

Left Hegelianism, Arab Nationalism, and Labor Zionism

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A significant portion of the conflicting leftist ideologies of the contemporary Middle East—in particular, the socialist philosophies of both Arabs and Israelis—is an outgrowth of nineteenth-century social theories and philosophies of history originating from a group of individuals who at one point constituted the Young Hegelians. Moses Hess, Michael Bakunin, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, the respective founders of Zionist socialism, anarchist socialism, and Marxist socialism, were associates in Berlin and Paris in the 1840's who attempted to apply the thought of Hegel to revolutionary, democratic, and communist ideas. While traditional and modernistic interpretations of Jewish and Arab world views obviously influenced the development of Zionism and Arab nationalism, the ideological roots of the socialist varieties of these philosophies may be traced in part to the contributions of the left Hegelians. A key to the comprehension of the philosophical outlooks of political forces as diverse as the Labor Party of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization may be found in the comparison and contrast of the thought of Hess, Bakunin, Marx and Engels.

Hegel's philosophy of history not only expressed prevailing European perceptions of Middle Eastern peoples but also influenced some (but not all) of the left Hegelians in respect to the question of colonialism as a modernizing force. Shlomo Avineri, perhaps the most significant Marxist Zionist philosopher and whose interpretations of Marxism contribute to the central thesis of this essay, has summarized Hegel's earliest analysis of the Oriental world in these terms:

The oriental nations are characterized, according to these fragments, by their complete subordination to external necessity, coupled with a total disregard for immediate reality in their cultural life. Further, oriental society is static, stagnant and unchanging. The subservience to external necessity makes despotism and tyranny into the main ingredients of the oriental political system. . . .¹

Hegel developed this perception in the *Philosophy of History*, which traced the stages of history through the Persian, Greek, Roman, and Germanic cultures. According to Hegel, "The Orientals have not attained the

knowledge that Spirit — Man *as such* — is free; and because they do not know this, they are not free. They only know that *one is free*.”² Greece and Rome knew that some are free, while the Germans know that all are free. Early in the work Hegel begins to exclude non-Europeans from the category of world historical peoples. India, simply put, “has no History.”³ “The inferiority of these individuals in all respects,” he said of native Americans, “is very manifest.”⁴ Some Europeans (Anglo Saxons and Germans) were depicted as superior to others (Spaniards) — thus, the “industrious Europeans” of North America whose society was based on “firm freedom” were harbingers of a culture much superior to that of South America.⁵

“Africa proper, as far as History goes back, has remained . . . shut up; . . . the land of childhood, which lying beyond the day of self-conscious history, is enveloped in the dark mantle of Night.” African peoples are described as “hordes” characterized by “reckless inhumanity and disgusting barbarism,” although Egypt had been “a mighty centre of independent civilization.” North Africa, including Morocco, Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli, “*must* be attached to Europe.” “The Negro,” claimed Hegel, “exhibits the natural man in his completely wild and untamed state.”⁶ By allowing themselves “to be shot down by thousands in war with Europeans,” according to Hegel, Africans displayed a “want of regard for life.”⁷ (Why this slaughter did not indicate disregard of life by *Europeans* is unclear.) Slavery occasioned an “increase of human feeling among the Negroes” and would lead to their freedom. Early in the work Hegel leaves Africa, for it is “unhistorical” and represents the “Undeveloped Spirit.”⁸

“China and India lie, as it were, still outside the World’s History,” Hegel continued. “The traditions of the Arabs are very old, but are not attached to a political constitution and its development.”⁹ China and India were “stationary and fixed” and “it is the necessary fate of Asiatic Empires to be subjected to Europeans.”¹⁰ In contrast to such Mongolian societies which “perpetuate a natural vegetative existence,” Persia represented Hither Asia which belonged “to the Caucasian, *i.e.* the European Stock,” and it is there where history began.¹¹ Thus, all world historical peoples end up as Europeans. Hegel depicts Semitic peoples of Western Asia, including Syria, Judea, and Egypt, as belonging to the first though lowest stage of history.¹² In fact, the Jewish and Moslem religions are described rather favorably.¹³ However, Hegel concludes, “At present, driven back into its Asiatic and African quarters, . . . Islam has long vanished from the stage of history at large, and has retreated into Oriental ease and repose.”¹⁴

In his own description of Hegel’s stages of history with its assumption that Oriental society was stagnant and unhistorical, Avineri points out that “Marx held a similar view, probably derived from Hegel, on the unchanging and static nature of what he calls ‘the Asiatic mode of production.’”¹⁵ On that subject Avineri has edited a significant work of Marx’s writings entitled *On Colonialism and Modernization*. As Avineri points out in the introduc-

tion, there is a "discrepancy between the analytical and historical nature" of the categories of ancient, feudal, and bourgeois modes of production and "the mere geographic designation of the Asiatic one." Thus, Marx combined "a sophisticated, carefully worked out schema describing the historical dynamism of European societies, rather simple-mindedly grafted upon a dismissal of all non-European forms of society under the blanket designation of a mere geographic terminology of the 'Asiatic mode of production,' which appears static, unchanging, and totally non-dialectical."¹⁶

Avineri argues convincingly that Hegel directly influenced Marx in respect to the notion that the Orient has no history.¹⁷ An examination of the writings of Marx and Engels reveals phrases which appear to have been copied almost directly from Hegel. Marx saw the Opium Wars in China as having made "this whole people drunk before it could arouse them out of their hereditary stupidity,"¹⁸ and during the Taiping rebellion he referred to "China — this living fossil."¹⁹ English imperialism in India was described as "the only *social* revolution ever heard of in Asia."²⁰ "Indian society has no history at all," and it was England's task to lay "the material foundations of Western society in Asia."²¹ Europeanization was seen as necessary for the development of both Asians and American slaves.²² Avineri's assessment is worth quoting at length:

Since Oriental society does not develop internally, it cannot evolve toward capitalism through the dialectics of internal change; and since Marx postulates the ultimate victory of socialism on the prior universalization of capitalism, he necessarily arrives at the position of having to endorse European colonial expansion as a brutal but necessary step toward the victory of socialism. . . . [T]he horrors of colonialism are dialectically necessary for the world revolution of the proletariat since without them the countries of Asia (and presumably also Africa) will not be able to emancipate themselves from their stagnant backwardness.

Marx's view of European — and particularly British — colonial expansion is determined by these dialectical considerations. Consequently, Marx's views on imperialism can be painfully embarrassing to the orthodox communist; there certainly is a deep irony in the fact that while Marx's writings on European industrialization are always the first to be used and quoted by non-European Marxists, his writings on India and China are hardly known or even mentioned by them. The Maoists in particular seem to be totally unaware of them. . . .²³

The Hegelian and Eurocentric orientation of Marx and Engels is particularly evident in their writings on the Arab world. In 1848, a year of revolution in Europe, Engels wrote:

Upon the whole it is, in our opinion, very fortunate that the Arabian chief has been taken. The struggle of the Bedouins was a hopeless one, and though the manner in which brutal soldiers, like Bugeaud, have carried on the war is highly blameable, the conquest of Algeria is an important and fortunate fact for the progress of civilisation. . . . And

the conquest of Algeria has already forced the Beys of Tunis and Tripoli, and even the Emperor of Morocco, to enter upon the road of civilisation. They were obliged to find other employment for their people than piracy. . . . And if we may regret that the liberty of the Bedouins of the desert has been destroyed, we must not forget that these same Bedouins were a nation of robbers, — whose principal means of living consisted of making excursions either upon each other, or upon the settled villagers, taking what they found, slaughtering all those who resisted, and selling the remaining prisoners as slaves. All these nations of free barbarians look very proud, noble and glorious at a distance, but only come near them and you will find that they, as well as the more civilised nations, are ruled by the lust of gain, and only employ ruder and more cruel means. And after all, the modern *bourgeois*, with civilisation, industry, order, and at least relative enlightenment following him, is preferable to the feudal lord or to the marauding robber, with the barbarian state of society to which they belong.²⁴

Ironically, Marx and Engels allied with conservatives who favored colonialism, while both non-Marxian socialists and *laissez faire* liberals often opposed colonization.²⁵ Some Europeans would have disputed Engels' description of Algeria as a land of wild robbers and feudal lords. Col. C. H. Churchill's biography of Abdel Kader, the Arabian chief whose capture Engels applauded, pointed out that Kader's movement received active support more readily where feudal influences did not prevail; typical supporters were the fierce Kabyles, "these stern republicans" who "were accustomed to scorn all authority."²⁶ A true nationalist, Kader opposed both Turkish and French domination. He read French journals and often tried to make peace with the French.²⁷ "Abdel Kader never in his life exacted from his subjects more than the *ashur* and *zekka* (all other imposts, including custom-house duties, being held in abomination by the Koran)," and lived a simple life, defraying his expenses from his gardens. Kader used persuasive methods in dealing with the localist and stateless tribes who "wanted no legislature; they could manage their own concerns."²⁸ Independent tribes followed him; at one place he was told: "We have no single chief to whom we delegate our power. Our *Ameens*, chosen by the popular voice, express the general will." Kader responded: "I wish not to change your customs, or alter your laws and usages; but the conducting of warlike operations demands a chief." So they chose one.²⁹ Still, they were volunteers, for the people "revolted at the very idea" of conscription.³⁰ In short, the Algerian guerillas were what modern leftists would call a splendid example of a genuine national liberation movement.

"The public functionaries were few, their salaries moderate, their spheres of action well defined." Kader wrote: "the usages of barbarism have been abandoned and obliterated." Reform included improvements in the schools and justice system; manufactories conducted by Europeans were encouraged.³¹ Economic development accelerated.

The government of the young Sultan of the Arabs, based on a strict and

undeviating adherence to the principles of the Koran, had largely increased both the trade and the revenues of his empire.

Formerly the rich caravans which plied between Fez and the southern parts of Africa, passed through Algeria as through an enemy's country They were frequently attacked and plundered, with serious loss of life. . . . Now they traversed the whole extent of Algeria in perfect safety. In the interior they paid no tolls; at the frontiers they paid no duties. In Abdel Kader's eyes a custom-house was an anomaly and an abomination.³²

Even after his capture, Kader praised the French for abolishing royalty in the 1848 revolution, for he believed a republic would have "for its object to root out injustice, and to prevent the strong from doing violence to the weak."³³

In sum, it was not so clear not only to the Algerians but even to some Europeans that the slaughter of Algerians and the transfer of their lands to Europeans *colons* was "progressive." In any case, by 1848 the founders of Marxism were already engaged in a significant controversy with Michael Bakunin, a previous associate from the revolutionary Hegelian circles. Bakunin published an essay entitled *Appeal to the Slavs* where he called for social revolution, the destruction of empires, and national self-determination.³⁴ Engels wrote an answer arguing that justice and independence were "moralistic categories" which prove nothing. Referring to the U.S. war against Mexico, Engels wrote:

And will Bakunin reproach the American people for waging a war which to be sure deals a severe blow to his theories based on "Justice" and "Humanity," but which none the less was waged solely in the interests of civilization? Or is it perhaps a misfortune that the splendid land of California has been wrested from the lazy Mexicans who did not know what to do with it? . . . Because of this the "independence" of a few Spanish Californians and Texans may suffer, occasionally "Justice" and other moralistic principles may be injured, but what do they count compared to such world historic events?³⁵

Hegelian overtones are clear here, and in various writings Marx and Engels rejected the legitimacy of Latin American revolutionary movements.³⁶

In later years Marx and Engels wrote further in a manner expressing a Hegelian heritage of picturing the Arab world as stagnant and in want of European civilization. Engels saw the Moors as "semi-savages,"³⁷ and Marx referred to "the barbarous clans of the Lebanon" and to "the Turkish sway that curbed the wild tribes of the Lebanon."³⁸ Avineri refers to Marx's "understanding of the retrograde impact Islam had even on the Christian communities in the Middle East" and of "the stagnation that is common to Islamic society, as well as Oriental society in general."³⁹ Actually, as early as the *Communist Manifesto* Marx and Engels had discussed the progressive character of the European bourgeoisie, which "by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production . . . draws all, even the most barbarian, nations

into civilization." It has "rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life. Just as it has made the country dependent on the towns, so it has made barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on the civilised ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West."⁴⁰ Elsewhere the peasantry is depicted as reactionary as against the revolutionary bourgeoisie.⁴¹

A major element of the Marx-Bakunin controversy related to the anarchist's defense of the right of nations — including Eastern, peasant nations — to self-determination. Bakunin called for "the supreme right of all populations (of Europe and the world), great or small, weak or strong (civilized or not civilized)" to freedom.⁴² A Russian, he castigated the "civilization" of the Occident which was based on slavery of workers which pretends to be superior to "us, the barbarians of the Orient."⁴³ Bakunin also saw the European role in China and India as reactionary.⁴⁴ Unlike the professional writers Marx and Engels, Bakunin was a practical revolutionary, and his references to the Middle East are sparse—at one point he referred to pretexts which states employed to execute violence on other peoples and used the taking of Jerusalem as an example (whether this related to the Crusades or perhaps to European incursions in the Middle East in the 1860's is unclear).⁴⁵ And in 1873, under the influence of the anarchist revolution in Spain, Bakunin wrote: "Spain aids in our South, which is the reddest country of France, and for the other part lends a hand to Algeria, which is no less scarlet."⁴⁶ Bakunin's reference to Algeria apparently indicated his support for the rising of the traditionally stateless Berbers of Kabylia in 1871 which was not completely suppressed until 1884.

In a letter to Bernstein dated August 9, 1882, Engels wrote:

It seems to me that in the Egyptian affair you are defending the so-called National Party too much. We know little about Arabi, but I am prepared to wager ten to one that he is an ordinary pasha who does not want to let the financiers collect the taxes because in good Oriental fashion he prefers to put the taxes into his own pocket. It is again the eternal story of peasant countries. From Ireland to Russia, and from Asia Minor to Egypt—in a peasant country the peasant exists only to be exploited. . . . We Western European socialists should not be so easily led astray as the Egyptian fellahs—or all Romance people. . . . And yet, no sooner does a riot break out somewhere than the entire Romance revolutionary world is uncritically in raptures over it. I think that we can well be on the side of the oppressed fellahs without sharing their monetary illusions (a peasant people has to be cheated for centuries before it becomes aware of it from experience), and to be against the English brutalities without at the same time siding with their military adversaries of the moment. . . .⁴⁷

Whether based on a Hegelian world view or perhaps ethnic prejudice, Engel's view is certainly out of touch with twentieth-century nationalist thought. Egypt had been dominated by Europeans and Turks; the ruling

Khédivé was a tool of the European bondholders who controlled much of Egypt's economy. Exorbitant taxes extracted from the fellahin went to the European bondholders, and by 1881 Egypt had sold its last stake in the Suez Canal Company's profits. Arabi Pasha, a conscript of fellah (peasant) origins who became a colonel, joined a secret society which mutinied against the higher ranking Turkish-speaking Circassian officers and he thus became a symbol of resistance against Turks and Europeans. When he was appointed minister of war and the danger of an uprising appeared in June 1882, the British sent a fleet to Alexandria, and in the ensuing massacre 50 to 100 Europeans and 500 Arabs were killed. Arabi raised the slogan "Egypt for the Egyptians," and was supported by the broad masses, excluding the elite which sided with the British. The class struggle pitted poor, Moslem, Egyptian nationalists against wealthy, Christian, European colonialists. On July 11 British warships carried out the unprovoked bombardment of Alexandria.⁴⁸

Engel's reaction to these events has been described. Yet during the same month in which Engels wrote a letter denouncing Arabi Pasha and the revolt, the Italian anarchist Errico Malatesta arrived in Egypt to join the insurrectionaries. This contrast is indicative of the whole basis of the dispute between the Marxists and Bakuninists in the nineteenth century—the former by lifestyle were theorists and by ideology denounced what they considered to be atavistic revolts against European colonial progressivism, while the latter often personally participated in revolutionary armed struggle and had an optimistic attitude toward peasant and Eastern revolutions. Malatesta's background regarding Egypt warrants further explanation.

A Bakuninist, Malatesta participated in armed peasant focus in Italy and was often imprisoned. He took refuge from Italian repression in 1878 in Alexandria, Egypt. After an attempt on the life of the Italian king, monarchical elements of the Italian colony in Alexandria demonstrated, shouting "Death to the internationalists!" When the internationalists (a term often used to describe the anarchists) organized a protest rally, the police detained a number of them, including Malatesta. Malatesta was boarded on a ship and disembarked in Beirut, Syria, and eventually returned to Italy, where he was again detained.⁴⁹

In 1881 Malatesta organized the International Revolutionary Socialist Congress in an attempt to rebuild the First International, and he represented a number of workers' and internationalists' federations, including those of Alexandria.⁵⁰ Thus it was not surprising that when a year later the Egyptian revolt began, he returned to Egypt with some other internationalists. In Max Nettlau's words, "Malatesta went to Egypt in the summer of 1882 with some Italian comrades, wanting to fight in the Arab lines in insurrection against the English and other European exploiters in Egypt. It was in the time of the insurrection of Arabi Pasha who had a certain social foundation."⁵¹ Military cordons around the city and the continuing skirmishes

prevented them from joining the Arabs. After several daring attempts to cross land, sea, and mud made impassible by nature and by British troops, Malatesta returned perhaps to Alexandria and did not reappear in Italy until spring of 1883.⁵² In the next decades the libertarian internationalist agitated against French massacres in Morocco, Belgium's Congo atrocities, and Italy's attacks on Libya.⁵³

In any case Arabi Pasha's forces were defeated on September 13, 1882 at Tall al-Kabir, which resulted in European losses of 57 killed and 380 wounded and in Egyptian losses of 2,000 killed. Few Egyptians were left wounded, according to an author sympathetic toward the British: "The wounded were not spared by the British saber and bayonet. There was, however, some excuse for the alleged cruelty on the part of the attacking troops. An Egyptian, like the wild beast of the jungle, gets an added ferocity and desperation with each wound."⁵⁴ British and French occupation followed the suppression of the nationalist movement.

The day before the British slaughter of the Egyptians, Engels wrote a letter to Kautsky again depicting the English and other Europeans as civilized and the Arabs and other Orientals as barbarians.

In my opinion the colonies proper, i.e., the countries occupied by a European population—Canada, the Cape, Australia—will all become independent; on the other hand, the countries inhabited by a native population, which are simply subjugated—India, Algeria, the Dutch, Portuguese and Spanish possessions—must be taken over for the time being by the proletariat and led as rapidly as possible towards independence. . . . India will perhaps, indeed very probably, make a revolution, and as a proletariat in process of self-emancipation cannot conduct any colonial wars, it would have to be allowed to run its course. . . . The same might also take place elsewhere, e.g., in Algeria and Egypt, and would certainly be the best thing *for us*. We shall have enough to do at home. Once Europe is reorganized, and North America, that will furnish such colossal power and such an example that the semi-civilized countries will of themselves follow in their wake; economic needs, if anything, will see to that. . . .⁵⁵

As Avineri points out, Engels assumed that stagnant Oriental societies held back historical progress and would threaten European socialism, that a socialist, white Anglo-Saxon world would have to dominate and thereby revolutionize the colonies, and that national liberation movements would not precede the coming of European socialism.⁵⁶

As is clear, Marx and Engels, but not Bakunin, retained a Hegelian world view in respect to the identification of Europe with progress and of the Orient (including the Arab world) with stagnation. The other left Hegelian under review, Moses Hess, expressed the civilizing mission of Europe in *The European Triarchy* (1841), which called on Germany, England and France to "civilize" the world.⁵⁷ The extent to which Hess influenced Marx

and Engels has been the subject of considerable discussion.⁵⁸ Bakunin, who had first-hand knowledge, described Hess as "a learned economist and socialist" who "had then a considerable influence on the scientific development of Herr Marx."⁵⁹ It is known that *The European Triarchy* favorably impressed Marx and Engels.⁶⁰ Although Hess is known for having converted Engels to communism, he also originally supported anarchist ideas which were more acceptable to some of the more libertarian left Hegelians, such as Max Stirner and Bakunin, both of whom rejected communism (Stirner was an individualist, Bakunin a collectivist). Additionally, during the Young Hegelian period Hess, like Marx,⁶¹ supported the integration of Jews into European society.

Hess later rejected the assimilationist approach and became less radical politically. He authored *Rome and Jerusalem* (1862), the first great Zionist classic. Hess was inspired by *The New Eastern Question* (1860) by Ernest Laharanne, advisor to Napoleon III on French intervention in Syria, who advocated Jewish colonization of Palestine on the following rationale: "European industry has daily to search for new markets as an outlet for its products. . . . The time has arrived when it is imperative to call the ancient nations back to life, so as to open new highways and byways for European civilization."⁶²

"But the soldiers of civilization, the French, are gradually sweeping away the dominance of the barbarians,"⁶³ wrote Hess in reference to conquests in the Arab world. French intervention in Syria, the Suez Canal, and a Eurasian railroad signified that "our lost father land [will] be rediscovered on the road to India and China that is now being built in the Orient."⁶⁴ Praising French conquests in the Middle East, Hess contended:

Napoleon the First, who had undertaken an expedition into Egypt, and the Saint Simonists group, one of which is at present at the head of the Suez enterprise, have already recognized how important it is for France to civilize the Orient. . . .

After the work on the Suez Canal is completed the interests of world commerce will undoubtedly demand the establishment of depots and settlements of such a character as will transform the neglected and anarchic state of the countries lying along this road into legal and cultivated States. This can occur only under the military protection of the European powers. Sagacious French diplomacy has always planned to annex the Orient to the precincts of culture.

Hess did not object to French "desires for conquest and domination" which would underlie this Oriental policy because "the Ideal" must be based on material interests.⁶⁵

Addressing himself to Jews, Hess wrote: "You should be the bearers of civilization to the primitive people of Asia. . . . You should be the mediators between Europe and far Asia, open the roads that lead to India and China —

those unknown regions which must ultimately be thrown open to civilization."⁶⁶ The indigenous peoples, those "wild Arabian hordes and the African peoples," lived in a land which "no one should inherit but the Jews." "Oh, how will the East tremble at your coming!" he warned. To secure these aims the statist imperative was necessary, i.e., "a police system must be established by this [Colonizing] Society, to protect the colonists from the attacks of the Bedouins. . . ." ⁶⁷

While Marx and Engels shared with Hess a Hegelian view of Europe as the center of world history, they attacked him a number of times for his "utopian socialism" based on sentimental idealism. Additionally, in his early radical years, Hess had broken with Marx and Engels due to their purging the Communist League of some of its more activist and revolutionary members, while in later years Hess became more pacifist as indeed were Marx and Engels all along. A major point of divergence between Marx and Bakunin had been the latter's stress on revolutionary agitation and armed struggle⁶⁸—as Young Hegelians, Marx had written that universal suffrage meant the end of bourgeois society⁶⁹ while Bakunin had argued that the urge to destroy is creative.⁷⁰ In 1869 Bakunin and Hess became reacquainted at a congress of the First International but soon broke because of the support by Hess of the position of Marx against that of Bakunin. Bakunin attacked Hess for bringing national and bourgeois politics into the International.⁷¹ When the Bakuninists and Marxists finally split the International in half, the former promoted insurrection in several countries, particularly France, Spain, and Italy, while Marx promised a peaceful transition to socialism.⁷²

That Marx was more of a social reformer than a revolutionist is convincingly argued by Shlomo Avineri in *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx*. Thus, under Marx's direction in 1848 the League of Communists altered its activities from engaging in revolutionary activism to the creation of workers' libraries and schools.⁷³ Since communism is the dialectical abolition (*Aufhebung*) of capitalism, the stage of capitalism cannot be skipped.⁷⁴ Contrary to Lenin, Marx saw imperialism as progressive.⁷⁵ Since colonialism exports capitalism to backward societies, it heralds socialism; Marx's disputes with Bakunin likewise had to do with the latter's rejection of the necessary stages of history and of political liberalism.⁷⁶ Socialism arises from the development of the forces of production and not from revolutionary violence, and during 1848 Marx urged the workers not to revolt.⁷⁷ Just a few months before the Paris Commune of 1871 (a revolutionary period in which Bakunin personally participated), Marx warned against a "*Commune de Paris*."⁷⁸ Even in the *Communist Manifesto* Marx had argued for a peaceful transition to socialism through elections, and nowhere did he advocate the abolition of the state; such were Bakunin's ideas later adopted by Lenin.⁷⁹

The foregoing assessment suggests an interesting anomaly: while Marx and Engels saw colonialism (and hence colonial violence) as progressive, they

regarded the violence of workers and especially peasants as retrogressive. By contrast, Bakunin and Lenin as well as a number of twentieth-century revolutionaries in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America, picture their violence as progressive and the imperialists' violence as reactionary.

Jewish nationalists and internationalists have supported both anarchism and Marxism as well as all kinds of Zionist and non-Zionist, assimilationist positions. Aaron Lieberman, described by Ber Borochov as the "Father of Jewish Socialism,"⁸⁰ was also a leading Bakuninist anarchist. *Chorni Pere-dial* and *Narodnaya Volya*, "non-Marxian mass movements embracing peasants and workers," included some prominent Jewish revolutionaries;⁸¹ Zundelovitch and Lieberman were unique in that they promoted socialism among the Jewish masses. "Being themselves proletarians and raised among the Jewish proletariat, they knew that the Jewish masses lived by their own toil—that the Jewish people was not a people of exploiters and parasites, but a people of exploited and oppressed workers." After Zundelovitch was captured by the czarist police, Lieberman escaped to London where he worked with Lavrov, a populist and associate of Bakunin, and "organized a Jewish socialist society—the first in Jewish history."⁸² The Hebrew Socialists of London declared:

We Jews are an integral part of humanity and cannot be liberated except through the liberation of all humanity.

The liberation of humanity from misery and slavery can be achieved by the workers only if they unite in a struggle against their despoilers, destroy the existing order, and replace it by the reign of labor, justice, freedom, and the fraternity of mankind.

The workers of Europe and America have united in various societies to achieve their aim and are preparing for revolution, for the establishment of the reign of labor socialism (*Socializmus Laavoda* in the Hebrew text). Therefore, we, the children of Israel, have decided to affiliate ourselves with this noble Alliance of Labor.⁸³

Lieberman addressed himself to "*el shlomei bachurei yisrael*" (the intelligent youth of Israel), and "in a biblical style he portrays the awakening of the Jewish masses and their struggle against their Jewish exploiters." The organization was described as "the friends of the Jewish people and of all the suffering masses." "Lieberman was far from the scientific socialism of Marx and Engels." "On the one hand he was a nihilist, discrediting the past and denying the right of existence of all nations, including the Jewish; on the other hand, he was a fanatical Hebraist and lover of the Jewish people."⁸⁴ In sum, Lieberman was a cosmopolitan.

An equally revealing analysis of Lieberman's philosophy and praxis was set forth by the anarchist Rudolf Rocker in *The London Years*. Like other Russian students in the early 1870's, Jewish students became followers of Bakunin and Lavrov and "went to the people." Lieberman became an anarchist philosopher and activist in Russia and England and organized the East European working class. He wrote: "Human brotherhood knows no divi-

sion according to nations and races; it knows only useful workers and harmful exploiters."⁸⁵ To the rich: "It is your fault that we have been exposed to calumny. International speculators, who have dragged our name through the mud, you do not belong to us." "Our most ancient social system is anarchy; our true federation over the entire earth—the International."⁸⁶ Conservative elements being offended, "the 'Jewish Chronicle' started an agitation against the foreign Nihilists who, it said, had come to London to incite the Jewish immigrants to disorder. Sermons were preached against them in the East End Synagogues."⁸⁷

Rocker was a leading figure for years among the Jews who migrated to London, and his description of the Jewish labor movement at that time provides a useful social history. The British ruling elite must have become frightened in view of the following: "The mass meetings of the Federation of Jewish Anarchists in the Great Assembly Hall in Mile End and in the wonderland in Whitechapel were attended by thousands of people, five, six, seven thousand."⁸⁸ "There were many thousands of Jews living in this great London ghetto, they had left their old homes in Russia, Poland and Roumania because of the oppression and pogroms."⁸⁹ "The fact is that all the Jewish trades unions in the East End, without exception, were started by the initiative of the Jewish Anarchists. The Jewish labor movement grew largely out of the ceaseless educational work that we carried on year in, year out."⁹⁰ "Most of the Jewish Socialists in Leeds belonged to the Anarchist wing."⁹¹ Zionism was attacked by the Jewish anarchists. "The Zionists had no following of any consequence at that time in the Jewish working class movement."⁹² In fact, the British Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain came to support the Zionism of Theodor Herzl due to the influx of Jewish immigration and the subsequent "trouble" in East End; the desire to expell these Jews from Europe was alleged to be a trades-union, not a race, question.⁹³ Zionism was partly a reaction to anarchism and to socialism in general.⁹⁴

The Zionist who wrote the introduction to Rocker's book confirmed that Jewish workers did not support Zionism. However, the argument was made that some Jewish anarchists emigrated to Palestine and that the *kibbutz* provides an example of a voluntaristic, stateless community which libertarianism would endorse. While this argument may be sound insofar as the *kibbutz* abolishes traditional state structures, it arguably has represented a state, i.e., a repressive organized force, in respect to the Arab peasantry. Still, Jewish humanists inspired partly by anarchism such as Martin Buber have discussed solutions in the context of a federated, decentralized society tolerant of Christians, Jews and Moslems alike.

If Lieberman was the father of cosmopolitan Jewish socialism, Ber Borochov founded Zionist socialism; while perhaps Hess deserves the latter title, socialism is not a major element of his Zionism, and though Borochov may arguably be called the first Marxist Zionist, Marx's assimilationist

outlook may preclude the idea of a Jewish state as such. Yet while he specifically rejected the cosmopolitanism of Marx and Lieberman, Borochof applied some of Marx's concepts of political economy to the Jewish question. Thus, in "Economic Development of the Jews" (1916) Borochof argued that Marx held that constant capital grows at the expense of variable capital, and thus, since Jewish labor was concentrated in variable capital and was being displaced by non-Jewish labor, the logical application of Marxism implied a Zionist solution.⁹⁵ Borochof's concept of a Jewish "nation" was rather broad, and included figures as diverse as Rothschild and Marx.⁹⁶ Aware of Marx's rejection of such a concept of nationalism, Borochof argued in 1916 that times had changed: "Marx was quite correct in saying that proletarians have no fatherland. . . . But since then, progressive nationalism has become a unique historical phenomenon." Borochof also attacked anarchism.⁹⁷

Previously, in 1905, Borochof had argued that Marx's notions of the relations and conditions of production expressed in *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* led to a "group psychology" (a concept apparently foreign to Marx) to be explained in materialistic terms.⁹⁸ "In the third volume of *Capital* Marx also states that one and the same economic base can develop in different ways because of different conditions, such as natural environment, race, and external historic influences."⁹⁹ And in "Our Platform" (1906) Borochof alleged that "*the direction of migratory labor depends upon the direction of migratory capital*. This law was propounded by Marx."¹⁰⁰ "If the new country of refuge is economically suitable, if Jewish capital may be utilized to advantage and production enhanced, emigration of the impoverished masses increases and the success of the first pioneers of Jewish capital brings additional numbers of Jewish entrepreneurs and workers."¹⁰¹ Thus Borochof attempts to draw normative implications from Marx's mere positivist analysis. Finally, Borochof claimed that Jews cannot compete against other groups and consequently must have an exclusive land.

This land will be the only one available to the Jews; and of all countries available for immigrants of all lands, this country will provide the line of greatest resistance. It will be a country of low cultural and political development.¹⁰² . . . Jewish petty and middle capital will find a market for its products in both this country and its environs. *The land of spontaneously concentrated Jewish immigration will be Palestine.*¹⁰³

While Borochof inspired a school of Marxist Zionism,¹⁰⁴ other socialist Zionists rejected Marx in favor of Hess.¹⁰⁵ Yet Theodor Herzl was the "unrecognized ancestor" of the Marxist school of Zionism, and Borochof "proceeded from premises expressed in consciously proletarian, socialist terminology, but he really adds up to the same thing."¹⁰⁵ Thus there were common origins between the Labor Zionism of Borochof and the rightist, anti-Communist Zionism of figures such as Menachem Begin, who referred

to the self-avowed fascist Jabotinsky as "the greatest Jewish personality of our era after Herzl."¹⁰⁷ Moses Hess had long before distinguished his approach from that of Marx in declaring a principle which seemed both empirical and normative: "The race struggle is the primal one, the class struggle secondary."¹⁰⁸ Further, Ben-Gurion, the leading organizer of Labor Zionism, held that the number of Arabs living in Israel should be reduced as much as possible. "While this might be called racialism, the whole Zionist movement actually was based on the principle of a purely Jewish community in Palestine."¹⁰⁹ In reaction to this world view, some Israeli socialists came to reject Zionism on the basis of a more consistent Marxism as well as on the basis of the Jewish code of universal ethics.¹¹⁰

In the meantime Shlomo Avineri has made significant contributions regarding the application of Marxism to Zionism which go far beyond those of Borochoy. In *Israel and the Palestinians* Avineri accepts Borochoy's analysis of Zionism as an escape by Jews from middle class Europe to a working class, socialist Palestine. Yet the new twist added by Avineri is his emphasis on the largely unknown writings of Marx which pictured European colonialism in the Arab world (and in the Orient in general) as historically progressive.¹¹¹ Applying the standards of Marx and Engels to the conflicts in the Middle East, Zionism would be progressive—not because it involved Jews, but because it involved European settlers—and Arab nationalist movements would prevent the internationalization of European capitalism and thus delay socialism. Like Engels, Avineri argues that Arab society has been inferior to that of Europe and does not concede the progressive character of any Arab nationalist struggle. On the coming of the twentieth century Arab society "found its civilization profoundly inferior to Western culture and technology,"¹¹² and there has been a "lack of a cohesive social *praxis* in Arab nationalism."¹¹³ "There are probably more Marxists in Israel than in the whole of the Arab world,"¹¹⁴ and it is almost *a priori* with Avineri that Arabs, especially Palestinian guerrillas, cannot be revolutionary.

In "Modernization and Arab Society," Avineri contended: "Whatever the aims of imperialism, it did, after all (as was pointed out very perceptively by Marx) put an end to the old, traditional society." The colonial administration managed "to introduce rational codes of law," and colonial power "became the prime mover in the modernization of the non-European world," creating the "state infrastructure" to enable the Arabs "to come to grips with the modern world."¹¹⁵ While Marx and Engels agreed that the modern nation state was historically progressive, they also depicted it as an instrument of class domination. While the predatory character of the State is recognized in both revolutionary and conservative political analyses (e.g., those of Bakunin and Lenin as well as Burke and Mosca), perhaps the most thorough sociohistorical inquiry of the State as an institution of violence and exploitation was set forth by the early Zionist Franz Oppenheimer in

Der Staat (1908).¹¹⁶ If social progress is defined in terms of humanism rather than technological development, there is a case for the proposition that the modern state is reactionary. The sociological tendency of peasant cultures towards horizontal non-state societies provides an interesting model of participatory democracy in sharp contrast to the bureaucratic domination and genocidal militarism of twentieth-century national states. The instinctive anarchism of the traditional Palestinian rural population was discussed by Elihu Grant, a turn-of-the-century visitor. From the nineteenth century the urban government could not establish its dictatorship over the rural dwellers.

The province came near to a condition of anarchy. Every man did that which was right in his own eyes. . . .

To the country peasant the chief functions of the government seems to be those of restriction and oppression. The fear of imprisonment, fines and confiscations keeps the peasants down. . . . The peasants looked suspiciously on every movement of every officer, refusing to believe that any government representative can have good intentions or do worthy actions. Government provisions or improvements are looked upon as gloves for the hand that is stretched out for more of the means of the villager. The taxes are farmed out to tax collectors whose approach is dreaded extremely. . . .

The tendency among the villagers is to settle their disputes so far as possible without resort to the government. If quarreling arises and the government gets information of it, soldiers are sent out to investigate and compel order, and incidentally to secure as much money as possible. To avoid these dreaded quartering of soldiers on themselves, and to escape the money-making ingenuity of city officials, who seem to welcome quarrels and litigation for the profit ensuing, the disagreements and even bitterer issues may be submitted to councils of neighbors. Sometimes eight or ten men from a village will be asked to act as arbitrators in the quarrel in another village.¹¹⁷

The shaykh of the tribe is its leading man, not a legislator. He exerts authority by personal influence and moral suasion and cannot constrain otherwise, in theory at least, any member of his tribe.¹¹⁸

In essence the Palestinian peasants, dispersed and exploited by Turkish, Israeli, and Arab States, might well dispute the humanizing and progressive character of the State, and it is also arguable that the Zionist garrison State has entailed high human and material costs to the Israeli settlers themselves. It goes without saying that Hegel's image of the State as the embodiment of freedom and Marx's analysis of the state as historically necessary may be counterbalanced by examples of the state as the instrument of genocide, of which Hitler's state and the threat of nuclear holocaust are primary illustrations. The escalation of state power in the Middle East only increases the institutionalization of violence against Moslems, Jews, and Christians. The libertarian philosophy of Martin Buber as expressed in *Paths in Utopia* (1949), which is based on traditional Jewish ethics and on the anarchism

of Proudhon and Kropotkin, rejects ethnic-based statism, bureaucratic elitism, and colonialism and instead seeks to attain the goals of internationalism and universal liberation of all peoples in voluntaristic communities.¹¹⁹ Perhaps the utopian solution shall someday be viewed as the realistic condition for peace in the Middle East.

NOTES

1. Shlomo Avineri, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 8. Avineri has taught at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Yale, and Florida State University, was head of Israeli intelligence in the late 1950's, and has recently been director-general of Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover, 1956), p. 18.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 81.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 83-84.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 91-93.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 96. A statistic, Hegel also faulted Africans for lack of a political constitution, for equality of subjects and masters, and for the practice of deposing and killing kings. (*Ibid.*, pp. 96-97.)
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 98-99. Cp. Avineri, *Hegel's Theory*, p. 223, n. 8.
9. Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, p. 116.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 139, 142.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 173.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 191-222. See also *ibid.*, pp. 161-63.
13. See *ibid.*, pp. 355-60.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 360.
15. Avineri, *Hegel's Theory*, p. 224. Most of the above references to Hegel are not included in Avineri's account. For an overall assessment of "Hegelian Origins of Marx's Political Thought," see Avineri, ed., *Marx's Socialism* (New York: Lieber-Atherton, 1972).
16. Karl Marx, *On Colonialism and Modernization*, ed. Avineri (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969), p. 5.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 68.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 442-44. Cp. "Taiping Revolution," *China Reconstructs* (Peking, June 1971).
20. Marx, *On Colonialism*, p. 93.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 132-33.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 453-56.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14. "Marx's sole criteria for judging the social revolution imposed on Asia are those of European, bourgeois society itself. . . . 'Chinese communism' or 'African socialism' have no place in the universalistic scheme of Marx's socialist theory and make little sense within his philosophy of history. . . . [T]he Middle Eastern issue is only an appendage to a struggle that is basically European. . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 29).
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 47-48. Engels defines civilization in terms of technological development. Cp. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove, 1971), which defines civilization in terms of humanism.
25. See, for example, the comments against French colonialism in Algeria by the *laissez faire* economist Frédéric Bastiat (whom Marx often attacked) in *Economic Sophisms* (Princeton, N.J.: Nostrand, 1964), pp. 151-52, 200-201; and *idem*, *Selected Essays on Political Economy* (Princeton, N.J.: Nostrand, 1964), pp. 38-42, 140-41. A parallel exists between anarchism and *laissez faire*, and it is known that Bastiat and Bakunin were acquainted.

After traveling in North Africa in 1847, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote: "Even in the environs of Algiers, fertile land has been taken from Arabs and given to Europeans who are not able, or do not wish, to cultivate it themselves, and who have rented it back to the

- same natives—now tenant farmers on land that was their fathers' " (cited in Peter Geismar, *Fanon* [New York: Dial Press, 1971], p. 71).
26. C. H. Churchill, *Life of Abdel Kader* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1867), p. 35. Cf. Amílcar Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea* (New York: Monthly Review, 1969), pp. 56–75.
 27. See, for example, Churchill, *Life of Abdel Kader*, pp. 97–100.
 28. *Ibid.*, pp. 110–11.
 29. *Ibid.*, pp. 141–43.
 30. *Ibid.*, p. 128.
 31. *Ibid.*, pp. 149, 128.
 32. *Ibid.*, p. 231.
 33. *Ibid.*, p. 275.
 34. See Michael Bakunin, *On Anarchy*, ed. Sam Dolgoff (New York: Random House, 1971), pp. 63–68.
 35. Frederick Engels, "Democratic Panslavism," in Marx and Engels, *The Russian Menace to Europe*, ed. P. W. Blackstone and B. F. Hoselitz (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952), p. 71.
 36. See Jorge A. Ramos, *Historia de la nación latinoamericana* (Buenos Aires: A Peña Lillo, 1968), pp. 480–81, 492–95.
 37. Marx, *On Colonialism*, p. 407.
 38. *Ibid.*, pp. 423–24.
 39. *Ibid.*, pp. 22–23. This is in reference to an 1854 article. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 448–49, 452–53, along with Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, "Marxism and the Moslem World: The Middle East," in Nicholas Lobkowicz, ed., *Marx and the Western World* (London: University of Notre Dame, 1967).
 40. Marx and Engels, *Selected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969–70), 1:112.
 41. *Ibid.*, p. 118.
 42. Bakunin, *Obras*, ed. Max Nettlau (Barcelona: Tierra y Libertad, 1938), 1:180.
 43. *Ibid.*, 6:56. John Bright, John Stuart Mill, and Garibaldi also supported the Congress of Peace and Freedom in 1867, where Bakunin made these statements—ironically, nineteenth-century liberals were often more sympathetic to the right of self-determination of Eastern nations than were the founders of Marxism.
 44. Bakunin, *Obras completas*, ed. Max Nettlau (Buenos Aires: La Protesta, 1924–29), 5:189–90.
 45. Bakunin, *Obras*, 6:39.
 46. Bakunin, *Obras completas*, 5:9.
 47. Marx, *On Colonialism*, p. 472.
 48. See generally Mohammed Sabury, *Le genèse de l'esprit national égyptien* (Paris: Librairie Picart, 1924), including the Appendix, "Mémoire d'Arabi-Pacha à ses avocats, octobre 1882." See also Mahmūd Y. Zāyid, *Egypt's Struggle for Independence* (Beirut: Khayats, 1965).
 49. Luis Fabbri, *Vida y pensamiento de Malatesta* (Barcelona: Tierra y Libertad, 1938), pp. 80–82.
 50. *Ibid.*, p. 82.
 51. Max Nettlau, *La vida de Errico Malatesta* (Barcelona: La Revista Blanca, 1933), p. 20.
 52. Malatesta's comrades were Caesare Ceccarelli, Gaetano Marocco, and Apostolo Paulides. His attempts to join the insurgents were made in the vicinity of Abu Qir, Ramleh, and Lake Maryūt. See Fabbri, *Vida y pensamiento de Malatesta*, pp. 86–87, which is based on Un Vecchio (Icilio Parrini), "L'Anarchismo in Egipto," *La Protesta Umana* (San Francisco, Calif.), no. 40, January 9, 1904.
 53. Nettlau, *Errico Malatesta: The Biography of an Anarchist* (New York: Jewish Anarchist Federation, 1924), pp. 62, 68, 70.
 54. J. E. Bowen, *The Conflict of East and West in Egypt* (New York: Independent Press, 1886), p. 69.
 55. Marx, *On Colonialism*, p. 473.
 56. *Ibid.*, pp. 21–22.
 57. Moses Hess, *Die Europäische Triarchie* (Leipzig: Otto Wigand, 1841), pp. 176–78,

- 184-85, and generally.
58. Sidney Hook, *From Hegel to Marx* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1950), chap. 6; Mary Schulman, *Moses Hess* (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1963), pp. 50-75; and Detlef Horster, *Ökonomische Schriften: War Moses Hess Vorläufer des Marxschen "Kapital"?* (Darmstadt: Melzer Verlag, 1972).
 59. Bakunin, *Obras completas*, 5:241 (from *Statism and Anarchy* [1873]).
 60. John Weiss, *Moses Hess: Utopian Socialist* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1960), p. 23. See also Isaiah Berlin, *Moses Hess* (Cambridge: W. Heffer, 1959); and *idem*, *Karl Marx* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 73.
 61. "On the Jewish Question" (1843), in Marx, *Early Writings*, ed. T. B. Bottomore (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), pp. 1-40.
 62. Quoted in Hess, *Rome and Jerusalem* (New York: Bloch Publishing, 1918 and 1945), pp. 135-36.
 63. *Ibid.*, p. 68.
 64. *Ibid.*, pp. 129-30.
 65. *Ibid.*, pp. 227-29.
 66. *Ibid.*, p. 139.
 67. *Ibid.*, p. 154.
 68. See "Organization" (1866), in Bakunin, *Gesammelte Werke* (Berlin: Der Syndikalist, 1924), 3:52; "The Bear of Berne and the Bear of St. Petersburg" (1870), in *idem*, *Obras*, 4:244; Bakounine, *La Commune de Paris et la Notion de L'État* (Paris: Temps Nouveaux, 1899); and Lenin, *Polnoye Sobranie Sochineniya* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1962), 33:128-31.
 69. "Draft Plan for a Work on the Modern State," in Addenda to Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968), p. 668.
 70. Bakunin, "The Reaction in Germany" (1842), in *Russian Philosophy*, ed. J. M. Edie, J. P. Scanlan, and M. B. Zeldin (Chicago: Quadrangle Press, 1965), 1:406.
 71. Bakunin, *Obras*, 1:188 (1870).
 72. "Speech to Hague Congress" (1872), in Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, 2:293.
 73. Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp. 146-47.
 74. *Ibid.*, pp. 150 ff.
 75. *Ibid.*, pp. 168-71.
 76. *Ibid.*, pp. 174, 181-84.
 77. *Ibid.*, pp. 187-98.
 78. *Ibid.*, pp. 198-200.
 79. *Ibid.*, pp. 202-18, 236-48, 251-58.
 80. Ber Borochov, *Nationalism and the Class Struggle: A Marxian Approach to the Jewish Problem* (New York: Poale Zion-Zeire Zion of America, 1937), p. 169.
 81. Borochov mentions the Levinthal brothers, Axelrod, Aronson, Lazare Goldenberg, L. Zukerman, Jessie Helfman, and Gotz.
 82. *Ibid.*, p. 170.
 83. *Ibid.*, p. 171.
 84. *Ibid.*, pp. 171-72. "Lieberman's leading article in the first number of Haemet, devoted to the Jewish problem, categorically denied the existence of a Jewish people, as may be seen from the following: 'We Jews do not possess a culture of our own which differentiates and isolates us from the nations among whom we live. . .'" (*ibid.*, p. 173).
 85. Rudolf Rocker, *The London Years* (London: Robert Anscombe, 1956), p. 119.
 86. *Ibid.*, pp. 116-17.
 87. *Ibid.*, pp. 117-19.
 88. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
 89. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
 90. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
 91. *Ibid.*, p. 153.
 92. *Ibid.*, p. 163. See also *ibid.*, p. 29; and Isaac Deutscher, *The Non-Jewish Jew* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 61, 66-67.

93. Theodor Herzl, *The Diaries of Theodor Herzl*, ed. Marvin Lowenthal (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1962), p. 375.
94. *Ibid.*, pp. 395-403, 412-13.
95. Borochoy, *Nationalism and the Class Struggle*, pp. 30-34.
96. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
97. *Ibid.*, p. 117.
98. *Ibid.*, pp. 142-43.
99. *Ibid.*, p. 137.
100. *Ibid.*, p. 197.
101. *Ibid.*, p. 199.
102. Borochoy rarely mentioned the Arab population, although at one point he declared that proper "colonization" methods would provide sufficient land for Jews and Arabs. (*Ibid.*, p. 130.)
103. *Ibid.*, p. 202. See further, Borochoy, *Sozialismus und Zionismus* (Vienna: Zukuntt, 1932). Cf. Moshe Zedek, "Borochovism," in J. N. Porter and P. Dreier, eds., *Jewish Radicalism* (New York: Grove, 1973), pp. 100-10.
104. See generally Alexander Manor, *Le sionisme-socialisme* (Tel Aviv: Ihoud Nanoar Hahal-outs, 1952?), a survey of Hess, Syrkin, Borochoy, Gordon, Katznelson, and Arlosorof; and Allon Gal, *Socialist-Zionism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1973), an attempt to apply Marxist analysis to Jewish people, based on the sociology and economics of Borochoy and Syrkin.
105. Yehuda Gothelf, ed., *Israel: Towards a New Society* (Tel Aviv: Labour Zionist Movement, 1969), p. 86—pro-Hess and Lassalle, and anti-Marx; A. D. Gordon, *Selected Essays* (New York: League for Labor Palestine, 1938)—no significant references to Marx; and generally S. Levenberg, *The Jews and Palestine: A Study in Labour Zionism* (London: Poale Zion, 1945).
106. Arthur Hertzberg, *The Zionist Idea* (New York: Antheneum and the Jewish Publishing Society, 1969), p. 50.
107. Menachim Begin, *The Revolt* (London: W. H. Allen, 1951), p. 3.
108. Hess, *Rome and Jerusalem*, p. 199.
109. Michael Bar-Zohar, *Ben-Gurion* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1967), p. 103.
110. Arie Bober, ed., *The Other Israel: The Radical Case Against Zionism* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1972).
111. Cf. Bryan Turner, *Science and Society* (Winter 1976-77) as reprinted in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 6, no. 3 (Spring 1977):166-77, "Could Karl Marx Ever Have Supported Colonialism?"
112. Avineri, *Israel and the Palestinians* (New York: St. Martin's, 1971), p. 144.
113. *Ibid.*, p. 146.
114. *Ibid.*, p. 140. Al Fatah does not consider itself Marxist. As spokesman Abu Eyad stated, "There are classes and groups which were not known at the time of Karl Marx. Did Karl Marx discuss the question of the class of refugees that has emerged among the Palestinian people?" (Leila S. Kadi, ed., *Basic Documents of the Armed Palestinian Resistance Movement* [Beirut: P. L. O. Research Center, 1969], p. 68). While some smaller Palestinian guerrilla organizations call themselves Marxist-Leninist, their "Marxism" may be a matter of form, especially if Avineri's interpretation of Marxism is correct.
115. Avineri, "Modernization and Arab Society," in Irving Howe and Carl Gershman, eds., *Israel, the Arabs and the Middle East* (New York: Bantam, 1972), p. 301.
116. Franz Oppenheimer, *The State* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1914), reprinted in 1975 by New York: Free Life Editions. Cf. the works of Engels, Bakunin, and Lenin on the state.
117. Elihu Grant, *The People of Palestine* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1907 and 1921), pp. 225-28.
118. *Ibid.*, pp. 251-52.
119. Martin Buber, *Paths in Utopia* (Boston: Beacon Hill, 1949).