with the enthusiasm appropriate to a genuine act of economic liberation.

On February 10, 1953, according to an order of the "High Authority" of the Montan Union (the organization set up to carry out the Schuman Plan), tariffs for coal and steel were abolished between the participating countries. Will this be an historical date like those just mentioned? There have been plenty of efforts to turn it into such an event. But there has been no real enthusiasm on the part of the countries involved.

Yet can we really blame them for their lack of enthusiasm? Is there not a reason for the apparently widespread notion that such an act, under present conditions, is inadequate to create a real economic "integration"? Can it be that this is only a play on the front of the stage, while the real problems remain unsolved in the background—problems which up till now have not been thought through at all?

One is tempted, in fact, to ask the rather insolent question: Where do realities end and appearances begin? This question concerns not only the Schuman plan, but the whole range of actions being undertaken today under the slogan of European economic integration.

One essential aspect of the bitter reality that has been obscured by the surface activities of the Montan Union became apparent suddenly and with shocking impact. For on the same day that the first coal transport passed the border between France and Western Germany under the sign of "abolished custom tariffs," the French government announced that the idea of "practically free" Montan products would have to be interpreted in view of the existing facts, and that, naturally, nothing

would be changed with regard to the existing laws about *the control of foreign exchange*. This announcement frankly exposed the central difficulties of the whole Schuman plan.

To grasp the full significance of this difficulty one must get to the core of the entire problem of European economic integration. We have to start with this question: What is the actual goal of this often proclaimed but highly vague European integration? Obviously it is the establishment of a condition which makes possible the free and reciprocal flow of trade between the various national economies in Western Europe. That is, a condition in which all major prices and costs are, so to speak, in communication with each other, where anybody can buy freely at all times on the cheapest market and sell just as freely at all times to the highest bidder. In other words, we can speak of a true integration of international economies only if this integration differs in degree and not in kind from the integration we accept as natural *within* the frame of a national economy.

Convertible Currencies Needed

There are two main conditions of integration within a national economy. National economic relations must be multilateral, and people must be permitted to spend or receive money without restrictions. An international economy, if it wants to realize the idea of "integration," requires the same conditions. It requires the multilaterality of international trade and a free "convertibility" of money that corresponds on an international scale to the freedom and uniformity of the national exchange of money. Free convertibility of currency makes multilaterality possible. And multilaterality is essential for an integrated international economy. For only under those conditions can a given economic area become a true unit. And only then can the economic potential of each country be employed in its most advantageous lines of production so as to realize to the full the advantages of an international division of labor. This, after all, is the basis of all trade.

This desirable condition once existed. Indeed only twenty years have passed since it was destroyed. It existed to a degree we hardly dare hope for today. It existed at a time when Europe was not yet cut to pieces by currency restrictions and

other measures of a "collectivist" policy which makes any economic multilaterality impossible. It was an integration without super-plans, super-planners, super-bureaucracies, super-conferences, and without a super-state and a "High Authority."

To be sure, protective tariffs played an annoying role during this time. But in the end these tariffs were probably no greater impediments to trade within Europe—with its short distances and good transport—than the enormous distances in the United States, which brought transportation costs to a point where they were, in effect, comparable to inland tariffs. This European integration, which was a reality when nobody even mentioned the word, had also the tremendous advantage of being an "open" and world-wide integration, not a "closed" one.

But this integration was destroyed by the "new economic policy" which began twenty years ago, and developed into a gigantic, tremendously complicated and widespread system. This policy culminated in the restrictions on foreign exchange that made the convertibility of currencies impossible. It abolished the very basis for international integration by abolishing the multilaterality of trade.

Whatever the reasons for this development may be, the restrictions on foreign exchange were the final step of a particular European policy which can only be described as collectivist-inflationary. Some twenty years ago, in spite of distances, borders, different languages, customs and monetary systems, the whole world constituted one coherent economic system. But today Zurich and Munich—not to mention Stuttgart and Dresden, one in West, the other in East Germany—are economically farther apart than Iceland and Patagonia were twenty years ago.

Customs Union Inadequate

Europe's economic integration has been destroyed by an economic foreign policy which had its root and its parallel in the more or less collectivist-inflationary policy of national governments that sailed under the flag of "planned economy," "full employment," "cheap money," and deficit spending. Thus, a successful re-integration can only be started at the point where lie the causes of Europe's economic disintegration, i.e., within each single nation and its planned-inflationary economic policy. Integration can be accomplished only by removing the upper layer of collectivist measures which has accumulated in twenty years over the lower layer of traditional protective tariff policy.

The main problem here is the abolition of restrictions on foreign exchange. Only steps that bring us closer to this goal will forward the aim of economic integration. Everything else is aimless fumbling and sterile activity, which can but lead to dangerous confusion and a costly loss of time

and energy. This conclusion should be clear to anybody who realizes that it is impossible to overcome international economic disintegration by some kind of planned European economy. Although collectivists of all shades keep pointing in this direction, this road toward a planned European economy is barred. Even if it were wide open, it would not lead us anywhere but from a national into a larger continental prison.

This elementary examination shows us the real nature of the whole problem of European economic integration. It provides us with the norm we must apply to any project recommended to us as a means of approaching this goal. Thus it becomes quite obvious that the idea of a customs union along the lines of Benelux, which appears time and again in various forms and shapes, does not touch the real problem. It does not mitigate the disintegrating effect of isolationist policies, culminating in the autarchy of national currencies. It merely presents us with a series of new and complicated problems.

Common Market an Illusion

We can also see quite clearly what is wrong with the Schuman plan, as far as it is designed to lead Europe's economy out of the prison of national isolation. The decisive question which was raised two and a half years ago, when this plan was initiated, is unfortunately still decisive: What sense is there in the solemn declaration of a common, customs-free market for the products of a single industry, when each national industry composing it is an integrated part of a single national economy, separated from its neighbors by a highly organized, planned (and thus exclusive) economic and financial policy with an autonomous currency and restrictions on the convertibility of foreign exchange?

If one considers the possible consequences of such a strange arrangement it becomes quite obvious that the thing cannot work. We are trying to create what should be the natural effect of a true European economic integration, while we leave the real causes of Europe's economic disintegration untouched. It is foolish to try to "integrate" one part of industry while the forces which upset the adjustment of the payment balance from within remain at work. The price of the optical illusion of a "common" market for one branch of industry will be serious and hard-to-predict disturbances and tensions that cannot be overcome even by a highly complicated system of preventive measures. These may not only hinder progress toward integration, but actually result in a backward step.

No doubt appearance and reality will clash here too. It is quite possible that in the case of a collision between the "common market" and the existing reality of disrupted balances of payment, refuge can be found in a more or less disguised or concealed regulation of the exports and imports of

the Montan products. Most countries have indeed reached a state of perfection in applying such veiled restrictions. Perhaps one can ignore these difficulties, since the "common market" in Montan products has become the symbol of European economic integration, and the "High Authority" will probably do everything to keep this market open in spite of difficulties in the payment balance and restrictions on foreign exchange. But this means that as long as there is no true integration of Europe's economy, European trade in one branch of industry will be treated *as though* there were no difficulties in currency exchange or the balance of payments.

No Guarantee of Integration

The result of such a policy of appearances is obvious. As long as the European countries cling to an internal credit and budget policy and a foreign exchange control (with its unrealistic exchange rates) which pushes this or that country arbitrarily on to the debit side of the European Payments Union, and as long as they regard the quantitative regulation of exports and imports as the main way to obtain a payment balance, the permanent liberation of one economic branch will have to be paid for with a corresponding decrease in the liberalization of another. Somewhere the balance will have to be restored.

This effect will only be mitigated to the degree to which a true integration of Europe's economy is realized. But if this should happen we wouldn't need the Schuman plan. It can only function without major disturbances if the true integration of Europe's economy progresses along the lines we have outlined. The hope of reaching by way of the Schuman plan a genuine European economic integration (in the sense of a multilateral community of markets and prices, which is obtainable only on the basis of a free convertibility of currencies) shows a definite lack of realistic thinking.

The so-called "functional" integration along the lines of the Schuman plan is based on an amazing confusion. Only an "integral" integration could accomplish this—and that would be worth celebrating with fireworks and champagne. There is, however, a hope that perhaps the governments, since they have already embarked upon the Schuman plan, may realize that it cannot function without an "integral" integration; and this may spur their efforts in that direction. In that case, the Schuman plan, in spite of its inherent dangers, might still turn out to be a shock therapy in overcoming European disintegration.

There is one other point. Monetary autonomy for European countries not only means that these countries achieve their balance of payments by controlling foreign exchange, but also that they provide police protection for an unreal rate of currency exchange. Now the creation of a common

market for the steel and coal industries of France and Western Germany has as its prime objective the laudable goal of fostering true competition between the participating industries, their establishing the best possible distribution of production centers on the basis of differences in production costs. But how can an economically efficient international division of labor be accomplished when unreal relations between different currencies falsify the cost-basis, and when it remains possible to shift the foundations of a competition based on cost alone by manipulating the currency?

A common market, in which only the performance of competitors is measured, necessitates a system of solid and economically sound currency relations, which, like the old gold standard, practically establishes a uniform international monetary system. Such a system, however, can only be established on the basis of free convertibility of currencies, for only a free market can establish sound currency relations.

It is therefore safe to assume that the attempt to create a common market before such an international monetary system has been established will but lead to another collision between appearances and realities and cause immense problems.

If the Schuman plan has been recommended primarily for political reasons, the fact remains that this advantage has been paid for with economic dangers and problems; among which the last and not least is a tremendous concentration of power. Every good European must earnestly hope that, after all the praise the Schuman plan has received, it may not turn out to be the biggest fiasco of our time. But this hope can only be realized if we recognize clearly the problems just considered; if we tackle them energetically; and if we turn what are now the mere appearances of an economic integration of Europe into realities.

To a Lovely Lady of Another Nationality

You do not speak the language of my race,
Nor I the one your fathers loved so well.
I can surmise, but I can never tell
What rich antiquity of charm and grace
Endowed the world with you. But I behold
Within your heavy-lidded dusky eyes
The lambent twilights of Hellenic skies
And all the splendor of a world grown old.

You do not speak in words your thoughts of me,
Yet in your warm lips' languid droop I know
Deep, promised love. Oh, let us prove it so;
Let the slow fusion of our bodies be
Our only speech. Let us with love define
My strange dark world to yours and yours to mine.

ANDERSON M. SCRUGGS

She Read It in the Papers

By VICTOR LASKY

Though Eleanor frowned on "smearing good people like . . . Alger Hiss," it took six weeks to drag from her a grudging retraction of her smear of Louis Budenz.

This is a story involving Louis F. Budenz, the former Communist, and Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, who dislikes former Communists over twenty-five years of age.

But before you jump to conclusions, Louis Budenz did not smear Mrs. Roosevelt. Mrs. Roosevelt smeared Louis Budenz. And it took six weeks before she retracted the smear.

Yet, no editorials appeared in the anti-anti-Communist press denouncing Mrs. Roosevelt, such as greeted Chairman Harold Velde of the House Un-American Activities Committee, when he leveled an unfortunate accusation against Mrs. Eugene Meyer. But Mr. Velde made amends. And it didn't take him six weeks to do so.

Now, as we all know, the former First Lady deplores "smearing." Whenever one of her friends is identified as an alleged Soviet agent, she waxes really bitter. For example, shortly after Whittaker Chambers identified Alger Hiss as an underground Red, Mrs. Roosevelt wrote: "Smearing good people like Lauchlin Currie, Alger Hiss, and others is, I think, unforgivable. . . . Anyone knowing either Mr. Currie or Mr. Hiss, who are two people I happen to know fairly well, would not need any denial on their part to know they are not Communists."

It took some time for Mrs. Roosevelt to seemingly accept the jury verdict in the Hiss case; but she has never quite forgiven Whittaker Chambers. In a speech at Columbia University last February, she declared: "I don't like Whittaker Chambers."

In that same speech, Mrs. Roosevelt also assailed Louis Budenz as an ex-Communist whose reliability she questions. Her own reliability seemed more in question to those who knew how reluctant she had been to retract a false statement she had made about Budenz. The false statement appeared in her nationally syndicated column on January 10, 1953:

"As I said good-by to my friends Mr. and Mrs. [Clarence] Pickett. . . I could not help remembering that I had read the other day that Louis Budenz, the reformed ex-Communist, had recently named Mr. Pickett and Earl Harrison, among others, as Communists. I have often felt in similar incidents . . . that because I did not actually know [the people concerned] I could not say what I thought of such accusations. In this case I have known Mr. Harrison . . . through his work, and have worked closely with Mr. Pickett for years.

"Mr. Pickett not only is not a Communist, but he is one of the best and the finest type of citizens that any country could possibly have. If we are going to begin to smear the type of people we should look up to and be proud of, then I think the time has come for those of us who love our country to state what we know in the hope that there will be greater care exercised by those people who are prone to make such rash statements."

Rash-Statement Repercussions

Now it so happened that Louis Budenz had never named Messrs. Pickett and Harrison as Communists.

"As a matter of fact," Mr. Budenz wrote to the *World-Telegram and Sun*, which had carried the column in New York, "I have never been asked by any agency of any kind in regard to any Communist associations allegedly connected with these gentlemen, and have never discussed either one of them on any occasion."

Shortly afterward, Forrest E. Corson, a prominent Long Island civic leader, wrote to Mrs. Roosevelt asking her for the source of her charge against Mr. Budenz. He suggested that she retract her statement if she had no proof.

"Otherwise," Mr. Corson concluded, "you can be judged guilty of the same crime of which you accuse others—making 'rash' statements."

Mrs. Roosevelt did not reply, and Corson wrote to the executive editor of the *World-Telegram and Sun*, suggesting that Mrs. Roosevelt be requested "either to prove her 'rash statement' about Budenz's alleged rash statements, or correct it in one of her daily columns."

On February 16, Mrs. Roosevelt finally wrote to Mr. Corson:

"I cannot remember now in what newspaper I read the statement that Mr. Budenz had named Mr. Clarence Pickett and Mr. Earl Harrison as Communists. I usually read four papers every day and the same ones—the *New York Times*, the *Herald-Tribune*, the *World-Telegram and Sun*, and the *New York Post*. I have traveled considerably and it may have been in a paper somewhere else. When I was in Chicago I read the *Chicago Tribune*.

"The fact that I am sure I read it in a newspaper does not, of course, mean that Mr. Budenz said it and perhaps I should have said that I took my in-

formation from a newspaper. I simply said these names were included in some he mentioned.

"I do not think it was a rash statement to say that I had seen this, since Mr. Budenz has been somewhat free in his mentioning of names which he did not remember in his first statements. Evidently one is not able to accept what one reads in the newspapers as true."

To which Mr. Corson, still seeking a retraction, replied:

"Since Professor Budenz has denied that he ever mentioned Messrs. Pickett and Harrison, and since you furnish no proof beyond the recollection of something you read in some newspaper, might it not be in the interests of journalistic accuracy and fair play for you to inform your legion of readers of Mr. Budenz' grievance?"

"The 'rash statement' which you blamed on Professor Budenz was somebody else's 'rash statement,' but by reprinting it, you share responsibility for an offense of which you unjustly accuse Budenz.

"Mr. Budenz has a prodigious memory, as all who know him can attest. He has a memory for faces, facts, and intimate details—a memory which has made him such an excellent witness, able to withstand the blistering attacks of Communists' lawyers in cruel cross examination.

"Summoned, in every instance, by his Government to testify against the enemies of our country—open and concealed—he has answered on the witness stand only the questions asked him about specific persons. Mr. Budenz is a lawyer, too, and he has not been led into the traps baited for him by the Communists and set out by the anti-anti-Communists.

"It seems strange reasoning, indeed, which leads good, sincere Americans to join in the persecution of a reformed man who is trying to make honest amends for his treasonable past.

Strange Reasoning

"Our country needs the sincere ex-Communist because he alone knows the philosophy, the strategy and tactics of Communism, the personnel of the conspiracy which is aimed at the eventual destruction of all liberal thought and of all the freedoms.

"Communists who leave the party and who keep quiet are left alone. But just let one of them, in expiation of his sins against God and man, seek to expose an Alger Hiss, a Harry Dexter White, a Lauchlin Currie, a William Remington or an Owen Lattimore, and he is viciously attacked. He is smeared not only by the Communists, but by the sincere and the pseudo-liberals, as well.

"It just doesn't make sense, Mrs. Roosevelt. But it certainly does make the Communists very happy."

On February 24, 1953, six weeks after the original item appeared in her column, Mrs. Roosevelt admitted to her readers she had made an error:

"I have received a protest from Mr. Budenz who says that I falsely attributed to him a statement naming Mr. Clarence Pickett and Mr. Earl Harrison as Communists. I read in some newspaper, which I cannot now remember, that he had numbered them among others whom he has 'remembered' as being Communists. Since he now insists that he did not do so, I am delighted to learn through a friend of his that he would like a retraction from me. I take this to mean that he has no reservations about these two gentlemen. Nothing could give me greater pleasure since I thought it was becoming a little too much if we were asked to believe that these two men were Communists."

Grudging Admission of Error

It was a grudging admission of error, however. For in another letter to Mr. Corson, dated February 23, 1953, Mrs. Roosevelt wrote this telling explanation of it:

"I retracted my statement about Mr. Budenz in my column for publication February 24.

"However, I must differ with you on one point. You say: 'It seems strange reasoning, indeed, which leads good, sound Americans to join in the persecution of a reformed man who is trying to make honest amends for his treasonable past.' I have very little faith in the reform of a grown man who has been a Communist for a number of years. It is quite a different thing when youngsters between the ages of 16 and 25 join a Communist organization or one that develops into a Communist-dominated organization, for a short time, but when mature men allow their minds to be dominated for any length of time by the Communist Party, then there is something which does not make them reliable. . . .

"I am not at all sure that the men you named are Communists and I doubt if some of them have been as dangerous to the U. S. A. as is the hysteria which Budenz and Chambers have brought about."

As far as Mrs. Roosevelt is concerned, then, ex-Communists like Budenz and Chambers are much more "dangerous" to the United States than traitors in high place like Alger Hiss. Perhaps this hatred of ex-Communists on the part of people like Mrs. Roosevelt is due to their own intimate flirtations with Communism in the past. They were wrong, horribly wrong, on the crucial issue of our times—the threat of Communism. They coddled the Communist youth, joined Red fronts, signed the petitions, invited Communists to the White House.

Instead of facing up to their mistakes, they have tried to forget the whole sorry business. It doesn't help them in this effort when they see former Communists frankly face up to their mistakes, and try to atone for them.

The Kansas Experiment

By L. D. McDONALD

The government flood-control program is costly, muddled, and ineffective, and we need to examine the alternative proposed by independent experts.

Less than two short years ago the waters of the Kansas River were rolling down that valley in the most destructive flood in the history of the state. Now the scars are nearly all gone. Rebuilt and re-finished buildings replace the weather-worn and obsolete ones of preflood days, giving those areas a new and proud look. Crops again flourish in the fields.

Today another flood is rolling down that same Kansas valley—a flood of bitter and too often ill-considered criticism, of dissension and strife over the proper solution to the flood problem. The flood of 1953 is not the result of rain but of what might be called the “Kansas Experiment.” It is too soon to estimate its magnitude, to weigh the damage and destruction or the benefits that may follow. It is not too soon to turn the tide into the channels of reason and to assure not only the people of the Kansas valley but the hilltop taxpayer of a bright future and a sensible answer to the flood problem.

What is this “Kansas Experiment”? Perhaps the best answer to that question is a modest news item of September 2, 1952, which stated:

An independent engineering study of the Kaw River basin was directed by Governor Edward F. Arn as a guide in further flood protection work. The Governor said an independent and impartial report is necessary to give the people of Kansas an objective and an unbiased answer, not influenced by rival federal agencies or by pressure groups.

The back-page location of the item perhaps reflects the taxpayers' lack of real interest in an unbiased review by competent engineers in private practice, or the vast spending program of our federal agencies. Governor Arn and the Kansas Industrial Development Commission demonstrated their sincere interest and the courage of their convictions, however, when they selected three prominent engineers—Abel Wolman of Baltimore, Louis Howson of Chicago, and N. T. Veach of Kansas City—to make the survey.

On February 16, 1953, these engineers submitted a preliminary report, which reviews the history of flood protection planning to date, particularly from the time of the 1936 Flood Control Act, which relegated responsibility for flood-control planning to the United States Army Corps of Engineers. The report outlines the Army's successive recommendations as they have to do with the Kansas River and as they were authorized by Congress. In 1936,

it states, levees were proposed for the urban areas of Kansas City, Lawrence, and Topeka at an estimated cost of less than \$15,000,000. Three reservoirs—Kanopolis, Milford, and Tuttle Creek—were added in 1938 to make the cost about \$70,000,000. In 1944, and again in 1950, the flood-control program was modified and enlarged until it included eighteen reservoirs and ten local protection (levee) projects, at an estimated cost of about \$400,000,000. It proposed to give a high degree of protection to 608,000 acres of farm land. The report notes that the Army and the Bureau of Reclamation now propose a plan to construct thirty-four reservoirs at an estimated cost of \$700,000,000. It states, however, that eighty-four additional reservoirs are being studied and that the entire program of the combined federal agencies may cost in excess of \$1,000,000,000.

Sound, Integrated Program Needed

“The situation may be described with some accuracy as being entirely ‘fluid,’” these engineers observe. “New structures are added, old ones are withdrawn, some are expanded, functional purposes are redesigned and multiplied, with the result that the board is unable to present in any effective manner exactly what the program of the various agencies are at this writing.”

Most ironical of all, however, in view of the vast increase over the original program, is this revealing statement:

Had all eighteen dams . . . been completed and operating as designed, the 1951 flood would have overtopped all urban levee protection works from Manhattan to the Missouri River by from one to three feet.

In other words, it is proposed to spend something like \$1,000,000,000 on a flood-control program which has been demonstrated to be wholly inadequate. Not unreasonably, the report of the board of engineers questions the economic soundness of spending such a sum; it recommends that, pending the final report—which will be submitted shortly—all construction and planning on flood-control reservoirs be halted until the taxpayer can stop, look, and listen.

The report suggests that the old-fashioned, perhaps long forgotten, measure of economic justification could be used to good advantage, and that the

parties receiving the benefits ought to make some contributions to the cost of the necessary construction. In the present flood-control program, the taxpayer pays the entire cost of reservoirs, the beneficiary contributing nothing at all.

The storm of protest and criticism over the construction of reservoirs in Kansas centered over the rich Big Blue Valley of Kansas. The residents of that area failed to see the justice of their being forced to leave their long-established homes and businesses to hunt new homes with the accompanying hazard of failure in the new start, only to benefit a neighbor downstream at costs greater than the benefit to that neighbor. The storm rolled not only down the Kansas Valley but over the state and, to stem that flood, facts not levees were needed.

Save by Sharing Costs

Now a new flood crest is rising, its magnitude yet unknown. Strangely, many residents of the Kansas and Missouri basins, sincerely interested in a proper solution to the flood problem, businessmen who stop, look, and listen before spending their own money unwisely, are now protesting against the proposals contained in the preliminary report, unwilling to await the final report with its promised saving of some \$500,000,000 or more. There are, of course, cries from the people downstream who hoped to benefit, and from the proponents of the federal agencies plan.

The report quotes President Eisenhower's statement referring to the development of natural resources: "It will involve a partnership of the states and local communities, private citizens, and the federal government, all working together." The report goes on to say:

The board believes there should be local participation in the cost of such improvement—and that there should be local participation in the planning and control of the work. But there seems no good reason why participation in the cost of securing land and right of way on the part of the federal government should act as a stumbling block in the saving of vast sums of federal money.

Less complimentary to the moral standards of government agencies and to engineering ethics has been the public appearance of representatives of those agencies—who receive their pay from opponents as well as proponents of their plan—speaking in terms to engender bitterness and even discredit the opponents of their grandiose plans. Certainly engineering ethics demand that the taxpayer be given a complete and fair presentation of all the facts, favorable and unfavorable.

Most peculiar of all is the fact that these storms in all cases center around the few who benefit. The taxpayer, who has no direct means of benefiting more under one plan than the other, is seldom heard. Perhaps he is amused at the claim of the man in the floodway who says he is entitled to pro-

tection even though he moved there by choice and in fact may have flooded his upstream neighbor by his encroachment on the rivers flow-way.

Perhaps the taxpayer is still imbued with the erroneous belief that it costs him nothing to protect that valley land—and then only partially—merely because his money travels the long and devious route to Washington before part of it trickles back, to pay for that protection at an average cost of more than \$500 per acre.

Let us hope that the taxpayer will awaken to his responsibility and that out of this "Kansas Experiment" will come a new and better solution for both taxpayer and tax beneficiary. The preliminary report is prepared by outstanding engineers; it proposes a solution at less than one-third the estimated cost of the present plan; it can be accomplished in a fraction of the time required for the federal agencies' plan; it will afford complete protection and thus return immediate dividends to each area as the individual levees are completed. It should give the taxpayer cause to examine with more than ordinary interest the promised final report. The area of the Kansas River basin is about 60,000 square miles. The federal agencies have prepared, or are preparing, similar plans for all basins. If the review of the Kansas basin plan can save the taxpayer more than \$500,000,000, a similar review by independent engineers of the plans of all basins might well save billions of dollars.

So Homer Sang, So Aeschylus

(After hearing André Michalopoulos in a talk on Greek drama and poetry)

"Above the gods, above the state
Is set the ordinance of fate

From whose implacable decree
Nor gods nor kings nor men are free."

So Homer sang, so Aeschylus,
So Sappho in her sweet distress;


So all who questioned or appealed
The foreordained, the doomed, the sealed.

And yet they strove and dreamed and wrought,
Knowing it might avail them nought;

Knowing no help or hope could come
From oracle pitiless and dumb;

And that all earthly things must pass
Like a wind, blowing over grass.

GUSTAV DAVIDSON



Our Most Ticklish Problem

By MAX EASTMAN

Sidney Hook's brilliant pamphlet, *Heresy, Yes, Conspiracy, No*, published a year ago by the American Committee for Cultural Freedom, has grown up into a book with the same title (John Day Company, 283 pages, \$3.75). There is always a trifle of regret when anything grows up, but the pamphlet is here, only somewhat revised, in the first two chapters. I think it has a good chance to survive as a classic if our civilization survives. It tackles the crux of the problem of its survival with poised judgment, unflinching good sense, and masterly logic. The problem is, of course—aside from matters of open war—to defend democratic rights and liberties against totalitarian infiltration without destroying them in the process. This is a new problem, never posed before in human history, and it would have been sad indeed if no tough, lucid, and informed mind in the free world had perceived, defined, and grappled with it.

Sidney Hook has not only done that, but in its basic outlines, he has solved it. Every one concerned with the defense of the free world ought to take a firm hold of his distinctions between conspiracy and heresy, between "cultural vigilantism" and discriminating vigilance, between "ritualistic liberalism" and the thinking defense of civil liberties. These are the terms in which the problem must be coped with.

The cultural vigilantes, blind to the distinction between heresy and conspiracy, would like, if they could, to stamp us all into a mold called Americanism—although Americanism, rightly conceived, consists in the absence of such stamping and such molds. The ritualistic liberals, blind also to the distinction between heresy and conspiracy, would in the name of free speech defend the efforts of a gang of unscrupulous conspirators to abolish the last vestige of free speech. At bottom it is a contest between informed intelligence and two kinds of ignorant emotionalism. Unless intelligence wins, our free civilization is certainly doomed. There could hardly be a more important book.

In Chapter 4, Hook gives all the information that a tough mind requires on the slogan "Guilt by Association," which is used by ritualistic liberals with about as much scruple as goes into a cigarette ad. In Chapter 5, "Reflections on the Smith Act," he hands down an opinion (I use the phrase ad-

visedly) to the Supreme Court of the United States that I believe would teach something to every one of its members. I especially recommend it to Justice Douglas, who shields behind a wilful ignorance of Communism a disposition to wallow in abstract libertarian sentiments that makes him the very archetype of the ritualistic liberal. His statement that the Smith Act, as upheld by the majority of the court, hardly differs from the law of the Soviet state denying free speech to anti-socialists, is torn to shreds by Sidney Hook's logic. It is also correctly characterized by him as "a gratuitous piece of demagogic rhetoric no less injudicious and irresponsible because it is made by a member of the highest judicial body in the land."

Sidney Hook speaks with special authority on academic freedom, because of his position in the academic world, his teaching experience, his studies in educational theory, and his expert knowledge of Communism. His general viewpoint is indicated on the title page of the second part of his book by an admirable quotation from the Bulletin of the New School for Social Research:

The New School knows that no man can teach well, nor should he be permitted to teach at all, unless he is prepared "to follow the truth of scholarship wherever it may lead." No inquiry is ever made as to whether a lecturer's private views are conservative, liberal, or radical; orthodox or agnostic; views of the aristocrat or the commoner. Jealously safeguarding this precious principle, the New School stoutly affirms that a member of any political party or group which asserts the right to dictate in matters of science or scientific opinion is not free to teach the truth and thereby is disqualified as a teacher.

There are points in Sidney Hook's application of his impeccable principles where I think his localization in the academic world, a rather small sector of the *demos* after all, misleads him somewhat. A little more practical experience, for example, and he would not have interchanged his carefully coined phrase "cultural vigilantism" with the political smear slogan invented by the Communists, "McCarthyism." Senator McCarthy's actual character and behavior are not unusual enough, above all in American politics, to warrant his being raised to this etymological pinnacle. In "irresponsible denunciations," in "wild, indiscriminating, unscrupulous harangues" (to quote Sidney Hook's wild phrases), he isn't in the same class, for instance,

with Harry S. Truman on a whistle-stop campaign. But even suppose he rose to that height—it would not warrant his being enshrined for all time in the dictionaries of the English language. The cause of that is not his indiscriminating, but his entirely correct accusations against people in high positions and pin-striped suits who were actually promoting the Communist conspiracy. His swift ascent to infamy among certain elite circles, has some of the same strange set of social, moral, and political causes as those which well-nigh destroyed Whittaker Chambers. Of that, whatever may be one's estimate of his nature and place in history, there is not much room for doubt. Unfounded accusations could hardly have caused this monumental reaction. Such considerations, and the enormous popular support McCarthy has received among earnest people, might have deterred Sidney Hook from taking over the indiscriminating term "McCarthyism." It will lessen his influence with some who especially need the lesson he teaches.

Another sign of Sidney's somewhat academic remoteness from practical matters of fact, is his assertion that Karl Marx, by contrast with Lenin and Stalin, was an "unconcealed heretic," and "scorned the use of conspiratorial techniques." This is proven, he thinks, by the concluding sentence of the Communist Manifesto: "The Communists disdain to conceal their views, etc." A fine peroration, but when it came to an actual struggle for power, or even for influence, Marx abandoned it without a scruple. I am discussing this whole question of Communist immoralism in another issue of the *Freeman*. Suffice it here to point out that the essential tactic of Marx and Engels when they entered Germany in the spring of 1848, was to disguise themselves as "democrats" in order to gain adherents in their effort to destroy democracy. "We joined the democratic party," Engels wrote later, "as the only possible means of getting the ear of the working class." Otherwise, he explained, "there was nothing left for us but to preach Communism in some little hole-and-corner paper, and to found a small sect instead of a large and active party. . . . Our program was not designed for that." Lenin read every scrap of the writings of Marx and Engels, studied their characters, and followed their example with assiduous devotion. He wasn't misled by perorations.

In the "Positive Proposals" with which Sidney Hook concludes his discourse on Academic Freedom, I detect a trace of the same thing I have objected to in his defense of democratic socialism. He inclines to be satisfied when he has shown that the notion is logically neat and nice, and the thing will be a fine success if we do it in a certain way. The question who "we" are, and what will induce us to do these logical things in the prescribed way—a primary one for his hero, Karl Marx—some-

how gets left out of Hook's consideration. In a similar way here, he shows how much better it would be if the faculties of our universities would deal with the problem of Communist infiltration—following the pattern set by the New School—instead of having organs of the government step in. He lays down detailed and excellent programs of action for faculty committees entrusted with this task. But he does not seem fully or constantly aware of the dismal failure of the faculties, by and large, to do it, or even believe in doing it. He admits that where a faculty "is indifferent or lax in upholding its standards, legislative investigation may still be undesirable but in time it becomes inescapable." But most of the faculties, according to what he tells us, are so much worse than indifferent or lax, that you receive again the impression that the dynamics of the problem are not confronted.

He tells us, for instance, that the American Association of University Professors, forty thousand strong, is permitting itself to be "exploited by a few members of the Communist Party—declared enemies of academic freedom, democracy, and professional integrity—to build a bulwark around themselves behind which to continue their work of educational subversion, the sapping and mining of free institutions, and the corruption of free inquiry." He further imparts the almost unbelievable news that the secretary of this organization "has always insisted, in denying the right of the membership as a whole to determine the position of the AAUP, that the position in question is only that of Committee A—its leading Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure." "The forty thousand members," he adds, "have never had an opportunity to pass upon it, or to read dissenting views in the official organ, the *Bulletin*, where a virtual censorship of contributions on this theme is enforced, if they differ from the position of Committee A."

It seems to me that the phrase "indifferent or lax" is miserably inadequate here, and that these professors are rather to be described as forty thousand of the most politically inert if not inanimate citizens that could be collected together out of any liberal profession in the United States. For my part, much as I wish and hope that faculty committees may increasingly take charge of this problem, I could not, after learning the above facts, object to an investigation by the people's representatives of the operating staff, and especially Committee A, of the American Association of University Professors.

Notwithstanding a certain cerebralism (I can think of no better name for it) and his obdurate loyalty to a Marx whose thoughts and attitudes he long ago transcended, Sidney Hook is one of our most gifted defenders of cultural freedom. He is an original thinker, a lucid writer, a devastating debater. And he is at his best in this book.

Economics Too Exciting

The Attack and Other Papers, by R. H. Tawney.

194 pp. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co. \$4.50

For many decades Professor Tawney has been vociferous in calling the market economy such names as "economic jungle" and in vehemently asking for the substitution of planning of the Russian pattern for the "dictatorship" of the capitalists. He has been indefatigable in talking and writing about economic topics. But, lo, in one of the essays contained in this volume, he admits that he does

not study the works of economic theorists with the assiduity they deserve, for one reason—if it is a reason, and not mere weakness of the flesh—explained to her pupil by the governess in that ancient, but admirable play, *The Importance of Being Earnest*: "Do not read Mill's chapter on the fall of the rupee, my dear; it is too exciting for a young girl."

Every line of the present volume shows that Professor Tawney has been very conscientious in observing the advice of the Victorian governess. He reproduces the most outworn, a hundred times disproven socialist slogans with the utmost pretentiousness. He does not have the slightest knowledge of the irrefutable objections advanced against the socialist creeds and dogmas. He passes over in silence all the unpleasant experiences of the nationalization experiments in Great Britain as well as in all other countries. Actually what he says could have been said, and has been said, by the first generation of Fabians and was untenable and spurious already then.

Mr. Tawney is an outstanding representative of that pseudo-intellectualism that has ruined Great Britain's political institutions, its freedom, and its wealth. These literati are fully aware of the fact that they are inferior to the eminent British thinkers and authors of the nineteenth century. Hence their neurotic rejection of everything they call Victorian. They know very well that they could not hold their own in a competitive market and that they lack all the qualities required in the conduct of business. Hence their spiteful disparagement of the entrepreneur and the profit system. Unable to serve the consumers in the way the businessman serves them by offering ever better and cheaper products, they aspire to the position of a planning dictator who according to his own pleasure graciously bestows handouts upon his wards.

Mr. Tawney pretends to be a historian and has published several historical studies. But his political and social philosophy is not inspired by any gleam of historical understanding. He condemns capitalism as inhuman and un-Christian. He does not realize that a table showing the increase of England's population from 1700 to 1940 utterly explodes the pathetic lamentations of the Webbs, the Hammonds, and all their followers. The drop in in-

fant mortality and the prolongation of the average length of life are certainly compatible with humanitarian ideals both Christian and secular.

To the unprecedented improvement in the masses' standard of living Professor Tawney does not refer. Or should we consider it as a reference when he declares that

one of the trades—by no means the least profitable—of which the plutocracy is master is lion-taming by kindness?

The Soviet system which, as Mr. Tawney has learned from the Webbs, rests "on a broad basis of popular support," is, of course, not guilty of this crime of dispensing "discreet, gentlemanly bribes."

Even if one applies to this volume the low standards of contemporary British economic and social writing, one cannot help qualifying it as a poor performance. LUDWIG VON MISES

Fighting Mad

The Lattimore Story, by John T. Flynn. 118 pp.

New York: Devin-Adair Company. \$1.00

John T. Flynn is one of the hardest hitting political pamphleteers of our time. And he has found a subject eminently suited for his shillelagh in the amazingly successful conspiracy of a number of Americans of Left Wing sympathies—ranging from Communist Party members and Soviet spies to gullible dupes—to soften up American public opinion and pervert American foreign policy in the interest of the Chinese Communists.

There is a mine of detailed information on this subject in the published hearings of the Senate Internal Security subcommittee, headed by Senator Pat McCarran, concerning the Institute of Pacific Relations. The subcommittee was fortunate in possessing the services of two experts on Communist infiltration, Robert Morris and Ben Mandel. Its inquiries were relevant and to the point; they overlooked few, if any, angles of the propaganda effort that was made on behalf of Mao Tse-tung's Communist regime, a regime that has been responsible for over 130,000 American casualties in Korea and for the brutal maltreatment (including in some cases actual murder) of scores of missionaries and other Americans living peaceably in China.

But the hearings of the subcommittee are of encyclopedic proportions. They run to more than five thousand pages of closely printed testimony, fascinating reading, much of it, but too bulky for best seller purposes. Mr. Flynn has gone into this mine and quarried industriously. From this and other sources he has compiled the main points of the great China disaster. He pulls no punches and names plenty of names. He shows how the Institute of Pacific Relations, outwardly a most reput-

able organization with the avowed objective of promoting national and international Pacific studies, was taken over by Communist sympathizers to a degree where, during the war and postwar years, it was one of the most effective Communist fronts in the country.

No less than forty-six persons associated with the Institute as officers, staff workers, and writers were identified as Communists in sworn testimony before the subcommittee. And the Institute was a semi-official organization, which exercised substantial influence on the framing and implementing of Far Eastern policy. Its members were frequently chosen for wartime assignments in the Far East. Some of them served in various capacities in the occupation of Japan.

Owen Lattimore, who has now succeeded Alger Hiss as the favorite hero of the fellow-travelers, the anti-anti-Communists, and the "eggheads," was a man whose career was of public as well as private concern. President Roosevelt picked him in 1941 to "advise" Chiang Kai-shek. After Chiang got rid of him, he headed the Far Eastern branch of the OWI. In 1944 he went with Vice President Wallace, John Carter Vincent (a close friend and a very influential figure in shaping Far Eastern policy in the critical postwar years), and John Hazard on a Far Eastern trip which included a stop at Magadan, center of the notorious Soviet slave labor colony in the Kolyma gold fields. Lattimore had only praise for what he saw there.

After the war he was an influential figure on the Pauley mission which drew up a kind of Morgenthau Plan (fortunately never put into effect) for Japan. As late as 1949, when Lattimore in the *Daily Compass* had committed himself to the idea that we should "let South Korea fall without giving the impression that it had been pushed," he was a favored consultant of the State Department.

Flynn reduces to shreds the image which Lattimore has tried to build up of himself as the objective ivory-tower scholar, wickedly hounded by witch-hunting politicians. He cites one chapter and verse after another to show that Lattimore, in the magazine *Pacific Affairs* which he edited, systematically slanted the contents in a pro-Soviet direction; that he asked instructions from Moscow for policy guidance; that he knowingly employed Communist contributors and wanted to recruit OWI employees from the staff of a Chinese paper in New York whose president and former editor have been indicted for running a Communist racket which, in the language of the *New York Times*, embraces "murder, extortion, torture, and in general commerce in human misery." Mr. Flynn builds up a convincing case for his conclusion:

Whenever Far Eastern affairs have called for critical decisions, the shadow of Lattimore has fallen across some agency of opinion and decision on the side of the Asiatic Communist objectives.

All the highlights of a long and most fruitful investigation are presented in this brief and vigorous pamphlet of a little over one hundred pages. We are shown the sinister triumvirate that dominated the IPR: Lattimore, the "cagey" (to use a word of which he is very fond) schemer, the suave, outwardly impressive Edward Carter, and Frederick Vanderbilt Field, one of the sons of riches who make a specialty of supporting and financing Communist causes.

We see Lattimore congratulating Carter for "cageyness" in turning over a supposedly impartial research project to three Communists, two Chinese and one German, who can be relied on to "bring out the essential radical aspects," but "with the right touch." Carter appears as a volunteer press agent for a violently pro-Communist book by one of the Institute's favored authors, one Israel Epstein, identified by Elizabeth Bentley as a member of the Soviet secret police in China. Any doubt as to Mr. Epstein's sympathies was dispelled when he turned up in Red China during the Korean war, blackguarding the United States as hard as he could.

The book abounds in vivid word pictures of the IPR infiltrators at work. One of their methods was logrolling for each other's books, in which for some curious reason they were regularly assisted by the editors of the most influential book review organs.

When IPR member Lawrence K. Rosinger wrote another book, it was given a boost by IPR editor, writer, and trustee Owen Lattimore, and when Lattimore turned out a book it got a lively plug from IPR editor Maxwell Stuart as a reviewer, who also recommended highly in another review a very bad book by one of the worst of the Communist spies—IPR member Guenther Stein.

John T. Flynn impresses one as having been fighting mad when he wrote this book, but not so mad that he missed any link of evidence in the damning case which he builds up. One suspects that most readers of the book will fully share his feeling.

The Lattimore Story is an ideal present for anyone still open to conviction who has succumbed to the legend that Lattimore is an innocent, objective scholar. And it contains lessons for the present. The book review organs are still at it, trying to kill a forthright anti-Communist work like James Burnham's *Containment or Liberation?*, finding merit in a paranoid production like T. H. Tetens' *Germany Plots with the Kremlin*, and neglecting the best available objective study of Germany, Norbert Muhlen's *The Return of Germany*. And, as Flynn suggests, there should be an ideological Bradstreet for the guidance of uninformed businessmen, college presidents, and heads of foundations who lend the prestige of their names and more solid support to "front" enterprises.

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

Uncommon Common Sense

The Writer in America, by Van Wyck Brooks.
203 pp. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co. \$3.00

The conspicuous traits of this book are intellectual maturity, uncommon common sense, and literary urbanity. Its message is a vigorous statement of beliefs that have been unfashionable during recent years in what are commonly regarded as our best literary circles; its statements are a challenge to the authority of the spirit that denies.

In the course of his affirmations Mr. Brooks urges us to put first things first, to recover a sense of values that has been largely lost, to believe that there are enduring truths, to recognize fashion for what it is, to reassert man's faith in himself as the maker of his own fate, and to go forward on life's admittedly troubled road as "wakeful and willing creators," inspired by the conviction that our true destiny is not merely to "endure," but also to "prevail." Specifically, writing as a man of letters, Mr. Brooks dwells on the limitations of the New Criticism and its unfortunate influence; argues the importance of American writers' being aware of the American tradition and America's cultural resources; suggests that it is high time for our writers to outgrow the "cult of youth" with its adolescent patterns of thought and feeling; salutes Lewis Mumford as a yea-sayer and a prophet who is carrying on the tradition of Emerson, Whitman, and William James; pleads for a return to "curative," as opposed to "diagnostic," literature; and commits himself to the declaration that "the present state of the literary mind cannot continue much longer in fiction, in poetry, in criticism, in any department."

The New Critics, who are growing old, have been subjected to their own kind of close scrutiny before now; but Mr. Brooks has done the job again, and it has never been done better or with more good humor. He notes their preoccupation with form to the exclusion of substance, their bypassing of values because of their obsessive interest in technical expertness, their "concentration on the small" which "destroys all feeling for the great," their complete refusal to engage in "any search for the meaning of life." He notes, too, their power as "a pressure group' with an almost despotic power in academic circles"; he makes it clear that they are the creators, exponents, and victims of a new scholasticism; and he deplores the effect on young writers of their failure to recognize the truth that "form follows function." Pointing to the fact that a surprising number of these critics are teachers, he asks pertinently: "Why should criticism be identified with classroom studies and a discipline that has killed the poet in the man?" Wisely, too, he laments the fashionable obsession with "the death-obsessed John Donne," and suggests that we observe "an

hour of silence regarding Melville and Henry James before they have been killed for all time with kindness."

Believing in the importance of tradition, Mr. Brooks wrote the five volumes of *Makers and Finders* "hoping to connect the literary present with the past, reviving the special kind of memory that fertilizes the living mind and gives it the sense of a base on which to build." He does not subscribe to the popular delusion that the American past is the heritage of every American; he knows that "the new immigrant strains" have "no natural connection" with the taproot of New England tradition, and he also recognizes the hostility of the South and West towards New England; but he still believes that our literary salvation lies in a sense of continuity and of community.

Even for an habitual pessimist, this is a heartening book. One can draw strength from it without sharing Mr. Brooks's apparent faith in the future of "the planetary mind," without accepting the simplification that man's only choice is between one world and world destruction, without agreeing with Ashley Montagu's conviction that "all of man's natural inclinations are toward the development of goodness." Mr. Brooks's view of literature is, I am sure, the right view, the long view, the long-lived view. It rebukes and demolishes mere fashion. I have referred to Van Wyck Brooks as a man of letters. There are not many of them around these days, and we should value them for their rarity in a world that has a superfluity of pedants and journalists.

BEN RAY REDMAN

Positive Political Warfare

The Ultimate Weapon, by Oleg Anisimov, 163 pp.
Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. \$3.50

This book puts its views, though firmly, with modesty and evident good will. The author, who was educated partly in France, taught at the Institute of French Literature in his native city of Riga, Latvia. During the shiftings of the war period, he ended up in association with General Vlassov and the German-supported "Russian Liberation Army." He traveled extensively throughout the German-occupied Soviet territory, and his work brought him into touch with many thousands of Soviet citizens. He now resides in the United States. In his own experience he is thus acquainted with both sides of the Iron Curtain.

"The ultimate weapon" is democratic political warfare aiming at the Soviet Empire's liberation from Communism. Most of the book is a discussion of the popular states of mind and feeling that bear on the content and conduct of political warfare. Mr. Anisimov's estimate of American and West European attitudes is rather superficial and, I think, wrong at least in part. What he says about

Soviet attitudes is more convincing. Of Soviet people he particularly insists that "as to the majority . . . one of its outstanding characteristics is its present inability to think politically in terms of fine shadings and subtle distinctions." An "either/or approach is the product of the decades of Soviet rule. . . . Operating within the framework of a few fundamental needs, emotions, and ideas, Stalinism has produced a standardization whose impact is difficult to grasp for people reared in pre-Soviet Russia or under conditions of democratic freedom."

From this observation, Mr. Anisimov draws practical conclusions for political warfare. The American government, dropping complicated double-talk, must speak "directly to the peoples over the heads of their tyrannical governments . . . in direct, concrete, plain language that can be understood by every man and woman in Russia and the other enslaved countries." The Soviet subjects, if their potentially explosive discontent is to issue in a positive result, have got to know just where America stands on the—relatively few—great questions about which they are basically concerned. Black or white, Yes or No: Will the peasants get their land back? Might America negotiate a settlement with Moscow on the basis of the present imperial boundaries? And so on.

The "containment" outlook, in any of its variants, makes true political warfare impossible. "While the containment policy, combined with non-interference in the silent struggle between the dictators and the people of countries behind the iron curtain, is technically virtuous under international law, it, in fact, increases the dangers of total war by alienating the oppressed and bolstering the confidence of their masters." The goal of political warfare must, like every other item, be unambiguous: "On the political side the open goal should be the liberation of the peoples behind the iron curtain. . . . What is vital is that the United States make it a matter of policy that it will help all peoples to gain freedom, and that it will champion the integration of the freed nation into whatever veto-free security federation or organization of the democratic powers is finally constituted in the West."

The book concludes with a brief but concentrated discussion of some of the methods and organizational devices through which serious political warfare could be carried out. Though we may not agree with all of these specific proposals, they will seem fantastic only to those who reject the possibility of anti-Communist political warfare, or who imagine that it amounts simply to a government-run advertising campaign.

The Ultimate Weapon is another indication that we are gradually building up, in the sense that military staffs give the word, a *doctrine* of anti-Communist political warfare. Most of the conclu-

sions that are being stated by those now writing publicly in this field show a surprising consistency and coherence. So far, however, there is little evidence of any union between this body of doctrine and current American practice.

JAMES BURNHAM

Mind Over Drama

With a Quiet Heart, by Eva Le Gallienne. 311 pp. New York: Viking Press. \$4.50

The first time I met Eva Le Gallienne she was a subdued, shabbily dressed girl of seventeen, playing bit parts occasionally in New York. The last time I saw her, a couple of years ago, she looked neat and ladylike—beautifully dressed in a well-bred way. Between those two dates ran a stormy life, full of struggle and excitement. But her book conveys little of that; it has a nice-little-girl quality, which is unsuitable.

She writes charmingly about her mother, who was an able Danish journalist. Her father, Richard, was a distinguished poet of "The Mauve Decade" in his youth—one of those who walked "with a lily in his hands." Richard parted with his wife and Eva when the latter was four years old; she did not see him again until she was eighteen. And after that very little. Nonetheless, he had an overwhelming influence on her life. He had been born Richard Gallon, son of the head of a brewery in Liverpool, a narrow, rigid man. The change of name was probably part of an almost desperate break. He was beautiful then, by all accounts; I remember him much later as handsome and charming. Eva says that her father was often possessed by a creature she calls a "daimon," or more simply a demon. For that reason he was not a good person to have as a father. But he managed to have a pleasant, comfortable life until he was very old, largely with the help of his charm, which is a family characteristic. His influence gave Eva's career a literary, or at least a bookish, quality.

As an actress she is not of the first rank. Perhaps her best performance was an early one in *Liliom*. She was always, as theater people say, on top of her part, rather than in it.

But she was a fine organizer and promoter. She tells over and over again of her success in raising money from rich people. It was this ability, plus her bookish tendency, which helped her start the Civic Repertory Theater, the outstanding activity of her career. It brought medals, honorary degrees, and the gratitude of serious people in the theater. *The Three Sisters*, as performed there, could not bear comparison with the Moscow Art Theater's performance, and the romantic ecstasies of the audiences were unpleasant to a sober critic. But this was the first repertory theater to produce good

plays in America. Its free school trained many actors and actresses who have since had distinguished careers. But it was a financial failure and closed after five years.

There are parts of this book which would interest a psychologist: the terrible burning of her hands right after the closing of the Civic Repertory, her almost pathetic love for her French servants, her escape from her nurse and dancing for strangers in the Bois de Boulogne at the age of ten—and the money she collected with that showing off.

After her five years with the Civic Repertory Theater, Miss Le Gallienne's career often lay fallow. At the present time she is reading on radio, and doing it superbly, again a literary rather than a stage activity. All in all, she has made a success, with a rather small talent but an excellent head on her shoulders.

HELEN WOODWARD

Our Economic System

The American Way, by Shepard B. Clough. 246 pp. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co. \$4.00

The American Way is primarily a description of things as they are, with enough historical background to show how they got that way. For example, we are told how the chronic labor shortage in this country, together with the gradual move from the twelve- to the ten- to the eight-hour day, provided the incentive for employers to mechanize their plants, and so make each man's working time more valuable; how, as a result, output per man expanded almost fivefold between 1899 and 1937, becoming three times that of the German or British worker; how there is a close relation between the amount invested and the output of the worker, and how bigness therefore has proved its value to America.

Professor Clough has kind words for the elder Morgan and Harriman, "geniuses of consolidation," and especially for the professional managers of the present day, with their "genius for getting people to work together." He points out that price stability is not normal, but exceptional, and that we in America have been lucky, in spite of all the screams about inflation. Prices actually fell between 1865 and 1945, and since the earlier date have fluctuated within a 400 per cent range, against 2,000 per cent for most European countries. Professor Clough bemoans the policy of lush credit, primarily because it wrecks about half the new retail businesses in a matter of two years.

Before 1919 we knew almost nothing about the economics of present-day capitalism. We had various ivory tower theories, but most of them have since proved unreliable. However, we now have usable and steadily improving data on gross national product, disposable income, net savings, rate of retail spending, productivity, expansion plans of

industry, spending plans of consumers, to mention only a few.

There are not now and there never can be automatic controls in economics. Too much depends on mass psychology. But gradually we are assembling the tools we need so that, in Professor Clough's words, "our man-made depressions can be man-cured."

It remains to be seen, he says, "whether man has the intelligence and ability to devise and apply the necessary remedies for them."

BURTON CRANE

Lanny Comes Back

The Return of Lanny Budd, by Upton Sinclair. 555 pp. New York: Viking Press. \$4.00

If the Scarlet Pimpernel, Monte Cristo, Sherlock Holmes, and other redoubtable returnees could do it, why not Lanny Budd? Honorably retired by Upton Sinclair a while ago after positively the last (tenth) fat volume, Budd is on the loose again—a bit slower in his late forties, but indestructible as ever, mingler with the mighty, watcher and maker of history. Of course, nothing trivial could have torn Lanny from his lotus-eating: nothing less than the Soviet drive for world dominion. But once aroused, Upton's boy functions with his habitual brilliance—spying on, lecturing to, frustrating, exposing, and confounding the Red minions with the same omnipotence he poured in earlier Budd chronicles on the agents of fascism Black and Brown.

This time the scene is mostly Germany, with side trips to Poland, France, Britain, Washington, D. C., and Edgemere, N. J., radio headquarters of a \$1,000,000 Peace Program our hero operates in his spare time. Recruited by the secret service against a flood of Hitler-printed dollars and pounds stashed away for postwar Nazi use, Lanny put his finger speedily to the dike. He unearths close to \$8,000,000 worth of solid gold bricks in the foundations of the top Nazi's cottage. He maneuvers the latter into abandoning collaboration with the Soviets and becoming a United States operative. Besides, he finds leisure to be a devilishly effective broadcaster over the American radio in Berlin, repulse the enemy on still another battlefield by launching the "Free University" in the Western sector, get kidnapped into East Berlin, survive such tortures as blinding lights and the "temperature chamber" (where initiates are helped toward confession by being alternately frozen and fried), hoodwink his tormentors with a lie bigger even than the one they wanted him to admit, and ride the subway back to liberty and his devastating microphone.

Money and cover for these deft operations come from Lanny's interim activities as purchasing agent of art treasures at fabulous prices and commissions. Stitched into his innumerable trans-

Atlantic shuttlings is the story of half-sister Bess, who will be remembered by Budd fans from way back as a fanatic party member headed for a bad end. Sure enough, she is convicted in Federal Court as a Communist spy and her violinist-husband Hansi takes off with an authoress famous for re-searching the habits of rabbits. Lanny, however, fixes it up with Bess by turning the Kremlin sour on her (I refuse to divulge how) and thereby persuading her to go straight, a conversion which will be universally applauded. On occasion, of all things, Lanny communes with spirits through his wife, who is conveniently psychic.

All this is obviously fantastic stuff—told, moreover, in a fantastically dull style which plods doggedly from item to item like a bright high-school senior's essay. Not a single neat phrase, nor flexible conversation, nor dramatic moment (except during the inquisition by the Vishinsky types) in 550-odd pages. Nevertheless, and most fantastic of all, *The Return of Lanny Budd* is one of the most informative and persuasive anti-Communist tracts ever produced for wide public consumption.

This is so because, as always, Budd's adventures are only the frame for huge quantities of current history and political education. The inner workings of the party and the party mind, the strategy and designs of the Kremlin in America, Europe, and Asia, the meaning of totalitarian terror, the inadequacies of United States policy, and Berlin airlifts, French general strikes, Kasenkina's high dive from a Soviet Consulate window, the truth about Polish graves in the Katyn woods—all the prime events and lessons of the first post-bellum years—are plainly recorded. A serious student might find these on the non-fiction and back-newspaper shelves. But nowhere else are they heaped inside one binding, garnished with just enough story-line and razzle-dazzle to keep the casual reader trapped and attentive.

Throughout each doughty deed, Lanny and the others go on inexorably discussing and analyzing the momentous situations of the day. Everybody talks like everybody else, Mr. Sinclair apparently making no attempt at characterization or grace. But the facts about the cold war sink in, especially so since Budd is no cast-iron reactionary but a peace-loving, erstwhile "pink" liberal who has looked squarely upon the Communists and reluctantly perceived their real intentions toward human freedom.

The reader is further assisted to share and participate by Sinclair's device of drafting great names and actual persons into the narrative. Once FDR's accredited "Presidential Agent," Lanny becomes a regular caller at the White House of Harry Truman, depicted as a worried and earnest man interminably signing documents. In place of Hitler, Goering, Stalin, and the other giants and ogres who were Budd's familiars in preceding

sagas, we now rub shoulders with names like Dean Acheson, Jan Masaryk, Lucius Clay, Ernst Reuther. Also in the cast of characters are a flesh-and-blood Soviet ex-colonel, a former Luftwaffe flyer (Bismarck's great-grandson), both of them authors of current books, and even two Americans of this reviewer's personal acquaintance—Boris Shub, formerly the spark plug of our Berlin radio (RIAS), and Melvin Lasky, whose one-man assault against cultural totalitarianism at a "German Writers Congress" will be forever memorable.

Lanny Budd's final solemn thought as the long story closes is that we are "failing in our propaganda against the Reds." One way to help redress the balance will be the translation of this book into every language of those parts of the world which are still free.

HAL LEHRMAN

That "Mysterious" Arabia

Nine Days to Mukalla, by Frederic Prokosch. 249 pp. New York: Viking Press. \$3.00

Two men (American) and two women (British) are tossed from a burning plane in a lonely spot on the Arabian desert. A beautiful young Arab and his homely friend step up and take charge of getting them to a more central place. From there on, "evil" broods over them. The four outsiders are colorless and pretty silly. The Arabs are astute, mysterious, and strong. There are gobs of atmosphere. An Arab says: "You will cross our deserts like thieves and creep into our forbidden cities. But you will never find our secret." It rather spoils the effect when you remember what a few million dollars are doing to this secret right now. One genuine mystery, however, occurs on page 118. At line 10 "they entered a large, cool room." Line 20, same page, same room, same time: "The heat was suffocating." But I've never met so many beautiful men in one book.

H. W.

A Lot of Book

The Green Man, by Storm Jameson. 762 pp. New York: Harper and Bros. \$3.95

This is one of those three-generation novels which the British turn out in spite of the paper shortage. It's the story of two brothers and their descendants, with plenty of top financiers, statesmen, and peculiar but high-minded nobodies. And how they all talk; 762 pages about everything. If you like Galsworthy watered down, this book is crumpets and jam. But don't take my word for it. Storm Jameson is a highly successful and serious novelist, serious meaning without humor. Long ago Storm Jameson wrote part of her autobiography; that was a small book and very fine.

H. W.

DANCE

"The Moderns"

It was not much over thirty years ago that a thing known flauntingly as the "modern dance" began arguing and choreographing its way into the realm of serious art. It is only twenty-five years since the brave and barefoot Isadora Duncan, lonely first of the "dancers," died.

The years have gone quickly. Last month, for the first time, the now aging masters and initiators of "modern dance" (Martha Graham, Doris Humphrey, Jose Limon) as well as a handful of the young new stars (Pearl Lang, Nina Fonaroff, Merce Cunningham) came together at a Broadway theater for a two-week cycle of performances, a kind of summative festival of the art. Participating in this show, called now less embracingly "The American Dance," were nine full companies of dancers and choreographers—a small part only of all the "modern dancers" in America today.

A family that size not only pays its taxes, but sends its daughters marrying into all the other arts. Broadway, for instance, has incorporated much of its quick growth, and almost every new musical since *Oklahoma* has used its dancers, its choreographers, or its stylizations of movements and settings. Hollywood, and particularly MGM musicals, have done likewise. Gene Kelly's fabulous dance sequences in *An American in Paris* would have been unthinkable without the Graham disciples and the Graham lore. And the newest medium, television, has used the latest crop of dancers as filler material on variety shows.

But the pure dance as performed in recital and concert is something else again. It makes no attempt to say the easy thing for a mass market. It is the esoteric addiction of a few, with a language still so private that today "modern dance," or the American Dance, is the least attended of all the performing arts, and hardest to understand.

The reason is simple. It lies in the manner by which an art grows social. Art, whether it is a symphony or dance or theater, is not the product of any single birth, but is of necessity *always* a tradition—a tradition that takes on meaning and style only in the accretion of effort over years and generations. There is no such thing as a language of the dance separate from its heritage and its years, from its slow stylization and its slow creation of symbols. This is true whether we speak of Hindu dance, or Western, or African, or dance styles long dead in ancient Greece and Egypt.

It has fallen to Graham, Humphrey, and Limon to be among the major creators of the modern dance, and thus of the new tradition. Their language, however, is not yet all clear, nor free of the fumbling, the experiments, the false tries, the ges-

tures that are incomplete as symbols, the symbols that are incomplete as language, the choreography that fails. In spite of these lacks, it has grown more social with the years, clarifying itself, coming closer to public understanding.

As performed today pure modern dance is a complex of attitudes and styles, ranging from the formal and abstract patterning of movements to music, as in the dance sonatas and fugues—to the telling of humorous, realistic fables, as in Charles Weidman's pieces by James Thurber—to the philosophic, symbolic dramas of Martha Graham.

Miss Graham, now nearing sixty, has that breadth and genius that encompass all the attitudes, and her choreography and dancing create them with all that occasional brilliance of modern dance as well as its obscurities.

I remember ten or fifteen years ago when, seeing Miss Graham for the first time, I was appalled and oppressed and blinded by the intensity, the privacy, the grotesqueness of the language. The angularity of her basic movement seemed to me, as I recreate it in retrospect, like that of a foetus, curled over on itself, suddenly exploding with arms and legs thrust out wide. Her tragic gesture was a sudden curling up again, all angles, elbows and knees bent over the belly, back to the foetal position.

Miss Graham has mellowed, and in age seems to have quietened her pains. Seeing her now I find myself surprised at the clear, clean range of her mute show. In "Letter to the World," that tale of the inner and outer life of the poetess Emily Dickinson, Graham seems year by year to have simplified her performance so that now there is no waste gesture, no obscure motion, no meaningless choreography. Emily's moods fluctuate from the passionate to the humorous; the formal manners and customs of New England, whether at a party or a funeral or in a character sketch, are danced with a formal dignity that has at the same time a satiric quality; the inner life is danced on its own level of dreamlike gesture and symbol. It is a fine, delicate weaving of many meanings, and styles and attitudes, which, once understood, are exquisite.

Jose Limon, who has been called the great male dancer of his time, has a talent and genius of quite a different sort. He has neither Miss Graham's scope nor fecund inventiveness. The tense and tight angularity of the Graham school has been displaced with him by a style of larger grace and slowness. But the Limon quality is not in the style, it is in the man—a high pride in dance and carriage that is both strictly male and mostly Spanish, with an innate ease and dignity that becomes, on his large frame, an incandescence. No dance of Limon's stands apart from this personality, nor could any role that he dances be filled by another dancer, using the same choreography. And here he differs from Martha Graham, whose art invites both argument and imitation, who can create a style and a school. ALEXANDER MARSHACK

Dufy's Pennant

PARIS

The death of Raoul Dufy takes from us one of France's best-known and most beloved painters. Because of his long sojourn in the United States, where he underwent treatment for arthritis, his courage and optimism in the face of great suffering became known to millions of Americans who may never have seen his paintings.

Raoul Dufy inveterately painted joy. He did not settle a cloud upon mankind, like Rouault, and threaten it with universal disaster, nor did he commit himself to a tropical overloading as Matisse sometimes does. He avoided heaviness; he might be compared to Rameau, who could fashion a lasting work from a dialogue among the chickens.

Undismayed despite a long and complicated illness, Dufy never lost his verve. I recall a meeting with him some two and a half years ago. I was dining with him and Gromaire in New York, and I noticed he gripped his fork with a certain gingerliness, as if his fingers had not yet thawed out, so to speak, from his cortisone treatment. At the Jewish Memorial Hospital, Roxbury, Massachusetts, specialists had administered injections to restore suppleness to his fingers. After this treatment Dufy was able to continue painting; he managed to produce curtain designs for a Broadway production, to gather together several sheafs of watercolors, and even to attempt some "prospecting" in the gold and canyon country of the American Southwest.

Born in the busy port of Le Havre in 1877, Dufy early contracted a fondness for the sea. After preliminary schooling he clerked for a coffee importer, though meanwhile he attended the local art academy. Eventually winning a scholarship, he studied at the Ecole Nationale des Beaux-Arts in Paris. He and his friend Othon Friesz exhibited among the Fauves, and later traveled to Munich, though already Dufy had set his mind on other objectives. He briefly painted with Braque and grazed the Cubist influence. But, unlike these insurrectionists, he also produced textile designs; Paul Poiret first commissioned his frolicsome works in 1909. He illustrated the *Bestiaire* of Guillaume Apollinaire, a veritable Noah's Arc of charming animals.

Dufy managed to describe a mounting arc amidst the contending factions of the modernists. Sometimes he suggested a sprinkling of Impressionist confetti, sometimes the toilsome examination of the analysts, but never the hot anxieties of a Picasso, nor the dreamy inexactitudes of the later surrealists. He was Puck peopling his world with sprites and sparkling fancies. He drew with conciseness; unlike the abstractionists, he never abandoned the subject completely, whether it was a nude, a bowl

of fruit, or a crescent of the Mediterranean at Nice. He could saturate these Mediterranean works in sapphire, but still never surfeit the eye.

Nobody can contest Dufy's vivacity as a decorator, nor the grace he imparted to his fabrics, the glee and ebullience he brought to his watercolors. Considerably less appreciated, one suspects, is his incisiveness. Dufy had worked out his own alphabet of signs—inscriptive hieroglyphics whereby, at a flourish of his brush, he could express his meaning: by a dolphin he could imply the sea, by a curve to a reclining nude he could set up the whole ambiance of Montmartre. He possessed, in short, a special cut and vigor to his mind. It might indeed be that his orchestras and harvesting scenes, produced since 1940, will upset the notion that he capered on the surface rather than encompassing the basic structure.

Surely, in any case, his gaiety was no light thing. It recalls Whistler's retort when somebody objected that "the trouble with French manners is that they are all on the surface." "And a very good place for them, too," Whistler replied.

Dufy had the rapidity of instantaneous understanding and the courtesy that never falters. But he supported it with a persistent quest for what would not violate his reason. He left us the richer for having beheld the high pennant of his avowals, and now the more downcast that its flutter should have been stilled.

JEROME MELLQUIST

The following, both typical and poignant, is from the catalogue of watercolors exhibited recently at the Carstairs Gallery in New York by the eminent doctor who treated Dufy when he was in America.

"Besides speaking about the work of my watercolorist friend, Freddy Homburger, the aim of this introduction is . . . to destroy the legend which, so to speak, was spontaneously created in the American press: that I came to America to cure my rheumatism by the famous cortisone treatment practiced by Dr. Homburger in return for divulging the secrets of painting to him. . . .

"When I arrived in Boston I was curious to see the work of Homburger as a painter. He showed me a series of watercolors which immediately made me feel that I was going to be treated by a confrère; which was in itself already very reassuring, even if one did not take into account the reputation of Homburger as a doctor and scientist. It is therefore definitely established that Homburger was certainly a painter before I myself was a rheumatic. . . . In Paris Homburger showed me a series of watercolors which he had painted in Mexico. . . . I was really tempted to ask him—should my health allow it—to make a date to take a painter's trip in Mexico with him. If he should agree, then I shall be the one to ask him for a Foreword for my Mexican exhibition!"

RAOUL DUFY

FROM OUR READERS

Whiff of Sanity

Thank you, thank you, for blowing a whiff of sanity into the political scene. Of course, I know the old maxim that, for one's education, one should read comment at odds with his own opinion rather than comment which makes him say: "Isn't it so?" Nonetheless, I feel bound to say that in the last and preceding paragraph, "The Fortnight," April 20, 1953, you have attained a height of incisive power which makes me very desirous of continuing a careful reading of your magazine.

Berkeley, Calif.

CHARLES B. COLLINS

Constructive Irritant Wanted

Hayek's "Substitute for Foreign Aid" is by far the most important article that the FREEMAN has published in its short and fruitful career, and if Congress and the Administration are really concerned about re-establishing a free world, I do not see how they can fail to give it most serious consideration. If American universities had been cultivating freedom of thought and expression during the last ten years, the obvious truths that Hayek expresses would have been embodied in public policy since 1945 instead of waiting until now for public presentation and discussion.

It is not necessary to go into the story of the last ten years to know that Congress and the Administration and the technical experts from the universities did not want to give victory in World War Two to the Communists and create the prospect of a third world war. How then can we explain the decisions made during World War Two?

I think the answer lies in ignorance, sheer ignorance, plus the most praiseworthy humanitarian sentiments—sentiments without which the world would be an even more horrible place than it is.

If we probe seriously into the problems this world faces today, I think we will find that we do not know, on many important issues, when we are working for tyranny, and when we are working against it. I hope the FREEMAN will find it possible to make greater use of its pages to stimulate serious probing into this central issue in a most highly complex set of issues.

New York, N. Y.

WILLIAM T. COUCH

Book Review Challenged

It was truly astonishing to find Thaddeus Ashby's highly subjective and emotional mouthings in the February 9, 1953, book review section. How could you let this article slip by without reminding Mr. Ashby that he was "reviewing" Goethe, the Thinker, and not presenting a personal evaluation of its subject?

Concerning the article proper, I would respectfully urge Mr. Ashby to avoid making the mistake of many pseudo-literati who seize upon two or three passages within one monumental work of a prolific and versatile writer and then draw positive and arbitrary truisms therefrom. I'm sure there are critics who, using this same technique, could deduce that Shakespeare, for example, was a fascist, a collectivist, an atheist, or whatever you will.

Valley Stream, N. Y.

FRANK J. SCHOENBORN

Our McCarthy Editorial

If you will pardon the suggestion, we do not all agree with your comments on McCarthy as registered in your April 20 edition. The very "bull in the political china shop" that you scorn seems to be the only tactics that have brought serious matters to public attention and action thereon. Do you honestly think that Lattimore would now be standing indictment today without the McCarthy stir? Do you think that the public would know anything about Marshall's role in the China sell-out without his sensational Congressional Record speech? When dereliction of duty characterizes the State Department—must a legislator remain "strictly within his own jurisdiction" while the sons of American mothers suffer crippling injuries and death? . . . Seems to me we need more bulls in Congress.

Washington, Indiana

A. G. BLAZEY, M.D.

When I read in the April 20 issue of the FREEMAN your sharp criticism of Senator Joe McCarthy, I was shocked, dismayed, and disheartened. . . . For a right-wing publication to pick on and attempt to discredit a loyal right-wing public figure is really a sad situation. A division in the ranks of the right-wing is exactly what the left-wing forces wish to accomplish. Let's not fall into that trap.

San Francisco, Calif.



LOUISE MILLER

I congratulate you on the fairness and balance of your editorial on the Bohlen affair. It would be too disheartening if the intolerance of those who think that nothing Senator McCarthy does is worthy of praise were offset only by the intolerance of those who insist that everything he does must be beyond criticism. You have been praising President Eisenhower when you thought him right, and criticizing him when you thought him wrong. I hope you will continue to comment on Senator McCarthy in the same manner. I hope you will continue to defend him when he is unjustly attacked, as you have done in the past, but not to hesitate to call him to account when he steps out of line. The FREEMAN, in short, should continue to put principles above personalities, which seems to me to be the very function of a true journal of opinion.

Houston, Texas

PAUL ELDREDGE

Who says cows can't fly?




BY CUTTING RUNNING TIME IN HALF between Salt Lake City and Los Angeles, the Union Pacific's *Daylight Livestock Special* has given cattle and hogs wings.


Because there's less wait than before—27 hours' running time instead of 60—livestock arrive in better condition with

less weight loss. All because, by putting Timken tapered roller bearings on the axles, Union Pacific can operate the *Daylight Livestock Special* at sustained high speeds and cut inspection time at intermediate stops. It's the first roller bearing "name-train" for freight.


It's the next great step in railroading!



"HOT BOXES" are the No. 1 cause of freight train delays. Now railroads like Union Pacific are finding the answer to "hot boxes" is "Roller Freight"—freight cars on Timken roller bearings instead of friction bearings.




ONE RAILROAD'S "Roller Freight" has gone 50 million car-miles without a "hot box". By contrast, freight cars with friction bearings average only 212,000 car-miles between set-outs for "hot boxes".




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
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
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