Ambivalence, Ambiguity, and Contradiction: Garrisonian Abolitionists and Nonviolence*

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Historian Alice Felt Tyler once used the expression "Freedom's Ferment" to characterize the antebellum period in American history.1 It was an apt phrase referring to the multitude of reform movements, religious enthusiasms, and social experiments which transformed American culture in fundamentally important ways. The modern abolitionist movement emerged out of this cauldron of ferment—a movement which called for immediate repentance from the sin of slavery, and denounced the South's peculiar institution in thunderous, vituperative terms. The abolitionists' rhetoric called down upon their heads mobs in the North and threats of reprisal in the South and ultimately of secession if slavery was not granted absolute security by the North. But northern abolitionists were not only courageous but unrelenting in condemning slavery as sin and calling for the elevation of black people to an intellectual, moral, and political equality with whites.

In essence the sin of slavery was not simply the brutalization and exploitation of one human being by another. It also stemmed from the fact that enslavement prevented black people from being "free moral agents." As the constitution of the Lane Seminary Antislavery Society phrased it, God created the black man as "a moral agent, the keeper of his own happiness, the executive of his own powers, the accountable arbiter of his own choice." Slavery "stifle[d] the moral affections, repress[ed] the innate longings of the spirit, paralyze[d] conscience, turn[ed] hope to despair and kill[ed] the soul."2 But if most early immediate abolitionists advocated the use of moral suasion to bring about the repentance of slaveholders, they nevertheless warned that if slaveholders did not take heed by

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voluntarily emancipating their slaves, an angry God would visit his wrath on a sinful nation—the end result of which would be violence, bloodshed, and civil war. As the constitution of Lane's Antislavery Society warned, slavery "aroused feelings of desperation and revenge, provoke[d] insurrection and periled public safety." It "fomented division and alienation in our public councils and put in jeopardy the existence of the union," and it paralyzed "all missionary effort" and "expose[d] the nation to the awful judgment of God."  

In sum, there was a degree of ambiguity or ambivalence in the commitment of many abolitionists to nonviolence from the outset. Even so, it is clear that the principles of nonviolence were still the dominant abolitionist credo in the 1830's and early 1840's. But between the Mexican War of 1846-1848 and the secession of the South in the winter of 1860-1861, pacifism declined in importance, and the call for a holy war against the evil of slavery increased in some abolitionist circles. One of our major tasks here, therefore, is to explain in comprehensive terms why nonviolent principles gradually lost ground to the idea of waging a jihad against sin.

Before attempting that, however, we should first examine the nature of the abolitionist commitment to moral suasion and pacifism, particularly that of the Garrisonian or "ultra" wing of the abolitionist movement. The Garrisonians, unlike other abolitionists after 1837, not only attacked the institution of slavery but challenged the legitimacy of all human institutions, including civil government. In order to understand what is known as Garrisonian nonresistance, we must analyze the implications of the work of historian Lewis Perry. His book Radical Abolitionism and his recent biography of the Garrisonian abolitionist Henry Clarke Wright provide the most detailed, perceptive, and complex analyses of Garrisonian thought yet to reach print.  

Perry does not believe that:

there was an anarchistic wing—that is, a few identifiable anarchists—in the antislavery movement. I would argue that certain of the most basic ideas honored throughout abolitionism turned out in experience to have anarchistic implications. . . . Besides attacking violence, institutional religion, and human government, they occasionally tried to establish new, noncoercive styles in human relationships. This quest led them to departures in religion, community life, marriage, spiritualism, and even political parties. But the quest was so varied and inconsistent that it would be difficult to define an anarchistic wing of abolitionism. We are on safer ground, I think, in taking note of the importance of the problem of authority in antislavery ideology and then in recognizing a wide range of attempted solutions to that problem in the lives of abolitionists.  

First of all, what does Perry mean by anarchy? It is, as he admits, a highly ambiguous term, one that ordinarily has been vilified as a philosophy of disorder leading to violence, pandemonium, and license. But as perceived by Proudhon, the French social thinker, by Tolstoy, and, indeed, by some American antislavery radicals, anarchy was the secret of order, not chaos. Proudhon, a contemporary of
American abolitionists, did not influence them in any way. But Perry compares Proudhon's ideas with those of American nonresistance and discovers many valid parallels. Proudhon's thought contained three basic premises: (1) that the coerciveness and violence of government indicate that it is evil; (2) that law is offensive; and (3) that government is unnecessary to produce a harmonious and just society. While there is no necessity to apply the phrase "unequivocal anarchism" in a Proudhonian sense to the Garrisonian nonresistance, definite affinities in outlook do exist. As Perry phrases it: "Some abolitionists had come to believe that the Biblical injunctions against violence meant that Christians had to renounce all manifestations of force, including human government; this is the belief we call nonresistance."

While such a view contains anarchistic overtones, Garrisonian nonresistants resented the charges of "no-governmentism" attributed to them, and "insisted that they were striving for, and placing themselves under the only true and effective government, the government of God. They maintained that they opposed not government, but human pretensions to govern." By becoming regenerate, men would become free of ordinary shackles and restraints and develop noncoercive, spontaneous, voluntary relationships that not only would lead to harmony, but would usher in the millennium, the kingdom of God on earth. As Perry concludes, "With their minds set on the government of God it was possible for abolitionists to seek an end to slavery, to call for governments of perfect moral purity or to say . . . that human government was no more necessary than sin."

There is, however, still another aspect of nonresistant anarchism that needs to be stressed — the potential for internalized "social control." Henry Clarke Wright, the chief theoretician of nonresistance, argued (in Perry's words) that "if one is owned by God and therefore free of usurped coercive authorities — controls are internalized." As Wright phrased it, "The action of each human body must be controlled by a power within it — or by a power without it — by an Interior or by an Exterior power." The potential for individual self-control was not appreciated by contemporary opponents who viewed the extreme libertarianism of nonresistance as dangerously disruptive to social stability because of its strong indictment of institutions such as civil government. Although Wright was a "belligerent nonresistant, a combative, divisive figure," he also urged "mankind to be calm and harmonious." In Wright's view, nonresistance was more than a pacifist doctrine. He was self-conscious enough to realize that "it was a form of restraint as well as a form of expression: it represented his own victory over murderous feelings" which empowered him through professions of pacifism and love "to show the blood on his brother's hand and prove his own innocence." In contrast to some anarchists and pacifists, Wright did not view human nature as benign. As Wright explained, "combativeness and destructiveness are essential parts of our nature, that our guilt lies not in the possession, but in the abuse of these propensities; and they are to be regulated and not destroyed." The key was to seek "vengeance" not against individuals, but rather against principles and institutions that were corrupt.
Perry analyzes a variety of manifestations of anarchism or anarchistic tendencies within the American antislavery movement: come-outers, the Hopedale Community, the New England Non-Resistance Society, no-organizationists, libertarian deists, political secessionists, and others. These groups frequently differed greatly in theory and practice—oftentimes in ways that qualified their anarchism; but they all shared the belief that “force violated the scheme of law that God had laid out for the world.” Of all the groups, “the nonresistants probably gave this conviction its sharpest statement.”¹²

Yet even in the ranks of the New England Non-Resistance Society, a wide range of opinion existed; and, more importantly, their convictions often reflected ambiguity, contradiction, or paradox. For example, “the theoretical consequences of the government of God were clear enough, but the practical applications were problematical.”¹³ It was clear that a nonresistant should not vote nor hold office. But should one refuse to testify in court, to pay taxes, to use banks chartered by civil government? Garrison even believed that a man, when called to militia duty, should refrain from engaging in civil disobedience. Garrison paid a fine for refusing to serve, believing that the state bore the responsibility with what it did with the money. In brief, Perry writes: “Nonresistance, quite simply, did not offer a comprehensive practical understanding of the evils of government, of anarchistic alternatives to the existing arrangements, or of the duties of nonresistants in the present dispensation. What really mattered to the nonresistant was the declaration that the only proper government was divine.”¹⁴

Moreover, even though nonresistants were not supposed to vote, they “were seldom indifferent to the results of elections, as might have been expected of a movement which held even republican government to be a usurpation of God’s throne.” In one issue of The Liberator, Garrison both urged antislavery men to vote against proslavery candidates for Congress, and “ridiculed a vote for either presidential candidate.” At times, Garrisonian nonresistance sounded “more like an instrument of political influence than a declaration of independence from government.” Perry observes that the source of confusion as regards politics stemmed in part from the uncertainty of the Garrisonians as to whether nonresistance “was merely one among many other secular reforms or the most fundamental and divine of all reforms.”¹⁵ Phrased another way, the Garrisonian nonresistants attempted the almost impossible task of fusing “the quietistic attitude of nonviolence with the revolutionary purpose of millennial perfectionism.”¹⁶ As a result, nonresistance declined in importance as the Garrisonians would not allow their commitment to the abolition of slavery to be circumvented by their quest for personal liberation from sin.

If, as we have observed, contradictions, ambiguities, and ambivalence regarding violence were present in nonresistant abolitionist thought from the outset, we are nevertheless faced with explaining more precisely why it was not until the period between the Mexican War and John Brown’s Raid on Harpers Ferry in 1859 that abolitionist acquiescence in or militant advocacy of “righteous violence” became dominant, if not universal.

In part, abolitionist receptivity to violent means can be explained as a “stimu-
lus-response” reaction to the growing sectional crisis over slavery and slavery expansion. Numerous abolitionists, while condemning the Mexican War, nevertheless expressed the hope that the American Army would incur heavy losses and be repelled by Santa Anna and his legions. The strengthened Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 also escalated demands for physical opposition. As the Garrisonian Samuel J. May exhorted: “If you are fully persuaded that it would be right for you to maim or kill the kidnapper who had laid hands upon your wife, son or daughter, or should be attempting to drag yourself away to be enslaved, I see not how you can excuse yourself from helping by the same degree of violence, to rescue the fugitive slave from the like outrage.” And Frederick Douglass, who had earlier broken with the Garrisonian circle and abandoned pacifist principles, stated in 1852 that “the only way to make the Fugitive Slave Law a dead letter [is] to make a half dozen or more dead kidnappers.”

When guerilla warfare broke out in “Bleeding Kansas” in the mid-1850’s and nonresistant Charles Stearns wrote to Garrison that if “nonresistance is not a safe principle it is not a true one,” Garrison staunchly responded that Stearns had been frightened out of his commitment to pacifism. But Garrison’s close colleague, Wendell Phillips — revealing the conflict that had developed between his “head” and his “heart” (that is, his intellect and his emotions) — agreed with Stearns. “I believe in moral suasion,” Phillips said. “I believe the age of bullets is over. I believe the age of ideas is come. . . . Yet, let me say in passing, that I think you can make a better use of iron than forging it into chains. If you must have metal, put it into Sharp’s rifles.”

It was John Brown’s raid, however, that produced the greatest reaction, the largest number of defections from pacifism. Lydia Maria Child declared: “All I know, or care to know, is that his example stirred me up to consecrate myself with renewed earnestness to the righteous cause for which he had died so bravely.” And Henry Clarke Wright, undoubtedly the most brilliant nonresistant theorist, recanted in 1859 when he proclaimed that “resistance to slaveholders and slavehunters is obedience to God, and a sacred Duty to man” and that “it is the right and duty of the North . . . to instigate the slaves to insurrection.”

Although the “stimulus-response” phenomenon goes far toward explaining the abandonment of nonviolence among an increasing number of abolitionists, there had to have been, as we have noted, ambivalent feelings toward violence in the first place. But there was also an important ideological component in abolitionist thought, an intellectual loophole, which permitted nonresistants who had not themselves abandoned the principles of nonviolence to acquiesce in or condone violence on the part of others. This, of course, was the nonresistants’ emphasis upon the idea of private judgment or individual accountability to God. In essence, Garrisonian emphasis upon the uncontested sovereignty of God meant that the individual must follow his own best light. An explicit statement of this doctrine was made by Bronson Alcott in 1839 when he said:

What guide have I but my conscience: Church and State are responsible to me; not I to them. They cease to deserve our veneration from the moment they
violate our consciences. We then protest against them. I believe that this is what is now going on. . . . I look upon the Non-Resistance Society as an assertion of the right to self-government. Why should I employ a church to write my creed or a state to govern me? Why not write my own creed? Why not govern myself?24

In other words, nonresistants emphasized the contrast between their ideal of noncoercion in all human affairs with the violent reality of American society. This distinction allowed them to condemn violence in the abstract while spurring those who in good conscience advocated violence to employ physical resistance on behalf of the just end of the abolition of slavery. As William Lloyd Garrison put it, "We are taking the American people on their own ground and judging of them by their own standard."25 The right of private judgment thus allowed nonresistants a brilliant, if not very logically consistent, agitational tactic: on the one hand they condemned violence, but on the other supported its use against slavery. As Garrison argued to the unconvinced pacifist Adin Ballou during the Civil War, "Although nonresistance holds human life in all cases inviolable, yet it is perfectly consistent for those professing it to petition, advise and strenuously urge a pro-war government to abolish slavery solely by the war-power."26

In addition, there are still other factors which help to explain the repudiation of pacifism by an increasing number of nonresistant abolitionists. The use of moral suasion in the 1830's and early 1840's (which was accompanied by millennial expectations of creating God's kingdom here on Earth) simply had not worked. In the minds of abolitionists, the "slave power" was not in decline, but was advancing aggressively on all fronts. Nor had they succeeded in influencing most of the nation's churches and benevolent societies to adopt an antislavery stance. Lack of apparent success caused among abolitionists feelings of failure and powerlessness, or what historian Lawrence J. Friedman has called a sense of "fragmented personal selfhood." The resort to violence transformed their original missionary impulse based on moral suasion into a crusade for righteous violence, a Manichean quest to destroy evil. As Friedman put it, in referring to the Unitarian minister William Furness: "Whereas unmodified moral suasion doctrines had faltered and had left him with a deep sense of personal inadequacy, the violent means of devout warriors promised to secure God's kingdom on earth."27

Finally, Friedman talks in terms of the old immediatists' "search for conviviality" with (acceptance by) a new generation of abolitionist leaders such as Theodore Parker and Thomas Wentworth Higginson who had not been influenced by the nonresistant strains in their thought. In Friedman's words, as the pioneer abolitionists "sought to build social bridges with more moderate antislavery Northerners and to retain harmony with the younger generation of abolitionist, they realized that old peace principles kept them isolated, but defense of violence did not."28

Yet, Friedman's emphasis on the "search for conviviality" as a partial explanation for the abandonment of nonviolent principles is somewhat suspect. His argument tends toward psychological reductionism: that is, his explanation
posits a subconscious reaction which relies more on psychological theory than on persuasive evidence. In fact, old-line immediatists had courted social ostracism and, in a few instances, martyrdom itself in their unremitting commitment to the cause of the slave. Why, then, should we accept the view that for the sake of popularity they would willingly (if subconsciously) compromise, in the 1850’s, those values and beliefs for which they had paid so dearly in personal terms during the 1830’s and 1840’s, especially when we have assembled a variety of other reasons — both ideological and psychological — which do not depend upon theoretical constructs lacking strong evidential support?

The outbreak of war itself convinced still other nonresistants to abandon their pacifist principles. When confronted by charges that the Civil War was not a war to free the slaves, abolitionists nevertheless expressed their hope and belief that in time the war could be transformed into a righteous crusade to destroy evil. In the spirit of “The Battle Hymn of the Republic,” Garrisonian Lydia Maria Child was “convinced that this is the great battle of Armageddon between the Angels of Freedom and the Demons of Despotism.” Abolitionists saw the war as a heavenly retribution on a sinful people. To regain divine favor, Americans would have to undergo a bloody expiation, and if they proved worthy they could remake the nation into a model Christian republic that would be an example to the world. Nonresistants viewed slavery as the example par excellence of sinful coercion, and by the advent of the Civil War it became clear that most desired slavery’s extinction even at the cost of a national bloodletting. The nonresistant Stephen Foster had earlier pointed out the direction that much abolitionist sentiment would follow when he militantly commented on the Fugitive Slave Law that he would “rather a hundred lives should be sacrificed than that one fugitive should be carried back to bondage.”

In conclusion, it must be said that, if the concept of righteous violence became the dominant view of nonresistants, a minority still clung tenaciously to their original pacifist beliefs. Adin Ballou, the founder of the nonresistant Hopedale Community, was perhaps the most prominent among them. In response to Henry Ward Beecher’s charge that nonresistants were cowards, Ballou asked if it was not “absurd twaddle” for Christians to argue that it was moral to kill their enemies if it was done “in pure love, with holy affection, for the sake of justice.” The most significant group of nonresistants who conscientiously objected to the war were young, second generation Garrisonians, including Ezra Heywood, Francis and Wendell Phillips Garrison, Alfred Love, John Wesley Pratt, and Moncure Conway. With quintessential nonresistant logic, Heywood declared that the draft law must be disobeyed because it was “plainly in conflict with divine law.” Although William Lloyd Garrison supported the war effort and conscription, he argued that non-voting conscientious objectors, whether church members or not, should be exempted from military service. It is true that Garrison respected his son George’s personal decision to enlist in the army, but his ideological sympathy was clearly with his sons Francis and Wendell Phillips who were conscientious objectors.
The case of Moncure Conway, scion of a Virginia slaveholding family, is instructive because it illustrates that William Lloyd Garrison and Wendell Phillips and most other nonresistants valued their commitment to the Union war effort before their peace principles. When on a mission to England to stir up British abolitionist sentiment in favor of the Union cause, Conway startled his compatriots with his proposal to the Confederate commissioner, James M. Mason, that if the South would emancipate their slaves, the "abolitionists and antislavery leaders of the Northern States shall immediately oppose the further prosecution of the war on the part of the United States government, and, since, they hold the balance of power, will certainly cause the war to cease by the immediate withdrawal of every kind of support from it and with its secession a restoration of peace and the independence of the South." Conway's statement raised a furor in both American government and abolitionist circles. In a somewhat exaggerated response Wendell Phillips remarked: "Moncure Conway does not represent one single man on this side of the Atlantic." What Conway had not understood was that the Garrisonian slogan of the 1850's - "No Union with Slaveholders" - was not simply a device to exonerate themselves from personal complicity with sin, but a political tactic to counter southern threats of secession. In the final analysis, many abolitionists were also committed nationalists, believers in an American nation endowed with a unique mission in the world. In historian Peter Walker's words, "The political Union was an arena in which a providential moral drama was being enacted." And without Union this "morality play was impossible." It is little wonder then that the attempts to apply the principles of nonresistance failed to survive, and that pacifist Leo Tolstoy in the late 1880's and 1890's learned to his sorrow that the American version of Christian anarchism had withered and died.

NOTES


4. Although the first generation of immediate abolitionists embraced moral suasion as the optimum means of social change during the 1830's, abolitionists differed from early on as to whether there were situations where physical resistance might be legitimately employed. The pacifist Garrisonians condemned the martyred Reverend Elijah Lovejoy for his resort to weaponry in defending his abolitionist press from a proslavery mob in Alton, Illinois, but by a two-to-one vote the annual meeting of the American Anti-Slavery Society in 1838 refused to censure Lovejoy's actions. We would like to suggest that a contributing factor in the abolitionist schism of 1837-1840, but one overlooked by historians, was the clash of incompatible values on the role of violence. The schism resulted from a reformulation of strategy and tactics initiated by William Lloyd Garrison in the face of a nationwide antiabolitionist backlash during the mid-1830's. Polarization
over the issues of political action, women's rights, and the legitimacy of civil government factionalized the abolitionists, so that by 1840 three distinct groups had coalesced — the Garrisonian nonresistants who then dominated the American Anti-Slavery Society, the politically engaged Liberty Party supporters, and the backers of Lewis Tappan's American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society who tended to be religiously orthodox. From the perspective of their Christian anarchism, Garrisonians denounced physical resistance as a violation of divine law. In turn, anti-Garrisonian abolitionists, though in common opposition to much of Garrison's post-1837 ideology, split on the issue of violent means. The founders of the Liberty Party such as Alvan Stewart, Henry Stanton, and Elizur Wright showed an early receptivity to what they regarded as the justifiable use of violence. The anti-Garrisonian Lewis Tappan initially opposed their Party and instead directed his efforts to creating the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society in 1840, but by 1844 Tappan and some of his supporters joined the Liberty Party. Tappan nevertheless maintained his peace principles until the outbreak of the Civil War. It appears to us that the existence of differing attitudes toward violence and nonviolence helps to explain what amounted to a tripartite split in abolitionist ranks by 1840. For a revisionist interpretation of the abolitionist schism, see Richard O. Curry and Lawrence B. Goodheart, eds., "The Complexities of Factionalism: Letters of Elizur Wright, Jr. on the Abolitionist Schism, 1837–1840," *Civil War History* (forthcoming, September 1983).


7. Ibid., p. 57.

8. Ibid.


11. Ibid., pp. 86–87.


13. Ibid., p. 76.


15. Ibid., pp. 78–80.

16. Ibid., p. 70.


Although this essay is primarily focused on nonresistant abolitionists who were mainly whites, it is important to note that northern black abolitionists such as David Walker, Henry Highland Garnet, and Charles L. Remond among others were in the vanguard of those justifying the use of violence to overthrow slavery. Other Afro-Americans such as the slave insurrectionary Nat Turner, the fugitive slaves who killed a pursuing federal marshal at Christiana, Pennsylvania in 1851, and the liberators who forcibly freed the alleged fugitive Shadrack (Fred Wilkins) from a Boston courtroom in 1852 actively employed physical resistance to overcome radical oppression. As the specially marked victims of slavery and the Fugitive Slave Law, black abolitionists had fewer intellectual qualms and less moral reluctance in wholeheartedly endorsing slave rebellion or in legitimizing violent opposition to oppressive federal statutes than their white nonresistant counterparts. An introduction to the black abolitionists is best approached through Benjamin


22. Quoted in ibid., p. 217.


27. Quoted in Friedman, Gregarious Saints, p. 216.

28. Ibid., p. 222.


32. Quoted in Mabee, Black Freedom, p. 346.


34. Ibid., p. 3.

35. Ibid., p. 11.

36. But if the religious strain of libertarian individualism had expired by the end of the nineteenth century, it had been replaced by secularized versions—doctrines of free thought, free love, and individualist anarchism. Indeed two longtime abolitionists, Elizur Wright and Parker Pillsbury, held executive offices in the National Liberty League, the leading free-thought organization of the 1870's, which shows a strong linkage between pre-war and post-war concerns with personal freedom and civil rights. For related discussions, see Eric Foner, "Radical Individualism in America: Revolution to Civil War," Literature of Liberty 1 (1978): 5–29; and Wendy McElroy, "The Culture of Individualist Anarchism in Late Nineteenth-Century America," Journal of Libertarian Studies 5 (1981): 291–304.