Critique of Containment  
James Burnham

Bankruptcy on the Left  
William Henry Chamberlin

Is Your Child an Isolate?  
Burton Rascoe

Resurgence of Liberalism  
Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn

Germany, Key to Europe  
F. A. Voigt
Republic BECAME strong in a strong and free America. Republic can REMAIN strong only in an America that remains strong and free... an America which owes much of its progress to the men and machines of its countless industries. And through these industries, Republic serves America. A good example can be found in the Roadbuilding Industry, responsible for the more than three million miles of highways that crisscross our nation from border to border and coast to coast. Steel earthmovers pave the way, followed by graders, mixers, forms, roadbed wire mesh, drainage pipe, guard rails... the list is long. All products of steel, much of which comes from the mills of Republic.

* * *

For a full color reprint of this advertisement, write Dept. D, Republic Steel, Cleveland 1, Ohio.
Letters

Paris Enthusiasts
I am particularly interested in your treatment of the left-wing, "liberal" college professors. As President of the American Students and Artists Center here with a thousand members, I notice that the Freeman is eagerly awaited by a large group, as a consequence of which the readers are becoming more and more sane.

THE VERY REV. FREDERICK W. BERKMAN
Paris, France

A Counterfeit Leninism
In his startling and long overdue article, "The Quarter-Billion Occupation Mark Swindle" [November 17] Richard L. Stokes writes of "the great Lenin's prophecy that Bolshevism would force America to spend itself into bankruptcy." This "prophecy" is a fabrication—despite the fact that it has been repeated hundreds of times, even on nation-wide broadcasts. Lenin never made such a prophecy, and if he ever entertained any such thought he failed to put it into writing.

I am sure that the Freeman and Mr. Stokes were innocent of any intentional distortion, but I am constrained to try to put the record straight. Let's stop making Lenin out to be the smartest man of the century.

New York City
J. B. MATTHEWS

Quiz Kids
Please shake Rene Kuhn's hand for her article, "Our Juvenile Pundits" [December 29]. I have long been currently bored as well as utterly outraged by the antics of the Quiz Kids.

Winnetka, Ill.
IRENE I. CAMPBELL

I wish to submit an opposing rejoinder to Rene Kuhn in the spirit of Her Majesty's loyal opposition. I too like children (I have three of my own) and I also like children's programs of the type mentioned. I invariably find them on a higher intellectual plane than corresponding adult programs.... Miss Kuhn mentions the urge toward exhibitionism as though it was the exclusive property of children. Saints preserve us from adult exhibitionism!

I admit that I personally feel that such exhibitionism is a form of pandering but such puritanic morals could probably be applied to all forms of entertainment. At any rate people have always exploited whatever commodity was readily available, and without Papa Mozart we might never have had Wolfgang.

Marfa, Texas
J. R. LOHMAN

Kennametal

Kennametal is super-hard cemented carbide which, as a tool material, has multiplied production in metal-cutting plants, coal mines, and other industries. Its characteristics are known; its quality is uniform; its performance constant—it is as dependable as gold. Like gold—a piece of Kennametal has the same intrinsic value a year or ten years hence as it has today.

Unfortunately, U. S. paper money does not have the same stable characteristic—not since the right to exchange it for gold was invalidated in 1933. Since then the purchasing power of the dollar has declined 60% or more. American industry, through greater productivity, has helped offset this decline—but it is not enough.

For—when the redeemable gold standard was invalidated—the public's control over government was cancelled. Consequently, there has been extravagant government spending, a flood of fiat currency.... ever-increasing public debts, and heavier and heavier taxes.

Return to the Gold Coin Standard* is the only practicable means to stop wasteful government spending, and inflation. It enables holders of currency to exchange their holdings for gold coin, if necessary, when they lack confidence in government policy. Most important—it will give currency the dependability of basic metals such as gold and Kennametal.

*What you can do about the Gold Standard
Ask your Senators and Congressmen if they wish to help restore the Gold Standard with sound money redeemable in gold coin on demand. Write to: The Gold Standard League, Latrobe, Pennsylvania for further information. The League is a voluntary association of American citizens joined together to prevent collapse of our monetary system.

Kennametal Inc.
Latrobe, Pa.
Contents

Editorials

The Fortnight .................................................. 329

Articles

Critique of Containment .............................. JAMES BURNHAM 331
Bankruptcy on the Left ......................... WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN 334
Resurgence of Liberalism ..................... ERIK VON KUEHNELT-LEDDIHN 337
Is Your Child an Isolate? ....................... BURTON RASCOE 340
Cold War in the UN ............................ ALICE WIDENER 342
Join up with Us Crackpots! ................. ANNE FALCON 343
Germany, Key to Europe ...................... F. A. VOIGT 344
Conquest of the Chinese ................... ANN SU CARDWELL 347

Books

The Great Goethe’s Great Error ............. THADDEUS ASHBY 350
GBS and Mrs. Pat .......................... THEODORE KOMISARJEVSKY 351
China Terror ................................ FREDERICK GRUIN 353
General Grant ................................ A. G. KELLER 354
McLiberal’s McCarthy ...................... WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR. 355
A Satirical Moravia ......................... THOMAS G. BERGIN 356
“Liberal” in Politics .......................... ROBERT PHELPS 357
Grand Cham’s Mother ....................... EDWIN CLARK 357

Poems

To the Unicorn ................................ KATHERINE DAY LITTLE 345
Realization ........................................ MAX EASTMAN 349

Letters .................................................... 327

This Is What They Said .................................. 339

Our Contributors

JAMES BURNHAM is author of “The Managerial Revolution” and “The Struggle for the World.” His study of the Institute of Pacific Relations appeared in the Freeman of last June 30. “Critique of Containment” is part of a chapter from his forthcoming book “Containment or Liberation!”

ERIK VON KUEHNELT-LEDDIHN, Austrian economist, is best known for his book, “Liberty or Equality.”

ANN SU CARDWELL contributes to the Christian Science Monitor and has written occasional editorials for the Saturday Evening Post. She has long been a student of Soviet history and life, and has been preparing a book on Moscow’s policy with regard to children and youth in the lands it dominates.

THADDEUS ASHBY is editor of the Gazette-Telegraph of Colorado Springs.

THEODORE KOMISARJEVSKY was a director of the Imperial and State Theaters in Moscow until he left Russia in 1919. Since then he has directed and designed dramatic and operatic productions in England, France and the United States.

Among Ourselves

Owing to a change in its staff this issue of the Freeman contains fewer editorials than usual. The customary length of this section will be restored in the next number. Beginning with the issue of February 23 Henry Hazlitt, until November 3 a co-editor of the magazine, will assume its editorship. Florence Norton, formerly managing editor of the American Mercury, will become Managing Editor of the Freeman.

The magazine will be conducted with complete independence from outside pressure of any kind. It will adhere firmly to the principles elaborated in the leading editorial of its first issue of October 2, 1950, “The Faith of the Freeman.” In addition to exposing the fallacies of the Socialists and the intrigues of the Communists, it will seek variety of tone and content, and will put its emphasis on the positive values of a free economic system and the dignity and liberty of the individual.
The Fortnight

President Eisenhower got safely into office, and the country got through the interregnum period without disaster but not without irritation, anxiety and expense. There was no deterioration in business morale like that which precipitated the banking panic between the defeat of Herbert Hoover for re-election in 1932 and the inauguration of Franklin Roosevelt in 1933. There was nothing to parallel the awful period between the election of Abraham Lincoln in November of 1860 and his assumption of office in March of 1861, when half a dozen states seceded from the Union and set up the Confederacy. Neither Soviet Russia nor any of its satellites launched some new aggression that would have called for an instant response from the President and a unified public opinion behind that response. In other words, this time we were lucky.

But the possibility of a needless crisis in the future will remain as long as the institution of a fixed interregnum is permitted to remain. We gain nothing by this institution, and we stand to lose a great deal. It has twice proved disastrous in the past, and it has never proved beneficial. What it cost us this last time was certainly not negligible. It bore with great unfairness upon the President-elect and the choices for his cabinet. Though the law kept him out of office, public opinion demanded that he set to work almost immediately upon his new assignment. Public opinion also demanded that he name his proposed cabinet, which he did, long before he took office. He had to hold multitudinous conferences. He had to maintain a set of offices in New York at private expense. His designated cabinet members, ambassadorial and other appointees had to resign their previous jobs before receiving confirmation from the Senate. Most of them started to work immediately, conferring with their opposite numbers in the Truman Administration, getting “briefed,” formulating policies, lining up their own proposed staffs—all at private expense, and with uncertainty surrounding their confirmation.

Yet this unfairness to the new Administration was only a minor part of the cost. The main cost was national uncertainty. The country marked time. Officials here, our government representatives abroad, the Pentagon, our top command in Korea, European governments, American businessmen, lost time trying to guess what the policies of the new Administration would be. Were we going to hand out less foreign aid? Would we change the conditions on which it was granted? Would a new military strategy be ordered or permitted in Korea? Would price and wage controls be repealed? Would the excess-profits tax be allowed to lapse? To what extent would the attitude toward free enterprise be less suspicious and hostile? Upon the answers to these questions depended the formulation of new plans.

But it was unfair to demand detailed answers to these questions from an Administration that had not yet taken office. In some cases—notably regarding the new policy in Korea—it would have been self-defeating to call for answers. Yet the country was forced patiently to listen from the old Administration to answers that it did not ask for, did not want, and did not respect. It had to listen to Mr. Truman using the White House press conference as a megaphone for ranting against General MacArthur and accusing the President-elect of demagoguery in promising to go to Korea. He used his stay in office for a series of transparent political tricks—such as ordering the Navy to take control of offshore oil deposits when he knew that Congress opposed this action and when he knew that Eisenhower had defeated Stevenson on this very issue among others.

But it must be said in fairness that the most foolish thing done by Mr. Truman during the interregnum was not his own fault. This was his presentation of a Federal budget for the fiscal year 1954—a year that does not begin until July 1 next, and for which Mr. Truman neither should be nor can be held reasonably responsible. Yet the presentation by the Presidential incumbent of that budget at that time was required by law. Nobody, fortunately, paid much serious attention to it. The proposed expenditure of $78,600,000,000
for 1954 would be reckless. It would involve an officially estimated deficit under present taxes of $9,900,000,000, which would be dangerously inflationary. What is needed, moreover, is a reduction of taxes below present oppressive levels.

There was, by the way, an unintended bit of humor in Mr. Truman's budget message even apart from some of the fantastic sums he asked for. He tried to pose, oddly enough, as the great Budget Balancer. "During the four fiscal years 1947 through 1950," he wrote, "the Government had an over-all net surplus of $4,300,000,000." When we look to see why this was so, we find that there was a surplus of $8,400,000,000 in the only full fiscal year under the Republican Eightieth Congress, "the worst Congress ever." If we credit that Congress with half of the $754,000,000 surplus in the fiscal year 1947, and debit it with half of the $1,811,000,000 deficit in the fiscal year 1949, we find that this four-year net surplus of $4,300,000,000 existed in spite of a net deficit of $3,600,000,000 in the period when the "do nothing" Congress was not in existence. Mr. Truman was boasting of the record of his only Republican Congress.

The problems raised by the interregnum period between the election of a new President and his inauguration, which used to be four months and is still two and a half months long, are problems that need not exist at all. The fixed interregnum, even so far as the changeover of Presidents is concerned, could probably be abolished without the necessity of further tinkering with the Constitution. It would merely be necessary for Congress to change the Presidential succession law explicitly to permit the outgoing President to resign at any time after the election (together with the outgoing Vice-President) and to appoint his elected successor to an office (either existing now or specially created by the new law) from which the latter would immediately and automatically succeed to the Presidency.

Such a change in the Presidential succession law would provide for complete flexibility in the transfer of office. The outgoing President could resign, if he wished, and enable his successor to take office, the day after election. Or he could consult with his successor and they could arrange the transfer of office at their mutual convenience—say three weeks after the election. Or the outgoing President, as now, could remain in office, if both he and his successor wished it, until the following January 20. The first course might be essential if the country were engaged at the time of election in a major war. The last might be possible in a quiet time, particularly if the elected successor were of the same political party as the outgoing President. The middle course would probably be the most desirable under most circumstances. It need hardly be added that no economic penalty whatever should be attached to an earlier resigna-

tion of this sort, and that the outgoing President should in any case receive his salary up until the statutory inauguration day.

Even if Congress is unprepared to make such a reform, there are other and minor changes that would considerably improve matters. The outgoing President should not be called upon to present an annual message to Congress after the election of a successor, and certainly he should not be required to present a budget for a fiscal year during which he will not be in office for a single day. In this regard we could simply follow the British precedent, under which the budget for the new fiscal year is not presented until a few days before or after the new fiscal year has actually begun. If such a provision were in effect now, Mr. Eisenhower would not be called upon to present the budget for 1954 until June or July of this year.

A fairer and more rational provision could easily be made for the changeover of Cabinet offices, even if the date for Presidential changeover is not made more flexible. The outgoing President could be authorized, as a courtesy to his successor, to appoint the choices of his successor as Alternate Secretaries. Such Alternate Secretaries would receive the same rate of salary as Cabinet officials from the day of taking office. They would be entitled to employ a modest amount of their own secretarial help. Their appointment would not be subject to Senate confirmation, but they would have by statute maximum terms of office of, say, three months. And the incoming President could be authorized, by the same law, to appoint the outgoing members of his predecessors' cabinet as Alternate Secretaries to stay long enough to brief and advise the new Cabinet members. In this way the changeover of Cabinets could be effected not only more smoothly and fairly, but without the present grave dangers of loss of vital time when the new Administration is trying to pick up the threads where the old one left off.

Some commentators have been finding fault with the vaguenesses in Mr. Eisenhower's inaugural speech. They are excessively impatient. The generalities in the speech were, if anything, reassuring. They show that the new President wishes to proceed with caution. In the circumstances this caution is commendable. Mr. Eisenhower will face a hundred detailed situations, and nearly all of them are complicated. His speech was crammed with negative virtues. It did not, like Mr. Truman's inaugural speech of 1949, announce the launching of a whole new foreign giveaway program. It did not, like Mr. Roosevelt's speeches, announce more penalties on production, more burdens on taxpayers, more extensions of government powers, and more restrictions on freedom. Mr. Eisenhower's inaugural speech, in brief, left room for a return to dignity, integrity and sense.

HENRY HAZLITT
Critique of Containment

By JAMES BURNHAM

The policy of containment was in accord with the liberal sentiment that has been prevalent in official American circles. At the time of its formulation in 1947, it was a natural enough response to the given world situation.

For many years Americans had been drugged by the social workers, fellow-travelers and Soviet agents who penetrated the public opinion industry, and assembled in Washington under the careless scepter of Franklin Roosevelt. During the war they had been taught to honor and love Red Army commanders, Stakhanovite workers, “heroes of the Resistance,” Soviet “democracy” and Uncle Joe. It was a shock when at the close of the war they saw their great Soviet ally gobbling one nation after another, with an appetite that seemed to wax only the greater by feasting. Some began to suspect that the Bolshevik leaders were taking their own program seriously.

Fearing that Moscow might soon take over so much of the world as to make Soviet victory inevitable, Americans and their friends decided that they would have to mount some sort of counter-action. They therefore tried to improvise ways short of all-out fighting to halt the Soviet avalanche. This attitude and effort are the content of the policy of containment.

Nicholas Spykman, the late geopolitical theorist, wrote that “in the United States the word ‘power’ has a connotation of evil.” The resulting “distrust of the moral character of power” complicates the problem of democratic statesmen, especially since the Industrial Revolution and the replacement of mercenary with mass conscript armies. The armed citizenry

... needed a great deal more psychological training to overcome its natural preference for defensive action

... unless public opinion is educated to the strategic advantages of offensive action or inspired by a messianic ideology, the nation will offer the lives of its sons only for national defense. To the man in the street, national defense means defense against attack, and attack is identified with invasion. To the general public the logical place to stop invasion is at the border, and border defense is the form of warfare which it intuitively prefers. This attitude satisfies two contradictory psychological needs of the good citizen, the requirement that he refrain from aggression and the requirement that he display virility in the defense of his home.

The “White Knight” Policy

The policy of containment might be called the Eastern college graduate’s version of this instinctive viewpoint of the man in the street. Patriotism is out of fashion in the older universities, so that the borders which the policy of containment worries about are those not of the nation but of that somewhat vague entity, “the free world.” At its more polite and wordy level the theory of containment is a teacup version of the ordinary citizen’s normal bias, and similarly answers the two contradictory psychological needs to which Spykman refers.

Containment doesn’t “threaten” anyone, not even the big bully loose on the block. It doesn’t ask anyone to give up what he’s already got. There is not a trace of “imperialism,” “aggression,” “preventive war,” “the offensive,” or any of those words that are taboo to liberal lips. White Knight Containment will merely stand up for the internationalist’s version of hearth and home: collective security, peace, legitimate rights and the United Nations.

Not only does the policy thus recommend itself to the moral sense of many good citizens. It stirs more subtly another set of emotions less likely to be put on public display. It promises to solve the Soviet problem without any real sacrifice on our part. True enough, it costs a lot of money, but money is the least of sacrifices, especially if spending it seems to be good for both business and politics. An armament program slow enough so that it doesn’t interfere with civilian luxuries, but sufficient to be profitable and job-creating: international economic moves that put all the non-Soviet world inside our economic orbit; plenty of stimulating world travel for temporary and professional bureaucrats. . . . By a political slip, a few boys have been getting killed on a distant peninsula—a small price to pay for the sake of making televised speeches at the United Nations.

The Problem of Coexistence

Though the policy of containment is attractive and natural, it is also wrong.

1. It is internally inconsistent. It denies and presupposes the “coexistence of socialism and capitalism,” as it is termed in Communist propaganda.

According to George Kennan’s argument, the Soviet government is in the grip of men unalterably committed to the belief that the continued coexistence of the Soviet Union and non-Communist nations is impossible:

Tremendous emphasis has been placed on the original Communist thesis of a basic antagonism between the capitalist and Socialist worlds. . . . This fiction has been canonized in Soviet philosophy . . . and it is now anchored in the Soviet structure of thought by bonds far greater than those of mere ideology.

---

1 Nicholas John Spykman, “America’s Strategy in World Politics,” pp 11, 27
It is in fact this doctrine that created the trouble that led to the policy of containment. The second half of the policy, dropping overboard this entire line of reasoning, blandly assumes that the “innate antagonism” will evaporate and co-existence become not merely possible but pleasing to the unalterably committed Communist leaders.

I rather believe that what Kennan and the other State Department spokesmen of containment want is to communicate the following message to the Kremlin: You people often announce that you believe in the peaceful coexistence of capitalism and socialism. But you have been acting in a way that endangers our vital interests. On our side, we believe 100 per cent in peaceful coexistence. We can’t help trying to stop you when you threaten our security, but we are ready to go a long, long way to prove our sincere wish to be friends. Let’s get together and really coexist.

This interpretation is in keeping with Kennan’s press statement on the day in 1952 when he sailed away to take his post in Moscow.

Fallacies of a Defensive Strategy

2. From a strategic point of view, the policy of containment is purely defensive. If a Soviet force moves outside the 1947 boundaries of the Soviet sphere, then theoretically at least, the policy requires a répétition. It neither requires nor permits any action to be taken inside the Soviet sphere by an anti-Soviet force.

No lesson from historical experience would seem to be more thoroughly proved than the conclusion that a purely defensive strategy can not succeed. “An absolute defense,” according to Von Clausewitz, “completely contradicts the conception of war,” and consequently of political struggle, of which war is a part. A defensive strategy can cover a necessary period for deployment or preparation, and can sometimes induce an unwary enemy to commit mistakes. But the defensive strategy must always be part of a larger plan that is conceived offensively, and that waits for the decisive moment at which to seize the initiative and to launch the offensive campaign that victory always demands.

3. A defensive strategy, inadequate in every case, is triply so when applied to the Soviet Empire. The Soviet territory is vast in expanse and perimeter. With the Soviet power holding the interior position, the borders can not be sufficiently guarded from the outside. The population is 800 million; the resources, ample and varied. As for the Soviet attitude: not since the early days of Islam has a power drive been so dynamic.

Even these insuperable facts do not fully enough express the absurdity of the idea of defensively containing the Soviet power. It is absurd enough to suppose that anyone could ally with an enemy with a border of more than 25,000 miles; but in the most profound sense there is no Soviet border. The Soviet power—that is, the power of its leaders to move men—extends by means of the world Communist apparatus and the Communist ideology into every nation and every community.

4. The positive content of the policy of containment is the proposal to “build situations of strength”: that is, to improve the economic, social and military condition of the non-Communist nations so that they will become bulwarks against Soviet advance instead of victims prime for slaughter. The difficulty with this laudable aim is that, under the perspective of containment, it is impossible.

Non-Communist nations with large internal Communist movements—like France, Italy, India or Iran—can not be developed into adequate containers of Soviet power because the Communists have both the will and the power to prevent it.

The Communists conduct a double-pronged action against the non-Communist nations. From within, the Communist apparatus together with its dependent layers of fellow-travelers, front organizations, dupes and innocents, corrodes the internal structure of the nation by propaganda, infiltration and subversion. From without, the Soviet state applies a dizzying mixture of pressure and cajolery, promises and threats, and at the same time secretly feeds and directs the internal subversive apparatus. A program for strengthening the non-Communist nations can not be complete, therefore, unless it includes a double counter-offensive, designed to smash the internal Communist movements and to set back the Soviet state. Because the Soviet Union is the central focus of the infection, the two objectives are necessarily linked. Containment, rejecting such a counter-offensive, can do no more than treat symptoms.

5. Even if containment could work, the result would be neither useful nor desirable. Let us imagine what successful containment would mean. Soviet power would cease its advance into new territory. It would remain at the borders of what would be recognized and accepted as the Soviet sphere. In 1947, when the policy was formulated, that sphere was taken to include not only the pre-1939 Soviet Union but also the nations of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, the Soviet zone of Austria, Mongolia, Sinkiang, the Kuriles, and North Korea. Since then Manchuria, China and Tibet have entered the Soviet sphere.

The policy of containment excludes the initiation of any action within the Soviet sphere. This means that the Soviet leadership is given a free hand to consolidate the newly conquered regions, and to promote their economic, social and political integration into the Soviet system. Politically speaking, containment can be interpreted in no other way by either the Kremlin or its subjects.
If the United States and its allies are serious about containment, they are saying to the Soviet leadership: Move into a new territory outside the recognized boundaries of your sphere and we will resist, even by arms if necessary. Stay at home to cultivate your posted acres, and we will not interfere in any way. Incorporate the satellite states juridically into the Soviet Union. Fill your slave labor camps. Perpetrate your genocides. Organize the industry and manpower of your vast sphere into a colossal war-making machine. Establish a death zone at your borders. Russify the ancient cultures of Rumania, the Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, Bohemia. So long as you keep the Red Army on your side of the line, we will neither interfere nor intervene.

**Strain on Western Economy**

Looked at economically, the containment prospect is intolerable. If they are to slow the strategic buildup of the Soviet sphere, the non-Communist nations must maintain a virtual economic boycott. But over a long period such a boycott submits many of the non-Communist nations to a strain much more severe than it imposes on the Soviet Empire. Western Europe can not reach economic health, much less prosperity, without economic access to eastern Europe and to China. For emergency and war purposes the strain can be endured, but the indefinite perspective of a world divided economically into two exclusive halves is economic insanity. Strict containment would be equivalent to the slow economic strangulation of the United States' principal allies.

6. Everyone will grant that the task of solving the Soviet problem will be long and arduous. Success will demand heavy sacrifices. This demand can not be met on the inert material level alone. Spirit must direct matter toward a goal, and a firm resolution must sustain an unyielding effort through periods of failure, loss and sorrow.

It is perhaps the crucial defect of the policy of containment that it is incapable of meeting this moral and spiritual demand. The average man can not even understand the policy, much less become willing to die for it. Will the captives of the Kremlin risk death for a policy that starts by abandoning them to the usurpers of their freedom? Will the citizens of the Western nations die willingly for the sake of running all over the earth to put out fires started by a gang of arsonists who are declared in advance to be immune in their own persons? They will die for their own flag, but how much will they choose to suffer for the flag of a "United Nations" which has been watered not by the blood of their ancestors but only by the words of international bureaucrats?

For a man to endure resolutely, he must believe that he is pursuing a goal. The strange truth is that containment is a policy without a goal. If its defenders disagree with that description, then let them name the goal.

The policy of containment, stripped bare, is simply the bureaucratic verbalization of a policy of drift. Its inner law is: Let history do it. We haven't got the intelligence, courage and determination to grapple with the Soviet problem head on. Let's duck the responsibility, then, and slip the ball to old history. Maybe she will do our work for us. To quote Kennan directly once more: "Who can say with assurance ... This can not be proved. And it can not be disproved. But the possibility remains, ..."

The basic error of the policy of containment, underlying all of these specific errors which I have listed, is its failure to comprehend the revolutionary nature of the Communist enterprise.

The policy of containment conceives of the Soviet union as a national state in the traditional post-Renaissance sense: powerful, expansionist, dangerous, but nevertheless not differing in kind from the many other powerful national states of the past several centuries. It is conceived to have a government which, though curiously organized, is established and "legitimate," able to speak authentically for "the nation." Toward such a government, any of a number of standard political attitudes are possible. We might seek to establish a relation of friendship or alliance or neutrality or mere mutual respect and non-interference; or, granted other political indications, we might consider the relation to be one of friction, hostility, or war.

Since 1947 the political attitude of the Moscow government has seemed to the conventional observer to be one of hostility, and its intention expansive. The traditional response is to try to erect an immediate barrier against expansion, while constructing a balance of power unfavorable to the hostile and expanding government. If this power balance is attained, then the hostile government (Moscow) will be confronted with a choice between alternatives both of which give the advantage to the active opponent (Washington): either Moscow will continue hostility and in the end fight on a power basis weighted against her; or, accepting the new power relations, she will have to change her attitude, negotiate positively, and agree to some sort of modus vivendi.

**The Semantics of Containment**

Looked at in this way, the policy of containment is an instance of classic balance of power politics. That this is the way in which Kennan and his associates understand it is made apparent by their semantic habits.

Kennan, for example, uses the terms "Soviet Union" and "Russia" as if interchangeable. Such looseness reveals a basic assumption, and confusion, of major scientific importance. Even in relation to the pre-Revolutionary period, the careless use of the term "Russia" conceals the distinction between "ethnic Russia" (the nation of Russians which developed from the medieval Duchy of Muscovy) and the Czarist-ruled "Russian Empire," which included as many non-Russians as Russians, and dozens of non-Russian nations. Today the term "Soviet Union" carries a third meaning: the headquarters and central base of the world Communist enterprise. Kennan's verbal usage shows that in his mind all three of these meanings are indiscriminately lumped together.

Kennan hardly ever refers to the world Communist movement, seldom even to Russian communism. He discusses briefly, at an abstract and superficial level, a few items of
Bankruptcy on the Left

By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

It has become a widely accepted cliche on both sides of the Atlantic that the United States is living under a reactionary reign of terror. Americans, so the tale runs, have discovered the secret of perpetual hysteria. Witch hunting has reached the intensity of Puritan days and "redbaiting" is supposed to be as popular a form of inhuman sport as bull baiting in Spain and Mexico.

America is a large country, and Americans are more disposed than most peoples to sound off a bit extravagantly in expressions of opinion. Even in more tranquil times than the present it would not be so difficult, by combing the records of the forty-eight states, to find a number of examples of foolish speech and some cases of unwarranted bigotry and intolerance.

No reasonable person would deny that anti-communism, like other desirable attitudes, can be exploited and abused, that cases arise which call for discriminating judgment and sometimes for a display of civic courage. But when it is seriously argued that American conditions are even remotely comparable with Soviet and Nazi totalitarianism, a mountain of evidence to the contrary comes to mind. Consider, for example, this routine item about the case of Judith Coplon:

The United States Court of Appeals in New York had said that "her guilt was plain" on the espionage charge but that her conviction was illegal on two grounds. The United States Court of Appeals in Washington had sustained her espionage conviction but held that she was entitled to a new trial because evidence obtained by wiretapping had been used to convict her.

This is not the way citizens suspected of espionage are dealt with during an authentic reign of terror.

Reading an article by a man who has been an active figure in at least one organization on the Attorney-General's subversive list, I noticed that he is a lecturer of political science at a well-known university. And this university has been widely considered a den of reaction because of a well-publicized dispute, in which both sides took rather silly extremist positions, about a loyalty oath required of members of the faculty.

One could multiply such examples. And when one examines other counts in the familiar left-wing indictment of America as a land where liberty has almost, if not quite, ceased to exist, they seem equally faulty and defective. One hears a good deal, for instance, about persecution of men in the diplomatic service, about blasted careers and ruined lives.

But it is highly probable that, if a fair, honest count were made of...
persons who were victimized during the war and immediate postwar period because they were “premature anti-Communists” and of those who have been called to account for real or alleged pro-Communist leanings, the number of cases in the first category would exceed the number in the second.

Moreover, why should foreign service officers, who are rightly commended when they do a good job, be considered immune from criticism when they do a bad job? In theory at least, American foreign policy is the concern of the American people.

When a foreign policy has flopped as dismally as the China policy of the last two Administrations, have the people no right, through their representatives in Congress, to try to find out what went wrong and why? When a State Department employee picks out the pro-Communist editor of a pro-Communist magazine as the special recipient of confidential information, why should there be such an outcry when, after a lapse of years, a loyalty review board finds that he is not the ideal man for his job?

It would seem obvious that this man either cherished an emotional sympathy with communism or didn’t have the proverbial sense to come in out of the rain. On either assumption he was not well qualified to represent American interests. It has been too widely assumed that, although there is a known percentage of failures in every other business or profession, there is no such thing, in a large, heavily expanded service, as a diplomat who falls short of the requirements of his profession.

No doubt there have been some stupid mistakes in the granting of permission to enter and leave America. But not every case of this kind is as unreasonable as it may appear at first sight. For example, a professor at a prominent university was refused permission by the military authorities to go to Japan as a visiting professor. It is easy to de-nounce this as a case of high-handed militaristic bungling.

But this incident acquires a somewhat different appearance when one reads in the testimony before the McCarran Committee that the professor, then employed by the OWI in China, was in the habit of bringing material from Madame Sun Yat-sen to Mildred Price, identified by Elizabeth Bentley in her testimony to the committee as an active communist sympathizer and executive secretary of a communist-dominated organization. It may be that his intentions were of the best; but under present circumstances military security agencies may be pardoned if they are a little suspicious of individuals who run private courier services from one Communist destination to another.

The diminished popularity of certain “liberal” (i.e., pro-Soviet) writers, lecturers and radio commentators is mentioned as a sign of intellectual repression. But it is scarcely surprising if people lose faith in the prophetic and analytical gifts of a man who praised the Soviet Union as a bulwark of peace, democracy and international good faith and who has been proved so quickly to be utterly, dismally wrong.

**Illusions of the Thirties**

The truth is that leftist in America is suffering not from repression, but from bankruptcy in ideas. One need only look back to the mood which prevailed among more serious student groups and among many intellectuals in general in the thirties. What emerges today is a shambles of lost illusions.

At that time a disgracefully large number of Americans of more or less distinction in literature and drama, science and the arts systematically committed treason to all the rational and humane values of Western civilization. Their names are preserved in lists of signatories of innumerable manifestoes glorifying the Soviet regime and endorsing the sanguinary purges which were wiping out the old guard of the Communist Party. While Russia was clearly going back to the political methods of Ivan the Terrible, they believed in some queer, perverse way that a bright new era of brotherhood had dawned for the human race.

Two examples may suffice to illustrate the mental aberrations of that period. A circular letter of “Hooray for Murder” content, upholding the “darkness at noon” that had descended on Moscow contained the following amazing appeal to prospective signatories:

“Your voice . . . will lend even greater weight to the world-wide defense of the right of the individual to speak, write, create and otherwise engage in cultural activity in complete freedom.” Could one imagine a better illustration, drawn from real life, of George Orwell’s grim fantasy of the totalitarian slogans of 1984: “War is Peace. Slavery is Freedom. Ignorance is Strength”?

The climax of this sorry spectacle of professed humanitarians growing ecstatic over mass murder, intellectuals praising a regime which had made independent thought a major life insurance risk, and artists excelling in a strait-jacketed culture was reached in August 1939. On the eve of the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact some four hundred writers, professors, artists, musicians and scientists put their names to a manifesto which denounced as a fantastic falsehood the idea that the Soviet Union could have anything in common with Germany and announced: “The Soviet Union continues as always to be a consistent bulwark against war and aggression, and to support the goal of a peaceful international order.”

This virtually coincided with the Stalin-Hitler deal carving up the whole of eastern Europe, and preceded by a few weeks the Soviet attack on Finland.

These manifestoes were symptomatic of an intellectual climate which made deep Communist infiltration into every branch of American activity easy and facilitated recruiting for Communist spy rings. Eugene Lyons, whose book “The Red Decade,” is the best documented exposure of this unsavory episode in American cultural history, sums up as follows the results of what he calls “the intellectual and moral red terror”:

“It could bar you from house parties on Park Avenue, jobs in Hollywood, places on the relief rolls of your city, fair treatment in the columns of great conservative papers, a hearing before supposedly broadminded public lecture forums, access to Federal projects. It could hold the threat of this power over the heads of doubters and backsliders.

Uncritical adulation of the Soviet Union was a main item in the leftist

FEBRUARY 9, 1953 335
credos which found a considerable following on college campuses during this period. Other items were a blind faith in planning and controls, an almost mystical conviction that the state could do everything, the individual nothing. International relations were seen in unrelieved black-and-white, and sometimes black was mistaken for white.

Typical of the double standard of morals which prevailed was the fact that there were many student protests and boycotts inspired by the misdeeds of the Nazis and the Japanese militarists, but not one, to the best of my knowledge, directed against such Soviet crimes as the political purges, the liquidation of the kulaks as a class, and the state-organized famine of 1932-33.

It was assumed that full employment was the sole reasonable objective of economic policy. The circumstance that by and large the unemployed in Western countries lived better than many employed workers in dictatorships, to say nothing of the wretched slaves in concentration camps, was mentally bypassed. It was fashionable to sneer at political and civil liberties as “freedom to starve.”

This intellectual leftist upsurge of the thirties wrought more harm than is generally realized. The whole American attitude toward the war was distorted from the beginning because of the indefatigable propaganda which insisted that the “peace-loving” Soviet Union would be a worthy partner in the struggle against fascism and a friendly ally in a brave new world. The active spirit in a campus student front organization today might be an influential Washington bureaucrat tomorrow.

The Kremlin's Stock Falls

Now this whole leftist credo of the thirties has been tested by the march of events and found wanting. A few of the leftist leaders of the thirties have become fanatic Communists or unteachable fellow-travelers. But the majority have, in varying degrees, awakened to the tremendous fraud which was perpetrated on their moral sympathies. The Soviet dictatorship is revealed more and more clearly as the power which, by its ruthless and unlimited ambition, is destroying and may destroy for a longer period than we like to think of, the desired carefree pattern of American life.

The large leftist emotional and intellectual investment in Kremlin stock has gone bankrupt. And this is also true as regards other items in the leftist creed. Statist economics in Great Britain has spared civil and political liberties but has led to interferences in everyday life, in a man’s ability to build his own house, travel when and where he wishes, raise chickens and pigs for his own use, that would have probably provoked widespread rebellion in a time when arms were easier to get hold of and the power of the state was less crushing.

The aftermath of the New Deal and a crusading foreign policy in the United States has been an era of inflationary corruption, with the state bearing down harder and harder on the individual taxpayer and every new investigation turning up new evidence of dry rot in an administrative machine that has become too big and unwieldy for popular control.

A sign of the times is that what might once have seemed conventional humdrum ways of dealing with economic dilemmas have now acquired the excitement of revolutionary discoveries. Not long ago, for instance, the Economist of London came out with the idea that a rise in the price of coal, and in miners’ wages, might be a means of getting more coal mined and of checking wasteful use of coal by industries which had little incentive to save on fuel they were getting at artificially cheap prices. In the atmosphere of statist control which began to dominate the British economy even before the Labor Party came into power in 1945 this suggestion that a free market and pricing system would be the simplest and easiest solution for many current economic difficulties and distortions suggests a fresh breath of revolutionary pioneering.

Not long ago I attended an address by a former Congresswoman, identified with the “liberal” or “left” wing of the Democratic Party. The audience was composed mostly of members of a sympathetic student organization. The occasion was propitious for a clean-cut, militant statement of the contemporary leftist credo. But nothing of the kind developed.

The speaker went back fifteen or twenty years to recall the horrors of Hitler and the plight of the Okies. But Hitler is fortunately dead, while Stalin is very much alive. And the Okies, according to reports from individuals who have followed up the sequel to their migration, are pretty comfortably absorbed into the working life of California. One wonders, in retrospect, whether they would have been better off if some Big Brother, at the head of an all-powerful benevolent state, had packed them off in freight cars to do some kind of “essential work” instead of letting them try their fortune on their own.

This address, compounded of vague inspirationalism with occasional references to dead issues, furnished pretty strong proof that what the American Left is suffering from today is not repression, but intellectual bankruptcy. It is now paying the penalty for having, in the thirties, placed its faith in too many propositions that just weren’t so.

It would be an exaggeration to suggest that the entire intellectual legacy of that period has been washed out. But disillusionment not only with communism but with the whole philosophy of a society spoon-fed by an omnipotent state is growing. This trend is noticed by young professors and instructors in touch with student opinion. Almost all the vigorous, challenging, caustic satire in England today is along individualist lines.

The time is ripe for uncompromising proclamation of the philosophy of integral freedom, for a renaissance of the conception that society exists by and for the individuals who are its living members. When idols crumble, ideals have a better chance of acceptance.
Resurgence of Liberalism

By ERIK VON KUEHNELT-LEDDIHN

An Austrian economist discusses the waning influence of collectivism on political and economic thought in Europe, and the growing interest in the new libertarian economics.

Many Americans may think Mr. Henry A. Wallace's pat and superficial formula, "Communism for Russia, Socialism for Europe, Capitalism for America" has been thoroughly realized. No doubt the depredations and calamities of wars, revolutions and wanton destruction have generated in Europe a strong desire for security, a flight from responsibility, a fear of risk. Also, the occupation policies of the victorious English-speaking nations were instrumental in fostering the socialist cause on the Continent. The administrators appointed by the Labor government worked hand-in-glove with certain "advanced" elements in the American establishment. (Only a miracle prevented the arrest of the great anti-Nazi Cardinal Galen and the "reactionary" Dr. Adenauer was removed by the British in 1945 on the pretext of "incompetence"?) American public opinion, in turn, had been prepared by Marxist emigrants and their "progressive" American friends to look with favor on the European Social Democrats.

Still, there are two bright spots in this dark picture. One, the Continental Socialists, under the impact of Russian events, have become more moderate in their aims than their British colleagues (the Italians being the exception). Two, political and economic thought in Europe (as opposed to the whims of the agitated masses) is rapidly moving away from the socialistic, centralistic and collectivistic positions.

In order to understand what is going on in Europe, one has to glance for a moment into the past. Fighting the remnants of aristocratic privilege, toying with republican and embracing democracy (yet at the same time fearful of organized labor and suspicious of a "backward" peasantry and an "intolerant" clergy), Europe's liberal bourgeoisie of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries tried to steer a middle course. This bourgeois liberalism of a more or less anti-clerical and anti-conservative nature went into bankruptcy in 1919. The republican order in central and eastern Europe gave effident mob leaders a chance to get into the saddle and, after the elimination of the old elites, to suppress even the Common Man. Everywhere, from Gibraltar to the Urals, we saw monarchies supplanted by "democracies" which lasted a few months or years, only to be supplanted by totalitarian dictatorships. Ethnic nationalism and socialism became the determining forces. World War II, we have to bear in mind, was for Europe a great fratricidal struggle between the various forms of national socialism, though even after the elimination of Hitler the era of national socialism of the Bevans, Schumachers, Nennis, Titos, Stalins, etc., is by no means over.

What Is "Liberalism"?

Luckily, a reaction is under way, and today its outlines are clearly visible on the Continent. We encounter it under the label of neo-liberalism (a label rejected by many of its supporters for historical rather than etymological reasons).

The political term "liberal" is of Spanish origin. The Spanish liberales were the supporters of the liberty of the press and the Constitution of 1812, as opposed to the serviles, the reactionaries. Among English authors it is Southey who used this expression for the first time in 1816, referring to "our British liberales [sic]," and Scott, soon after, wrote about the liberaux. A liberal, therefore, is a person who answers the question "How should rule be exercised?" by saying: "Re-gardless of the rules—a monarch, an oligarchy or a parliament—a government has to see to it that the individual has the greatest possible amount of liberty still compatible with the common good."

The various forms of government he will judge primarily by their ability to respect individual rights. If an election might threaten to produce a Communist or Nazi majority, and thus to prepare the establishment of a totalitarian tyranny, the liberal might conceivably tolerate the formation of a military dictatorship—by far the lesser evil from a liberal point of view. For the liberal is not a doctrinaire democrat. Liberty, not equality, is his ideal.

With this reflection we have touched upon an important point—the reason for the moral defeat of nineteenth century liberalism. It had a shallow, basically materialistic ethos waver ing between a naive optimism and a somber skepticism, a cheap Darwinism and the despair of agnosticism. These viewpoints set the liberalism of yesterday against the great European tradition, which is profoundly Christian. On the Continent, prewar liberalism was generally regarded as a political attitude "left of center," and in cultural matters it frequently sided with the extreme left and the Socialists. Its hostility against the living forces of Christianity drove these, in turn, into a sterile, grubbling and defensive conservatism, and deprived liberalism of the very ideological wellsprings of freedom. There is, after all, no other cogent foundation for the concept of a human dignity that demands freedom than the basic Christian—and Judaic—position. After World War I, liberalism occupied a precarious position among Marxism, the Catholic political organizations and the rising forces of totalitarian nationalism.

FEBRUARY 9, 1953 837
These degenerative trends have been aggravated by the fascination which the militarily victorious “economic democracy” of the USSR exerted on “advanced” opinion in Europe no less than in the United States. During the war, Sovietism and other forms of Marxism were assiduously praised through British and American propaganda channels, and it was Washington no less than London which methodically fostered socialism, statism and every other conceivable form of leftist in “liberated” Europe west of the Iron Curtain. Even some of the Catholic parties, betraying the spirit of the West, fell in line and nationalized private property right and left.

But the severest criticism of statism in general and socialism in particular, came from the Catholic Church in affinity with the re-thinkers of the liberal position. Sometimes these neo-liberals were and are convinced Catholics, their protest assuming thus a dual character. The Catholic Church is the only solidly organized body of opinion on the Continent (with the exception of the northern peninsulas), with a central leadership, a variety of intellectual schools having a common denominator, and with a certain appeal for the masses. Today most of the Catholic parties as well as most of the new liberals are definitely “right of center,” if not on the right. Yet here again it becomes necessary to redefine the terms Right and Left.

Rightism of the liberal brand stands for liberty, for tradition in the profounder sense of the term, for respect for things organically grown, for spirituality, for inviolability, for variety and generosity. Leftism (sinistrismo), on the other hand, stands for coercion and “planning,” including the horrors of “social engineering”; for the fulfillment of Utopian blueprints and contempt of the great heritage (“of the past let us make a clean slate”), says the “Internationale”, for materialism, uniformity and bureaucratic rule. It is utter nonsense to treat fascism or Nazism as “rightism.” They belong to the extreme left. It is a fallacy to see in the repressive tendencies of the early nineteenth-century restoration (borrowed from the Terror regime of French revolutionary democracy) a “rightist” characteristic. The phrase “We’re against all totalitarian tyranny whether it comes from the right or the left,” makes no sense whatsoever, since totalitarian warfare against man’s liberties is under all circumstances leftist.

Rœpke and the Austrian School

The new liberalism admits the errors of liberalism in the past; its shallowness, its suicidal policy of rejecting ideas and ideals which ought to underlie its creed. Wilhelm Rœpke, the brilliant professor at the Institut des Hautes Etudes in Geneva, goes so far as to reject the label “liberal,” because it carries negative historical connotations. Instead of the expression “neo-liberalism,” he advocates the term “decentralization” which, I am afraid, lacks semantic point and pull. To Rœpke, the collectivist mania of our day has profound psychological reasons and historical roots which are to be found in the French Revolution and its socialist aftermath.

Toward the end of World War II he wrote a memorandum for the Allies in which he recommended restoration of a monarchy for Germany. Carefully distinguishing between liberalism (a way of governing) and democracy (a form of government), he is fearful of all the manifestations of Jacobinism in the democratic framework and highly critical of the “radical” wing of the old liberalism. He is a fearless fighter against the “soft” currencies, planned economies (dirigisme, Kommandowirtschaft), the movements for national autarchy, the mania for “full employment,” the worship of size, dictatorial trade unionism and the welfare state. Rœpke is a German Protestant, but his understanding of the Catholic position in political, social and economic matters marks a turning point in liberal thinking.

Closely allied with his views and ideas are the members of the “Austrian School”: Ludwig von Mises, F. A. Hayek, Peter F. Drucker and, in a qualified sense, the late Joseph A. Schumpeter. It would be interesting to study the reason why liberal thinking, in general as well as economic matters, has received so much impetus in Austria. Contrary to what many Americans believe, there always has been in baroque Austria a liberal spirit, though not necessarily expressed in political terms and programs. The collapse of the old monarchy and the strait-jacket of a new, small Austrian state in a totally divided Europe, has stimulated anti-collectivist thinking. So has the preeminence of a doctrinaire and intransigent socialism in Vienna. Also, Austria’s Catholic background, with its libertarian theology and its inherent joie-de-vivre, as well as the “liberty of the mountains,” were bound to have their effects.

The trans-Atlantic relocation of this Austrian School at first reduced its impact on Europe, but now it can be felt in an ever-increasing degree. In France we have such outstanding liberal thinkers of a conservative stamp as Bertrand de Jouvenel and Louis Rougier, while Italy can boast of a great liberal sage, its President Luigi Einaudi, the financial wizard who saved the lira. We praise him rather than the late Guido Ruggiero or the venerable Benedetto Croce, both political-historians rather than economists. Among the minor liberals in Germany, Alexander Ruestow deserves special mention.

When we seek further reasons for the rapprochement between conservatives and liberals, we must not forget the shadows cast from the East over free Europe. Professing Catholics and Protestants think increasingly in terms of personal freedom, and liberals have rediscovered Christianity. As a result, liberal parties figure today in most countries definitely as parties of the right, and emphatically more so than the Christian parties. They have given up their old resentments and look at the great European tradition with open eyes. Very often they favor monarchical trends and underwrite the concept of a pluralistic society. Democracy, their ally of yesterday, they contemplate with a new sense of critical evaluation.

In this and in many other respects the Continental liberal of today comes nearer to the views of America’s Founding Fathers, who combined with a liberal outlook a fear of the logical conclusions of democracy and were afraid of the never-ending demands of the masses.
(Madison). In Europe the dilemma between a rather spurious concept of “security” on the one hand, and liberty on the other, is even more topical than in the United States. No wonder, therefore, that neo-liberalism has few chances of becoming a mass movement. It affects primarily the elites who think further than their noses and have thus resumed their original aristocratic character. Their importance will be intellectual rather than demagogical.

The writings of the neo-liberals have affected economic and political thinking more than did the numerically weak liberal political parties— the PRL in France, the largely monarchist Liberal Party in Italy (PLI), the FDP in Germany, or even the still slightly anti-clerical liberal parties of Switzerland, Holland and Belgium.

**Liberal Resurgence in the Catholic Church**

Of even greater importance is the resurgence of liberal thought in the Catholic Church which has a liberal tradition all her own. One only has to remember the names like Tocqueville, Acton, Montalembert, Lacroix, Leo XIII (all men, incidentally, very sympathetic towards the United States). The old cleavage between Catholicism and liberalism is rapidly disappearing because neo-liberalism is by no means in favor of gigantism. The giant corporation going through its last stage of de-personalization figures in the neo-liberal mind as an evil not much less pernicious than socialism (which combines all drawbacks of capitalistic without its virtues). Here neo-liberalism meets with the Catholic position which is hostile to a soulless capitalism that sees only immediate profits.

There is a Catholic insistence on the intrinsic value of private property which, in an ideal society, should be widely distributed. Neo-liberals agree with Catholic thinkers that man deprived of property without his consent is unfree, unhappy and a menace to our civilization. Today we see Catholic periodicals like La Vie Intelectuelle, which once was rather leftist, dealing aggressively with British Labor or with the rising egoism of the working class.

The last conference of the Catholic League of French Intellectuals dealt with “Christianity and Freedom,” the “Religious Weeks in Paris” with “Church and Liberty,” while the Viennese Katholikenlig gen selected the motto “Liberty and Dignity of Man.” In Spain, Bishop Angel Herrera of Malaga courageously fights for the liberty of the press while in Italy the symbol of de Gasperi’s party is a crusader’s shield with the inscription Libertas.

Liberal thought is also making some headway among the less doctrinaire Socialists—in Holland, in Belgium with its revisionist school, and even in certain Austrian groups. As a non-ideological, non-intellectual attitude it exists today in large layers, in the middle classes no less than among the entrepreneurs.

The experience with postwar socialization has been almost uniformly bad on the Continent. It not only extended the grip of the omnipotent state, but it also combined political with administrative and financial corruption. Everywhere in free Europe the recognition is gaining that a healthy society is a free society with many small and medium-sized owners of private property; with free enterprise and possibilities of success for the gifted and industrious; with large trading areas transcending the artificial national boundaries of Europe; with few governmental restrictions and stable, “hard” currencies which encourage thrift.

Yet it is equally obvious to an increasing number of Europeans that such a free society would never endure on a materialistic basis. A faith which insists on the moral responsibility of every man before an unbribable Judge, and on the uniqueness of the human person, can alone assure us this free world. Against that ideal stands egalitarianism which sees in man a mere nose to be counted at an election—if not a faceless robot working ceaselessly, and dying obediently, for a Pharaonic government.

**This Is What They Said**

We waste too much time talking about whether Stalin wants war or doesn’t, as if it were up to him.

EDGAR SNOW, “Stalin Must Have Peace,” 1948

As everybody knows, such a policy [non-recognition] has proved not only futile but also rather fussy and undignified. Next time it would be wiser simply to accept whatever regime the Soviets may install, realistically and without any pious up roar, in the interest of long-term Russo-American relations.

JOHN FISCHER, Harper’s, August 1945

After the war the Soviet Union will surprise the world by its wisdom and moderation. It desires peace for itself and for others. It wants to continue the vast work of cultural and social development it has begun. It will not take any territory which it does not own (frontiers of 1941) . . . It will work for an international organization which will guarantee to all peoples liberty and peace.

FRESHMAN PROSE ANNUAL, University of Texas 1947

Americans should read the accounts of this trial [in Communist Czechoslovakia] with care, and having read them, should then re-read the testimony of the professional informers and denouncers, the ex-traitors, the self-confessed perjurers and espionage agents who have testified before the various Congressional committees in this country to see if they can find a parallel or any similarity between the two witch hunts.

THE NATION, Editorial, December 6, 1952

Support of Allied imperialists [against Hitler] can only lead to the deepest enslavement of humanity.

WILLIAM Z. FOSTER, Daily Worker, June 14, 1949

Whatever you contribute will be deeply appreciated not only by Mr. Lattimore but also by everyone who feels that the issues of academic freedom and free speech are on trial.

DR. GEORGE BOAS, request to his colleagues at Johns Hopkins University for funds for the defense of Owen Lattimore, January 10, 1953
Is Your Child an Isolate?

By BURTON RASCOE

Do you know what an “isolate” is? It is a little boy or girl in the primary grades of the public schools, who must be carefully watched, disciplined and drilled so that his, or her, mind may be thoroughly “oriented” toward “international understanding and relationships” and “conditioned” for “world citizenship” and “world government.” Otherwise the child may grow up to be a confirmed “nationalist” or “chauvinist” or, worse still, an “isolationist.”

Does the child know he is an “isolate”? No. But he must be made aware of it and treated accordingly. He must be made to know, and to feel, that to be an “isolate” is very bad—something that society under world government will not tolerate, and the quicker he reforms his habits of thinking, the better.

The fact that a child is an “isolate” can be conveyed to him directly by the teacher, or indirectly through other children. The children can be told that the child is an “isolate.” They won’t know what that means, but the tone in which the epithet is spoken will convey that the child is a bad word. They will do the rest. They will shun him, refuse to let him play with them. When they catch him alone, they will stick out their tongues at him, yell “Yah! Yah! Isolate!” and trip him up, grab his satchel of books, open it up and throw them all into a mud puddle.

How does the teacher determine that a child is an “isolate”? There are many ways, all of them set forth in several handbooks for teachers, published under the auspices of the National Education Association; in “A Handbook for the Improvement of Textbooks and Teaching Materials,” published by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); and in back issues of Progressive Education, the monthly organ of the American Educational Fellowship (formerly the Progressive Education Association). No “modern education” teacher, either in the primary or secondary schools, can afford to be unfamiliar with the techniques set forth in back issues of Progressive Education, to be found in many libraries.

There’s a Handbook for It

The essential handbook for detecting and dealing with the child “isolate” is “Organizing the Elementary School for Living and Learning,” by Willard E. Goslin and his co-workers of the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development of the NEA. Mr. Goslin is always referred to by his associates and in the educational press as “Dr. Goslin,” which is a courtesy title for Mr. Goslin has no doctorate, earned or honorary. He is, as you know, the Jacques d’Arc of Progressive Education who was burned at the stake in Pasadena but emerged, phoenix-like, from the flames under incantations by the Messrs. Conant, Hersey, Schlesinger, Melby, Pruner, Givens, Kennan and other high priests of New Deal education, into a flock of radio and lecture contracts and a grant of $625,000 from the Carnegie Corporation to set up a program at Peabody College for the “recruitment and training of teachers,” plus an endowed chair and full professorship in school administration.

Mr. Goslin, who coined the term “isolate,” is also one of the architects of the NEA’s “national training laboratory for group development,” financed by an initial grant of $100,000 from the Carnegie Corporation, and of the “citizenship education project” for teacher indoctrination at Teachers College, Columbia University, financed by a $1,450,000 gift of the Carnegie Corporation and implemented by a grant from the teacher-training division of the $7,154,000 Ford Foundation Fund for the Advancement of Education. (The bitter, bitter martyrdom of “Dr.” Goslin, so widely trumpeted throughout the land by mouthpieces of the NEA, the American Library Association and Americans for Democratic Action, has paid off.)

“Mind Conditioning” Projects

Teachers in both the primary and the secondary grades are faced today more seriously than ever with the problem of the “isolate.” The United Nations World of July 1952 reveals just how pressing the problem is. That monthly magazine, which is devoted to the promotion and enlargement of the functions of the various agencies of the United Nations, sent out a questionnaire to 10,000 small businessmen, professors, lawyers, farmers and others, selected by standard poll procedures, as persons presumed to be aware of the prevailing sentiment and opinions in their communities.

With chagrin and disappointment the editors presented these awful results: 82 per cent answered “Yes” to the question, “Do people relate higher taxes to our present policy of internationalism?”; 61 per cent said that “people generally” have an “unfavorable opinion of UN”; and 67 per cent said that unquestionably “the American people are going isolationist.” No fewer than four mass magazines have recently conducted surveys which showed a comparable or worse situation.

That is why Teachers College and other places having projects for “mind conditioning” of children in the elementary grades, dispense with textbooks in such courses. The precepts from the series of handbooks called “Paths to Better Schools,” prepared by the Yearbook Committee (Willard Goslin, Chairman), jointly sponsored by the NEA, the John Dewey Society, the American Education Fellowship and UNESCO, are conveyed orally to the teacher.
students by staff and special lecturers among the proponents of world-government-through-education.

The special lecturers include Eleanor Roosevelt, Dr. Ralph Bunche, Trygve Lie, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Clark M. Eichelberger, Arthur Sweetzer, Virginia Gilder-sleeve, James T. Shotwell, Major George Fielding Elliot, Dr. Harlow Shapley, Grayson Kirk and Quincy Wright. Lists of books for collateral reading are suggested and term-paper grades are marked in accordance with the teacher-student's right-thinking attitudes, which can come only from familiarity with the thoughts of such progressive writers on the recommended lists as Howard Fast, Langston Hughes, Maxwell S. Stewart, Norman Corwin, Robert S. Allen, Richard Wright, Goodwin Watson, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Elmer Davis, Henry Wallace, M. F. Ashley-Montague, Clarence Streit, Chester Bowles, John Gunther, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Vera Michele Dean, Gene Weltfish, Owen Lattimore, Corliss Lamont, Carey McWilliams, Henry Steele Commager, the Rev. Leon Birkhead, Clyde R. Miller, Gunnar Myrdal and Otto Klineberg.

The reason there are no printed, or official, textbooks at the Teachers College “citizenship education project” is that there are people all over the country like those in that 82 per cent class discovered by the United Nations World, who, as Mrs. Roosevelt put it so wonderfully the other day, are “confused” in their thinking about the United Nations and its agencies and some of them even bigoted and reactionary “100 per cent Americans,” as Dr. Benjamin Fine of the New York Times so aptly and opprobriously dubbed them. These ignorant and benighted persons have got annoyed by their children coming home and telling them they don’t know nothing from nothing; that they are low “isolationists” and “victims of McCarthyism, anti-Communist hysteria and fear of change” and should begin to educate themselves for world citizenship. Their children know all about the Universal Declaration of Human Rights but nothing about the Constitution of the United States except that it is an “outmoded instrument” designed by the “aristocrats of the British colonies to exploit the poor” and doesn’t say a word against the poll tax, lynching, monopolies or slums or in favor of the Point Four program.

Dr. Fine recently told of some re-actionary members of a Parent-Teacher Association in Los Angeles who had gone so far as to adopt a set of resolutions to be presented to the Board of Education, recommending “more emphasis on teaching reading, spelling, writing, geography, arithmetic and American history and less on frills.” If adopted, said Dr. Fine, such a program “would set education back half a century.”

So, in developing the “citizenship education project” at Teachers College, they have had to proceed very much on the Q.T., confine the courses to oral instruction, withhold the general nature of the project from the public. In fact the idea of the (international) citizenship education project was first tried out secretly at the Great Lakes Naval Training Station, later tested at Fort Meade and other army training bases and in eight high schools in key cities throughout the country. From a teacher in one of these cities your correspondent got a sample “teaching kit” (which costs $25 to teachers enrolled for the project at Columbia) and the list of the project’s 1046 recommended reading titles.


Today it has become necessary for the elementary school to be actively concerned with developing world understanding and acceptance of world citizenship . . . citizens of the world are just at the threshold of this one world idea. It is an urgent necessity to us that the schools help this nation and particularly its children to cross that threshold.

If we are to have one world . . . it must be built through such constructive agencies as education. On our part, that building will have to begin with the little children in the elementary schools of America.

In another section, Mr. Goslin says:

. . . the schools must give priority to human relationships. This “R” is of even greater importance than the three “R”s . . . The school which has as its basic objective the development of intelligent and competent world citizens strives to develop boys and girls who . . . understand the interdependence of the world economically and socially . . . and recognize the special responsibility of the United States . . .

But the teacher’s obligation, according to Mr. Goslin, does not end with converting a six-year-old “isolate” into a “world citizen”; she must work on the “isolationist” parents—through the child, and through developing a “world citizenship” consciousness throughout the school and, insofar as she can, the community.

How to Spot an “Isolate”

How does the teacher recognize the “isolate” in the primary grades? One way, to put it bluntly, is by snooping. The teacher inquires around to find out what newspapers and periodicals the parents read, how they vote, what opinions they express, how they feel about the United Nations, McCarthyism, Federal aid to education, the FEPC bill, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Smith and McCarran acts. If they think as Mrs. Roosevelt does, say, on all these subjects, it shows that the parents are not “confused,” therefore are not “isolationists” and ergo their child is not an “isolate” or a problem.

If the teacher finds it difficult to get enough reliable data on the “en-
environment of belief and opinion" in which the child is being incorrectly brought up. Mr. Goslin and his associates have a whole set of scientific determinants for discerning whether a child is an "isolate" or not. They consist of "sociographs," "social distance measurement technics," and other more esoteric graph and chart dingbats of tabulation and deduction to gauge the "social relationships developing in her classes." The teacher is warned that detection of the "isolate" should be accomplished in the first grade, before the "adjustment problems develop."

As the "isolate's" adjustment proceeds, he should be subjected, say Goslin & NEA Associates, to the filmstrip, "The United Nations," which "describes how world government works"; to films such as "The Bridge," and "We Hold These Truths" and to the radio drama, "Could Be," by Norman Corwin. (These fine artistic and educational products are the work of persons whose characters have been assassinated by former Attorneys General Francis Biddle and Tom Clark, who listed their affiliations with subversive and Communist organizations. But the Goslin-instructed teacher, who is world-minded, will not be deterred by any such narrow, nationalistic views as the Attorney General's office may entertain.)

One-World Dramatics

For the older pupils, including those in the secondary schools, nothing can be more highly recommended than the "Commencement Manual for 1948," which can be ordered from the NEA for $1.00, postage prepaid. This remarkable book gives instructions for United Nations pageants, tableaux and flag displays, and offers plays, with instructions for stage settings, make-up and costumes. One of the plays which enable the pupil to assume the personalities of such great heroes of the world government movement as Joseph Stalin, Maxim Litvinov, V. N. Molotov, Andrei Gromyko, Warren Austin, Spam of Belgium and Trygve Lie, requires a knowledge of the background and biographies of these figures; but the teacher can supply the information from various sources, in order that their actual published words may be spoken by the pupils. Thus, by the we-learn-by-doing method, the student can get a better appreciation of "how world government works."

There are less well-known but just as eager figures in the world government movement whose deeds and noble words may be acted out by pupils for the edification of parents and other pupils. There is a dramatized interpretation of the work of UNESCO "in which the students may assume the roles" and speak the actual words uttered, in the very setting and under the actual circumstances, of an UNESCO meeting. The chief roles in this playlet are those of Archibald MacLeish, Anne O'Hare McCormick and William H. Benton!

The NEA and UN handbooks also tell how to fill out a program of such playlets with quiz games, art contests, pageants and folk songs (translated) from the USSR, the Ukraine, Poland and Czechoslovakia as most recently approved by those nations, which are represented in the UN but unfortunately no longer in UNESCO.

In many secondary schools and colleges, courses in international relations have long been obligatory, along with courses in American history stemming from Arthur Schlesinger, Sr.'s "New Viewpoints in American History" down to the latest works by Toynbee and Langer which show how the rotten and crumbling structure of our own and all other capitalist nations must give way to an East-West coalition that will emerge as a world government patterned on Socialist designs.1

Cold War in the UN

By ALICE WIDENER

During the Seventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly on December 11, 1952, the United States suffered a total diplomatic defeat in the Economic and Financial Committee. There a Bolivian-Uruguayan proposal for nationalization of wealth and resources in underdeveloped countries without safeguards for compensation to private investors was adopted by a vote of 31-1 against our country. Immediately after the balloting, the United States Delegation issued Press Release No. 1611. This document was marked "For Immediate Release" and contained a statement by the Honorable Isador Lubin, Alternate United States Representative, who said:

The United States Delegation had hoped it would be able to express its views on the resolution submitted by Uruguay and Bolivia. For this purpose we, as well as other delegations, had placed our names on the speakers' list. However, due to the action by the committee to close debate we were prevented from making our views known. Moreover, the closure of the debate made it impossible for us even to explain the amendments that we had submitted to the resolution before us.

Many freedom-loving Americans who respect the great traditions of parliamentary procedure were shocked at Mr. Lubin's cry-baby, after-the-fact protest. It appears to reveal clearly that spinelessness on the part of several American representatives to the United Nations is a major cause for American cold-war losses in the international organization. The crux of the matter is that Mr. Lubin sat in on, instead of walked out on, a situation where Communist Chairman Nosek of Czechoslovakia silenced the legitimately raised voice of America in the UN Economic and Financial Committee. Thus a delegate from the United States, which has been the main supporter of the United Nations and the major contributor to its humanitarian projects for the

342 THE FREEMAN
underdeveloped countries, meekly submitted himself to Communist
dictation. Mr. Lubin, acting on behal­f of all of us Americans, re­ained in a situation which he him­self declared “made it impossible” for the United States to explain its position.

Perhaps the real reason for Mr. Lubin’s attitude can be found in the official United Nations nation­al AC/C.2/SR 246, dated December 24, 1952, the provis­ional summary record of the meeting held on December 20, 1952.

This document reports that at the final session of the Economic and Financial Committee, Mr. Elahi of Pakistan thanked Communist Chair­man Nosek of Czechoslovakia, who had conducted the Committee’s pro­ceedings throughout the Seventh Session of the General Assembly, and complimented him on his “com­plete impartiality.” In conclusion, Mr. Elahi thanked the Secretary of the Committee and also the Secre­tariat of the UN for their part in the Committee’s work.

Mr. Arkadyev Extends Thanks

It is noteworthy that the Secret­ary of the Committee was David Weintraub, an American whose past employment in the UN has been described by U. S. Senators and Congressmen as “an outrage.” Reli­able U. S. government sources have said that the FBI has 43 adverse comments in its files on the matter of Mr. Weintraub’s fitness for ser­vice to our country.

Another prominent American member of the UN Secretariat who took part in the Economic and Fi­nancial Committee’s affairs was Dmitri Varley. He, too, has been publicly described by members of Congress as a questionable security risk.

On the morning of December 20, at the final meeting of the Commit­tee, the last speaker was Mr. Arkadyev of the Soviet Union. He said he was glad that a representative of a country friendly to the USSR had presided over the Committee. Mr. Arkadyev congratulated Chairman Nosek “for the skilful way in which he had conducted the discussion . . .”.

Arkadyev also extended his thanks to the Secretary (Weintraub) and

to members of the Secretariat (in­cluding Mr. Varley) who had as­sisted the Committee in its work.

Next came the most amazing inci­dent in the entire Seventh Session of the General Assembly: Mr. Lubin, who had issued a special U. S. gov­ernment press release condemning Chairman Nosek’s parliamentary maneuvering, joined with the dele­gates from Irak, Iran, Argentina, India, the United Kingdom, Indo­nesia, Guatemala, Turkey and Af­ghanistan in supporting the state­ments previously made by Elahi of Pakistan and Arkadyev of the Soviet Union. Therefore in the matter of what is now popularly known as the UN Nationalization Proposal, Mr. Lubin formally joined in thanks to Communist Chairman Nosek for his so-called impartiality and skillful handling of a discussion that led to a disastrous U. S. defeat.

The record of Mr. Lubin’s action leaves the average American with several unanswered questions. Mr. Lubin ought, in good faith, to give the answers. Was he sincere when he issued on behalf of the U. S. gov­ernment a protest against Commu­nist Nosek’s arbitrary closing of debate at the UN Economic and Fi­nancial Committee on December 11? Or was Mr. Lubin sincere on De­cember 20 when he associated him­self with congratulations to Com­munist Chairman Nosek on his con­ducting a discussion that led to a 31-1 vote against our country? Last but not least, does Mr. Lubin still wish to associate himself with offi­cial UN thanks rendered to David Weintraub and Dmitri Varley?

Last winter my husband and I worked as attendants in a State Hos­pital. After a few weeks we were conscious of an undercurrent among the employees. They were over­worked and underpaid. Most of them had to live at home and support families, and the state was not pro­viding adequate allowances for out­side maintenance.

It was easy for a union to come in and make hay. One of the attendants, a smooth-mouthed persuader, had a better education than most of us. He could make the issues appear worse than they were.

I knew that if the union succeeded in getting a certain percentage of the attendants signed up it would mean that no attendant could work at the hospital who didn’t agree to join the union. I had had the unhappy ex­perience of being required to sign up with a union which has since been exposed as a defender of com­munism; and thrown out of the CIO. The union which was trying to or­ganize the attendants had a reputa­tion in some states for similar objectives.

I sat down and wrote a letter to the editor of the local paper. I put my whole heart into that letter. I have long been a defender of the right of workingmen to organize. I believe that unions make good spokes­men for workers who more often than not have neither the ability nor the time to interpret their needs to the employer. But during the last ten years we have witnessed the prostitution of many unions by indi­viduals and groups who have turned them into miniature dictatorships. No real American wants to be dic­tated to by anyone, not even his labor union.

All this I put into my letter, add­ing an analysis of the employee’s pay check. I also pled with the legis­lators to give state employees a raise. If they didn’t, I said, the state could expect trouble from the union and probably from more menacing sources.

The next few months were tough. Most of the employees wouldn’t speak to me. Anyone who would write a letter to the paper was considered something of a crackpot. But now, months later, the state has raised its employees’ salaries. My fellow-at­tendants have come to see that I probably “had something.” Some of them may even realize by this time that not all unions are fair-minded, and that the principle of the closed shop contains elements of fascism. There is evidence that my fellow­workers have come to know and re­spect me. Anybody, even you, can be a crackpot!

ANNE FALCON
Germany can contribute more to Western defense through her reviving free economy than through military aid, a British observer points out.

Germany, Key to Europe

By F. A. VOIGT

For more than seven years Great Britain, France and the United States have governed the people of the German Federal Republic in a manner that recalls the benevolent despotism of the eighteenth century. They overruled two principles that are fundamental to the Rule of Law—that no man be judge in his own cause and that there be no penalty without a law (nulla poena sine lege). They arbitrarily assumed the competence of the court which tried the “war criminals.” They hanged indubitable villains for villainies which were no crimes under any penal law when they were committed.

On the Germans, their new subjects, they imposed democracy of the same kind as the one which was impotent to arrest the attack of Hitler in 1933. Whether it was democratic to impose democracy was a question which was never answered because it was never asked. By no right known to international jurists they undertook the forcible conversion of their former enemies by a process officially known as re-education.

They imposed not only their political principles but also their literary tastes, with the result that contemporary writers, both good and bad, of their own nations, like André Gide, Camus, Faulkner, Norman Mailer, Graham Greene and Cronin, acquired an artificial vogue to the prejudice of contemporary German literature. The Germans were induced to nibble at that vast vegetable excrecence which goes under the name of Arnold Toynbee’s “Study of History.” It even acquired a certain vogue—the Germans called it Spengler-Ersatz—but as they found it to be more filling than satisfying, the vogue did not last. In the early days of their rule, the Three Powers even prohibited the works of Nietzsche whom they seem to have regarded as a forerunner of Hitler, although Nietzsche was proud of his Polish ancestry, wanted all anti-Semites shot, and declared that the German victory over France in 1871 was a defeat for civilization.

They discriminated against certain categories of Germans, not only penalizing individuals for real or alleged offenses, but for belonging to certain “types” of an ancestral nature. There was at least a plausible case for the process termed “de-nazification” in the hideous bureaucratic jargon of our day. But there was never even a plausible case against the Junkers. In the Third Proclamation issued by the Allied Military Government and relating to Fundamental Principles of Judicial Reform, they announced that “all persons are equal before the law.” But it would seem that, as in George Orwell’s “Animal Farm,” some persons were more (or less) equal than others, for, in addition to “Nazis” who were “subject to complete removal” from “positions of control or influence,” certain “types” were to be “closely examined,” among them “persons who represent Junker tradition” and “any individual who was a member of any aristocratic Prussian . . . family.”

The Junkers were among the finest farmers in Europe. They were on patriarchal terms with their laborers. They supported Bismarck’s efforts to keep the German Empire on good terms with Russia and they opposed German colonial and naval expansion, for they wanted no conflict between the Empire and Great Britain. As for “Prussian tradition,” it is associated with beneficent administrative and social reforms in Europe and with noble achievements in the realms of art and letters, science, law and education (we are compelled to wonder if the authors of the Proclamation ever heard of Alexander von Humboldt).

Today the Junkers are possessed of their estates and totally ruined. In the Soviet zone, those who failed to escape were hunted down and executed, or sent to perish in Soviet labor camps.

But the three Powers saved the people of the Federal Republic from chaos, hunger and pestilence. They probably averted a popular rising which, although it could have been salutary in one respect, might have heaped catastrophe on catastrophe and advanced the cause of communism. Germans of sober judgment maintain that such a rising would have been salutary because an outraged nation would have erected gallows in every town and village to “string up the golden pheasants,” as the National Socialist dignitaries were called by reason of their resplendent uniforms.

The effect of the measures taken by the three Powers to eliminate the “Nazis” was to destroy a few, to incommode more, and to save most (including many of the worst).

Work, Not Ideologies

Having lost two wars, the Germans no longer believe in their own invincibility. They are convinced that whoever wins the third war, they will not. And yet they are not a defeatist nation any more than they are a pacifist nation, for they are bursting with vitality. The pacifist believes in a revolutionary doctrine to which he is prepared to sacrifice his own country. The defeatist believes in nothing. The Germans believe in work: all the ideologies, without exception, have brought disaster; work has brought recovery and only in work is there any trust or hope!

In this respect, the despotism of the three Powers has been benevolent indeed, for, much as the Germans owe to their own work, they also owe much to Marshall Aid and, above all, to the financial reform which was carried out in 1948.

Despotism, as distinct from tyranny, is not always destructive of freedom. There was an efflorescence of intellectual freedom under the more enlightened of the benevolent des-
pots in the eighteenth century, such as Frederick of Prussia. Under the rule of the three Powers, the Germans enjoyed a freedom such as they had not known even during the years of the Weimar Republic, despite (or perhaps because of) the abstract rights embodied in the Republican Constitution.

The three Powers assumed responsibility for all the higher affairs of state. The Germans were not only rescued from the National Socialist tyranny, they were sheltered from the importunities of political theorists, from the incessant pressure of mass movements, and from the coercion and seduction of a stupefying propaganda.

As long as the Germans showed an outward deference toward democracy and Western institutions, very much as the subjects of a despot in the eighteenth century had to observe a certain etiquette, they were free to think their own thoughts without being pestered or intimidated, and to enjoy a certain irresponsibility which, although it would have been inimical to freedom if it had lasted too long and in excess, offered relief and liberation from the sometimes unendurable tension in which they had lived for more than thirty years. After the culminating shock of the collapse and of the decisions of the Powers at Potsdam, a solid substratum of calm appeared for the first time in a generation. It is no mere chance that the finest German literature today—the novels of Werner Bergengraven, for example, and the essays and poems of Rudolf Alexander Schröder—have a great inner tranquility.

There is not a nation that lives so much in the present as the Germans of the Federal Republic. To them, the Empire of the Hohenzollerns is a far and fading memory, the Republic an episode of the rapidly receding past; the Third Reich, although so recent and so manifest in the ruins that lie around and in the bereavement that tears millions of hearts, like something in a dream.

The Third Reich was a semi-Socialist Welfare State and many Germans remember it as a period of stability, social security and full employment, that put an end to a long period of civil tumult and unrest, of ruinous inflation and vast unemployment. That the National Socialists were the instigators of the second World War is known to all Germans of sober judgment. But there are others, and they are not few, who are ready with their excuses and their extenuations. They say that Hitler “meant well,” but was “misled by his advisers,” or that “his generals lost the war.” Or they even blame Hitler, not for starting, but for losing the war. Of the atrocities they say that these were “exaggerated” by propaganda. Propaganda did indeed increase the capacity for self-deception—and not German propaganda only.

But even Germans such as these have begun to forget the Third Reich. And even to those Germans who on their bodies still bear the marks of torture and who still mourn friends who were hanged, shot, or gassed, the Third Reich, as it recedes into the past, has acquired the unreality of a dream, though a nightmare.

It is the intense reality of the German present that makes the German past, both near and distant, assume so unreal a character. Under the German surface some organic principle is at work, some potent reality that is, as yet, formless but will surely, in time, impose its form, though whether the form will be democratic or not no one can foretell. There is little central planning. The German order is organic, rather than organized.

Changing Roles

The English are becoming what the Germans used to be, theorists and planners, the Germans what the English used to be, pragmatists and with faith in free enterprise. The cautious efforts of the present British government to reduce the number of controls are being resisted not merely by the Labor Party and by the trade unions, but by the people, especially by traders who have grown so accustomed to an unimaginative security and all its comforts that they shrink from the risks and fear the imaginative flights of insecurity without reflecting on its rewards. Once the spirit of enterprise has begun to languish, it can not be revived save, perhaps, by hardship and disaster.

The Germans are more interested in freedom than equality; the English, for the first time since they became a nation, in equality rather than in freedom. The English will fight for their country, but they will not work for it. They are more interested in war, as an art, than the Germans are, and they are the best all-round soldiers in the world. The Germans will work for their coun-

To the Unicorn

*(in the tapestry, “La Dame à la Licorne”)*

Fragile and fantastic beast
slim hoof upraised,
what visions in the mirror
(held in the Lady’s lissome hand)
shine out? Phantasmagorical
dim forests? Or the golden winged deer
their wondrous antlers spread
stepping with ivory feet
fastidiously placed between the pale
delightful blossoms that spring thickly upward,
harebell convolvulus or asphodel?

Improbable alluring beast,
what do you see
with that sly silken and satiric gaze?
Small snow-white upright hares? D’you hear the blaze
of Roland’s horn filling long leafy ways
with ancient magic that has never ceased?
Tell me, improbable and lovely beast.

KATHARINE DAY LITTLE

FEBRUARY 9, 1953 345
try, but they will not fight for it. The Englishman, fighting for his country, does not fight for himself. The German, working for his country, works for himself.

In England it is the convention to condemn competition as "cut-throat" and profits as morally wrong. The Germans extoll competition as life-giving and profits as morally right. In this respect, at least, the Germans will, in the next few years, teach the English a lesson that will, perhaps, administer a salutary shock.

New Civic Spirit

The Germans have not lost their taste for aggression, but they believe in conquering foreign markets, not foreign countries. They are confident that by hard work, free enterprise and strenuous competition, they will create an economy more formidable than any planned economy, that they have a great future as long as there is no European war.

There is a certain revival of nationalism in Germany, but it is without ardor and has little resonance. Even the flame of German patriotism is burning at singularly low temperature. But there is a new spirit of civic enterprise and independence. Each ruined city is being rebuilt without apparent reference to any other or to any national plan. It may be that German freedom, if it survives, will not be rooted in democracy as understood in the Western world, but in the civic spirit, as it was in the Middle Ages and in the early period of the modern age.

Even in the arts, the organic has begun to prevail over the organized, the reflective over the experimental. The Germans have emerged from a barbarous tyranny and an atrocious war with their manner more genial and refined and their arts less crude and chaotic—they are perhaps finding the mean between the anarchy of the arts under the Weimar Republic and the frozen anarchy imposed by the Third Reich. They have a love of quality and finish which shows itself in their ceramics, glassware, textiles, and so on. Local crafts flourish as nowhere else in Europe, and the newly carved images in the restored churches reveal the existence of many an unknown master-craftsman. And, for the first time, German cooking rivals French.

But the Federal Republic lacks a moral basis. In England, at least, there is nothing to resemble the ruthless intrigues and rivalries that beset the German administration, in which, of the three kinds of people into which mankind is divided—those with good character, those with bad character, and those with no character—it is the last who generally prevail. Nevertheless, we meet among Germans today men of extraordinary gifts and shining virtue, though more often among the unknown than among the known. There is little public, as distinct from civic, spirit. Germans dislike fellow-Germans who come from afar, especially the unfortunate refugees, more than they dislike foreigners. The German colors (the black, red and gold of 1848 and of the Weimar Republic) is the official rather than the national symbol; the Deutscherlandlied the official rather than the national anthem. There is no convergence of the people's loyalty in one national symbol, ceremony or institution like the British Crown or a Royal Jubilee, or the American Independence Day.

Two Republics

As the years go by, the difference between the Federal and "Democratic" Republics widens and deepens. We need only enter the Russian Sector in Berlin to see and hear that we are in another world. The people look different—they are shabbier and they are sullen. The loudspeakers blare and the posters flare—we are in the world of propaganda, of the brutal shouting that always goes with brutal terrorism and takes effect, not so much by what it shouts, as by what it shouts down, by the sheer noise that drowns the voice of reason and forbearance.

The Federal Republic, so fearful of future war, is unconscious of present war. Berlin is on the front and is more conscious of present than of future—so is the "Democratic" Republic which has the character of an occupied country behind the front. In the "Democratic" Republic we find much acquiescence in the existing order, but also an authentic patriotic spirit, sustained by a stern Prussian and Protestant ethic.

It is time the Atlantic Powers considered what German foreign policy will be, for the Federal Republic has a foreign policy, or will have one soon. German and Russian interests have begun to converge in the west. The Federal Republic holds a position of such importance, and is animated by such singleness of purpose, that it will surely exercise a powerful, perhaps a decisive, influence in the councils of the Atlantic Powers. It will be more obdurately than amenable, less ready to pay reparations than to borrow money to pay reparations, and less amenable to America's than to Russia's policy of "containment."

Germany can contribute much to the defense of the west by her labor and production, rather than by her divisions. But in no circumstances will she lend herself to the offensive which the Atlantic Powers may have to take in Europe even if they are not attacked in Europe but elsewhere. The German divisions in the European Army will not fight unless Germany itself is attacked. That being so, it follows that Germany, like Yugoslavia, will, in effect, be a neutral country, and that she and Russia will together preserve the interest they seemingly have in common—that Western neutralism which Germany thinks she needs for national survival and Russia does need for conquest elsewhere.

If this is so, the Atlantic Powers will be immobilized in the west, for, if they withdraw in any strength from western Europe to reinforce their positions elsewhere, the menace of Russian westward expansion will be renewed. They will be immobilized in a different manner, but with similar effect, as in Korea.

Unless the Atlantic Powers pass from a strategy of general "containment," and, therefore, of peripheral diffusion, to a strategy of concentration on the point where the periphery is at nearest striking distance from the center, the Communist Powers can, with relative impunity, devote the next ten or twenty years to conquest between the eastern Mediterranean and Indo-China.

---

2See "The Sovereign Position," the Freeman, January 14, 1952
Conquest of the Chinese

By ANN SU CARDWELL

Moscow is already in the second phase of a plan to subjugate China and turn into another economic and military satellite a vast nation often called unconquerable.

It should be evident to all but the most wilfully blind by this time that Stalin has no intention of permitting a truly national Communist government to arise anywhere in the world. That being so, it is not Chinese Communists who plot China's future but the men in the Kremlin, who by force and trickery have won control of that vast land. The question now is, can Moscow make a satellite of China as it has made satellites of its European neighbors?

There are people who hold that China's population is so huge, ignorant and poverty-stricken, so primitive yet so ancient in culture, and so steeped in traditions incompatible with Stalinist theory and practice, that it can never be made subservient to Moscow. The Chinese, they say, have in the course of their history been forced to accept foreign domination; yet in the end they engulfed their conquerors.

One may find a guide to what can happen in China in the history of the Mongolian tribes of Central Asia after the Bolsheviks came into power in 1917.

Until the nineteenth century these kindred tribes had occupied an area of approximately 1,600,000 square miles. They were nomadic except where fertile valleys and irrigation made cultivation possible. Immense flocks and herds, and the cultivated land, produced enough to sustain their patriarchal way of life. In faith, with the exception of one small unit, they were Mohammedan.

In the nineteenth century these tribes were brought under Russian rule and the region was divided into two provinces called Kazakhstan and Turkestan from the names of the two largest tribes. Force had to be used to maintain order in certain districts long after their formal submission. In the thirteenth century Genghis Khan had united the many tribes, and he and the khans under his command had established a relatively strong centralized government. Under his successors that power had decayed, but the tribes still cherished the memory of the great Genghis, as their songs and legends bear witness, and their final conquest cost both the Russian aggressors and the victims much blood.

The Russian government at once adopted what has been well characterized by the great Russian historian, Kliuchevsky, as an "interior colonization" policy in the newly annexed territories. But instead of settling their so-called colonists on unfortified lands, the Russian authorities confiscated the rich valleys and the areas the natives had brought under irrigation, and drove the rightful owners out upon the barren steppe, where, deprived of water rights, there was nothing for them but a return to nomadism.

According to Tsarist statistics, approximately 622,900 families were transferred from European Russia to the Kazakhstan province alone between the years 1893-1912. Transfer of people from Russia to Siberia and central Asia was particularly active after risings against the Tsars, a transfer more properly labeled exile or banishment.

Advantages to Russia

The "colonization" plan had important corollaries. In one of the eighteenth-century partitions of Poland Russia had acquired the great textile city of Lodz, often referred to as the "Manchester of eastern Europe." And Russia was looking for markets for the cotton cloth that could be produced in immense quantities in the Lodz mills. The tribes of central Asia could use that cloth. Moreover, the warm central Asiatic lands would produce cotton. Central Asia could become a source of raw material as well as a market for finished goods.

Apart from the enormous economic advantages accruing to Russia through this expansion into Asia, there were no less important strategic advantages. The Russian Empire now practically bordered upon India, a coveted prize held by Russia's ancient rival, England, but a prize the Tsarist governments never regarded as permanently lost. On the east was China, whose western provinces could in time be detached from the unwieldy Chinese mass, thus opening the road to Russian expansion in that direction.

To hold what they had won, the Tsars had to prevent unity of the conquered tribes and joint action in revolt. Therefore Russian scientists and historians were set to work to provide evidence of the cultural and historical differences existing among the kindred tribes, with the intent of creating separation if not friction among them. Along with this policy went the apparently contradictory one of centralizing authority; yet this was no contradiction, since centralization was not in the hands of the Mongol but of the Russian government in St. Petersburg. It was the application of the age-old dictum, "divide and rule."

Proclamation to the Mohammedans

Such, in brief, is the story of the central Asiatic provinces of Russia before the Bolsheviks seized power. On December 10, 1917, a proclamation signed by Lenin, and by Stalin as Commissar for Nationalities, called upon the Mohammedans of Russia and the East to free themselves of the Tsarist yoke:

"You are masters of your fate. You alone can organize your lives in accord with your desires . . .

FEBRUARY 9, 1953 347
your future is in your own hands."

The tribal peoples of central Asia, as I have said, are with one exception Mohammedan. Without exception they had resisted Russian annexation. Eager to regain their independence, they welcomed this call to revolt. But they were no match for the Bolshevik committees, accompanied by troops sent in ostensibly to help them but actually to take command. Thus it happened that when significant native opposition did in fact appear it was not against the vanished Tsarist regime but against the Bolsheviks. For almost simultaneously with the summoning of the Mohammedans to revolt, Bolshevik trickery had been exposed.

A resolution passed by the Turkistan Soviet in 1917 declared that "at present Mohammedans can not become members of the higher revolutionary authority [in Turkistan]." On June 5, 1919, at a regional meeting of the Turkistan Bolshevik Party a declaration containing the following was read:

We poor Mohammedans are cattle in the eyes of the present government just as we were under Nicholas the Bloody. We are even worse off although we offer no opposition to the Soviets... Their representatives said that they would fight capitalists and under that pretext began to strip our pockets. All these representatives have done has been to protect the Russians. And what have they done for the Mohammedans? Have they fed us? They have not... Had they done so we would not have died of hunger by the thousands and tens of thousands... [T. Ryskulov—"Revolucija i koriennoe vnielemenje Turkistana." GIZ 1925, p. 101].

Using Soviet statistics, Mustafa Cukoaj-Ogly in his book "Turkistan under the Soviets" (Paris, 1935) puts the number of deaths in that republic during the resistance at 1,114,000. Pravda, June 20, 1920, stated that more than 100,000 Kazaks had been killed or had died of hunger during the struggle in Kazakstan in the years 1918-1920. Later the Bolsheviks adopted the policy of deportation, and between 1929 and 1930 Kazakhstan lost another 100,000 people deported to northern Siberia or other Russian Asiatic regions. Similar statistics could be quoted with regard to the Kirghiz, Tadjiks and Uzbeks.

The men entrusted with the execution of the Bolshevik policy of subjugation or extermination in central Asia were not natives of that area. They were Kaganovich, still high in the Soviet councils; Kulibyshev, whose name has been given to the ancient Kazak city of Samara; Frunze, similarly honored by the renaming of a city among the Kirghiz; Budenny, known to the West through the exploits of his cavalry, and other men no less exalted in Bolshevik history.

Divide and Rule

The central Asiatic peoples had both the will and the courage to fight for their freedom. They were inured to hardship and privation. They had their traditions. They were devout Mohammedans, and the Bolsheviks had declared against all religious faiths. Those in the south-east were favored with a terrain difficult of access. The Bolsheviks were fighting on several fronts and had by no means established themselves in power. But they were ruthless wherever they fought, and were supported by the criminal element in Russia. They were adepts at organization, and their military strength was growing. The Mongols had no such inexhaustible supply of men and arms. They could hold out for a time, but there could be only one outcome of the struggle—a Bolshevik victory.

Once in control, the Bolsheviks proceeded to bring reduced areas into the master plan. Further pursuing the Tsarist policy to divide and rule, they broke up the Russian provinces of Kazakhstan and Turkistan in the five Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Turkistan, Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan and Kirghistan. The "liberation" to which the tribes had been called was succeeded by a policy of "differentiation," of division; that in turn by "federation" propaganda; and that by "union"—with the rest of the Soviet republics. This was no hit-or-miss development. It took place planned step by planned step, "legally" as the Soviets define that word. At the same time the Tsarist "colonization" policy was continued.

Soviet statistics indicate that as of January 17, 1939, the colonizing element in these five republics constituted 36 per cent of the population; in 1911 it had been barely 11 per cent. Since 1939 the percentage of "colonists" has risen sharply, for the number of Poles, Balts, Ukrainians, White Russians and other European nationals deported and placed in Soviet collectives or Soviet industries in these Asiatic republics runs into millions. More than half a million Poles alone, it is estimated, were removed to Kazakstan in 1939-1940. Mass deportations began with the invasion of Poland in 1939 and have continued on a smaller scale in eastern Europe ever since.

Through this inhuman procedure the central Asiatic Soviet republics are acquiring an increasingly large European population while the native population dwindles. The Mongols in 1939 were roughly one million fewer than in 1911, when they had suffered heavy losses in resistance to Russian annexation.

The Plan of Infiltration

This brings us to the role of strategy in Soviet use of this Asiatic area. Fundamentally it is the same as under the Tsars, but Soviet dynamism and zeal make Tsarist use of these territories as doors to further expansion look almost benign. Working across Iran and the Middle East, employing soldier, diplomat, priest, archeologist, anthropologist, professor, student, worker, pilgrim, writer, merchant, tourist—anybody whose talents can be turned to advantage—Moscow worms its way forward.

For many years this patient, insidious, disguised infiltration went on in northern and western China. With the Japanese invasion the big chance came to use Moscow-trained Chinese leaders and Soviet-trained Chinese Communist armies. The Japanese defeat and the American withdrawal opened the way to control of all China, and the Red flood spread over the country. The Moscow puppets, with Moscow's help, had put Moscow in control. And now the Kremlin is engaged in solving the problem posed in the beginning of this discussion, that of making China a docile satellite. If that problem is
not successfully solved, the Soviet Chinese adventure will end in failure. What are the chances of success?

There are Americans who believe they are slim; who predict that a Chinese Tito will arise whose defection Moscow will be powerless to prevent. But for such a development Moscow is most certainly prepared. It has poured men by the thousands into China to sit in all places of authority. The front may be Chinese but the actual direction of the government is in the hands of Soviet experts and advisers. The Soviet stranglehold was applied from the beginning.

In the second place, Moscow has a well-equipped standing army of millions, and a long common frontier with China which would render invasion of that country the easiest thing in the world. Unless the West were prepared to supply rebelling Chinese with unlimited military equipment and other aid, the invading Soviet armies would have a field day.

China Can Be Subjugated

As for the argument that the Chinese people, though conquered, can never be sovietized because their traditions and national culture are all against it, that might with equal truth have been said of the Mongols of Central Asia, who are still bitterly opposed to the Soviet way of life but have been forced to accept it. When tradition and customs are pitted against bullets and bombs, it is bullets and bombs that win.

But even in case of organized opposition Stalin will not have to resort to arms. Famine annually stalks China, taking its toll by the hundreds of thousands. Famine routes the Chinese. And Moscow need not wait for flood and drought to bring that specter to a disaffected region; it can simply order state collection of the entire harvest and let the people starve or deport them for forced labor. Stalin has used both measures with full success in the Ukraine and in the Asiatic republics.

Initial treatment of nations brought under the Soviet yoke naturally does not follow the pattern of subjugation or extermination. The first phase is confiscation of the land and its distribution among the poorer or landless peasants. This is done to win the support of the masses. But in China as elsewhere the new owners have found that ownership is meaningless while the product of their labor is subject to confiscation by the government. The result is not relief but chaos, which prepares the way for the next move in the Soviet plan—collectivization.

The Chinese are individualists, we are told. But desire to own the land he tills, though characteristic of man the world over, has nowhere saved private ownership after Moscow got control. Individualism will no more save the Chinese peasants from collectivization than it has saved Chinese business and industry from nationalization.

To a regime that uses men and women with less consideration than is usually accorded animals, China with its teeming millions is a labor reserve presenting a tempting picture—four hundred and fifty millions of human beings who can be sent to forced labor on the colossal construction projects to which “peace-loving” Moscow is devoting its energies, to hear the Kremlin tell it. A few armed guards and their trained dogs can herd the victims by the thousands to railway stations where they will be loaded into cattle cars, packed in as cattle never are, and started on their journey to a destination of which they know nothing. This has been done in all other Soviet-dominated countries—with resultant startling changes in the ethnic map of the far-flung territories under the hammer and sickle. If the Soviet grip is allowed to fasten itself on China, it will be done there, too.

If many of the deported succumb en route or under the intolerable conditions of forced labor camps, what is that to the Kremlin? More millions from China will replace the dead. And just there, in that callousness of Stalin and his gang toward human life, lies the answer to the question of Soviet ability to make a satellite of China.

In the early months of Soviet conquest, some progressive Chinese, weary of corruption and the lack of competent leadership, and many of the younger generation, attracted by Communist ideology, welcomed Communist rule. The arrival of increasing numbers of Soviet agents who exercise a firm hand in every area of life has brought disillusion.

The Chinese are already experiencing the second phase in the Soviet plan for China. And they will experience all the succeeding phases if the West does not wake up to what it will mean to the world if Moscow is left to get control of the Chinese as well as China.

The men in the Kremlin have a China policy of total conquest which they have followed from the very first, without deviation. It is high time the West took note of that sinister pattern.

Realization

Life fled before me: every spear of grain
Would beckon and I run, but life was gone,
To the next pasture placidly withdrawn.
I could not drink the wet and pelting rain
That I would run in, dancing, down the lane;
Though I would watch all night upon the lawn,
I never rose in time to clasp the dawn.
I could behold but I could not attain.
Always a glass, opaque to feeling, stood
Between me and the thrilling thing I would
Draw closely in as one draws in a breath—
Until you gave me in my cup your death.
Then I did drink; than I did taste. Then life
Came through to me and pierced me like a knife.

MAX EASTMAN

FEBRUARY 9, 1953 349
The Great Goethe's Great Error

By THADDEUS ASHBY

Goethe was a great individualist. For the most part, he defended freedom, praised the heroic in man, and hated the mob. Present-day individualists looking for a patron saint will might choose this mighty titan, but for one error he made. This error doesn't detract from his poetry, but it prevents me from accepting the thesis of a recent book of Karl Vittor's beautifully written "Goethe—The Thinker" (Harvard, $4), that Goethe is a profoundly original thinker. John Stuart Mill claimed to defend personal liberty, but justified liberty only if it served the good of society. Like Mill, Goethe champions freedom, then ties its practice irrevocably to other men. This is not original thinking; every social planner from Plato on has preached this. Mr. Julius Goebel, a student of both Plato and Goethe, argues that Goethe's Faust was profoundly influenced by the Greek grandaddy of all the collectivists. Mr. Vittor denies this, but his book hardly bears out the denial. For example: "Men will . . . realize that only mankind in the aggregate is the true human being." And: "Man desires to enjoy in all its fullness the existence granted to him. But . . . he can realize [this] only in community with others."

The road to hell is paved with ideas which didn't—perhaps couldn't. Of the key to Faust's salvation Goethe writes: "Whoever strives unceasingly, him we can redeem." Strives for what? The perfect socialist state? Roosevelt strove unceasingly; can we redeem him? The great thing about the burning incident is its prophetic adaptability to modern events. Is it farfetched to see in Roosevelt's dreams of New Deal planning a parallel to Faust's Utopia? Is it stretching a point to draw an analogy between the avowed goal of the TVA and Faust's project of reclaiming land by Imperial edict? Is it ridiculous to point to the infiltration of the Communists into New-Pair Deal government as the modern equivalent of Faust's hiring Mephisto to carry out his plans? Do you see a similarity between the WPA workers who gobbled up the idea that Charity is that Goethe is too fond of associating Imperial decrees with "free men working free land," a contradiction in terms. If the land remains eternally free by Imperial edict to any who comes along, nobody will work it, unless forced. Men who aren't free to acquire land aren't free at all. However, they are in Faust's dream. To achieve his illusion, he hires Mephisto as overseer and orders him: "Overseer, collect laborers, mass upon horde, pay, entice, press them by force. Every day I must have news of the progress of that ditch." Mephisto brings in a gang of Lemurs, fiends which are half dead and half alive. Watch out for them; they make a great noise of digging and draining; apparently they are digging Faust's Public Works Project. Actually they are digging his grave.

In Goethe's most heroic burst of poetry Faust realizes his highest will. "The highest of man is to make man and nature in the image of himself." But this starts trouble—there are other wills around. There's one plot of land that belongs to an aged couple named Philemon and Baucis—they don't want to be remade in Faust's image and refuse to sell their land to him. Faust offers them a new home on the reclaimed land, but they are happy where they are. Baucis likes her linden trees; they won't sell. Now note how the Public Planner's mind operates. Steeped in good intentions, rightly indignant at the old pair, hollering that they are impeding progress with their obstinacy, Faust orders Mephisto, "Go then, get them out of the way." When Faust hears that Mephisto has burned down their cottage, with them in it, he is sorry, of course. That was not what he intended. Husband, wife, guest, servant, home, and all their goods perished in the flames, but Progress can now march right ahead.

We well may take this as grave warning of the consequences of Eminent Domain. But Goethe had no such intention; he meant the event to show Faust's stature, to show that Faust is great enough to ignore the burdens of Care and Rue in his frantic desire to build. "It is the history, in little, of many a struggle between expanding powers and little communities bent on independence." Accept the doctrine, the Greatest Good for the Greatest Numbers; then you can quite cheerfully set fire to all the little communities bent on independence, liquidate all those reactionary egotists who babble about their sacred property and obstruct our downhill flight to Utopia.

No, Goethe did not intend the burning for a warning, though a warning it certainly is, for he wrote of this incident to Schiller: "In practical life man must always be constructive, and at bottom he has not to trouble himself about what can happen but only about what ought to happen." At bottom is right! The road to hell is paved with ideas which ought to have turned out right, but didn't—perhaps couldn't. Of the key to Faust's salvation Goethe writes: "Whoever strives unceasingly, him we can redeem." Strives for what? The perfect socialist state? Roosevelt strove unceasingly; can we redeem him? The great thing about the burning incident is its prophetic adaptability to modern events. Is it farfetched to see in Roosevelt's dreams of New Deal planning a parallel to Faust's Utopia? Is it stretching a point to draw an analogy between the avowed goal of the TVA and Faust's project of reclaiming land by Imperial edict? Is it ridiculous to point to the infiltration of the Communists into New-Pair Deal government as the modern equivalent of Faust's hiring Mephisto to carry out his plans? Do you see a similarity between the WPA workers who gobbled up the idea that Charity is
GBS and Mrs. Pat Campbell

Bernard Shaw and Mrs. Patrick Campbell: Their Correspondence, edited by Alan Dent. New York: Knopf. $5.00

Coyly posturing in four ladylike attitudes for the benefit of a stately alluring "Gibson" demimondaine—picture hat, long cakewalk skirt outlining a shapely leg, traditionally seductive bust, snakelike "boa," and a tall, fin de siècle umbrella in a gloved hand—George Bernard Shaw, belted, sportcoated, plus-fourné and, intentionally or not, with a suggestion of horns on his brow, is represented on the jacket of this book.

The now haughty, now irate demimondaine of the jacket is supposed to be the famous English actress, Mrs. Patrick Campbell.

I am certain that the gentleman-like GBS was never guilty of producing effeminate poses plastiques, or that the respectable Mrs. Beatrice Stella Patrick Campbell (by the first marriage) and Mrs. George Cornwallis West (by the second), sister-in-law of the Duchess of Westminster, and of such "good" London addresses as Kensington Square S.W. and Tedworth Square, Chelsea, could ever have been called a Gibson girl or une dame de chez Maxim's.

The only justification I can see for the naughty pictures on the jacket of the book is the commercial aim of making the work seem à la mode and "sexy," which, I am afraid, it is not. But my old-fashioned self can find no justification at all for the irreverence, putting it mildly, shown by the publication of such, taken as a whole, dull letters, often of poor taste, written by two artists of genius who gave joy and spiritual enlightenment to thousands and thousands of people with their work. To me, these letters give a wrong impression of the famous actress and neither "perpetuate the legend of Stella Campbell," as the preface to the book suggests, nor shed much "radiance" over the person of Shaw.

And, by the way, what does the backstage expression "legend-actress" really mean as applied to Mrs. Campbell? I should say that Mrs. Campbell was an actress who had done outstanding work but was "sent to Coventry"—or politely ostracized—because her original ideas and forms of expression were too dangerous for the traditionally minded majority of stage producers, actors, actresses, stage directors and playwrights, while she herself was too demanding, too outspoken, and not sufficiently "accommodating.

GBS himself was against the publication of these letters, though Mrs. Pat insisted; at last, having carefully edited them, he gave permission to have them made public after his and his wife's death. Being rather selfish and parsimonious, he would not help Mrs. Pat with money or jobs in times of her need, but thought of making a generous gesture towards the famous actress this way. When in 1940 Mrs. Pat died, the gesture went toward her grandchildren's education. I imagine that, vain as he was, Shaw also wanted to be posthumously taken for a kind of Don Giovanni.

GBS wore the masks of a nummer, a clown (Mrs. Pat called him "Joey" not without reason), a bragadocio, dancing dog and what not, so as to make the public swallow his "highbrow" stuff and his "shocking" social and political ideas—la sauce fait passer le poison, as the saying goes. In England, GBS became popular mostly on account of the sauce, and then only at about the age of sixty; on the Continent of Europe, mostly in Germany and Russia, his vogue started a little earlier, while the taste there had been more for the "highbrow" poison than for the clownish sauce. America followed Germany. In England, Shaw's literary popularity always seemed to me very much overweighted by that of a merry Andrew, a scandalmonger and a stunner; it was lacking in affectation, too. How could it be otherwise? He was a foreigner, an internationalist, living with a nation most conscious of its nationality. "A healthy nation," he wrote, "is as unconscious of its nationality as a healthy man of his bones." He showed no faith in England's beliefs, no pride or even respect for England's innermost feelings and, much more than H. G. Wells or John Galsworthy, he was harshly sarcastic of the English aspirations.

Besides, not being a poet, Shaw didn't live much with the beauties and mysteries of nature which are as akin to the soul of the English people as they were to that of Stella Campbell. "Is it just your adoration for plain facts that makes you so indifferent to all poetry, the universal truths and beauty that live behind and beyond?" Mrs. Campbell wrote to Shaw in 1913. No surprise, then, that the most successful of Shaw's plays on the other side of the Channel were the good psychological comedy but poor piece of propaganda, "Pygmalion," and the musical comedy sans musique, "Caesar and Cleopatra."
The fact that Shaw's popularity with the English public was boosted and exaggerated by the press and fostered by his own continuous clowning became obvious after his death. All of a sudden, with the relaxation of the press hullabaloo, the pendulum has swung against him. To put one of his plays on in England at the present time means to lose money; less than one thousand pounds has been contributed to Shaw's memorial fund of £250,000 during a whole year, while the sum of £500,000 necessary for the memorial of King George V, loved dearly by his people, was raised in a few days. In New York recently, to make the public purchase tickets for a comparatively short run of one of Shaw's new plays, it was, as it seems, necessary to produce it at a tempo prestissimo, making the dialogue unintelligible, and to jaz it up with the acrobatic exertions of a much advertised dramatic actress.

In his "love" letters to "Stella," old "Joey" was on his hind legs most of the time. He wrote to Ellen Terry, another famous actress with whom he also was "in love," though only by correspondence: "I went to her [Mrs. Campbell's] house [in the summer of 1913] to discuss business with her, as hard as nails, and fell head over ears in love with her in thirty seconds." But, reading GBS's love letters which followed that visit, we don't think of him as of a lover, but rather—may Mr. Shaw's spirit forgive me—as of a verbose, selfish, clowning and not too pleasant philanderer. "I tell you, my good woman," he wrote to Stella, "that if you expect to find any romantic nonsense about me, you are greatly mistaken."

Mrs. Patrick Campbell at the time of their first meeting was a widow of over forty, mother of two grown-up children, and engaged to George Cornwallis West, whom she married two years later. With her fine feminine instinct she grasped "Joey's" true feelings straightaway. "You didn't really think that I believed you came to see me because you were interested in me. I knew it was Eliza [the part in 'Pygmalion'], and I was delighted that you should be so businesslike in such a bewildering, charming way," she wrote on November 14, 1912. And four days later: "I haven't said kiss me because life is too short for the kiss my heart calls for. . . . If you give me one kiss and you can only kiss me if I say kiss me and I will never say kiss me because I am a respectable widow and I would not let any man kiss me unless I was sure of a wedding ring." While in her book, "My Life and Some Letters," published in 1922, she said: "I had been brought up to believe that woman is the Mother of Goodness, so that immorality in a woman is the worst that could happen." In the same year she wrote to GBS:

You know you always thought me a fool, and that never did I think your love-making other than what it was—sympathy, kindness and the wit and folly of genius. . . . I have never said you were in love with me, for the good reason that I never believed you were. In love with making a fool of me, yes. I was attached to what has turned out a very ordinary individual.

She became attached to Shaw after a serious taxicab accident which almost crippled her for life. "I missed the end by a hair's breadths." She thought that GBS "understood the nerve-rack of her illness. He made a dream world for me. Only those who can understand this can understand the friendship he gave me by my sick bed, the foolish, ridiculous letters he wrote me, and his pretense of being in love with me." Her nervous tension was really terrific. It made her feel acute loneliness; she became conscious of her solitude in theatrical circles where she was already disliked as a "difficult" person and not understood; it made her fear for her financial future.

Most unfortunately for Stella Campbell, as a person born in England and who had to work in England, she was not English either in land and who had to work in England, she was not English either in appearance. From her Italian mother, Maria Luigia Giovanna Romanini, a beautiful Catholic lady of delicate health, she inherited warm, luxurious beauty and a tendency to live in dreams. Writing to her uncle and friend when she was young and at the height of her fame, Stella Campbell said: "I never saw people and things as they were. . . . I lived in dreams. . . . Now I see, now I know, and I think the knowledge has nearly finished me." When only 31, she felt finished:

The fog of stage life was not in my blood; an untidy dressing room, a dresser who called me "my dear," smell of beer and scratched with a hook down my back until she happened to come across the eye, wore me out. Oddly enough, I have never been known to weep at rehearsals, however heartbroken and weary I have been.

What had she to do with the London West End or Broadway stages of the period, she who "wanted nothing to interfere with the fundamental atmosphere of beauty, simplicity and truth?" She who had a sensitive, romantic and witty mind, fine musical talent, advanced artistic taste, an impetuous temperament—"she is not a baby, she is a tiger," her nurse used to say—and a tragic lack of reserve.

Without doubt, Mrs. Patrick Campbell was one of the great actresses of her time. She was a performer of the new theater, belonging to the group of such revolutionary actors and actresses as Agnes Sorma, Eleanor Duse, Vera Komisarjevsky, and a few others. All her stage characters had a soul, they were simple, unpretentious, a "little off the earth" without being either morbid or depressed and in revolt against a narrow society and sham morals; the declamatory style, exaggerated gestures, rhodomontades in any form were "ridiculous" to her. Like the other revolutionary actresses of the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, she perceived the eternal truth and beauty which dwell on the enchanted shores beyond the immediate reality. Maurice Maeterlinck, the leader of the Symbolists, wrote to her: "You have taught me that one need never be afraid of dreaming dreams of too great a beauty. . . . you can render them visible and real."

No wonder that, since the first appearance of Mrs. Campbell on the boards, when she yet acted without experience, often overcome by fatigue because of her delicate health, she felt "isolated" in the rather commonplace and hostile theatrical world of the time. "Life was hideously difficult. . . . I used to feel angry and on the defensive—savage that I was."
Consequently, she had to meet more and more directors and authors who insisted on imposing on the interpreters every piece of characterization, every inflection; and more and more mistrustful, callous and commercial managers, more selfish, noncommittally smiling, hypocritical, snobbish actors who wanted to be thought ladies and gentlemen and who were not in the habit of thinking before speaking on the stage, actors who looked into the audience while talking or listening to their partners or were ignoring their partners altogether, who would not start rehearsals sitting around a table to understand the play's idea, the characters and their relations to each other, as Mrs. Pat wanted them to do, who were "overacting dreadfully," and, of course, intriguing and criticizing each other wickedly on the sly. Finally, Mrs. Pat, provoked to drop the last efforts of restraint, became known as a "difficult, impossible" actress, which meant taboo in the casting offices in London. Besides, when 66 years of age, she could not yet realize—and no one helped her to do so—that she was "an old lady who had arrived at Heavies, Matrons, etc.," that the times of Paula Tanqueray, of Melisande and Eliza were over and the interest of commercial managers in her was over, too.

I am afraid I can not agree with the late James Agate that the "world was for twenty years at her feet" and that "she kicked it away." An artist of the stage creates from the depth of his soul and is like a hothouse plant; he needs to be coddled and petted, trusted and loved; only in a suitable atmosphere does he thrive. The history of the good theater tells us all that. The atmosphere of the London West End theaters was unsuitable not only to the sensitive soul of Stella Campbell, but to such weather-beaten theatrical leaders as Harley Granville Barker and Gordon Craig. Stella Campbell at the age of 70 had to "walk on" in Hollywood films for a miserable pittance, while the "great" Barker and "immenso" Craig had to exile themselves from England, the first happy enough to possess a loving and wealthy wife, and the second, a few Maecenases to keep him alive.

When I met the unpopular Mrs. Campbell, already known not as a fine actress but as an "interesting personality," for the first time privately at a lunch in Arnold Bennett's house in 1927, as described in the reviewed book, I said very little mainly because I was truly terrified. I had heard so many terrible stories circulated about the lady's behavior at rehearsals, etc., that I was apprehensive of trying to work with her.

Naturally, having studied her biography, I now very much regret to have missed a stimulating opportunity of working with a great English actress of my times. After all, I had a good lesson and some good fun in my heyday rehearsing a stage star of the first magnitude after he had thrown a chair over the footlights at me.

THEODORE KOMISARJEVSKY

China Terror

No Secret Is Safe Behind the Bamboo Curtain, by Father Mark Tennien of Maryknoll. New York: Farrar, Straus & Young. $3.50

The Maryknoll missionaries are by all accounts a remarkable order of men: able, brave, devoted, and versatile, too. A good exemplar is Father Mark Tennien, a Vermont farmer's son who has spent most of the past three decades with the Maryknollers in South China. "No Secret Is Safe" tells a good deal more than the particular story of one Catholic mission suppressed by Mao Tse-tung's communists, or the personal ordeal of one priest who suffered and endured for his faith. Somehow, Father Tennien managed amid all his immediate woes to look about him with clinical observation. This Maryknoller could see and hear the goings-on in the commandoed chapel below, where the masses were herded for the ceremonies of land reform. What Father Tennien saw and heard should be most instructive for any who might still believe there is humanitarian virtue in the Red reformers. About a year after taking power, after disarming all villagers, drafting a peasant militia and reindoctrinating the schools, the Communists started the land program. It went on for weeks, under a fanatic team of officials. The redistribution of land was incidental to a bigger project: to dragoon the population into the Communist way of life.

During the reform, the jailers were packed with all possible objects, travel was strictly banned (lest anyone hide self or goods), public meetings went on incessantly for rehearsing grievances against the landlords, and the assemblies were toned up with group singing and dancing as well as exhortation. In public, everyone told how much he owned, and everyone was classified accordingly. Landlords were those who lived on rents from their fields. Wealthy farmers were those who sowed more than 60 pounds of seed.
rice yearly (which will produce enough rice for two persons living skimpily). Roped, paraded through the villages, mocked and reviled, the better-off minority became victims of the people's courts, those bestial spectacles whereby the Communists force the masses to share in pilage and bloodletting. But the new landowners were not allowed to rest easy. Taxes grew crushing. Bureaucrats burgeoned. The changeover, at least in its disruptive beginning, often brought on famine. The land holdings were subject to periodic review, and the terror that gave could also take away.

Father Tennien leans over backward to find "in fairness" what benefits the Communists brought to the tortured nation. He is impressed by order and discipline among soldiers, by lack of graft among officials—a "righteousness" achieved mostly through fear of ruthless punishment. But the more he adds and subtracts, the less the Red benefits appear: every discipline is bent toward building up "a race of fanatics, convinced that their mission is to liberate the rest of the enslaved world from imperialism and capitalism." Those who don't go along are eliminated.

Father Tennien estimates that no less than 7,000,000 Chinese died in the purges of 1951's first six months.

Another important communicating tool is brainwashing. Of course, the drive to reshape people's minds underlies every act of the Red masters, from land reform to the midnight knock of the police. But Father Tennien, during his months in a Communist jail, directly subjected to the pressure of special prison indoctrination and grueling interrogation, reached the conclusion that the Chinese Reds have refined "mental cruelty" to a science. "Repetition, nagging, prodding and threatening... ceaselessly applied to everyone... like bell vibrations that never cease ringing in a man's head... reducing a man's mind to something less than human. The dehumanized person is then ready for machine thinking and acting without sentiment, courtesy or charity." The case histories Father Tennien cites, including his own experiences, make graphic reading: and the breakdown of the mentally tortured is not a pretty thing to observe for those who believe in life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Among the "sad deaths" related by Father Tennien is that of Dr. William Wallace, the gentle Tennessee surgeon who headed the Southern Baptist hospital in Wuchow; he was pilloried and driven out of his mind by charges that he was a master spy.

Reading Father Tennien's report, one thinks back again to those State Department reports of the early 1940s, and how they praised the progressive reformers and so-called Communists under Mao Tse-tung. The misjudgments begun then have cost us—and our Chinese friends—clearly. The casualty lists from Korea tell us what we are paying. Father Tennien's documentary gives part of the terrible cost to China, and to freedom, which is supposed to be everyone's business.

FREDERICK GRUIN

General Grant

"Though Grant is the central character, all operations [in the West up to mid-July, 1862] are considered, in order to reveal the characteristics of other Federal commanders as well as opposing generals, and to give events their proper setting."

Thus Mr. Williams, on the scope of his book. This lay reviewer is no military specialist. His interest is in the "central character"—an interest awakened in boyhood as he listened to the Civil War tales of an uncle who served as an Illinoisan and upright character. It took a Lincoln's insight to find him, and a Mark Twain, with similar experience in misfortune, to pull him out of his embarrassments in his latter days.

A layman is incompetent to pass upon the details of Grant's generalship; but the net impression derivable from the verdict of history is plain enough. Grant had the largeness of mind to see a military problem plain; he knew that if the Confederacy could be cut in two along the line of the Mississippi River, it must shiver and die. At last, after much tribulation, Lincoln found his large-minded General, and lived long enough to see his insight vindicated. The two simple and large-hearted men instinctively dove-
talled together, in their essential and high qualities of character, in the working out of this nation's destiny. If Washington was the father of his country, Lincoln was its savior; and Grant was Lincoln's able, adequate, understanding and upright colleague.

The volumes on Grant are alike in their cumulativeness of impression as regards his quality. They are full of detail beyond the capacity of a layman's judgment; but the revelation of the General's professional ability, especially of his insight, perspective and alertness of action, keep piling up page after page—as they evidently did, in fact after act, with Lincoln and Sherman. There was nothing petty about Grant, from his quiet acceptance of lesser men's promotions over himself to the magnanimity of his terms to the deeply appreciative Lee. And his final efforts, in the very presence of death, were truly heroic. The cumulative evidence of his "Memoirs" reveals him, as Tennyson sings of the Iron Duke: "In his simplicity sublime." Nothing can be so convincing as the cumulative evidence of quietly recorded, unadorned facts of personal experience. —A. G. Keller

McLiberal's McCarthy

McCarthy: The Man, the Senator, the "Ism," by Jack Anderson and Ronald W. May. Boston: Beacon. $3.75

There is no point in concealing the fact that this long book about Joe McCarthy is first-rate entertainment. Asked how he liked a boisterous and choleric political speech which he had just heard, Lincoln replied, "If you like that sort of thing, that's about the sort of thing you'd like." Most of us (certainly I) like "that sort of thing" every now and again if it's well handled, and Messrs. Anderson and May handle it well. Why shouldn't they? May once apprenticed, and Anderson continues to work for the Grand Schem of "that sort of thing." Mr. Drew Pearson. And Mr. Pearson didn't win a nation-wide audience by relying on sobriety, objectivity, or a prudish degree of probity. Nor will his students. Still, it's fun to listen to Pearson, as it is fun to read his protegés' book—which is well-written, dramatic, exhaustive, alternately kithenish and stientorian, and always single-purposed: McCarthy is a liar, a demagogue, a gambler, a cheat, a hypocrite, a totalitarian, an exhibitionist and, although a Catholic, sometimes carnivorous on Fridays. McCarthy's detractors are vigilantes of democracy and freedom, and his defenders are pathological hatemongers and inchoate Fascists. That's all there is to it.

To be this conclusive about McCarthy requires the acceptance of certain propositions, and this comes easily to the authors. It must, for example, be supposed that by February 9, 1950, when McCarthy let loose for the first time in Wheeling, West Virginia, the issue of communism in government had evaporated, because there were no longer Communists or security risks in town. Thus the authors' assertion that by that time, "... real, live Communists in government were hard to find." Moreover, "... of all the government departments, probably the most security-conscious had been the State Department." (Contrast these propositions with the minutes of a meeting of the Civil Service Loyalty Review Board late in 1951, not mentioned in this book, which reveal the complaint by one member that "... the [members of] the State Department... are taking the attitude that they are there to clear the employees and not to protect the Government. We have been arguing with them since the program started." Another added, "It seems to me we assume some responsibility when we know that the country rests [with the] false sense of security that we are looking after their interests here, when we know darn well that [the loyalty program] is completely ineffective in one of the most important departments of the Government" (yes, the State Department).

In line with their postulate that Joe McCarthy or anyone else looking for loyalty risks in the State Department in 1950 and thereafter is nothing more than a witch-hunter, the authors defend William T. Stone, John Carter Vincent, Edward Posniak, John S. Service, Stephen and Esther Brunauer and others, and make no mention of Oliver Clubb, Robert T. Miller, Daniel Graze, David Zablowdowski, or a score of others who have worked for or been protected by the State Department even in the face of highly dubious and in some cases indisputably incriminating evidence against them.

Nor do the authors note that three individuals who worked for the State Department at the time McCarthy made his charges have since been found against on loyalty grounds by the State Department's own, maturing Board; or that 25-odd have been condemned on security grounds (most of these on ideological rather than moral grounds); or that 57 have since resigned before their investigations were completed; or that (as of May, 1952) 57 employees who have been with the State Department for over five years are still being investigated on loyalty and security grounds!

It is of course impossible, in a short or even a long review, to point out the errors in fact and interpretation that crowd this book. While the volume has the air of being "documented," in fact it is not. There are no footnotes, no listed book or page sources of any sort. Mr. Richard Rovere once wrote something useful, which the authors of this book reprint as pertinent to McCarthy, and which I am glad to reprint in turn as most particularly appropriate to their own book:

The "multiple untruth" need not be a particularly large untruth, but can be instead a long series of loosely related untruths, or a single untruth with many facets. In either case, the whole is composed of so many parts that anyone wishing to set the record straight will discover that it is utterly impossible to keep all the elements of the falsehood in mind at the same time. Anyone making the attempt may seize upon a few selected statements and show them to be false, but doing this may leave the impression that only the statements selected are false and the rest true.

The techniques that Messrs. Anderson and May use follow the con-

1The authors satisfy themselves with frequent references to dates and various magazine and newspaper editorials, and with the assurance, written on the jacket flap, that the book has been "rigorously checked for factual accuracy." In spite of this vigorous check, the publishers evidently anticipate an avalanche of mail indicat-
sistent anti-McCarthy pattern. Over half the chapters in the book are devoted to McCarthy's pre-Communist-hunting career. They are there to convince us that McCarthy has always been palpably dishonest and irresponsible (“the lowest mark he ever scored [in law school],” the authors gloat, “was in legal ethics”); and the same old repertory of anti-McCarthy incidents, widely circulated since McCarthy opened up on the State Department, are related—in greater detail than I, at least, have ever seen them treated. There’s the campaign for circuit judge, the Quaker Dairy Case, the “quickie” divorces, the military career, the La Follette campaign, the Malmedy and housing issues, and the rest of it—all of them pointing up McCarthy’s mental and moral disabilities, so clear to the authors and the cosmopolitan press, while so perversely obscure to the benighted citizens of Wisconsin.

It is important, when speaking definitely about McCarthy’s rascality, to dispose of those people and organizations who believe McCarthy’s activities have been, at the margin, healthy and important. Thus, George Sokolsky is a “self-styled China ‘expert’.”1 The authors gleefully point out that in the dedication of his book, “Tinder Box in Asia,” Mr. Sokolsky once expressed his “deepest gratitude” to Frederick Vanderbilt Field, and they suggest that by this token McCarthy could, consistently, charge him with pro-communism. The authors fail to point out that the book was published in 1932, when Field was a Norman Thomas Socialist. They also fail to point out that Sokolsky began to blast Field in the middle thirties, when Field swung over to the Communists.

Westbrook Pegler is quoted (correctly) as saying, “I am not interested in democracy, except to oppose it.” The authors do not bother to make the distinction between democracy and republicanism, the latter of which Mr. Pegler and the Founding Fathers ardently support. Dr. J. B. Matthews is, simply, a “Hearst super-sleuth and McCarthy informant.”

The authors borrow from Alan Barth to describe Senator McCarran as the “grand inquisitor and lord high executioner in charge of the extirpation of heresy.” And, by way of a final judgment: “McCarran, like McCarthy, appear[s] to be more concerned with dissipating time and money to create one-day headlines than with building a world healthy enough, spiritually and materially, to withstand the pressures of totalitarianism.”

The Freeman is described—you guessed it!—as “an ultra-conservative magazine, financed in part by China Lobbyist Alfred Kohlberg.”

No one who has ever supported any of McCarthy’s charges escapes similar treatment. It is puzzling just what sort of evidence against Communists and fellow-travelers is deemed legitimate. Not, apparently, the testimony of Red apostates, which is nothing but “hearsay testimony from professional ex-Communists.” Worse still: “... as for the mischievous testimony of the repentant Communists, those perennial witnesses demonstrated a remarkable facility for remembering more details as the years went on and the publicity rewards increased.” The authors don’t specify whether they refer to Mr. Budenz, Mr. Barline, Mr. Bogolepov, or whom.

The crisis of our time, and McCarthy’s part in it, is painted in rigid blacks and whites in this book. Only the case of Owen Lattimore represents a thorny hurdle for the authors. Certain concessions are made to the findings of the McCarran Committee, although Messrs. Anderson and May conclude their examination of Lattimore in a tone of suspenseful detachment: “... the nation wait[s] for the results of the Justice Department investigation.”

The reason the Lattimore incident is especially disturbing to Messrs. Anderson and May is that when Lattimore’s name was first released publicly, in connection with the Tydings Hearings, it was by their idol and patron, Mr. Drew Pearson,—who said, on a nation-wide broadcast, “Now, I know Owen Lattimore. He is a great patriot. I only wish we had more Americans like him.”

No doubt he does, and no doubt McCarthy doesn’t, which goes a long way to explain the differences between the two.

WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR.

A Satirical Moravia

The Fancy Dress Party, by Alberto Moravia. Translated by Angus Davidson. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Young. $3.00

Originally published in 1941, the present work has a flavor and an impact somewhat different from the other items of the Moravian production. For one thing the background is not the usual snob suburb of Rome but an imaginary South American republic, and consequently, in intent at least, fantasy replaces research. The characters, it must be admitted, show something of the ethical nihilism of many of the author’s earlier creations: the Dictator is lustful and cynical, the young men are egocentric, the women predatory and calculating. And the plot displays the Moravian virtuosity in this branch of the narrator’s art.

Still there is a difference and a more significant one than the simple background, though that may well symbolize it. It is a difference largely in tone and emphasis; Moravia is always in his own way a moralist but here he is clearly a satirist. Furthermore, paradoxical as it may seem, with increasing sharpness of satirical commentary there emerges also a somewhat less unremitting attitude of distaste for the poor creatures who play their parts in the game (here “Masquerade,” the title in the original, supplies a better clue than the title in translation). Even the Dictator is not entirely evil—though he was in 1941 sufficiently disquieting to the Fascist regime to cause the suppression of the book. Perhaps the more sympathetic tone is a product of the remoteness from the actual as evidenced in the setting and perhaps it is a mark of the author’s maturity, but in any case it is perceptible, I think, through all the pitiless depiction of human folly and obsession. From the point of view of enjoyable reading the book is first rate.

THOMAS G. BERGIN
“Liberal” in Politics

Hemlock and After, by Angus Wilson. New York: Viking. $3.00

Like the word “modern,” the word “liberal” has become so saturated with the attitudes, risks and losses of a particular generation that for at least the next few decades only innocents will be able to use it without quotation marks or a certain tone of voice. Its heartier, pretwentieth century connotation of a generous, open, ranging mind has been lost. What we now mean by the “liberal” is the man who confuses the subjective sincerity of his feelings with the objective value of his acts. He wears his heart, not on his sleeve, but across his eyes, and what moves him most is the sense of his own honesty. He can never understand that political action is public, and requires more of a man than mere sincerity of sentiment which, in private relationships, may be sufficient. The “liberal’s” epitome, if not his parody, was Henry Wallace, but unlike Wallace, the “liberal” is not in eclipse. For this, if no other reason, Angus Wilson’s first novel ought to be widely read and reflected on, since it amounts to as incisive (yet never merely belittling and exasperated) a probing of the “liberal” psychology as I have seen to date.

Appropriately, the hero of “Hemlock and After” is not a professional politician (after all, only a small minority of real “liberals” ever are, Wallace himself being a poultry specialist by vocation). Instead, Bernard Sands is a novelist, a Grand Old Man of British Letters who has arrived at his distinguished seniority with an only moderately self-deceived image of himself as shrewdly benevolent, worldly, ironic, and unguilable. He might have preserved this status, had he either restricted himself to writing novels, or, when tempted into political action, exacted of himself the disciplined behavior it demands. But because he is “liberal”—that is, more absorbed with his feelings than with the objects of them—he fails to do either.

His political action is modest, disinterested and relatively unfatuous. He is not at all the sort of fool to lend his name to the Communist “peace rallies” he is baited with. All he has worked for (and worked ardent is) a government-endowed country house where young writers can have a chance to begin their careers without commercial obligations. After years of conniving, he gets what he wants. His public action is about to be successful. But then an incident in his private life, which is quite irrelevant to his project, faces him with the fact that, like most humans, he is more of a hypocrite than he had assumed. And it is just at this point that his behavior becomes most characteristically “liberal.” For what is centipetal to the “liberal” psychology (and what makes it more dangerous and despicable to the true Communist than communism’s frankest enemies) is its enormous degree of self-absorption. As Sands’ private guilt overwhelms him, he identifies it with his motives in promoting his public project. Further, he can not shut up or be discreet about it. He must indulge himself in a public confession. COURAGEOUSLY, Hubly, yet with utter selfishness, he makes the inauguration of his writers’ colony an occasion to declare his own unreason of everything he has stood for. As a result, his friends are confused, his enemies elated, and his project itself seriously compromised. We are weak, he concludes, not only wishing to justify himself with the most self-loving half-truth a man can utter but doing so in a public context where his private suffering has no place, and can only bring unnecessary jeopardy.

As a novel, “Hemlock and After” has one further, and not unrelated, aspect of interest. In dramatizing his subject, Angus Wilson has drawn upon that underground world of homosexuality which seems to bloom most colorfully in the climate of the theater and the literary arts, and in doing so, he has evoked its anxiety and terrible loneliness more truly than any serious English novelist before him. Considering his deliberate ambitions in this respect, I found myself wondering if the 1950s might not see the appearance of a whole genre of novels, comparable to the “sociological novels” of the 1930s, which, instead of exploring and rationalizing the relation of the “liberal” highbrow to the masses, will be doing the same thing for the analogous relation of the hidden homosexual to the bourgeoisie. The “liberal” psychology of self-absorption, with both its temptations and iniquity for public action, are common to both.

Grand Cham’s Mother

Mr. Oddity: Samuel Johnson, LL.D., by Charles Norman. Drexel Hill: Bell Publishing Co. $4.00

This brilliant sketch of Johnson has been mishandled by several reviewers. Some accused Norman of trying to outdo Boswell—and failing. This completely misreads a witty and informative book, which uses information not available to Boswell, and otherwise fills in chinks overlooked in the life of a complex man.

If only for its material on the curious relationship between Johnson and his mother, “Mr. Oddity” would be an important book on a great figure. On this point Boswell wrote merely one innocuous paragraph. The plain facts differ from Boswell’s gloss. For during nineteen years in London, Johnson never went to see his mother, though he was only two days’ journey away from her. Why? He helped her when he could; he wrote dutifully. But Norman shows that Johnson, either consciously or unconsciously, blamed his mother for imbuing him as a small child with fear of eternal damnation. This fear never left this learned man. After his mother’s death Johnson visited his home town of Lichfield yearly.

In quite different episodes, Norman describes Johnson editing the “Rambler” and “Idler,” writing the “Lives of the Poets,” dining with Sir Joshua Reynolds, and telling of his talk with the King. Also of his association with Hannah More and other bluestockings, and his pathetic break, after years of friendship, with the widowed Mrs. Thrale. The wit of Johnson was pungent, but the moralist always prevailed. All is artfully arranged and told with style. The book even has an index.

EDWIN CLARK

FEBRUARY 9, 1953
...to the strength and freedom of STEEL

To the steel production that is so vital to peace and security... To the high standards that enable our nation's factories to produce more and better products made of steel... To the principles of free competitive enterprise that permit the steel industry to grow with the needs of our people... To the concept of government that upholds the rights of all people to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness... we pledge our loyal support.

JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORPORATION
PITTSBURGH 30, PA.

**MAY 1863**—Nothing but sagebrush, hostile Indians and some marvelously cool and sparkling mineral springs beside which General Connor laid out a settlement for his soldiers and the wagon train of eighty families.

**TODAY**—A giant Monsanto Phosphate Division plant, dominated by the largest electric furnace ever built, turning out elemental phosphorus from which come phosphoric acid and the phosphates that go into thousands of products for the home and industry.

Already the largest producer of elemental phosphorus in the world, Monsanto’s Phosphate Division widens its service to industry still further with this big new plant. In addition to the huge multi-furnace battery long in operation at Monsanto, Tennessee, still more furnaces are to be built at Soda Springs.

On that May day in 1863, General Connor saw only some springs that would assure a steady water supply, even though tangy with mineral content. Coming back today, he would find a bustling 20th century community ... realizing richly on the chemical promise the springs foretold ... supplying a basic chemical that serves all mankind.

Monsanto Chemical Company, Phosphate Division, 1700 South Second Street, St. Louis 4, Missouri. Monsanto Canada Limited, Montreal, Vancouver.
YOUR SAFETY IS A FIRST AND THIS IS WHY

There are engineering reasons for every benefit your new Chrysler Corporation car offers you.

EVEN BEFORE you turn the starter key, you sense the strength built into every new Plymouth, Dodge, DeSoto and Chrysler. The tight, firm way the doors latch hints that here is a body-and-frame structure ruggedly safe throughout. You notice, too, the wide, full-circle view through the smart new curved one-piece windshield and added window space all around. And on Comfort-Level seats, you sit naturally erect, better able to see the road all around you.

THERE ARE REASONS. Chrysler Corporation engineers manhandle every inch of a car's body and frame. They jolt it, strain it, literally try to twist it apart. Every component of the body is checked for endurance—the locks, hinges, springs, window regulators, even the fabrics. Then the car is subjected to thousands of severe road-test miles. When our cars shrug off this kind of punishment, we know they’re ready to guard the safety of your family.

UNDER WAY, you control your car with complete confidence. All your stops are smooth with Chrysler-engineered Safe-Guard Hydraulic Brakes. In case of a blowout, exclusive Safety-Rim Wheels hold the deflated tire firmly, let you make a safe, controlled stop. A new method of “springing” helps give you a sure, steady ride even on the worst roads. And in rain, the constant-speed electric windshield wiper keeps your vision clear at all times.

THERE ARE REASONS. Putting on the brakes a thousand times a day with a test dynamometer is one way Chrysler Corporation engineers make certain your brakes will stop your car safely and surely every time. Tests like this helped develop Cyclebond brake linings, with almost twice as much useful lining life as ordinary linings. Exclusive Safe-Guard Hydraulic Brakes furnish quick stopping power through six cylinders instead of the usual four.

Back of every development that makes your Chrysler Corporation car so safe to drive are the talent and experience of engineers, scientists and technicians with the one aim—to produce fine cars of superior worth. CHRYSLER CORPORATION engineers and builds Plymouth, Dodge, DeSoto, Chrysler Cars & Dodge Trucks.