

REJOINDER TO HOPPE ON IMMIGRATION

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I. INTRODUCTION

THE PRESENT PAPER IS the continuation of an intra-libertarian debate¹ over immigration. Previous contributions to this dialogue on the open borders side include Block, 1998, 2004A, 2011; Block and Callahan, 2003;

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¹That there is any such thing such as an intra-libertarian debate in a scholarly journal on any issue, let alone immigration, constitutes both a positive and a negative. This phenomenon is encouraging in that it is only through argument that we can ever get that one millionth of an inch closer to the truth (Hoppe, 1993, 204-207). In years gone by there was no peer reviewed journal that would more than barely tolerate libertarian analysis of any kind; sharp and bitter criticism of the libertarian philosophy was the best that could be hoped for. A refereed review opening its pages to an intra-libertarian discussion was simply not a possibility; ignoring this viewpoint in its entirety was the far more usual practice. Now, happily, there are more than just a few scholarly periodicals, including the present one, that will engage in such practice. But this is also a negative in that it shows how much more work needs to be put into libertarianism if it is to attain maturity. I take it that this perspective has not yet attained that goal for the following reason. I think I speak without fear of contradiction when I say (watch out for forthcoming shameless promotion) that there are not two more dedicated, committed, hard working, energetic, and, yes, talented libertarian theoreticians engaged in pushing out the frontiers of this philosophy than Hoppe and myself. If the two of us could come to such starkly different analyses of such an important issue as immigration, while enthusiastically sharing basic premises and agreeing on, to be conservative, 99.9% of all other issues pertaining to political economy, is *prima facie* evidence that this magnificent multi dimensional seemingly simple yet complex philosophy of ours is not fully understood. One further bit of evidence for this contention: Murray N. Rothbard, the greatest libertarian theorist who ever lived in my view, and who changed his opinion on virtually nothing else after he came to his maturity, was of two opposite minds on this issue. He took what Hoppe (2002, 88) calls an

Gregory and Block, 2007. The restricted borders argument includes Hoppe 1995, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002.²

To put our debate in its sharpest terms, Hoppe (2002)³ claims that under our present mixed economy statist regime, the government is justified in imposing limitations on immigration, and I deny this. This disagreement holds as a matter of libertarian principle and also from the perspective of pragmatism or utilitarianism, very broadly construed. The danger we both foresee in this latter regard is that we will be overrun by hordes of uncivilized folk and what little freedom we still possess will become a thing of the past as a result. Hoppe thinks that the only way to obviate this threat is for the government to place limits on immigration. My argument is that this is not compatible with libertarianism, and is not needed in any case, as a strict adherence to private property rights and the non aggression axiom will also save us from this fate, without being incompatible with libertarian theory.

Section II is devoted to a consideration of the areas where Hoppe and I agree. In section III we discuss major areas of disagreement. Section IV deals with minor areas of disagreement. In section V I attempt to offer a libertarian solution to the threat of being overrun by hordes of immigrants, if we adhere to libertarian principle.

II. AREAS OF AGREEMENT

First, I enthusiastically⁴ concur with him that were a billion Chinese or Indians or Africans⁵ to suddenly immigrate to the U.S., this would be an unmitigated disaster for our society. These newcomers would bring with them the same culture, practices, habits of mind, that have their home countries to pitiful existences under which they presently suffer. Their numbers would swamp ours, certainly if they were allowed to vote in our political process, and even if not. And further, under an open border policy, it is

“open border policy” in his publication of (1962, appendix B), and denounced this in (1994, 7). The latter recantation was cited in de Soto (1998).

²Bylund, 2005 and Rozeff, 2005 constitute an attempt to reconcile both parties.

³The main focus of the present paper.

⁴When I agree with Hoppe on pretty much any issue, I do so very enthusiastically. Our minds, at least in my own view, travel in the same channels.

⁵If only two billion of these people were to show up on our doorstep, any two of these three, and bitterly opposed each other, then it is barely possible that the 300 million people already in this country could obtain extra political power, as a sort of counter weight to each of these two communities. But this scenario is extremely unlikely. More plausible is that these two different populations would soon come to agree to a vast income and wealth redistribution from us to them, and we would be powerless to stop it.

extremely likely that just this sort of disastrous occurrence would befall us. International transportation is now relatively cheap. The gains to the Chinese, Indians or Africans would be enormous from relocating here.

Second, I am in full accord with Hoppe that the free international movement of goods, capital and people are not at all on a par. There is all the world of difference between the first two of these, on the one hand, and the third, on the other, as a matter of libertarian law. For in the cases of goods and capital, there are clearly two parties, one in the exporting, the other in the importing country, who *agree* to this transfer. As regards and immigrant who just shows up on our nations' shores, this is not necessarily the case.

Third, I think Hoppe (2002, 77) puts his finger on a crucial assumption underlying this discourse. This is his assumption that “all property is owned privately and the entire globe is settled. Every piece of land, every house and building, every road, river and lake, every forest and mountain, and all of the coastline is owned by private owners or firms. No such thing as ‘public’ property or ‘open frontier’ exists.” Under these circumstances, the immigration debate between the two of us would be at an end, at least insofar as libertarian theory is concerned, when applied to land masses comprising roads, parks, public libraries, fire houses, garbage dumps, etc. No one could “migrate” to any of these places without committing trespass. For they would all be owned privately. “Immigrating” to any of them, without their private owners’ express permission, would be exactly akin to breaking and entering into someone’s private home, shop or office. It would be a downright violation of property rights.

III. MAJOR AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT

Having discussed these three areas of agreement,⁶ I now move to points of disagreement.

First under this heading consider again that issue of the international movement of goods, capital and people. I have said before that there is a difference in international trade between goods and capital

⁶A large part of my motivation for doing so, indeed, for writing this entire article, is to attempt a reconciliation with Hoppe on this matter, and by doing so come just that small bit closer to the truth, which is “out there” (see X files: <http://www.themareks.com/xf/>) somewhere. It seems unreasonable to me that he and I should agree to so much, and diverge on this issue. I think I again speak for both of us when I say my goal is to ward off the immigration debacle scenario (being overwhelmed by billions of unsuitable immigrants) without compromising in the least with libertarian theory.

investment on the one hand and people on the other, in that the former necessarily requires mutual consent between the two trading parties, while the latter may not.

However, movement of people, too, could be mutually agreed upon, if there was a specific employer who invited in the immigrant to work for him. Hoppe says this would not be enough. The employer, in his view must act like a factory town and ensure the immigrant employee does not impose costs on anyone else. He (2002, 91-92, fn. 23, material in brackets in the first and third cases inserted by present author) states: “Unfortunately, welfare states are not operated like factory towns or even Swiss communities. Under welfare-statist condition(s), the immigrant employer must pay only a small fraction of the full costs associated with the immigrant’s presence. He is permitted to socialize (externalize) a substantial part of such costs onto other property owners. Equipped with a work permit, the immigrant is allowed to make free use of every public facility: roads, parks, hospitals, schools, and no landlord, businessman, or private (association) is permitted to discriminate against him as regards housing, employment, accommodation, and association. That is, the immigrant comes invited with a substantial fringe benefits package paid for not (or only partially) by the immigrant employer (who allegedly has extended the invitation), but by other domestic proprietors as taxpayers who had no say in the invitation whatsoever. This is not an ‘invitation,’ as commonly understood. This is an imposition. It is like inviting immigrant workers to renovate one’s own house while feeding them from other people’s refrigerators.”

But this claim cannot be reconciled with libertarianism. The employer who does not provide all these benefits to his immigrant employees is not himself guilty of a crime. If a democracy votes for such programs, which of course constitute blatant theft, it is not the employer’s fault if he in effect takes advantage of him via his immigrant employees. Would Hoppe be so rash as to condemn on these grounds parents who bring children into the world knowing full well that “other ... taxpayers ... had no say in the ‘invitation’ whatsoever”? Would he equate giving birth to feeding your children “from other people’s refrigerators?” If so, he is compelled by the laws of logic to maintain that starting a family in a mixed economy is a per se violation of libertarian law. If not, he must show a relevant difference between an immigrant and a newborn (some two decades later, when the baby will be entitled to all sorts of benefits at the expense of people other than the parents). This he has not done; nor has he even recognized the obligation on his part to do so.⁷

⁷This argument, analogizing new births 20 years later to present immigrants, was made in Block (1998).

Next, suppose that a large landowner in Texas for example, hired 1 billion “Zulus, Hindus, Ibos, Albanians or Bangladeshis” (Hoppe, 2002, 88, hence ZHIABs) and also an equal number of Chinese and housed them on his ranch. Would they be allowed out into the area of the entire U.S., under a purely libertarian regime? It is hard to see why at least certain ones of them would not. Posit that the ZHIABs were all obstreperous, high time preference (Hoppe, 2001) folk given to engaging in criminal behavior, and had not a shred of respect for the property rights of others, but that the Chinese were all peaceful, timid, low preference types who saw other peoples’ property rights as a sacred trust to be respected. It is difficult to see why the Chinese, all one billion of them, would not be welcomed by the “inter regional movement” (Hoppe, 2002, 78) industry, while the ZHIABs (South Park episode on the Jagoffs, tba) would be confined to their Texas ranch. Even Hoppe (2002, 78) himself seems to admit as much when he says: “There will be plenty of movement under this scenario because there are powerful reasons to open access to one’s property, but there are also reasons to restrict or close access. Those who are the most inclusive are the owners of roads, railway stations, harbors, and airports, for example. Interregional movement is their business. Accordingly, their admissions standards can be expected to be low, typically requiring nor more than a payment of a user fee. However, even they would not follow a completely non-discriminatory admission policy. For instance, they would exclude intoxicated or unruly people and eject all trespassers, beggars, and bums from their property, and they might videotape or otherwise monitor or screen their customers while on their property.”⁸

Hoppe (2001, 91) discusses “the intrusion and invasion of masses of aliens who by no stretch of the imagination can be deemed welcome or invited by domestic residents.” Note that this author uses the plural form for the word “resident.” E.g., he mentions “residents,” not the singular, “resident.” Here, he runs afoul of one of the basis premises of Austrian economics, methodological individualism (Mises, 1978, ch. 5; 1933). Yes, a *majority* of the residents of the U.S. may well object to our Texan inviting his two billion foreigner immigrant employees onto his land, but in the truly free, e.g., libertarian, society, it only takes *one* such person to justify this act, and the wishes of the other domestic residents may be damned, Hoppe to the contrary notwithstanding. If not, we have left the arena of proper libertarian theory, and are venturing into illicit philosophies.

Here is a second point of disagreement. Let us again consider this crucial assumption of Hoppe’s (2002, 77): “Let us take one more step

⁸See on this also Block, 2009.

and assume all property is owned privately and the entire globe is settled. Every piece of land, every house and building, every road, river and lake, every forest and mountain, and all of the coastline is owned by private owners or firms. No such thing as ‘public’ property or ‘open frontier’ exists.” And, again, (Hoppe, 2002, 89-90): “Foreigners would have a right to enter Switzerland, Austria or Italy (hence SAI) only if these places were uninhabited (unowned) territories. However, they *are* owned, and no one has a right to enter territories that others own unless invited by the owner. Nor is it permissible to argue, as some open border proponents have done, that while foreigners may not enter *private* property without the owner’s permission they may do so with *public* property. In their eyes, public property is akin to unowned property, and thus ‘open’ to everyone, domestic citizen and foreigners alike. However, this analogy between public property and unowned resources is wrong. There is a categorical difference between unowned resources (open frontier) and public property. Public property is the result of State-government confiscations—of legislative expropriations and/or taxation—of originally privately owned property.”

There are several difficulties here. First of all, our author slips too quickly from an *assumption*, in the first quote immediately above (Hoppe, 2002, 77), to an attempt at analogizing the real world situation in the second quote (Hoppe, 2002, 89-90). For Hoppe (2002, 84) announces “with this backdrop of domestic state policies we can return to the problem of immigration under statist conditions.” I understand him to mean by “statist” conditions the *real*, actual situation we face today. But if so, then there is an entire category of geography that Hoppe totally ignores, territory that is *not* owned, since it has never been homesteaded.⁹ Forget about, at least for the moment, the claim that “public property is akin to unowned property” Hoppe, 2002, 90). We are now discussing not “houses and buildings and roads (Hoppe, 2002, 77) but rather “rivers, lakes, forests, mountains and coastlines” that have never been so much as seen by the human eye, let alone touched by human hands; certainly, there has been no “mixing of labor” with them. Forget about SAI. For all I know, there are no such places there.¹⁰ We are now talking about places like the U.S. (the vast reaches of Alaska, Nevada, Wyoming), Russia and Canada (the frozen tundra) and Australia (deserts). What libertarian rights would a group of ZHIABs (Hoppe, 2002, 88) violate were they to, *arguendo*, settle in such

⁹Hoppe, along with Rothbard and Kinsella, are in my opinion the leading libertarian theoreticians of homesteading as the basis of legitimacy in property. See on this Hoppe (1993), Rothbard (1978A), Kinsella (2001).

¹⁰Although maybe parts of the Alps qualify in this regard.

places? None that I can see. Hoppe simply cannot be allowed to ignore this possibility, in his claim that a state is justified in barring its doors to all would be immigrants, on grounds of libertarian property rights. This simply does not hold if they are going to settle in terrains which have *not* been homesteaded by anyone.

Rothbard (1998, 63) speaks with great relevance to this point:

Suppose ... that Mr. Green legally owns a certain acreage of land, of which the northwest portion has never been transformed from its natural state by Green or by anyone else. Libertarian theory will morally validate his claim for the rest of the land—provided, as the theory requires, that there is no identifiable victim (or that Green had not himself stolen the land.) But libertarian theory must invalidate his claim to ownership of the northwest portion. Now, so long as no ‘settler’ appears who will initially transform the northwest portion, there is no real difficulty; Brown’s (sic; I think Rothbard means “Green” here) claim may be invalid but it is also mere meaningless verbiage. He is not yet a criminal aggressor against anyone else. But should *another* man appear who does transform the land, and should Green oust him by force from the property (or employ others to do so), then Green becomes at that point a criminal aggressor against land justly owned by another. The same would be true if Green should use violence to prevent another settler from entering upon this never-used land and transforming it into use.

The relationship between the “settler” and Green in Rothbard’s analysis is *precisely* the position of the would-be immigrant vis a vis the citizens of the country into which he wishes to enter. Just as Green “legally owns” land but has never homesteaded the “northwest portion” of it, so, too, do the citizens of the U.S. *legally* own the entirety of the landmass claimed by this entity, but have never “transformed from its natural state” parts of it. No problem arises until and unless the immigrant wishes to homestead those parts of the land claimed by the U.S. that remain an untouched wilderness. When the government uses violence to prevent the immigrant from settling in those areas, it becomes “at that point a criminal aggressor.”

Let us now leave off our discussion of totally unowned terrain and now turn to an analysis of actual public property. By this I mean we will now direct our attention not to “lakes, forests, mountains and coastline” in far off places but rather to “houses, buildings, roads” built by the government with money stolen from taxpayers. Here, I agree enthusiastically with Hoppe (2002, 90) that “While the state does not *recognize* anyone as its private

owner, all of government controlled property has in fact been brought about by the tax-paying members of the domestic public. Austrians, Swiss and Italians, in accordance with the amount of taxes paid by each citizen, have funded the Austrian, Swiss and Italian public property. Hence *they* must be considered its legitimate owners.” However, he then goes on to say (Hoppe, 2002, 90): “Foreigners have not been subject to domestic taxation and expropriation; hence, they cannot claim any rights regarding Austrian, Swiss or Italian public property.”

I regard this as the *beginning* of a libertarian analysis of the issue, not the end of the matter, as does Hoppe, who then ignores this very crucial point, and goes on to other matters. Let us, instead, probe a bit deeper.

Ok. So the ASIs do not seize their rightfully owned public property. We know that because there is such a thing as public property in these countries, that has not yet been privatized. Why have they not? Why are they so docile? So acquiescent? There are several possibilities. One, is that they dare not. Under this hypothesis, they are all, or at least most, really libertarians. They are filled with hatred for this statist theft of their wealth, and its conversion into public property. They know full well that these “public goods” (Barnett and Block, 2007; Cowen, 1988; Hoppe, 1989; Hummel, 1990; Osterfeld, 1989; Pasour, 1981; Rothbard, 1997; Schmidtz, 1991; Sechrest, 2003, 2004;) are really stolen property. They fully buy into the Hoppe-Block hypothesis that they are the rightful owners of these amenities. They are in the position of the man forced to give up his watch and wallet to a mugger at the point of a gun. They are hapless victims, positively drooling with anxiety to get back their stolen possessions.

If so, were a bunch of ZHIAB Ragnar Danneskjolds (Rand, 1957) to suddenly sweep down on these “public” institutions and offer to return these properties to them (minus, of course, something like a 30% cut for salvage),¹¹ the ASIs would welcome these ZHIABs as their saviors. The ASIs would see the ZHIAB Danneskjolds in roughly the same way that the hold up victim views a private detective who captures the mugger, and returns his stolen watch and wallet to him for a fee.

Say what you will about this scenario, its greatest danger is that it will engender serious stomach cramps from laughter on the part of the ASIs, and all commentators who know anything about these countries. “It betrays a breathtaking sociological naivete to believe that” (Hoppe, 2002, 88) this is the way in which the citizenry of these countries view “their” parks, roads, libraries, museums, public schools, fire houses,

¹¹Block (2006), makes the case that these rescuers would be justified, on libertarian grounds, in doing precisely this.

police stations, welfare offices, etc. They do not at all see these properties as having been robbed from them. This, of course, is not to deny that as a point of fact, these amenities *have* been stolen from them, and that, when the ZHIAB Ragnars liberate these properties from the ASI governments, they must, in justice, return these properties to the latter, subject to a salvage fee of course. It is only to demonstrate that we must probe deeper than does Hoppe. Further evidence for this claim, should any be needed, lies in the fact that in ASI, leftist parties form the government, sometimes with the minority support of actual communists. As well, actual Libertarian Parties are scarce as hen's teeth in the part of the world.¹²

Of course, if the ASI citizens protest too much, and actually oppose the ZHIAB Ragnar-like efforts to return their rightfully owned property to them, then all bets are off. If so, these people are no longer to be considered victims of statist aggression. Instead, they are rather now to be considered aides and abettors, collaborators, as it were, with evil governments.¹³ This being the case, the inroads of millions of Ragnar Danneskjolds from ZHIAB, must be viewed in an entirely different light, other than the one employed by Hoppe, at least from any perspective calling itself libertarian. Then, these ASI citizens, far from being the rightful albeit presently dispossessed owners of public property in ASI, are actually in league with these governments that have stolen from the righteous minority owners, the ones who oppose government, and favor deliverance from them, by ZHIABs or anyone else.

IV. MINOR DISAGREEMENTS

We shall now discuss a few minor disagreements I have with Hoppe (2002) and then move on to the next section where I attempt to offer a libertarian solution to the “yellow menace” problem.

States Hoppe (2002, 90-91): “... the democratic welfare states ... acknowledge that public property is ‘somehow’ the property of their citizens and that they are the citizens’ trustees in regard to public property.”

¹²In the U.S., where the Libertarian Party is the strongest in the world, it garners less than 5% of most vote totals. See on this <http://www.lp.org/>.

¹³Is it possible that anarcho-capitalism (what Hoppe for some strange reason calls “natural order”) has actually been *achieved* in ASI? Yes, but only if all residents acquiesce in the tax seizures used to finance public property. But if there is even a single solitary individual in each of these countries who objects, and assesses this as theft, then the support for these policies on the part of the 99.99% of the population amounts to nothing other than the tyranny of the majority.

I find this problematic. Even if Hoppe could provide cites to government officials “acknowledging” that public property really belongs to the citizenry, and that the bureaucrats are really only “trustees” in their behalf in this regard, which he does not, this claim is *false*. At best it is an assertion, not an “acknowledgement.” But putting matters thus, Hoppe mistakenly gives it some credence. But nothing could be further from the truth. The actual owner of property is of course he who can legally direct its use, and prevent others from utilizing it without his leave. When put in this way, who is the real owner of public resources: the government officials charged with their management, or the general public? It cannot be denied that the park, hospital or museum board is constrained in what it can do. It cannot privatize the given establishment, and personally pocket the proceeds. But apart from that, it, not the public, determines usage, opening hours, closing hours, rules, etc. Thus the *de facto* and the *de jure* owner is the state, no the long suffering taxpayer.

Next, consider Hoppe’s oft made denigration of those he is pleased to disparage as “left libertarians” (2002, 91-92) for opposing government restricted borders, such as myself. Why are they, we, *left libertarians*? If they are in error, on the assumption Hoppe is correct in his criticism, then they are not libertarians at all, in my view, at least on this one subject. Or, they are “mistaken” libertarians on this issue. For example, there are some people who call themselves libertarians, but are really no such thing; instead, they are libertines (Block, 1994). They claim, among other things, that not only should all addictive drugs and uncommon sexual practices between consenting adults be legalized, but those to refrain from actually engaging in such practices are not really libertarians. But this is an utter perversion of libertarianism. To call such people left libertarians is to bestow upon them an unearned honorific. They are not libertarians at all. Similarly, suppose there were someone who claimed that as an integral part of libertarianism, one must eschew mind altering drugs, wear a suit and tie, and favor Bush’s Iraq imperialism. Would such an individual qualify as a right libertarian? Not a bit of it. On those issues, such a person would best be characterized as not a libertarian at all; perhaps as a conservative.

Hoppe errs on this matter when he (2002, 92) characterizes the Randians as, of all things, supporting, or being in association with, *left wing libertarians*. If ever there were a group that deserved categorization as a right wing libertarian (not that any does) it is the followers of Ayn Rand. They are absolutely rabid on the pro U.S. imperialism side in Iraq, and positively excoriate “hippies.” I am truly confused. As an opponent of government interference with peaceful immigrants, an open border “enthusiast,” Hoppe (2002, 91) would characterize me as

a left wing libertarian. But I certainly reject the Randroid (Rothbard, 1987, 1989; Walker, 1999) notion that U.S. businessmen are “the welfare state’s most severely persecuted minority.” Rand, according to Hoppe, is thus a left wing libertarian. Since I oppose this view of hers, and she is left wing, I suppose that implies I am a right wing libertarian, at least on this one issue. Puzzling. Very. I confess, I do not see the benefits of such characterizations.

In contrast, I adopt a “plumb line” libertarian perspective (Block, 2007). There is but *one* libertarianism. It is based on private property rights through homesteading and the non-aggression axiom. Period. All other “libertarianisms” are errors, not members in good standing of libertarianism, only stressing “left” or “right” wing elements of this philosophy.

V. SOLUTIONS

Let us summarize to this point. I fully agree with Hoppe that under present circumstances (welfare states in Europe, the U.S., Canada, Australia) an open borders policy would be a disaster. Western civilization would be snuffed out by the onrushing hordes of ZHIABs, not the mention the Orientals and Indians. The challenge is to preclude this, without compromising in the slightest, as does Hoppe with his advocacy of statist immigration barriers, with libertarian theory.

Let me address this issue under three headings. First on the presently realistic assumption that libertarians have virtually no political power, and that our solutions will be dismissed with contempt, or, as is more likely, completely ignored.

What should we advocate under these assumptions, if we wish to remain true to our principles? Why, open borders, of course. It is not for us to worry about foreign inundation. Let the “duly constituted”¹⁴ authorities do so. An immigrant who settles in an empty unhome-steaded part of the U.S., Canada, Russia or Australia steals from no one, and commits no crime. To stop him from so doing smacks of forestalling (Block, 2004B; Block and Whitehead, 2005), forcibly excluding people from going about the business of homesteading land never previously justifiably owned, or even occupied at all. And if the immigrant perches in a public park he has every right to do so, certainly if he is willing to cede most (but not all) of it to those who are willing and able to offer tax receipts as evidence of statist theft.¹⁵

¹⁴Sure. See on this Spooner (1870).

¹⁵Those people would of course have to come with clean (libertarian) hands. See on this Block (2006).

Next, take an intermediate case. Here, the Libertarian Party is not strong enough to take full power, but is able to possibly form a minority government, or provide a balance, such that other parties find it in their interest to accede to at least some libertarian proposals. Then what? Why, then, we offer a series of threats: we favor open borders, but do not wish to welcome hordes of barbarians. In order to obviate this possibility, we also advocate dismantling the entire health, education and welfare system, along with the entire panoply of other “benefits” such as affirmative action, social security, public roads and parks, unemployment insurance, etc.¹⁶

Third scenario. We libertarians now have total power. We “take over” an entire country, for example the U.S., whether by coup d’etat or democratic methods, it matters not one whit.¹⁷ We do so only in order to “impose” freedom on the people.

Is our very first step to open the borders, wide open, to all comers? If we came to “power” through a gradual democratic process, and have already implemented every other element of our program, then Yes. That would be the only thing left to do. Our previous steps, to be discussed at length below, would safeguard us from the “yellow peril.” However, if we “seized the reins” of government more sharply, and found ourselves “ruling” over a mixed economy of the sort now in vogue in Europe and the Americas, we would not.¹⁸ Indeed, among the *last* things we would do would be to jettison all immigration requirements, for reasons eloquently and powerfully stated by Hoppe (2002). Similarly, if we have learned any lesson from the plight of New Orleans in the aftermath of Katrina (Rockwell, 2005B), it is that the public police, however inept and corrupt, would not be the very first institution to be privatized.¹⁹

¹⁶This might appear “impolitic.” But, note, we are not concerned about how this will “play in Peoria,” only with adhering strictly to libertarian principles. In short, we adopt the “Black power is gonna get your mama” principles of a very different movement, but informed by the non aggression axiom.

¹⁷For the libertarian this process means, of course, nothing other than that we *free* the populace of all sorts of infringements of their liberty and property rights. See on this Rockwell, 2005A.

¹⁸That is, if we had a choice, and there were many government institutions to dismantle. One of the lacunae in libertarian theorizing is the issue of the order in which we would free up a mixed, socialist or fascist economy. The next few paragraphs of this paper would be much improved if they had a literature of this sort to rely upon.

¹⁹Again, given a long list of statist programs to disassemble. Otherwise, the statist police must go, immediately. The New Orleans experience teaches us, I think, that ordinary citizens can band together to quell muggers, if they are not

What, then, do we do to minimize the chances the when we open the borders to all immigrants, we will not be overrun by billions of scalawags, criminals, bums and other undesirables?

First, of course, we implement our previously mentioned threats of ending all health, education, welfare and ancillary programs.

Second, we then quickly privatize each and every square inch of public land in the country. With this accomplished, there will be no need of any foreign (or domestic) Ragnar Danneskjolds. We do this task ourselves. We have our own “made in America” plan of privatization for converting the public into the private sector. There are no longer any more parks, or roads, or government buildings.

Third, either during our rise to power, if we did so gradually, or, if not, then, now, all at once, we implement a policy of full free trade with all nations. We did or now do so not via NAFTA and WTO and other such fascistic enterprises, but via an immediate unilateral declaration of free trade with all nations. If emanating from the U.S., this one policy alone will have a significant effect on raising living standards throughout the world. Thus, the differential in productivity levels of labor for a denizen of the ZHIAB between what it is in his home country, and what it would be in the U.S., will fall. It might well decrease drastically, so much that it would no longer economically justify immigration to the U.S. in the eyes of such potential immigrants. It is a lot cheaper to export capital to an undeveloped country than to import labor into a potential host country. Of course this one policy, on its own, will hardly suffice to ward off the hordes. There are numerous countries so wracked by internal warfare and lack of respect for property rights that they would not constitute profitable havens for capital. We must have other arrows in our quiver.

prevented from doing so by thugs such as FEMA. He who has the power to end a slave system, and retains it even for one minute longer than he need do, is at least partially guilty of that crime himself. Leonard Read once famously posed the challenge, if there were a button that could be pressed and would *immediately* end all statist depredations, would he push it. Murray Rothbard stated that he would *blister* his thumb pushing that button. Some libertarians might not be sure they would do so, particularly if there were a second button that would guarantee a quick and orderly but thus not instantaneous rescinding of all government institutions. Their fear would be that millions of innocent people would die in the chaos a too abrupt end of the state would bring. The fault here, they might argue, would not be libertarianism; it would be due to the centuries long evils of government. I take a more radical position on this matter. No utilitarian, I would push the first button. My motto is “justice though the heavens fall.” As for the slaughter of innocents, I rely on the beneficial effects of justice.

Fourth, we institute the truly draconian punishments on criminals, trespassers, and other malefactors that libertarian theory supports (Rothbard, 1998, 94; Gregory and Block, 2007). As well, our private police forces are far more efficient than the statist variety. One reason for this is the market's weeding out process for inefficient firms (Hazlitt, 1979). Another is that there would be no victimless crimes (drugs, sex) on which the police would waste their time and manpower. As a result, the rate of apprehension of evildoers rises spectacularly. Coupled with libertarian type punishments for those convicted, this not only discourages the unruly from entering our shores, it convinces some undesirable natives of the U.S. to *emigrate* to other more forgiving jurisdictions, to escape our far more certain and far more severe domestic justice.

Fifth, what about our Texas rancher who "imports" one billion third world workers onto his justly owned property.²⁰ As we have seen, if they are civilized, they will likely be let out onto the roads and highways of the nation, and do no real harm. Indeed, maybe some good. If not, they will be likely penned in at the ranch. If so, this will likely be anticipated by the ranch owner before he makes any such decision. He will be less likely to undertake such a venture in the first place, since he will not be able to "assume ... the full costs associated with the importation of his immigrant-employee(s)" (Hoppe, 2002, 91). He will not be able to lay off his health, education and welfare, etc., etc., costs of his over crowded workers onto others, for there will be no such programs, anymore, on the basis of which he can do so. Certainly, his efforts will no longer be supported by affirmative action, public social security, unemployment insurance and other such programs in existence.²¹ This being the case, our rancher is unlikely to inaugurate this policy in the first place, given that he will not expect it to be profitable.²²

²⁰According to Williams (1999) there is room for all of earth's six billion people in this entire state. There ought to be room for a mere one billion in a large ranch. If not, we can contemplate, in addition, parts of New Mexico, Arizona, Oklahoma, etc.

²¹Another reason for thinking this scheme to be uneconomical, and hence unlikely to take place, is that there would be too many people per unit of land to make it commercially viable.

²²For the argument that slavery, which is in some ways analogous to the scenario we are now considering, was not profitable, see Hummel (1996).

²³In a just libertarian society, private defense agencies (Anderson and Hill, 1979; Benson, 1989, 1990; Cuzan, 1979; Fielding, 1978; Friedman, 1989; Hoppe, 1993, 2001, 2003; Long, 2004; Molinari, 1977; Murphy, 2002, 2005; Rothbard, 1973, 1978B, 1998; Sechrest, 1999; Sneed, 1977; Spooner, 1870; Stringham, Edward, 1998-1999; Tannehills, 1984; Tinsley, 1998-1999;

What about a group such as the NAACP? Would it be likely that they might purchase or homestead vast tracts of undeveloped marginal land in the west or Alaska and invite in the proverbial one billion Africans? Groups of this sort are not exactly known for their entrepreneurial acumen. It is likely that any such venture would be a money losing proposition, which might well reduce the likelihood of its occurrence in the first place. This might well, alone, stop the second such venture, were there to be a first one. In any case, the harm to third parties of the initial attempt, should it occur, would be confined to this one land holding, given the low probability of such people being let out onto the roads by a private industry concerned with the bottom line. Another point is that groups of this sort, or, indeed, any sort, could no longer count on government subsidies. That alone might put paid to this scenario.

Sixth, let us consider the precise location of the supposed invited third world immigrant workers onto submarginal land: the Canadian and Alaskan tundra, or a mountaintop in the Rockies. This, too, would not constitute as much support for massive immigration under a libertarian open borders policy as Hoppe might think.²³ For there is a reason why these lands are submarginal: the alternative costs of locating there are simply too high to support residences or businesses in ordinary circumstances.²⁴ If a highly technological society such as that which exists in the U.S. and Canada cannot render the tundra or the out of the way mountain top economically viable, there is little hope that a far less sophisticated group of people from the third world could make a success of it.²⁵

There is one more point that must be made regarding submarginal land included in, or contiguous to, advanced western societies, that might serve as targets for immigration under strict libertarian rules. Given a regime of *laissez faire* capitalism, these countries would be

Woolridge, 1970) could exclude uninvited immigrants only from land that is owned by someone. We now assume that the territories under discussion have never been homesteaded, and thus cannot be legitimately *owned*, under libertarian property rights theory.

²⁴The location of a few Quonset huts now placed in Antarctica are not an exception to this rule. People there are doing scientific work deemed valuable enough by those supporting it to undertake the additional costs required by that harsh locale.

²⁵Hoppe (2002, 86, fn. 17) mentions the special case of the Jews and immigration. This one group might prove an exception to the general rule about immigrants and submarginal land. If they can make “the desert bloom” perhaps they could also do so for what is now considered arctic wasteland.

enormously wealthy. The richer they are, the more likely it is they could find an economic use for this submarginal territory. Part of the increased use of these lands could be economic in the narrow sense, with profit as the goal. But, another motivation for homesteading these areas might be the pursuit of psychic income: settling these territories not to earn money from them, but rather to preclude their use by would be or future immigrants who were considered undesirable. For as long as there is an acre of such wastelands unclaimed and unhomesteaded, there is no way, under the libertarian legal code in any case, that newcomers can be precluded from settling on them.

VII. CONCLUSION

There is still a little bit of a problem in the above analysis; a disconnect, as it were. Let us attempt to address it. On the one hand, we are talking about an anarcho capitalist society, and asking what kind of immigration rules, if any, it would have. On the other hand, in an anarcho capitalist society, there can by definition be no such thing as overall immigration rules which apply to the entire society. Perhaps we should envision an ultra minimalist state, where the central authority has but *one* function: to wit, to determine *the* immigration rule. This is apropos, since the ultimate question we have set ourselves is, What immigration rule is *now* justified, given a far more than minarchist regime. The answer emanating from the analysis of this paper is an open door policy for immigrants. This applies to the fully free society. It also is relevant to our present mixed economy. The threat of barbarians settling in our midst is what the libertarian offers to such societies in an attempt to attain *laissez faire* capitalism.

The real debate between Hoppe and myself has little or nothing to do with the libertarian response to immigration in some ideal libertarian world. Rather, it concerns, solely, whether or not the government, this particular government that now rules over us, would be justified in restricting immigration. Hoppe says yes; I say that the only thing the extant state would be justified in doing is to disband. Hoppe buttresses his case on the basis of what would occur in an ideal libertarian world, where all property were privately owned. He infers that our present government should model itself after this ideal one; since it would be entirely licit for the private defense agencies under anarcho-capitalism to pick and choose immigrants according to the wishes of their clients, he maintains that since most people in a democracy such as the U.S. favor at least some restrictions on immigration, the government is justified in carrying out this policy.

In a very different context, Rothbard (1984, 4-5) rejected such a facile equation of the public and the private under the rubric of “substitutionism.”

States this author in a critique of anarcho-libertarian Eric Mack for his support of foreign wars:

How does he do it? One critical device for Mack is what we may call ‘substitutionism,’ assimilating man to the State, and implying that if, for example, it is all right for Joe Zilch to do something in a free society, or for a Private Protection Agency to do so, then it is *ipso facto* all right for the State to do so. Now, Mack would agree with mainstream anarchists that the State should be abolished and all functions privatized; but, *failing that* he sees little wrong with the State and with what it does. In other words, the first deep flaw in the Mackian world-view is that he doesn’t *hate* the State, he doesn’t resent it from the very depths of his being. Like all other anarchists he regards taxation as theft; but like other *Randians*, who agree that taxation is theft, he unaccountably does not pursue the logic one more step. For if the very being of an organization—the State—rests on organized theft, then this makes the State simply an organization of thieves, a criminal organization. Unlike other robbers and criminals, the State, far from being scorned and reviled as are most other marauders, is admired and even worshipped as ‘sovereign.’ The State is the only socially legitimate organization of criminals. And yet, like other *Randians*, Eric Mack evidently regards taxation as a mere technical error, unfortunate perhaps, but not enough to hold the organization itself up to condemnation. So that he is able to apply to the State the same standards as to any private individual and organization; he lacks the state-hatred vital to any libertarian and which certainly should be in the bones of any self-proclaimed anarchist.

... suppose that, if roads were totally privatized, we would conclude that ‘private road firms would be embarking immediately on a \$20 billion program of repairing and expanding the interstate highways.’ ... But this by *no means* implies that, as libertarian, we should now advocate that federal or state governments spend \$20 billion on roads. Even when the State is actually performing an important service that it has seized and monopolized, it does not follow in any sense that we are warranted in calling for more government spending. For we cannot do so without adding to the burden of tax-theft in the society. In short, even in the case of valid by monopolized functions, it is always impermissible for libertarians to support an increase in tax-theft. For the State is *not* a private firm. If people want more roads, they should be willing to support this activity privately and voluntarily, and

blocking *at least* any more State funding might even give them the idea of privatizing roads entirely. We cannot substitute the State for a private person or firm because it is inherently unsubsistutable. It is unsubsistutable because the nature of the State differs totally and radically, and not just marginally and technically, from all other social institutions. The State's very being rests on theft and invasion of private property, and this theft and aggression must be reduced and hacked away at every way we can. At the very least, libertarians must never justify its increase.

Eric Mack ... asserts that there is nothing *a priori* immoral about State A making an alliance with State B, since, after all, in an anarcho-capitalist world, various Defense Agencies A, B and C may well make alliances with each other, regardless of territory, in order to curb outlaw 'Defense Agency' X, now turned aggressor, or simply for more efficient operation of their police functions. But the whole point is that, unfortunately, we are *not* living in an anarcho-capitalist society, and therefore States are *not* like private Defense Agencies. It is vital, then, that the two institutions not be conflated.

If Defense Agencies A, B and C, for example, make an alliance, they do not thereby commit anyone else in any territorial areas; they only commit their own members. But States commit *everyone*, willy-nilly, in the geographical area which they have grabbed and over which they exert sovereignty.

Eric Mack has ... (a) defective, fallacious arrow ... in his anarcho-war mongering bow. (It is) ... the assimilation of man to the State, the substitutionism of treating this coercive, organized criminal gang as if it were a private individual or defense agency in the midst of a free world-wide anarchist society."

At the very least, the state, in adopting the advice of Hoppe, will need additional taxes to carry out this policy. My claim is that Hoppe, regarding immigration policy, makes much the same error as does Mack, as to foreign military adventurism: substitutionism.

To summarize. Hoppe (2002) is too quick to jettison libertarian principles in an attempt to ward off the immigration inundation threat. As we have shown in this paper, with a strict adherence to libertarian theory, we can have our cake and eat it too. That is, we can weather the menace without violating libertarian principles. There is simply no need to support the government in restricting immigration. Give a society of full freedom, with no government subsidies or favoritism, no public lands whatsoever, full free trade internationally at least as far as the U.S. is concerned, and draconian libertarian punishment for malefactors, we need not fear being overwhelmed

by massive numbers of immigrants under an “open door” policy. The Texas ranch case is not as frightening as first appears, nor is there any real great problem with submarginal lands.

Libertarianism need not be modified, as Hoppe would have it, to support present-day illegitimate states in their restrictive immigration policies. No, this philosophy, if thoroughly and consistently applied, can obviate the menace of overwhelming immigration. Hoppe’s mistake is that he did not pursue the logic of libertarianism far enough.

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